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The first wave of stateless nationalist mobilisation triggered decentralisation processes 
in several Western European states. Political autonomy provided European stateless 
nations with sub-state institutions with significant competences to manage their own 
affairs. Multinational federalism scholars have long debated whether political 
decentralisation to accommodate stateless nations appeases demands for secession or 
rather exacerbates them. Autonomous institutions created a new sub-state political 
system which political entrepreneurs, most significantly Stateless Nationalist and 
Regionalist Parties, are able to exploit to put forward demands for further 
empowerment of sub-state institutions. 
In the last decade territorial demands have been progressively raised by political 
parties in some Western European stateless nations, thus casting doubt on the 
effectiveness of political decentralisation as a valid mechanism to prevent secession. 
Scotland voted on independence on September 2014 whereas Catalan nationalist 
parties have been attempting to hold their own referendum since 2013.  
By looking specifically at the effects of political party competition at the sub-state 
level, this research aims at providing an explanation for the dynamics of territorial 
demands that have led to a high saliency of the territorial question in many Western 
European multinational states. An in-depth qualitative analysis of party competition in 
Catalonia aims to provide a successful explanation for the escalation of territorial 
demands in that country, also taking into account the role played by central institutions 
and the increasing support that secession shown amongst the population. The Catalan 
case is compared to Flanders and Scotland to test whether the dynamics of party 
competition can tell us a bit more about the ongoing territorial demands put forward 
by political parties in these three countries. 
The territorial accommodation of multinational states have tended to be analysed from 
an institutionalist perspective whereas multi-level party competition has kept a blind 
eye on constitutional change. This research aims at contributing to the growing 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Territorial politics have been salient in most Western democracies since the 1960s and 
1970s, with centre-periphery tensions being fuelled in some particular cases by the 
existence of a plurality of diverse national identities within the boundaries of the state. 
Peripheral nationalism and claims to self-determination have been at the heart of the 
political debate in a significant number of countries, with demands for autonomy and 
even independence being espoused by broad cultural nationalist movements and also 
by stateless nationalist parties, either of recent appearance or with a long history of 
existence (De Winter 1998a; Seiler 1994).  
Central governments reacted and adapted their territorial organisation to provide a 
better accommodation to those who were not entirely comfortable with the dominant 
nation-state paradigm. Several cases illustrate this pattern. Belgium reformed its 
constitution in 1970 to recognise the existence of French- and Dutch-speaking 
communities within its borders (McRae 1986). In Canada, the central Parliament 
symbolically recognised Quebec as a nation while devolution was discussed in the 
United Kingdom for the home nations (Keating 2001a). Such movements often 
followed the electoral breakthrough of stateless nationalist parties, such as the 
Volksunie (VU) in Flanders or the Scottish National Party (SNP) (De Winter, Gómez-
Reino Cachafeiro, and Lynch 2006). In other cases, dictatorships and cultural and 
political repression could not prevent the rise of stateless nationalism either, as the case 
of Francoist Spain showed with strong Catalan and Basque nationalist movements that 
decisively influenced the shape of the country’s transition to democracy (Llobera 
1997; Moreno 2001b). 
In the long run, political autonomy has been granted or extended to these stateless 
nations so they can manage some of their own affairs, with substantial powers in public 
policy and tools to protect and promote their distinctive culture, including 
competencies in areas such as education, the media, and the arts. With the notable 
exceptions of the Basque Country, Corsica, and Northern Ireland, these processes have 
been dealt with in the complete absence of violence and territorial claims have been 
pursued through the democratic political process. Tensions have not disappeared, 
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though, and claims and counterclaims with regard to the specific scope of regional 
self-government, the nature of state and nation, and the complex issue of national 
identity have been prominent in the political debate in many Western multinational 
states. Stateless nationalist parties have been in office and have had an impact on state-
wide politics as well, and some have used their strong position as sub-state government 
parties to demand a renegotiation of the constitutional status of their sub-state nation.  
This demand for a continuous renegotiation of the constitutional status of stateless 
nations is still a highly relevant topic today. Scotland voted on its independence from 
the United Kingdom in September 2014 in a referendum sponsored by the SNP. 
Belgium has suffered two serious governmental crisis in the last few years because of 
territorial issues and a lack of agreement between Flemish and Francophone parties. 
Support for independence has never been higher in Catalonia and a non-binding public 
consultation on the matter was conducted in November 2014. Territorial disputes at 
the heart of Europe are more salient than ever and multinational states face self-
determination demands while also sharing more and more sovereignty with the 
European Union. The concept and nature of the state is under debate and internal 
territorial politics is at the heart of this discussion. 
This Ph.D. Thesis aims to shed some light on the causes of these ongoing demands for 
a renegotiation of the constitutional status of stateless nations in European 
multinational states. The territorial debate in some of these countries has changed 
dramatically in the last decade. Political parties that are in favour of independence are 
in power today in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland. Demands for further 
decentralisation have evolved into demands to hold independence referendums in 
Scotland and Catalonia. While in the former case the Scottish people voted to remain 
in the UK, the rejection of the Spanish government to hold a similar referendum in 
Catalonia has not appeased the determination of Catalan stateless nationalist parties to 
seek secession. Political decentralisation has not put an end to demands for further 
constitutional change and the accommodation of stateless nations within multinational 
states is thus challenged in several contexts. 
It is the intention of this research to provide an explanation of the persistence of 
territorially-based demands by looking specifically at the role played by political 
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parties. Nowhere has this evolution in territorial demands been more acute than in 
Catalonia. As a Catalan, I have witnessed the transition experienced by a moderate 
nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU) from being content with the 
constitutional status quo to supporting independence and calling for a referendum on 
secession in a timespan of ten years.  
The process of reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (2003-2010) set the ground 
for the current events. After a proposal of reform was agreed in the Catalan Parliament 
in 2005, the Spanish Parliament passed a final draft in 2006 which was ratified by the 
Catalan people in a referendum held in June that year. The main political parties looked 
satisfied with the outcome of the reform and it seemed that the constitutional question 
in Catalonia would be settled for a few good years. However, a Constitutional Court 
ruling in 2010 declared part of the new Statute of Autonomy to be unconstitutional, 
which triggered discontent across Catalan nationalist parties and public opinion. 
Following the Court’s ruling, several parties in Catalonia have put forward further 
territorial demands, which have ultimately evolved to a majority of the Catalan 
Parliament to back a demand to hold a referendum on independence.  
As an undergraduate student in Politics, I was keen on following the political debates 
leading to the reform of the Statute and I became intellectually curious about the main 
topics around the reform and the long-lasting political intention of the accommodation 
of Catalonia within a multinational Spain. These topics included, among others, 
federalism, multinational states, constitutional law, nationalism and national identities. 
The process of reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was a very valuable case 
study in many of these areas: the new Statute was intended by the Catalan leading 
negotiators to better recognise the national character of Catalonia and its constitutional 
entrenchment in a decentralised and plurinational Spain.  
My intellectual curiosity brought me to Edinburgh in 2009 to study the subject of 
nationalism in detail, which led me to pursue an MSc in Nationalism Studies at the 
University of Edinburgh. The choice of moving to Scotland was not random by any 
means. Scotland and Catalonia have been often compared and regarded as two cases 
of old stateless nations within wider, multinational polities. My experience in 
Edinburgh allowed me to become more familiar with the Scottish and British realities, 
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although I always maintained a comparative perspective in mind regarding the events 
that were going on in Catalonia. 
When I arrived in 2009, a minority SNP government intended to call a referendum on 
independence but lacked the necessary support to do so in the Scottish Parliament. At 
around the same time, the Commission on Scottish Devolution was putting forward a 
report to recommend further devolution to Scotland through a revision of the 
devolution settlement in place since 1999. From looking at both cases comparatively, 
I realised that in both countries devolution, or autonomy, was under revision; that 
territorial issues constitute an important share of the political agenda; and that demands 
for constitutional change seemed by no means about to decline. Here lies the main 
motivation of this research, which is to understand why political parties in stateless 
nations that already enjoy a substantive degree of self-government keep asking for 
more. The way I will look at it focuses on the role played by political parties, with a 
specific emphasis on party competition to provide a plausible explanation for the 
dynamics of demand-response-demand that can be observed, with the hope that a 
thorough qualitative study of specific case-studies might tell us more about the 
dynamics of constitutional change and the role played by political parties to trigger it 
in multinational contexts. 
In light of how political events have turned out, specifically regarding the political 
tensions that have evolved in Catalonia and Spain around the territorial question, it is 
my aim to provide an explanation of the dynamics of territorial demands in Catalonia 
since the proposed reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy up to the demand 
backed by a majority of the Catalan Parliament to hold a referendum on Catalonia’s 
independence. However, similar processes of party-driven territorial demands are 
occurring in Scotland and Flanders, and it is the intention of this study to compare 





Structure of the Thesis 
The second chapter introduces the theoretical framework of this thesis. The origins 
and rise of stateless nationalism are explained alongside the role played by nationalist 
parties in championing territorial demands. Then, the main strategies implemented by 
state institutions to contain and accommodate territorial demands from stateless 
nations are discussed. Finally, the chapter introduces the importance of party 
competition as a possible explanation for political parties’ persistence of territorial 
demands in stateless nations. 
Chapter 3 sets out the research question of this Ph.D. Thesis and establishes and 
examines the dependent variable: territorial demands. Then, three variables are 
considered as explanatory factors of the dynamics that lead political parties in 
multinational contexts to keep demanding further territorial claims: party competition, 
the strategies of accommodation implemented by the state, and the effect of public 
opinion on political parties’ territorial demands. A qualitative in-depth study of the 
Catalan case is presented in order to analyse the relationships between the variables 
that drive territorial demands, while the cases of Flanders and Scotland are added to 
broaden the analysis and better test our hypotheses. 
The empirical analysis of Catalonia is contained in the three following chapters. 
Chapter 4 introduces the Catalan political parties, their electoral performances, and 
their constitutional traditions. Then, the chapter charts the evolution of Catalan 
demands for self-government since Spain’s democratic transition to democracy.  
Chapter 5 analyses the effects of party competition on the dynamics of territorial 
demands in Catalonia. Two types of competition are considered. First, between 
stateless nationalist parties and state-wide parties, and second between different 
stateless nationalist parties. The analysis then turns to the effect that incumbency has 
on party competition by pointing out the strategies carried out by parties to compete 
on the territorial question depending on whether they are in government or in 
opposition. 
Chapter 6 looks at the other two variables, namely state accommodation strategies and 
the effect of public opinion on political parties’ territorial demands. The first section 
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of this chapter assesses the effect that Spain’s symmetric logic of decentralisation has 
had on framing Catalan political parties’ views on the constitutional status of 
Catalonia. The process of reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy will drive most 
of the analysis, while the impact of the reform has also had a great influence on the 
state’s strategies to deal with the successive territorial demands from Catalan political 
parties. The second part of Chapter 6 will analyse the impact that the constitutional 
preferences of the public have on influencing political parties’ territorial demands.  
Chapter 7 will introduce a comparative element to the analysis. The three variables 
will be examined in relation to the effects that they have on the territorial demands put 
forward by political parties in Flanders and Scotland. Comparisons will be drawn 
between these two cases as well as the evidence gathered from the Catalan case.  
This Ph.D. Thesis comes to a close with Chapter 8, which will wrap up the main 
argument that the dynamics of territorial demands raised by political parties in 






Chapter 2. Political Parties and the Dynamics of 
Constitutional Change 
 
Territory and identity are widely contested issues in several European countries where 
some citizens claim to have dual and complex national identities and others reject to 
share the same national identity of their fellow citizens. Identity is the backbone of 
several stateless nationalist movements across Europe that have long demanded 
political recognition and self-government to manage their own affairs. Such demands 
led to an eventual decentralisation of power in several European states with the 
creation of devolved, regionalised, and federal states, where power is territorially 
divided between a central state government and sub-state institutions that represent the 
territories comprising those who claim to have a sub-state national identity. Although 
this process of decentralisation started a few decades ago, it has not halted by any 
means. The nature of the territorial organisation of power has been questioned by 
actors both at the centre and the periphery and claims for a re-negotiation of such 
territorial settlements have been put forward by a variety of different political actors.  
The raising power of stateless nationalist movements led to the creation of political 
parties that espoused the interests of the stateless nation as their primary concern, and 
the participation of such parties in the political process led to institutionalised demands 
for political decentralisation. Once states transferred powers to the regions, such 
political parties aimed to become the leading political actors in their home territories 
by aiming to achieve office at the sub-state level and contributing to generate a specific 
sub-state politics and party system. Other parties, those that are present throughout the 
state, or State-wide Parties (SWPs), do also take an active part in sub-state politics and 
have also had access to regional government capacities. Thus, competition between 
parties in such contexts involves territory as well as socio-economic issues, and the 
constitutional status of the stateless nation is often a highly debated topic amongst 
political parties, the media, and the public.  
These debates are quite relevant in cases such as Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland. 
Political parties campaign on extending these territories’ governmental authority, from 
moderate transfers of competencies, to more economic and fiscal resources, and even 
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for the outright independence of these nations from their respective states. Other 
parties, however, are quite content with the territorial status quo and engage in the 
political debate to discredit the constitutional ambitions of their opponents and put the 
case for the benefits of the institutional status quo. Thus, political party competition in 
such contexts invariably involves discussions on territory, which political parties keep 
very much alive. Such territorial disputes are not only about autonomy or regional 
powers, but also resolve about nationalism and national identity, with often opposing 
claims to different peoples, that of the stateless nation vis-à-vis the entire population 
of the state, as the legitimising body for one constitutional option or another. 
These territorial conflicts have been widely studied in the literature, ranging from 
explanations to the reasons for peripheral nationalist mobilisation (Coakley 1992; 
Rokkan and Urwin 1983; Rudolph and Thompson 1985) to the ways in which central 
governments responded to such peripheral unrest, which include, amongst other 
strategies, political decentralisation granting such communities some policy-making 
powers (Keating 1988). These accounts focused on the centre and peripheries as actors 
and primarily analysed the institutional settlements to accommodate national diversity 
in plural states. These studies have been followed by a rich theoretical and empirical 
literature on the benefits of federalism and decentralisation to give an adequate 
response to stateless nationalist aspirations (Amoretti 2004; Gagnon 2003; Linz 1997; 
McGarry and O’Leary 2007; Requejo 2004). This kind of literature, however, has not 
paid much attention to political parties and the role that party politics has played in 
putting such institutional strategies to manage multinational polities under stress.  
On the other hand, there is a broad body of literature that discusses the characteristics 
and growth of stateless nationalist parties and their territorial objectives (De Winter 
1998a; Newman 1994; Seiler 1982), but this literature is somehow disconnected from 
party politics and does not account for the role that competition between nationalist 
and other parties play in challenging the territorial status quo. Similarly, there is a 
rising body of literature that analyses the organisational and strategic challenges of 
SWPs in order to effectively compete in decentralised and multilevel contexts (Fabre 
2008; Libbrecht, Maddens, and Swenden 2013; Swenden and Maddens 2009). This 
literature however does not consider what effects party competition has on 
constitutional change (for a notable exception, see Alonso 2012).  
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Political parties do indeed play a crucial role on territorial politics by raising demands 
and concerns over the constitutional status of both the state and the stateless nation; 
they are in charge of governments both at the centre and at the sub-state level and can 
therefore claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people, which demand, or 
oppose, constitutional change. Institutionalist accounts have pointed out the 
paradoxical effect of political decentralisation and federalism in order to manage 
multinational polities: while political decentralisation was thought of and undertaken 
by states to appease demands for secession, regional self-government may ‘provide 
incentives to mobilize in favour of separation, and, most alarmingly, provide 
institutions that can be used to overcome the collective action problem to accomplish 
secession’ (L. M. Anderson 2010: 131). To put it simply, by providing sub-state 
institutions, the state was also providing a structure of political opportunity to 
nationalist movements to promote and legitimise claims for secession.  
In Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, long-established decentralised systems 
have been in place in order to accommodate their most identity-assertive regions, and 
yet a secessionist party is in power in Scotland –which led to a referendum on 
independence to take place in September 2014; another Flemish secessionist party has 
been the first party in Belgium since 2010 and leads the Flemish government since the 
May 2014 elections; and CiU, the traditional autonomist nationalist party in Catalonia, 
back in power since 2010, turned separatist in 2012. Although none of these three 
nations has become an independent state as yet, the territorial debate is highly vivid in 
each one. Hence, the question of ‘whether federalism provides a stable, long-lasting 
solution to the management of conflict in divided societies or is, instead, a temporary 
stop on a continuum leading to secession and independence’ (Erk and Anderson 2009: 
192) is a very relevant one, and one of a very difficult answer. However, little attention 
has been placed on the specific role of party competition in explaining the challenges 
that decentralised polities experience through demands for substantial constitutional 
change or independence. Institutionalist accounts are indeed important, but if 
institutions were the most important factor, why then we do not see the same 
secessionist pressures in other contexts, such as the Basque Country, Galicia, Wales, 
Wallonia, or Northern Italy? The study of political party competition will provide a 
more comprehensive explanation of the dynamics of constitutional change to 
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complement the substantial effect that sub-state institutions have produced in making 
it easier for political parties and broader nationalist movements to promote territorial 
demands. 
This chapter will first discuss the key concepts and ideas relevant to this thesis. Second, 
it will discuss sub-state nationalism by providing the explanations behind this 
phenomenon, the type of demands posed by nationalist movements, and the role that 
political parties play as vehicles to put forward these demands. Third, the way states 
responded to territorial demands is discussed with a specific focus on the role that 
political parties play as agents for delivering constitutional change. Finally, the fourth 
section introduces party competition as the main driver of territorial demands in 
multinational states and suggests that the struggle of parties for power in contexts 
where territory and self-government is a highly salient topic increases the likelihood 
of successive demands for constitutional change to be put forward by parties and sub-
state governments. 
 
1. Nations, Nationalism, and Multinational States 
 
Nations are social groups with similar cultural characteristics and whose members 
have a common sense of membership to the group. This sense of membership is shared 
across members of the social group without each member personally knowing all the 
other members. Nations were thus famously described as ‘imagined communities’ (B. 
R. Anderson 1983), as a result of a historic process in which certain political 
institutions put together the necessary tools to create amongst the population this sense 
of constituting a social and political community. The education system, the army, the 
press, or maps are just a few examples of nation-building techniques inspired by 
nationalism, which is ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and 
the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1). The modern state, as the 
paradigmatic political structure of our time, engaged in processes of nation-building 
so the population under its control assimilated a sense of common membership based 
on the cultural and symbolic treats of the majority population.  
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However, such processes were not completely successful and it has been noted that 
only a minority of states are proper nation-states, that is, with a rather homogenous 
population that almost exclusively identifies with the state national identity (Connor 
1994). Among the rest, it is of relevance to discuss multinational states as those 
composed of a plurality of such ‘imagined communities,’ normally including a 
national majority or ‘staatsvolk’ (O’Leary 2001: 291), such as the English in the UK, 
the English-speakers in Canada, or the Castilian Spanish in Spain. Other groups 
however are present and identify themselves with a distinct territorially-based 
‘community,’ although often a certain degree of dual identity exists –i.e. people 
identifying as ‘both’ members of the national majority and the smaller community. As 
the name suggests, then, multinational states contain a plurality of nations within its 
territory, although this ‘means not only that there are a number of different nations 
within a polity; it also indicates […] that these nations have their own ways of 
interpreting history, valuing their languages, customs and traditions, or understanding 
what is or should be their political, economic, and cultural role in the present and 
future’ (Requejo 2003: 25). These views from the alternative nations to that of the 
majority might be conflictive to the state-dominant view, which may result in 
territorial and identity disputes. According to Erk (2011: 524), for example, ‘not every 
constituent nation sees the union in identical terms. For English-speakers, Canada is a 
federation of ten provinces; for French-speakers it is a union of two nations. Catalans 
view themselves as a nation within the Spanish federal system of Autonomous 
Communities; for Castilian-speaking Spaniards theirs is a single nation with a regional 
linguistic diversity.’  
The particular views from alternative nations are grounded on a distinctive identity 
which relies upon two criteria, one objective and one subjective. There may be some 
objective elements of distinctiveness, such as ‘historical, linguistic and cultural 
characteristics, which singularize a collective situated in a more or less defined 
territory, and which distinguish it from others in the surrounding area’ (Requejo 2010a: 
277). The subjective element determines the national character of the sub-state 
community, that is, whether it sees itself as an ‘imagined community.’ In this sense, 
the group must be ‘self-conscious’ of its national character (Lecours 2000: 105), which 
is essential in order to account for potential identity and territorial conflicts between 
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the majority and minorities. The self-consciousness of the group as a nation will have 
an impact on territorial politics and potential demands, because ‘what matters is how 
a group sees itself, not how others define it’ (Rudolph 2006: 2). In this sense, this self-
definition of the group as a nation normally carries along a ‘desire for a different status 
and self-government, which these collectives have historically expressed, and continue 
to express in the present’ (Requejo 2010a: 277). The will for self-government is 
strongly linked to nationalism as an ideology as noted above. Self-government implies 
a certain political unit which is quickly linked to the sub-state national group. As a 
result, both objective and subjective elements set the path to implement rival or 
complementary forms of nation-building to those carried out by the state-dominated 
majority. Nation-building and self-government, therefore, imply the aim to achieve 
some degree of sovereignty on behalf of the sub-state national community, and this is 
why this kind of ‘regional communities desiring sovereignty are indeed commonly 
referred to (by themselves as well as others) as stateless nations’ (Fitjar 2010: 4). 
Stateless nations, or nations without states, are nations with objective distinct 
characteristics and a self-conscious character that justifies a desire for self-
government, and are said to be stateless because these nations are included within the 
boundaries of other, larger states with a distinct national identity (Guibernau 1999: 
33). The presence of objective distinctive elements, such as language, institutions, or 
traditions, has often led to claims that non-state nationalisms were essentially of an 
ethnic nature, and ‘organizations and activists that claimed for a regionally based 
group an identity distinct from that of the ‘national’ population, and aspired to some 
form of territorial change and political autonomy, were for long more likely to be 
condemned as misguided criminal terrorists or ridiculed as quaint and irritating 
anachronisms’ (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 1). The critics of stateless nationalism, often 
members of majority communities in multinational states, espoused a dichotomy 
between good and bad nationalisms, in which the supposed ethnic nationalism 
emphasising the distinctiveness of the minorities was ‘backward-looking’ while civic 
nationalism or constitutional patriotism was ‘forward-looking’ (D. Brown 1999: 283). 
However, most nationalisms have elements of both civic and ethnic character, 
including state-nationalism. Language, for instance, is often depicted as an ethnic and 
exclusionary element of Catalan and Flemish nationalism, but it is also a mechanism 
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for integration and cohesion in a civic community; most stateless nationalisms include 
ethnic elements such as language or religion but also civic elements rooted in the 
community, such as traditions, values, and institutions (Keating 2001a: 11, 22). 
Nationalist claims for self-government are grounded on distinctive elements and the 
right that stateless nations espouse to rule themselves is not intrinsically different from 
the sovereignty principle claimed by state-dominated national majorities to defend 
national independence. 
The demand for self-government has traditionally been answered by some sort of 
decentralisation, which implies ‘the removal of core resources from the [centre] to 
lower levels of a multi-layered system, whether these resources are fiscal, 
jurisdictional, or administrative’ (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012: 568). 
Decentralisation, in several forms, provides stateless nations with some sort of 
autonomy on the basis of the self-determination principle, which entitles national 
groups to rule themselves within the existing state (Lijphart 1995: 275). Autonomy is 
the response to ‘the right of communities –defined by territory, language, culture or 
religion– to govern themselves, so that their distinctive features are protected and 
promoted’ (Loughlin 2000: 10). The most extensive way to accommodate its internal 
national plurality, albeit reluctantly in most cases, has been to implement political 
decentralisation consisting of a ‘set of constitutional amendments […] designed to 
open new –or activate existing but dormant or ineffective– spaces for the 
representation of subnational polities. Political decentralization policies are designed 
to devolve political authority or electoral capacities to subnational actors’ (Falleti 
2005: 329). Political decentralisation therefore implies the creation of new sub-state 
representative institutions for the stateless level, which allows for the more direct 
political participation of the sub-state community through the election of parliaments 
and governments with several policy competences that may better suit the specific 
characteristics of the community.  
Finally, the establishment of new sub-state institutions allows for party politics to be 
highly specific in the sub-state context and may lead to a regional party system which 
is quite different from the political party spectrum of the state as a whole. This is in 
part due to the presence in stateless nations of parties that are solely created and 
designed to represent the interests of the specific sub-state national community, and 
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whose main aim is to defend and demand regional autonomy (De Winter 1998a: 204; 
Fabre and Martínez-Herrera 2009: 234). These are Stateless Nationalist and 
Regionalist Parties (SNRPs), defined as ‘political parties whose core business is sub-
state territorial empowerment, whereby empowerment involves seeking to represent 
and advance the particular interests of the stateless territory and where territorial 
interests may be economic, political, social, cultural or symbolic in nature’ (Hepburn 
2009: 482). These parties are therefore clearly nationalist since they fully internalise 
and commit to the self-conscious element that the stateless territory is indeed a nation, 
comprised within the boundaries of a larger multi-national state. They are also 
committed to the nation’s self-government and their territorial aims respond to this 
principle: they demand either some sort of self-government when the stateless nation 
lacks it and they present themselves as the nation’s self-government guarantors when 
this is achieved, both by rejecting centralism and by promoting further autonomy.  
However, SNRPs are not the sole political parties in stateless nations. State-wide 
parties operate across the territory of the state and therefore are also present in stateless 
nations. The nature of party competition in these territories will be substantially 
different from those of the party competition at the centre and of other regions without 
any significant distinctive national identity. In stateless nations, though, the presence 
of SNRPs produces a considerable effect on the nature of party competition, with 
territory becoming as much a salient cleavage as socio-economic issues. The nature of 
party competition involving the different parties’ conflicting views on the 
constitutional status and national character of the stateless nation sets the ground for 
territorial demands to be one of the main topics of political dispute. The interactions 
between parties at the sub-state level and also from a multi-level perspective may 
provide an explanation for the dynamics of constitutional change present in several 




2. Stateless Nationalism and Territorial Demands: Political 
Parties as Vehicles of Constitutional Change 
 
2.1. The Rise of Stateless Nationalism 
The modern organisation of the world around the state as the main political entity 
presupposed a homogeneous character of the state as a social and political unit. 
According to Keating (1999: 72), the ‘rise of the modern state represented a 
concentration of authority within territorially defined units and the assertion of a 
unitary principle of sovereignty.’ The unitary conception of sovereignty was 
reinforced by nationalism through the definition of the people or the nation as each 
state’s sovereign body, which led to the common assumption that states and nations 
were congruent entities and states were often referred to as ‘nation-states’ (Connor 
1994; Llobera 1997). However, this homogeneous and unitary conception of the state 
as a single national entity was a mere ideal concept, while in truth, ‘even in the heyday 
of the west European nation-state in the twentieth century, territorial integration was 
never complete’ (Keating 1999: 74). The shortcomings of several European states to 
achieve a complete integration led to a plurality of national groups coexisting within 
the state territory. Multinational states, thus, contained several groups competing to 
assert their claims on territory, culture, and identity which set the scene for potential 
conflict, given that the state’s territorial boundaries were clearly defined, indeed, but 
the boundaries between social groups were not as clear (Coakley 2003b: 2). 
The minority groups ‘frequently possess a distinct set of historical and cultural 
customs, language, and religion, and the issues generated by the territorial cleavage 
typically involve the efforts of the ethnoterritorial community to preserve its cultural 
distinctiveness, to obtain a fair share of the broader society’s resources, and/or to 
achieve a greater control over its own political life’ (Rudolph 2006: 6). Therefore, 
preserving the distinctive traits of minority groups is articulated politically on the 
grounds that the group itself possesses distinctive characteristics that account for a 
different identity from that of the rest of the state. Keating writes that ‘where groups 
of people sharing cultural, linguistic or religious traits or common economic interests 
are concentrated in particular territories, a sense of collective identity might develop’ 
(1988: 16). Territory is accordingly a crucial factor in consolidating the groups’ sense 
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of identity, based on the concentrated nature of the group within a delimited 
geographical area of the state.  
Common identity and territorial concentration lead these social groups to claim self-
determination based on their subjective character as a nation, which accordingly allows 
them to decide or determine their future as a collectivity (Keating 2001b: 3). Thus, 
these groups style themselves as minority or stateless nations and through their 
respective national movements try to enforce the principle of self-determination for 
their communities. National movements, it has been argued, try to ‘reshape state 
structures’ (Coakley 1992: 1) in order to provide a better representation of the group’s 
interests, which involves some sort of self-government so the sub-state national 
community can manage its own affairs. As Hooghe (1992: 21) puts it, the ‘nationalist 
movement claims that the organization of the political realm should express ethnic 
distinctiveness,’ which implies that ‘political decisions affecting the […] group –at 
least in some policy areas– ought to be made by members of that group itself.’  
There is a wide assortment of cases of such stateless nations that put forward claims 
to self-government, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, Scotland and 
Wales in the UK, Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium, or Quebec in Canada (Erk 
2005b). There is also ample evidence that demands from stateless nationalist 
movements became particularly salient for the first time in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Forsyth 1989; Keating 1988; Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003; Llobera 
1997; Thompson and Rudolph 1989). This wave of territorial demands was seen as 
part of a broader phenomenon labelled as the ‘Rise of Regional Europe’ (Harvie 1994); 
a phenomenon that hit Europe as a whole, from Norway and other cases where sub-
state identities did not take the shape of nationalist movements, to the more ‘explicitly 
and visibly voiced ethno-national movements in Belgium, Spain or the UK’ (Rokkan 
and Urwin 1982: 2). Nationalist movements took at that time different shapes, in terms 
of mobilisation strategies, from lobbying and civil disobedience to using party politics 
as a vehicle, either through the regional branches of SWPs or by launching specific 
SNRPs to demand concessions from central governments (Rudolph and Thompson 
1989: 223). Sub-state nationalist movements were normally led by middle-class 
intelligentsia (L. Hooghe 1992: 30) and of particular relevance was their engagement 
in party politics. ‘In several countries the leadership of these ethnic movements 
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coalesced around political parties whose primary raison d’être was the improvement 
of the cultural, social, economic, and political conditions of their potential ethnic 
constituency’ (Newman 1994: 28). The necessity to articulate territorial demands 
which were quintessentially political forcefully required the canalisation of such 
demands through the state’s institutions and therefore political parties were crucial 
actors in spearheading stateless nationalist movements. 
 
2.2. Goals and Strategies of Stateless Nationalist Movements 
The main objective of nationalist movements was to acquire control over their own 
political, social, and economic affairs (Brancati 2006: 652), in order to prevent the 
group’s interests from being affected by the external influence of other groups, notably 
those of the majority group in a given state. This logic responds to the idea that a 
particular group, or nation, is the best suited to define its own interests and priorities. 
In essence, this corresponds to the principle of self-determination mentioned above. 
Self-determination is therefore claimed by national movements, and specifically by 
SNRPs, which aim ‘at making an ethno-national community responsible for itself’ 
(Seiler 1994: 20). The main idea is that political autonomy is necessary to accomplish 
the aforementioned objective of giving stateless nations the possibility to manage their 
own affairs. According to Fitjar (2010: 5), the group’s ‘interests could be more 
effectively advanced if the region were allowed more autonomy on internal matters’ 
and thus stateless nationalists ‘want to strengthen the regional layer of government by 
increasing the political and/or economic autonomy of the region within the national 
constitutional framework.’ Self-determination was claimed by stateless nationalist 
movements to better satisfy the national interests through some sort of political 
autonomy. However, there was a wide variation on the specific type of territorial 
demands put forward by nationalist movements, while taking into account that a 
demand for self-determination need not necessarily imply a demand for secession 
(Keating 2001b: 28). The principle of self-determination espoused by nationalist 
movements argued for managing the nation’s own affairs, a principle that SNRPs 
defended in Western liberal democracies, which was ‘precisely the same kind of 
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democratic and liberal legitimation as the larger nations within which [the stateless 
nations] are presently contained’ (Keating 2001c: 45). 
The literature contains a wide variety of typologies of territorial demands. There are 
two main kind of typologies. On the one hand, there are typologies that focus on the 
constitutional desired outcome and tend to be of a progressive nature. That is, 
typologies tend to present categories of demands that range from modest demands that 
require little constitutional change to more assertive demands for deep constitutional 
reform or even secession. On the other hand, other typologies are of a functional 
nature, classifying demands depending on the domain affected by the stateless 
nationalists’ claims. These may focus on authority issues, which include the transfer 
of competences to the sub-state level of government; economic and fiscal issues, or 
symbolic matters. 
Rudolph and Thompson succinctly describe four main categories of territorial 
demands posed by nationalist movements, with a clear progressiveness that ranges 
from minor concessions to full independence for the stateless nation’s territory. 
According to them, the typology is constructed from the empirical observations of 
several nationalist movements during the rise of peripheral nationalism occurred in the 
1960s and 1970s, arguing that  
‘there are those movements which are less concerned with achieving regional 
self-rule than with expanding their respective region’s share of government 
outputs […]. Other movements are primarily concerned with affecting who 
makes decisions, that is, with the nature of existing political authority […]. 
Closely related, a third type of movement focuses on changing the nature of 
the regime, the political-constitutional principles and structures regulating 
the manner in which decisions are made. Typically, nationalist organizations 
of this variety will opt for a federal-like system in which their region has 
autonomous control over those economic and cultural decisions affecting it 
[…]. Finally, organizations may sincerely challenge the legitimacy of the 
boundaries of the multinational political community in which they find 
themselves and champion independence’ (Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 
293-4).  
Put simply, Rudolph and Thompson’s categorisation consists of four types of 
demands. First, ‘policy concessions’ aimed at granting minorities with specific 
arrangements, in particular policy domains, which may include the use of a minority 
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language or economic concessions. Second, authority arrangements would imply some 
degree of administrative devolution to grant some powers to the local elites or also the 
incorporation of the minorities’ elites in the central decision-making process. Third is 
what they called ‘regime focus’ demands or ‘federalisation,’ which leads to formal 
constitutional change and the creation of sub-state institutions by virtue of the 
decentralisation of certain powers and competences. Finally, the fourth type of demand 
would be independence for the stateless nation (Rudolph and Thompson 1989: 224-5). 
Similarly, and with a more specific focus on SNRPs, Müller-Rommel depicted a four-
point category that fits rather well with the one established by Rudolph and Thompson. 
Parties could be classified according to the level of ‘nationalism’ of their demands in 
a progressive scale. Thus, ‘protectionist’ parties would seek to guarantee and maintain 
the group’s distinctive character. Second, ‘autonomists’ would demand more powers 
to do so. Third, ‘left-libertarian federalists’ would demand deep constitutional change 
and a considerable decentralisation of powers to the sub-state governments. Finally, 
‘separatist’ parties demand independence (Müller-Rommel 1994: 186-7).  
These two typologies fit well with each other and were useful to distinguish the scope 
of constitutional change and the type of party pursuing it. Another typology that 
simplified demands was depicted by Sorens (2008: 328), consisting of three categories: 
‘independentists, who explicitly [favour] full political independence as their near-term 
aim; radical-autonomists, who [favour] a right to independence, independence as a 
long-term aim, or far-reaching autonomy amounting to de facto independence; and 
regionalists, who reject independence explicitly but [favour] some kind of special 
regional rights, whether some kind of regional autonomy within the state, guaranteed 
regional representation in the central government, greater resources and development 
for the region, or protection of unique rights for regional citizens.’ These typologies, 
with their small differences, all emphasise the progressive character of territorial 
demands, with a clear progression in three steps with regards to constitutional change: 
first, demands that did not imply constitutional change; second, demands that pushed 
for decentralisation and the transfer of legislative authority to newly-created 




This type of categorisation proved useful to analyse the rise of peripheral demands in 
the 1960s and 1970s, when multinational Western European states were unitary. 
Several political parties in different cases espoused territorial demands that ranged 
along the progressive spectrum described above, although the constitutional evolution 
of many states, and certainly of the three states studied in this work, Belgium, Spain, 
and the UK, suggests that the bulk of the demands –or at least the successful ones, 
given the concessions by central governments– would consist of demands for 
decentralisation of legislative authority. In subsequent waves of territorial demands, 
though, these typologies have become rather obsolete. Indeed, the demand for 
independence is still present, remarkably in contexts were identity plays a substantial 
role in the territorial debate (Bunce 2004: 422), and it makes sense to maintain a 
category of independence as a territorial demand. However, there is the question of 
how to treat other demands short of independence, which are also existent in the 
contexts under study. Still, a conceptual definition between independence and 
demands for further devolution should be maintained, since independence ‘involves 
the full separation of the region from the rest of the country, and its establishment as 
an independent sovereign state with full powers over its internal and external affairs,’ 
which therefore ‘is a much clearer option than devolution, which may cover a variety 
of different institutional forms with varying degrees of dependence’ (Hepburn 2010: 
44-5). Current demands for further devolution however cannot be equated to demands 
for federalisation as described in the typologies mentioned above, since legislative 
authority was transferred long ago. 
To this aim, other typologies have a functional approach which may be better suited 
to analyse the existing territorial demands in stateless nations. Benz and Colino (2011: 
390) establish four domains of constitutional change, including 1) ‘authority or 
competencies;’ 2) ‘fiscal relations and fiscal autonomy: Rules that allocate fiscal 
resources between levels, producing redistribution and solidarity or maintaining the 
differences or existing imbalances;’ 3) ‘representation and participation in central 
decisions;’ and 4) ‘symbolic or community recognition: Rules that recognize certain 
principles or values or distinguish symbolically certain constituent units.’ A functional 
typology corresponds to the self-determination principle claimed by stateless nations 
for autonomy to manage their own affairs, since ‘demands […] can take cultural, 
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economic, or political forms’ while achieving one unique goal, to ‘legitimate 
difference and to expand autonomy’ (Bunce 2004: 421).  
 
2.3. Explanations of Stateless Nationalism 
There are several explanatory elements to account for the rise of stateless nationalism. 
This phenomenon is deeply grounded on the idea of distinctiveness. A self-conscious 
minority, concentrated in a specific territory of the state may have objective 
differences vis-à-vis the majority regarding economic, social, and cultural features, but 
the relevant point is the self-perception that these differences are real and should be 
treated accordingly (Amoretti 2004: 2). Cultural differences are often portrayed as the 
main relevant marker to set communities aside, specifically the use of a different 
language (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 68). Language is thought to be essential to give 
cohesion to the political community, ‘the linguistic community comes to perform the 
role of the default demos’ (Erk 2008: 7).  
However, language may not be enough to delimitate the boundaries of a political 
community, as the case of Scotland clearly shows. In this sense, culture, and therefore 
cultural differences, should be interpreted in a far broader sense than just linguistic 
differences (Seiler 1982: 17), including for instance distinct value-preferences, which 
have justified demands for autonomy in the past (Keating and McEwen 2005: 415). 
All these elements of cultural distinctiveness are also influenced and reinforced by 
history, since the ‘national character reflects a community’s historical experience over 
a long period: habitation of a common territory tends to produce shared historical 
experience and other components of a common culture, which are reinforced by a 
common language, which in turn […] shapes the national character’ (Coakley 1992: 
5). The existence of a separate institutional past also contributes to shaping this 
national character because of the influences that institutions have on society (Rokkan 
and Urwin 1983: 68).  
The existence of cultural differences and a separate national self-consciousness have 
also brought attempts to counter the state’s cultural homogenising tendencies. The 
modern state and its ‘rulers generally worked to increase the cultural significance of 
borders by trying, with different degrees of success, to impose common languages, 
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religions, and identities on their subjects,’ a process which ‘aimed at transforming the 
state into a nation-state’ (Amoretti 2004: 4). This historical process of state nation-
building has continued until today in Western liberal democracies. In this regard, 
‘statist liberalisms have promoted a series of collective particularist values and 
identities of a natural nature, to the detriment of the national values and identities of 
other minority collectives. In the name of an alleged universalism based on the 
individual, the collective values of minority groups are sacrificed in favour of the 
values, also collective, of majority groups. In reality, all democracies have defended 
state nationalism’ (Requejo 1999: 264). The aim of the state is therefore to ‘reconstruct 
national identity so as to portray it as an overarching identity which can accommodate 
and thereby control the claims of ethnic segments’ (D. Brown 1997: 263), which 
implies that when the state is not entirely successful in doing so, the potential for 
identity and territorial conflict exists. Homogenising policies and their implications for 
minorities in terms of culture and identity can therefore create a ‘sense of grievance’ 
(Horowitz 1981: 168), real or not, which can and is used by the minorities to justify 
territorial demands, including independence (Erk and Anderson 2009: 196). 
Rokkan and Urwin, however, perceived that cultural differences on their own could 
not justify regionalism and, ‘seeking to place ethnic variations in a general framework 
of geopolitical location, economic strength, and access to decision-making’ (1982: 2), 
developed what has been labelled as a centre-periphery theory. This approach analyses 
the ‘tension between centre and periphery in terms of an imbalance due to a differential 
location of economic, cultural and political power’ (L. Hooghe 1992: 25). Considered 
as a ‘useful analytical tool’ (Keating 1988: 8), the centre-periphery model analyses the 
interactions between each of the three levels, the military-administrative or political, 
the economic, and the cultural in order to explain the causes of peripheral nationalist 
mobilisation on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific geopolitical, economic 
and cultural contexts (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 16). 
The triad of political, economic, and cultural factors serves as the basis of analysis to 
understand the reasons why stateless nationalist movements gained importance and 
strength in the 1960s and 1970s. A great deal of attention has been focused on 
providing economic explanations. Territorial tensions arise when political and 
economic leadership within the state are not congruent (Gourevitch 1979: 306), 
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although this scenario was considered as a ‘rarity’ since it was assumed that 
centralisation implied both political and economic leadership concentrated in the 
state’s centre (Seiler 1982: 19). Territorial tensions where the centre was strong both 
politically and economically were said to be defined by peripheries having more 
secessionist tendencies, feeling mistreated by an economically developed centre 
(Horowitz 1981: 174), or even ‘exploited’ by the centre in what was labelled as 
‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter 1975). However, this theory was discredited since that 
was not necessarily the case, with economically rich peripheries putting forward 
demands for constitutional change and independence (Keating 1988: 11-2). Economic 
disparities are indeed important, with rich regions wanting to contribute less and 
poorer regions aiming at protectionist policies and more central government 
expenditure (Hepburn 2009: 484), and stateless nationalist mobilisation, measured in 
terms of the electoral support for SNRPs, tends to be larger in comparatively rich 
regions (De Winter 1998a: 217). The importance of the economy, that is, stateless 
nations having a stronger economy than the state’s average, was hinted at by a large-
N study carried out by Fitjar. He offered that ‘a highly distinctive regional party system 
and a high level of economic development are the two factors most likely to lead to 
regionalism, along with cultural and geographical variables such as having a regional 
language or not bordering the national capital’ (Fitjar 2010: 12).  
The economy is thus important but alongside other factors. Cultural distinctiveness 
seems to be a necessary precondition to stateless nationalist mobilisation, whereas 
economic conditions are of secondary importance. Culture, then, is of crucial 
importance to explain nationalist mobilisation, while ‘no territorial identity on the 
continent can be defined solely in terms of a distinctive economy’ (Rokkan and Urwin 
1983: 66). The importance of culture seems to go in line with Fitjar’s study that 
alongside the relative economic development, a different party system was the main 
explanatory variable of regionalist mobilisation. Different regional party systems are 
caused by the presence of SNRPs, which based its existence on the self-determination 
principle of the stateless nations and emerged precisely on cultural grounds to defend 
the perceived distinct interests of their home communities, following incongruences 
between the political and economic territorial leaderships in the state (Müller-Rommel 
1998: 21).  
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The rise of stateless nationalism was therefore the product of incongruences between 
political, economic, and cultural leaderships and centres of power within Western 
states. The economy and the existence of regional economic grievances against the 
centre was important but required of ‘ethnic preconditions’ (Máiz 2003: 196), which 
regional elites were able to exploit and led to mobilisation. Political parties, especially 
SNRPs, were the spearheads of nationalist movements and put forward demands for 
constitutional change. Although centre-periphery theories were accurate in explaining 
the outburst of regional mobilisation, they were not that helpful in predicting ‘the 
electoral strength of these parties in contemporary European systems’ (Müller-
Rommel 1994: 189).  
 
2.4. The Articulation of Demands through Political Parties 
Stateless nationalist parties’ primarily aim was ‘their demand for political 
reorganisation of the existing national power structure, for some kind of “self-
government”’ (De Winter 1998a: 204). Once this is granted, their primary objectives 
switch somehow to ‘fight for more regional autonomy’ (Fabre and Martínez-Herrera 
2009: 234). This aim goes in line with that of national movements more generally, 
which leads these parties to attempt ‘to secure self-determination for the national 
community they claim to defend’ (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 506), although as we have 
seen this ultimate aim encompasses several constitutional scenarios, from strong 
regional autonomy to outright independence.  
SNRPs become expressions of nationalist movements when the latter territorial 
demands cannot be articulated through the established SWPs (Seiler 1982: 24). Their 
regionalised character also makes it complicated for SNRPs to achieve power at the 
centre, so another incentive to further devolution is at the core of stateless nationalists 
own interests: more devolved powers will imply a better chance to exercise these 
powers at the sub-state level (Fitjar 2010: 26). As a result, SNRPs’ main electoral ‘goal 
is to maximize support in the territory they claim to represent’ (Amoretti 2004: 7-8).  
These parties have, as we have seen, different territorial goals that they try to achieve 
through pursuing different strategies. At the time when SNRPs demanded political 
decentralisation, and given their characteristics as minority parties in the central 
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political debate, many of these parties tried to exert pressure on the traditional parties 
to force decentralisation by often recurring to ‘tribune strategies’ (De Winter 1998a: 
211; De Winter 1998b: 40). This strategy of external pressure has traditionally proven 
more effective than becoming involved in central governments to promote 
constitutional change (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 519). The strategy pursued by SNRPs 
to pressure SWPs to commit to decentralisation was swiftly replaced by trying to 
achieve office at the sub-state level as the primary objective (Jeffery and Hough 2003: 
207). Put simply, for SNRPs, ‘regional elections are the first order elections’ (Gómez-
Reino Cachafeiro, De Winter, and Lynch 2006: 256). Achieving power at the sub-state 
level is also crucial to legitimise SNRPs’ further territorial aims, whether deeper 
constitutional change or independence. In this sense, ‘only a strong base at home 
influences state governments’ (Nagel 2004: 73) and, given that stateless nationalists 
are often ‘seen to better defend regional interests at the national level’ (Brancati 2008: 
139), being in government at the sub-state level can be a very strong platform to 
legitimise their territorial demands. SNRPs tend to do better in regional than state-
wide elections (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 6), which contributes to their objective 
of achieving power at the sub-state level, while a good regional election result is used 
as an endorsement of the voters to the party’s views on the constitution. Several SNRPs 
have been relatively successful in electoral terms and have gained office at the sub-
state level (Hepburn 2009: 478). 
Notwithstanding their successful breakthrough in the party system, SNRPs also face 
several challenges. First, and most important, is the trade-off between the nature of 
their territorial demands and their electoral support, that is, the more substantial their 
demands are –e.g. deep constitutional change or independence; it is less likely that 
they will have wide support from the electorate (Keating 1988: 21; Rokkan and Urwin 
1983: 142). Therefore, these parties normally tend to moderate their territorial 
demands –e.g. autonomy rather than independence– in order to appeal to a larger 
number of voters, while sacrificing their ‘nationalist’ nature for a sort of ‘catchmore’ 
strategy (Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 296). However, moderating their demands can 
lead to a confrontation between those who pursue the final territorial goal directly and 
those who support a more pragmatic strategy of gradual and progressive constitutional 
change (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 143). This intra-party struggle between ‘moderate’ 
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and ‘radical’ factions can potentially lead the party to split (Rudolph and Thompson 
1985: 302). Moderating demands can also undermine the party’s electoral support, 
especially if other parties demand more substantive changes that may appeal to those 
voters that support deeper constitutional change.  
Second, SNRPs also face other challenges, such as competing with other parties on 
other cleavages –e.g. class, religion; the difficulties in appealing to identity in societies 
where dual identities prevail; and arguing against the benefits of union and the costs 
of regional autonomy and independence. As Rudolph and Thompson put it (1989: 
226), ‘no region wants independence at the price of becoming the Western world’s 
most economically backward area.’ All these challenges need to be considered, of 
course, but many, if not most, SNRPs have been able to articulate their particular 
territorial character with other cleavages to be competitive in party politics and they 
normally have clearly defined and strong-based positions on the socioeconomic 
cleavage (Hepburn 2009: 478-9). 
Notwithstanding the relevance of SNRPs within stateless nationalist movements, party 
competition in stateless nations also involves parties that compete throughout the 
state’s territory and that may have different, or rather opposing views, on the national 
character of the sub-state community than those promoted by the SNRPs. Be that as it 
may, stateless nationalists ‘have a programme that questions the status of their region 
in the national state, and regional sections of statewide parties need to deal with these 
demands’ (Deschouwer 2009d: 32). Therefore, SWPs may opt to counter their stateless 
nationalist opponents with demands of their own, or may decide to downplay the 
territorial question in the political debate.  
The strategy pursued by SWPs will most surely reflect how salient the territorial 
question is in the sub-state political debate and how popular territorial demands are 
amongst the population. In this sense, ‘a state-wide party that dismisses the territorial 
issues raised by its autonomist [or secessionist] competitors when this is something 
that is important to voters is likely to be punished due to the perception that it is out of 
touch with political reality’ (Elias 2011: 8). In such cases, SWPs may have to introduce 
some internal flexibility to adapt to the specific conditions of the stateless nation’s 
political debate. State-wide Party leaderships have therefore ‘a strong incentive to 
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enhance the regional elites’ powers in order to contest the electoral threat. Likely ways 
of doing this include allowing regional party organizations to adopt differentiated party 
programmes, discourses and campaigning strategies in an attempt to develop an 
ethnoregionalist “face”, and possibly also greater autonomy in candidate selection’ 
(Hopkin 2003: 232).  
Internal flexibility in SWPs goes not without risks, though. Whereas a successful 
strategy at the sub-state level may depend on the party giving different messages at the 
regional level from those of the state-wide level (Erk and Swenden 2010b: 12), it is 
also likely that this divergence on the party’s message results in a lack of internal 
cohesion (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010: 108). Party competition at the sub-state level 
in stateless nations may put SWPs in a highly uncomfortable position, while different 
messages given at different audiences may result in a lack of credibility since these 
parties ‘do not want to contradict themselves’ (Libbrecht, Maddens, and Swenden 
2013: 15), and the ultimate strategy pursued by the party will respond to a cost-benefit 
analysis of the potential votes won or lost depending on the territorial positioning of 
the party (Sorens 2009: 257). As a result of this competitive interaction between 
SNRPs and SWPs, the latter’s regional elites may well end up supporting some form 
of political autonomy for the stateless nation (Fabre 2008: 311). As a result of 
decentralisation, then, SNRPs ‘are no longer the sole actors seeking to represent 
territorial interests’ (Hepburn 2010: 6). The repositioning of SWPs on the territorial 
dimension often forces SNRPs to further radicalise their territorial ambitions to 
recover the ‘ownership of this issue dimension’ (Alonso 2012: 246), which 
undoubtedly contributes to a competitive dynamic of enhanced territorial demands. 
There are several ways in which stateless nationalists can mobilise to publicise their 
territorial demands. Regarding the party system, mobilisation can be pursued by 
‘functioning within the existing [state-wide] parties as a nationalist faction; forming 
separate cross-class (catch-all) nationalist parties centred on the defence of the 
homeland’s interests […]; and avoiding political competition altogether by adopting a 
cultural stance’ (Máiz 2003: 206). Participation through the party system is a crucial 
way to influence the internal distribution of power within a state, since political parties 
run for office and attain representation and power in political institutions, which are 
the entities responsible for constitutional change. Thus, party competition responds to 
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territorial demands. If constitutional change is not delivered by the established SWPs, 
demands will be likely put forward through SNRPs, which may well increase their 
vote share at the expense of the traditional parties (Müller-Rommel 1994: 194). The 
latter may answer by promoting some constitutional change to cut down the electoral 
appeal of the nationalists in due course.  
Political parties also provide for a representative dimension of the popular preferences 
in a democratic society. Stateless nations, like the states they are members of, are not 
homogeneous entities. As any other society, stateless nations ‘contain, when examined 
more closely, fractures and factions that can significantly undermine their 
effectiveness in the political process’ (Rudolph 2006: 13), which means, to put it 
simply, that not all inhabitants of the stateless nations either think of it as a nation or 
want (more) self-government. Political parties provide a reliable idea of the society’s 
preferences. It has been argued that this works particularly when measuring support 
for independence in stateless nations by suggesting that ‘voting for a secessionist party 
is the major method of expressing support for the goal of secession or wide-ranging 
autonomy’ (Sorens 2004: 734). Thus, political parties in stateless nations, with their 
own views on the constitutional debate, might provide an approximate picture of the 
popular preferences on constitutional change. 
 
3. State Responses to Territorial Demands: Accommodation 
and Territorial Management 
 
The rise of stateless nationalism put under pressure the internal unitary structures of 
European states, with central governments facing the challenge to provide a response 
to nationalist movements’ demands. These included, as we have seen, direct claims to 
a reshuffle of the state’s territorial organisation, while in some cases the popular 
dissatisfaction with the state was expressed by the electoral breakthrough of 
secessionist parties. States in general and central governments in particular face the 
challenge to accommodate the concerns from the periphery by taking certain actions 
in order to mollify the discontent and cut down separatist aspirations. Accommodation, 
therefore, ‘refers to the capacity of states to contain conflict with the mechanisms and 
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procedures embedded in existing institutional arrangements’ and it has three 
dimensions: 1) ‘minimizing violence and extrainstitutional mobilization;’ 2) 
‘minimizing alienation or hostility toward the state itself and, relatedly, separatist party 
support;’ and 3) ‘respect for minority civil and political rights’ (Amoretti 2004: 2). 
States may undertake institutional reform in order to better adapt its institutional 
structure to its internal socio-political composition. Institutional reform often involved 
political decentralisation in order to provide stateless nations with a certain degree of 
self-government so these groups could manage, to some extent, what they considered 
to be their own affairs.  
The renegotiation of the state internal structure to provide an effective response to the 
specific concerns of stateless national groups in the periphery is part of a broader 
strategy of ‘territorial management,’ which refers to ‘the efforts of central elites to 
cope with the territorial dimension of policy problems and to contain territorially-
based challenges to the central power structure’ (Keating 1988: 18). The challenges of 
the periphery took the form of different territorial demands –administrative powers, 
federalisation, secession, etc.– and were voiced by nationalist movements using 
different social and political channels, one of the most relevant being through SNRPs, 
which received considerable electoral support. The different scope of territorial 
demands was met by central governments with a considerable wide range of responses. 
 
3.1. Aims and Types of Territorial Accommodation Strategies 
Territorial tensions raise indeed the potential for violent conflict, and political violence 
related to ethno-national movements is not rare to Western liberal democracies, as the 
cases of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country have demonstrated. However, under 
the assumption that states do have a strong preference to minimise violence in their 
territory, it is unlikely that central governments in democratic countries will meet 
peaceful territorial demands by violent repression. It has been argued that ‘the efforts 
to repress ethnonational demands have not been particularly successful, and more often 
than not they have themselves contributed to an escalation of political violence’ 
(Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 296). Certainly, even an authoritarian dictatorship, like 
Franco’s Spain, was useless in eradicating national mobilisation, and the birth of 
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Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country during the dictatorship confirms 
that state violence could indeed be met by ethnic violence. As a result, the more open 
and democratic the system is, the more incentives will national movements have to 
channel their demands and grievances through the legitimate institutional system 
(Rudolph and Thompson 1989: 224), of which one of the most effective ways is indeed 
through political parties contesting elections. 
Nationalist movements’ demands also respond to a willingness of minimising violence 
and containing inter-territorial conflict by ensuring ‘that each national group within 
the state feels that it has sufficient autonomy to guarantee its integrity and survival’ 
and ‘to ensure that there will be sufficient accommodation between them that 
unrestrained conflict is avoided’ (Simeon and Conway 2001: 339). Thus, once the 
‘peaceful coexistence’ seems to be an agreed aim both for the minorities and the centre 
in multinational liberal democracies, when dealing with peripheral demands central 
governments have two main objectives. First, states face territorial demands posed by 
strong civic nationalist movements and/or electorally successful SNRPs. It will 
therefore be their primary concern to halt and reduce the centrifugal force of centre-
periphery tensions by trying to diminish the influence –and electoral strength– of this 
kind of parties. Second, states will try to do so without making any concessions to the 
nationalist movements. The latter objective might be rather difficult to accomplish 
when the national movement is particularly strong or when SNRPs can have a strong 
influence to disturb state-wide politics, so states will then turn to territorial 
management to accommodate peripheral demands in order to fulfil their primary 
objective, namely to appease stateless nationalist discontent (Rudolph and Thompson 
1989: 233). 
In order to appease such discontent and contain popular support for nationalist 
movements, ‘[s]tates pursue territorial management strategies through party-political 
incorporation; centre-periphery intermediation through political and bureaucratic 
channels including clientelistic networks; policy concessions, notably but not 
exclusively in economic policy; and institutional decentralization’ (Keating 2008b: 
66). This wide scope of accommodation strategies can be divided between what 
Rudolph and Thompson describe as output-type and authority-type concessions. The 
former include regional elite incorporation into central decision-making and policy 
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concessions; the latter involve deep constitutional change, most notably territorial 
decentralisation and the creation of regional governments. Therefore, these two types 
of central government accommodation strategies differ markedly and there is a clear 
preference by the state political actors to attempt output concessions first, rather than 
kick-start processes of deep constitutional change. This is so, according to Rudolph 
and Thompson, because  
‘[o]utput concessions can be handled by the existing decision-making and 
administrative structure; [whereas] authority-type concessions imply the 
admittance of ethnoterritorial spokesmen into the decision-making process; 
regime changes and referendums pertaining to bring the ethnoterritorial 
communities themselves into the decision-making process, either in the 
referendum discussion or following regionalization or federalization of 
power in the state. […] [The latter] are also usually undertaken only after an 
ever greater share of the ethnoterritorial community has become mobilized 
by an ethnoterritorial movement’ (Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 297).  
The decision to undertake constitutional change thus depends on the strength of the 
nationalist movement. Output concessions, such as economic subsidisation of the sub-
state regions and the incorporation of regional elites’ grievances in the central 
decision-making process, often through the established SWPs, may be successful to 
contain territorial discontent to some extent (Bermeo 2002: 103). However, when 
peripheral demands include constitutional change and this is broadly backed by SNRPs 
it seems there is little option available to central governments than to consider some 
degree of territorial decentralisation. 
The strength of stateless nationalist movements in several European states led to 
constitutional change towards a decentralised territorial organisation of the state 
structure. There was, as a result, a shift in central governments’ accommodation from 
unitary strategies of accommodation to federalising ones. Constitutional change 
consequently transformed unitary state structures, either in the form of ‘unitary states’ 
or ‘union states’ to certain forms of ‘federalism.’ Amongst the former, unitary states 
attempted territorial accommodation through assimilation whereas union states 
represented a less integrated form of unitary accommodation, which granted stateless 
nations certain pre-union rights and the maintenance of some of the local institutions 
(Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 6-11). Federalisation as an accommodation strategy resulted 
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in constitutional change and the formal decentralisation of power to the 
aforementioned stateless nations. This process of federalisation took place in Spain, 
Belgium, and the UK and is therefore necessary to analyse its characteristics and the 
particularities of such strategy in order to accommodate multinational realities. 
There are several definitions of federalism in the literature, although a common 
principle of federalism is that power is divided on a territorial basis with two levels of 
government, one regional and one ruling over the whole territory of the state, with 
powers allocated to each level. From the sub-state perspective, territorial entities have 
a certain degree of ‘self-rule,’ but also exercise some kind of ‘shared-rule’ at the centre 
alongside the other regional entities and the state-wide or federal government (Elazar 
1994). Federalism also requires that the sub-state units and their powers and 
institutions be recognised and protected by a written constitution, thus making 
constitutional entrenchment a key element of federalism (Burgess 1993: 5). When this 
protection is not asserted on a written constitution but still sub-state institutions are put 
in place, it is more appropriate to describe this type of territorial organisation as 
regionalism or devolution (Coakley 2003a: 298). This sort of federal-like territorial 
arrangements have led academics to describe federalism as a tool ‘to unite people who 
seek the advantages of membership of a common political unit, but differ markedly in 
descent, language and culture’ (Forsyth 1989: 4), with multinational federalism 
attempting to provide a successful accommodation of stateless nationalist movements’ 
concerns by granting them ‘self-rule’ in the areas most important to them while 
satisfying the state’s main aim of guaranteeing its territorial integrity. 
Federal arrangements in multinational states institutionalise stateless nations as 
political communities, granting them political institutions and democratic legitimacy 
through the direct election of regional assemblies or parliaments. The 
institutionalisation of sub-state national communities through federalism ‘allows us to 
account for more than one demos’ (Burgess and Gagnon 2010: 16) in multinational 
states, which should accordingly be regarded as ‘one polity, several demoi’ (Requejo 
2005: 11). A plural conception of the state seems normatively a valid way to 
accommodate individuals with plural identities, namely that of the state as a whole and 
that of the stateless nation, since ‘federalism, more than unitarism or secession, is the 
best way of implementing fair terms of recognition for individuals’ national identities’ 
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because federalism is ‘better able to accommodate identities than mononational 
(seceded) states because members may be members of both the federal and the sub-
state nation simultaneously; and […] federalism is a fair way to adjudicate between 
conflicting identities among the citizens that make up the component nations’ (De 
Schutter 2011: 168). 
In spite of this strong claim of federalism as a useful strategy to accommodate 
multinational realities, the institutionalisation of the sub-state community does lead in 
fact to several tensions. The co-existence of two tiers of demoi generates a dissention 
on which one is the primary community, the state claiming its role as the sovereign 
entity while stateless nationalists tend to devise the sub-state community as the main 
locus of allegiance, which leads to ‘political battles over “who gets to decide”’ (Erk 
2008: 10).  
These tensions are intrinsic in federal-like arrangements and may curtail the potential 
normative benefits of federalism as a successful accommodation technique. 
Federalism does indeed allow the constituent parts of the state to maintain their own 
institutions and pursue different policies that may better suit their own interests, but 
this is not necessarily enough in multinational states where territorial and cultural 
differentiation play a role because federalism is a uniform system in principle (Keating 
2001a: 51). In order to better contain stateless nations’ specificities, then, political 
decentralisation may be implemented alongside other elements which may account for 
the particular character –identity, culture, religion, etc.– of the stateless nation. This 
element of distinctiveness, as we have seen, usually conforms the core of the territorial 
demands posed by stateless nationalist movements and protection of such 
distinctiveness is a top priority for these movements. 
The notion of federal asymmetry ‘refers to the degree of heterogeneity that exists in 
the relations between each member state [or region] and the federation, and between 
the member states themselves’ (Requejo 1999: 270). In other words, a certain degree 
of asymmetry might be an interesting accommodation strategy for the state, since 
‘peripheral dissent may be undermined by the concession of some kind of special 
status’ (Coakley 2003a: 302). Asymmetric arrangements are designed to provide 
stateless nations differentiated policy competences, institutional status or treatment 
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than those received by the other groups of the state and are aimed at better responding 
to the specific characteristics of the sub-state community (Pinder 2007: 10). The 
establishment of asymmetries alongside federal-like arrangements entails the 
recognition by the state of the stateless nations’ specificities and may potentially lead 
to a formal recognition of the existence of a plurality of demoi within the state. On the 
other hand, where asymmetries are denied by central governments as an 
accommodation strategy it is highly likely that the plurality of demoi within the state 
and its multinational character will also be denied (Requejo 1999: 271). 
It is often complicated for central governments to use asymmetries as an 
accommodation strategy to acknowledge stateless nations’ distinctiveness. There is a 
strong possibility that ‘asymmetry that grants minority homelands greater powers of 
self-government creates resentment within the numerically larger core nationality’ 
(Roeder 2009: 216). Asymmetry can indeed raise severe objections amongst those 
from outwith stateless nations, since ‘detractors of asymmetrical federalism of the 
view that it leads to unbalanced and unfair practices, and that it inevitably creates 
second-class status for citizens who do not see themselves as being part of a given 
political community’ (Gagnon 2001: 328). Asymmetry is as a result a controversial 
tool of territorial management and often a trade-off needs to be reached between the 
peripheral demands for recognition of distinctiveness and the protests of the non-ethnic 
regions which do not wish to be treated as second-order regions. Central governments 
will accordingly prefer symmetric decentralisation because otherwise ‘regions left out 
of the process protest, and the central government does not wish to appear to reward 
secessionism or to be responding too obviously to the pressures of secessionist 
movements’ (Sorens 2004: 740-1).  
The suitability of asymmetric arrangements ultimately relies on the majority’s 
understanding of the socio-political composition of the nation. Where the majority 
nation, and accordingly the central government, indeed sees the state as a composition 
of several demoi, then asymmetrical arrangements are likely to take place (Stepan, 
Linz, and Yadav 2011: 203). On the other hand, when the majority nation and the 
dominant political actors at the centre are reluctant to recognise the distinctive status 




As discussed above, though, the state response to territorial demands will depend on 
the strength of the stateless nationalist movement. Some central governments might 
rule out granting a special status to stateless nations on the basis of intra-state equality 
and to avoid resentment from other regions, but asymmetry ‘might come to be regarded 
as the only acceptable alternative for some nations without a state if they are to be 
discouraged from seeking independence’ (Guibernau 1999: 49). Thus, when facing 
strongest separatist claims, the granting of asymmetry may come to a last-resort, or a 
lesser evil, in order to avoid the secession of a stateless nation. This is a well-known 
trade-off for central governments in Western European states, which ‘were obliged to 
recognize territorial peculiarities and engaged in elaborate policies of territorial 
management […] to preserve their territorial integrity’ (Keating 1998b: 195). In the 
end, the type of asymmetry granted depends on how strong the claim for secession is, 
since states will not relinquish more powers than necessary or undermine their mono-
national status if not to appease a serious danger of secession. 
Secession is generally unacceptable to states, mainly because it involves, among 
several causes, the loss of territory, population and economic resources (Hale 2004: 
172). Central governments reject secession because ‘losing a part of their state’s 
territory would reduce the power and prestige of the state in the international arena, 
and may threaten its economic stability and development’ and also ‘the idea of 
secession often represents a blow to an identity widely shared by the population 
outside the community represented by a nationalist government’ (McEwen and 
Lecours 2008: 221). On the basis that secession is the least desired outcome for states, 
territorial accommodation strategies will be pursued in order to contain the secessionist 
threat, including constitutional change leading to wide-range federalism and 
asymmetry, but territorial management will always respond to the principle of granting 
the minimum of concessions possible (Rudolph and Thompson 1989: 227). 
 
3.2. The Role of Parties in Territorial Management 
Political parties have been one of the main vehicles of nationalist movements in order 
to make territorial claims and put forward demands for constitutional change. This 
applies in particular to political parties in stateless nations and primarily, although by 
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any means exclusively, SNRPs are the most vociferous political actors in supporting 
changes to the territorial status quo. Such changes forcefully require the acceptance 
and involvement of central state institutions, which lead political parties represented 
at the centre to devise and implement decentralisation processes. Thus, according to 
De Winter (1998a: 211), ‘only legislative bodies at the national level are competent’ 
for a territorial reorganisation of power, which drives SNRPs ‘to focus on increasing 
their political weight at the level of the national parliament.’ The presence of strong 
SNRPs in the state-wide political arena will have an impact on the saliency of the 
territorial issue and SWPs will have to deal with territorial pressures by providing their 
own views on the state’s territorial structure in order to counterbalance the demands 
for constitutional change raised in stateless nations (Alonso, Cabeza, and Gómez 
2015). Electoral competition between political parties is therefore a determinant factor 
to account for the dynamics of demands and responses that lead to constitutional 
change in multinational states, because SWPs are ‘faced with electoral threats that can 
undermine their political base,’ especially in stateless nations, and therefore these 
parties ‘respond with strategies of accommodation that involve output policies, 
regional institutions and support for constitutional change’ (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 
De Winter, and Lynch 2006: 266).  
The saliency of territorial issues in stateless nations as a result of a broad support for 
further constitutional powers will inevitably force SWPs to confront the issue to 
effectively compete with SNRPs. In order to do so, SWPs ‘must compete in 
aggregating, articulating and pursuing territorial interests in order to prevent minority 
nationalist parties from ‘owing’ this issue dimension and, most importantly, to provide 
constitutional alternatives to secession’ (Hepburn 2008: 538). SWPs are often, if not 
always, representatives of the majority nation and will defend the wide interests of the 
state in a holistic manner, which leads them to reject secession on principle on the 
grounds of national unity and social cohesion. The potential danger of secession will 
lead political parties at the centre to devise accommodation strategies to make 
secession less appealing to the citizens of the stateless nation, which include 
constitutional change among others.  
Political decentralisation is triggered by the SNRPs’ desire for constitutional change 
and a potential threat of secession, but they should not be the sole actors accounted for 
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decentralisation processes in Western European countries (Brancati 2008: 140). State-
wide Parties, which control the state institutions, are the main responsible political 
actors for delivering constitutional change and to mastermind the nature and scope of 
the territorial management strategies implemented. This has been the case in the three 
cases under study in this thesis, with the Labour Party delivering devolution in the UK, 
the Belgian traditional parties designing the progressive federalisation of Belgium, 
while a broad cross-party consensus brought forward a regionalising constitution 
during Spain’s transition to democracy.  
After decentralisation is carried out and sub-state political institutions are in place, so 
is party competition at the sub-state level. In this sense, political parties in stateless 
nations, and rather specifically those who are in power in that level, perform a double 
role, being ‘at the same time the regional governing party, linked to the regional 
electorate, and the party that can speak for the region in the horizontal and vertical 
intergovernmental relationships’ (Deschouwer 2003: 221). This double role can apply 
both to SNRPs and SWPs in stateless nations, which results in party competition 
between parties as to which is the better suited to better represent the territory’s 
specific interests. These sort of interests are set to play a dominant role in the political 
debate in stateless nations, and accordingly SNRPs are traditionally the self-declared 
champions of the stateless national community.  
Party competition may nevertheless lead SWP branches to present themselves as a 
better option to satisfy regional concerns through the links with the parties ruling at 
the centre, which ultimately hold the key to deliver constitutional change. However, 
SWPs that champion the stateless nationalist cause or ‘play the regional card too 
emphatically run the danger of eroding their appeal in other parts of the state and 
underlining their state-wide credentials’ (Jeffery 2009a: 646). Evidence suggests that 
when mainstream parties try to own the issue of niche parties, such as SNRPs, it may 
have a negative effect on their statewide electoral results (Meguid 2005: 358). This 
situation may result in intra party conflict between the central party leadership and the 
sub-state party branch which has important implications. First because it is an element 
ripe for party competition and other parties, especially SNRPs, will try to exploit 
internal struggles and incoherencies to their advantage (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006: 
15). Second, because internal party debate on territorial issues may lead SWPs to (re-
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)consider the party’s stance on the territorial organisation of the state, which may have 
an impact on constitutional change if the SWP is in a position to promote it at the 
central level. 
In spite of internal differences, SWPs may decide to promote constitutional change in 
order to gain support in a stateless nation, and consequently undermine electoral 
support for SNRPs. Proposals for constitutional change will aim at damaging the 
electoral prospects of nationalist parties, especially of those parties promoting 
secession, by taking away voters that might flirt with the idea of independence with a 
promise of further sub-state empowerment. In sum, SWPs may accommodate some of 
the views of SNRPs to become better engaged in the sub-state political debate and 
electorally damage their nationalist competitors (Newman 1997: 56).  
Political parties play thus a crucial role in devising which accommodation strategies 
are better suited to counter stateless nationalist challenges. Specifically, SWPs, which 
tend to cope the representative institutions at the centre, will have their own views and 
preferences on constitutional change. Such views will be intensively linked to the 
electoral threat posed by SNRPs and SWPs’ proposals for constitutional change will 
respond to a potential secessionist threat from the periphery, thus reinforcing the 
dynamics of challenges and responses embedded in political party competition. 
 
4. Political Party Competition as a Driver of the Dynamics of 
Constitutional Change 
 
4.1. The Persistency of Territorial Demands 
The rise of stateless nationalism in Western Europe was met by central governments 
through territorial management strategies, which often resulted in political 
decentralisation for stateless nations so they could have certain powers and decision-
making capacity on several policy areas. These decentralisation process have been 
often considered to be irreversible (Coakley 2003a: 313; Meadwell 2009: 226; O’Neill 
2003: 1076), meaning that once political autonomy has been granted to stateless 
nations it is very difficult to take it away. In fact, according to a large-N study that 
analyses political decentralisation and regional authority since World War II, ‘there 
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has been a marked increase in the level of regional authority over the past half-century. 
Not every country has become regionalized, but where we see reform over time, it is 
in the direction of greater, not less, regional authority’ (Marks, Hooghe, and Schakel 
2008: 167). This study suggests, then, that not only territorial decentralisation has an 
irreversible character, but also that there is some progressive character about it –i.e. 
decentralisation seems to increase over time.  
The existence of demands for further decentralisation and deeper constitutional change 
are most salient in stateless nations, which may lead to question whether federal-like 
accommodation strategies implemented by central governments had been successful 
at all. However, measuring the success of decentralisation is highly complicated, since 
different views may affect such a judgement. Majorities and minorities may have 
different views on how satisfying territorial accommodation has been, with majorities 
claiming it has avoided secession while minorities claiming it has not provided them 
with enough powers; or conversely, majorities can evaluate it negatively by 
highlighting the loss of authority of the centre and the subsequent push from enlarged 
powers by some in the stateless nation, whereas the latter may have a positive view on 
the powers allocated at the sub-state level (Simeon and Conway 2001: 341).  
The ambiguity on the successfulness of territorial accommodation paves the way for 
further demands (Rudolph and Thompson 1989: 239), since the territorial settlement 
might well be the agreed outcome of diverging views, with stateless nationalists 
demanding more than what they got and states giving away more than what they had 
desired. Party political and electoral logics also play a decisive role with central 
governments aiming to resolve specific problems without taking into account that 
inadequate or temporary solutions might leave problems unresolved so they come back 
in the future. Territorial management strategies, then, ‘tend to focus on the short-term 
problem of finding a compromise to satisfy the demands of the parties to a conflict, 
but give less consideration to ‘the days after’ the new institutional arrangement is in 
place. This may be a smart approach for politicians seeking to muddle through a crisis 
and pass the problem on to their successors, but may leave the successors with a still 
worse problem’ (Roeder 2009: 208). Institutional design may open the door to further 
territorial demands, but it is up to political parties to take advantage of any institutional 




4.2. Institutional Factors Contributing to Territorial Demands 
Political decentralisation aimed at appeasing stateless nationalists’ territorial concerns 
does create and ensure a new political space for party competition. A new sub-state 
institutional setting may have a highly relevant impact in stateless nations where 
identity and territorial politics play a predominant role in the political debate. 
Decentralisation in these cases provides for the ‘maintenance and significance of 
political, cultural, and economic institutions’ (L. M. Anderson 2010: 138), which may 
encourage demands for secession. Sub-state institutions in multinational polities 
decisively affect politics in the stateless nation, by providing ‘the minority with 
political and bureaucratic resources that it can use to launch a bid for independence. 
Giving a minority its own unit makes it possible for it to hold referendums on secession 
[…]. Multinational federations implicitly suggest the principle that the accommodated 
minorities represent ‘peoples’ who might then be entitled to rights of self-
determination under international law’ (McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 192). Sub-state 
institutions also offer stateless nationalists the possibility of influencing public policy 
by entering sub-state governments, which may lead to processes of nation- and sub-
state identity-building that may result in a reinforcement of the citizens’ sub-state 
identity and allegedly a desire for further autonomy or broader support for the stateless 
nation’s independence (Martínez-Herrera 2010: 141-3; Meadwell 2009: 230-1).  
The institutionalisation of sub-state politics through territorial decentralisation may 
also lead to further demands short of secession. Decentralisation also creates new 
patterns of territorial relationships between sub-state and central institutions and 
between sub-state institutions across the state. This introduces a potentiality for 
conflict and claims from sub-state elites to (re-)negotiate the terms of such 
relationships. Furthermore, the same elites at the head of political parties compete for 
power at the sub-state level which may provide incentives to demand greater authority 
for that level (Lecours 2004: 86). At the sub-state level, then, political elites have more 
powers to shape the political agenda in order to give more saliency to centre-periphery 
and territorial conflicts (Roeder 2009: 209).  
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The institutionalisation of territorial politics through political decentralisation is thus 
aimed at making ‘full independence less appealing to minority nationalist voters, [but] 
it also provides nationalist parties the institutional tools with which to hold a 
referendum on independence and can strengthen voters’ confidence that collective 
self-government can work’ (Sorens 2009: 255), which has been described as a sort of 
a paradox. The institutional setting provides the opportunity for stateless nationalists 
to promote independence, which generates a dynamic for progressive territorial 
demands, in which ‘demands for increased powers can lead to further calls for 
autonomy, the only logic stopping place for which is secession’ (Simeon and Conway 
2001: 364). This scenario, often referred to as a ‘slippery slope’ to secession (McCrone 
2003; Requejo 1999), does not however have, as yet, any empirical backing, with the 
case of the secession of Ireland from the UK being a counterexample as it occurred 
‘because of thwarted-autonomy, not because it had autonomy’ (McGarry and O’Leary 
2009: 10). In this sense, alongside the institutional setting that certainly aids the 
promotion of independence by stateless nationalists, it should also be emphasised that 
a push for independence may come as a response from the nationalists to the state’s 
rejection to negotiate further autonomy. 
Continuous territorial demands may be perceived by the state as a ‘slippery slope’ 
towards independence and one option available is to shut the door to further 
constitutional change and reject any demands posed by stateless nationalist political 
actors. This strategy, as we have seen, is not uncommon since states undertake 
constitutional change as a last resort. However, rejecting demands for more autonomy 
can have a negative effect for the state, with demands becoming more assertive through 
a substantial boost for the pro-independence movement. This may include an increase 
in public support for independence, separatist parties doing well in elections or former 
autonomist parties switching its territorial aim to independence. A rejectionist strategy 
based on the ‘intransigence’ of central governments to peripheral demands ‘can turn a 
moderate movement in a more radical direction’ (Bermeo 2004: 463).  
Nationalist movements, therefore, may turn to a more pro-independence stance if the 
stateless nations’ autonomy is or is perceived to be ‘thwarted by majority nations’ 
centralism’ (Maclure 2003: 48). A rejectionist strategy by central governments may 
also include symbolic elements such as the lack of national recognition of the stateless 
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nation or perceived grievances against the community’s distinctive elements. The 
recognition of such specificities is deemed necessary because ‘to accommodate 
politically minority nations is not only a question of decentralization, but also of 
political recognition of their national status’ (Requejo 2010a: 289); which implies that 
‘if the distinctiveness of a national minority cannot be accommodated within the state, 
secession may be seen as a necessary route to the continued survival of the nation’ 
(McEwen and Lecours 2008: 223). Finally, the state may be open to negotiate 
territorial demands, but broken promises or insufficient proposals might spark the 
discontent of stateless nationalist actors, which may turn towards secession instead. 
As Sorens (2004: 741) puts it, ‘offers of autonomy are risky for the central government. 
Sometimes such offers can defuse secessionism; at other times, they may inflame it, if 
they are viewed as insultingly cautious. Moreover, once proposed, such offers become 
the baseline for expectations, and if they are subsequently withdrawn or defeated, a 
public outcry is predictable.’  
There is a further institutional element that contributes to territorial disputes and, in 
the context of decentralised states, affects the distribution of powers across different 
territorial levels of government. The creation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and its evolution towards the European Union (EU) created a new arena for 
territorial allocation of power which had consequences as well on the member states’ 
internal organisation of power since ‘the traditional enemy of peripheral nationalism, 
the nation-state, changed its nature with European integration’ (De Winter and Gómez-
Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 488). The transfers of powers to the supra-national European 
level opened up the possibility for a reform of the functional allocation of powers 
within member states. The definition and evolution of European integration was also 
perceived by stateless nationalists as an opportunity to carry out a sort of ‘pincer 
strategy to undermine and reform central state structures’ (De Winter, Gómez-Reino 
Cachafeiro, and Lynch 2006: 20). The Maastricht Treaty was perceived by many 
stateless nationalist actors as a hopeful institutional setting to enhance the role of 
regions in EU policy-making, especially with the establishment of a Committee of the 
Regions, albeit with limited powers.  
However, the so-called ‘Europe of the Regions’ never materialised and the Committee 
of the Regions have proved largely ineffective to represent stateless nations’ interests 
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in Europe (L. Hooghe and Marks 1996). Stateless nations have ‘no specified place’ 
(Keating 1999: 83), whereas other nations constituted as member states with less 
population or smaller economies are accepted as full members of the EU, which some 
suggest is a sort of a contradiction (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, De Winter, and Lynch 
2006: 261). The lack of institutional accommodation at the European level for stateless 
nations adds up to the constitutional demands posed on states to renegotiate internal 
institutional arrangements, including further autonomy, symbolic recognition, and 
territorially-based shared-sovereignty. The European institutional framework may be 
regarded as stimulating demands for secession, since ‘the European project provides 
ideological sustenance to the post-sovereignty project, the EU does not provide an 
institutional space for anything other than states’ (Keating 2008a: 632). As a result, 
some stateless nationalist reached the conclusion that the only way to have an impact 
on EU governance is to become a state and join the EU on the same equal status as the 
other members. 
Political decentralisation has created an appropriate institutional setting to promote 
further demands, while the state’s unwillingness to (re-)negotiate such an institutional 
setting might pave the way to an increase in secession support. In this sense, ‘[b]oth a 
rejection of ethnoterritorial demands and concessions to them can, under the proper 
circumstances, become rallying points for ethnoregional sentiment’ (Rudolph and 
Thompson 1985: 306). However, the institutional setting on its own cannot provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the dynamics of territorial demands. In this sense, the 
role of political parties is crucial because they are the political actors that take 
advantage of the institutional setting to put forward territorial demands from the 
periphery, and to respond to such demands from the centre. 
 
4.3. Party Competition as the Main Driver of Territorial Demands 
Political parties acted as the vehicles of nationalist movements to put forward demands 
for decentralisation in several Western European multinational states. The 
breakthrough of SNRPs put pressure on the other parties with government 
responsibilities at the centre to devolve power to newly created sub-state institutions, 
with the primary aim of cutting short secessionist tendencies in peripheral territories 
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with strong distinctive national identities. The establishment of sub-state political 
arenas resulted in parties competing for votes and office at the sub-state level in 
addition to the state central level. As a result of decentralisation, party competition in 
stateless nations has institutionalised the territorial cleavage in sub-state politics, with 
parties often challenging each other on the constitutional status of the stateless nation 
and putting forward demands for enlarging the sub-state institutions’ authority.  
Meadwell (2009: 233) identifies three different types of strategic actions that parties 
take in the sub-state arena which lead to the reinforcement of the territorial cleavage 
and make the discussion on the regions’ self-government a very salient one. First, 
stateless nationalists may us the threat of secession to get concessions from the centre. 
Second, other stateless nationalists that actually favour secession will be more than 
happy to accept concessions made by the centre while they keep promoting 
independence, i.e. separatist parties will complain that concessions are not enough but 
will accept them nevertheless, since the more powers the sub-state institutions have, 
the more autonomous the stateless nation is. Finally, SWPs will favour and eventually 
concede concessions in order to appease popular demands for self-government, which 
will most certainly improve their electoral chances against SNRPs.  
The interaction of these three strategies perfectly summarises the effects of party 
competition in establishing a progressive dynamic of demand-response-demand that 
will make territorial disputes an every-day topic in the stateless nation’s political 
debate. The saliency of the territorial or centre-periphery cleavage in stateless nations 
‘emerged the process of nation-state building [which] clashed uneasily with the 
particularism of individual territories and peoples, producing alternative, sub-state 
forms of political mobilisation’ (Hough and Jeffery 2006: 5). The window for potential 
alternative mobilisation on territorial grounds led to the breakthrough of SNRPs and 
the persistence of territory as probably the main cleavage in party politics, even more 
important than class in stateless nations (Hepburn 2009: 481; Keating 2001c: 44). The 
importance of territory in these contexts has two main consequences on party 
competition, which takes place in ‘a distinct party system from that of its state-level 
counterpart […] and within which at least one secessionist party is present’ (Requejo 
2010a: 277, original italics). The distinctiveness of the party system forces SWPs to 
adapt to the specificities of the sub-state political arena while the presence of a pro-
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independence party polarises the political debate and sets the scenario for non-
secessionist parties to counterbalance the prospect of independence with demands for 
more autonomy, short of secession.  
A crucial element to determine how assertive demands will be in the political debate 
will depend on the electoral strength and governmental influence of SNRPs with 
further territorial ambitions. As Hepburn puts it (2008: 551), ‘[t]he strength of a 
nationalist or autonomy-seeking party within a given region also necessitates the 
development of alternative constitutional demands by their political opponents. 
Contrarily, if there is no strong nationalist party in the territory, the territorial 
dimension of party competition is determined elsewhere […] and the territorial project 
may be submerged under other socio-economic issues.’ Indeed, the less influent 
separatist parties or parties demanding substantial constitutional change are, the less 
SWPs ‘will emphasize the regionalist issue’ (Libbrecht, Maddens, and Swenden 2013: 
11). Conversely, if SNRPs are an electoral threat to SWPs, the latter will engage in the 
political debate, which ‘will normally increase the saliency of the regionalist issue in 
the election’ (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 208).  
Political parties are crucial in their role of representative institutions of the 
population’s preferences, which unavoidably include the voters’ views on the 
constitution. Besides, ‘political parties are one of the very important political actors 
that produce linkages between the political institutions’ (Deschouwer 2003: 220), 
which in matters of constitutional change translates into the position of parties as the 
actors being in control of both central and sub-state governments, the ultimate 
decision-makers on constitutional change. The role of governments and political 
institutions is thus very relevant in explaining the dynamics of constitutional change, 
but institutionalist explanations, as summarised above, do not adequately ‘consider the 
ways in which party competition can be an important cause of decentralizing reforms’ 
(Hopkin 2009: 182). Political parties are indeed the primary actors in triggering the 
dynamics of territorial demands as ‘the spokesmen for the ethnoterritorial 
communities, with the [central] government initially being respondent to their 
demands’ (Rudolph 2006: 15). Furthermore, the parties’ role of spokesmen of the 
stateless nation is endorsed by their electoral strength and political influence in party 
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politics, which indicates approximately the population share of support for certain 
constitutional options (Sorens 2008: 330).  
Party competition on the territorial cleavage is also affected by government-opposition 
dynamics, with parties in opposition more willing to put forward territorial demands 
to put pressure on the government parties at the sub-state level to highlight their lack 
of success in delivering constitutional change. Competition between SWPs and SNRPs 
has been widely discussed, but the saliency of territory in the political debate will be 
further enhanced when more than one SNRP is present in the party system (Massetti 
2009: 515). Some SNRPs that favour autonomy rather than independence, might try 
to establish themselves as the ‘governing party par excellence of the autonomous 
region, maintaining support by serving as the guarantee of the autonomy conquered, 
of good regional governance, by producing centrist pragmatic policies, as well as using 
party patronage over public resources and serve individual and group clienteles’ 
(Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, De Winter, and Lynch 2006: 258). 
 However, if a more radical SNRP in opposition were to be electorally successful, this 
would put the autonomist party under pressure to push for some constitutional change, 
in a type of competition akin to that between SNRPs and SWPs. The intertwined 
competition between different SNRPs and SWPs therefore results in an increase of the 
saliency of the territorial issue and parties often turn to the ‘nationalist card’ to win 
over voters. This, in turn, may result in a constant redefinition of political parties’ 
constitutional horizons, which will depend on whether their demands are met by 
central governments and whether their territorial views –or those of their political 
opponents– are endorsed by voters. 
Territorial mobilisation on grounds of ‘[e]thnicity and nationalism frequently run in 
cycles’ (Newman 1994: 53). The rise of sub-state nationalism of the 1970s in several 
Western European states led, in some cases, to decentralisation processes and federal-
like systems of territorial management. Writing a few years after that first wave of 
territorial mobilisation, Rudolph and Thompson argued that ‘institutionalization has 
tended to neutralize ethnoregional parties as effective agents for articulating demands 
on behalf of ethnoterritorial communities, even where strong ethnoterritorial sentiment 
may still be present. System participation may lead to the fragmentation of 
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ethnoregional parties and their disintegration as effective organizations’ (Rudolph and 
Thompson 1985: 306). The deepening of European integration in the early 1990s 
prompted a reinvigoration of territorial claims, since stateless nationalists perceived 
European integration as a potential weakening factor of the traditional nation-state, 
some new opportunities were introduced for sub-state entities to be represented at the 
European level, and debates were held on the changing nature of sovereignty and 
statehood in Europe (Elias 2008: 558). European integration therefore provided a 
scope for the renegotiation of multinational unions (Keating 2001c: 46-7), whereas the 
thriving push of European economic integration and globalisation more generally 
‘increases the efficiency of independence and thus makes the exit threats of peripheral 
regions more credible’ (Sorens 2004: 730). This window of opportunity at ‘the 
European level constituted a new focus of demands for autonomy during the initial 
period of deepening integration. Nationalist parties in all regions moderated their 
constitutional goals in the face of new possibilities for autonomy in Europe, whilst 
regional branches of state-wide parties adopted stronger territorial demands;’ although 
stateless nationalists’ hopes soon fade down and ‘from 1995 to 2005, parties began to 
question whether their territorial strategies could be met in Europe’ (Hepburn 2008: 
545, 548). 
The two waves of peripheral mobilisation in the 1970s and 1990s pointed out the 
growth of SNRPs across Europe (De Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Lynch 
2006: 14). Each wave also prompted a wave of social and political research (Sorens 
2008: 354), mainly around the causes and explanations of the growth of stateless 
nationalist parties and movements and around the institutional characteristics and 
effects of decentralisation. Arguably, the last decade has produced a new wave of 
territorial mobilisation, with secessionist parties not only being influential but also 
achieving office at the sub-state level in Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders, and 
promoting independence for their territories. The public saliency of identity and self-
government issues in these three cases has prompted political parties to develop 
detailed territorial proposals to better satisfy the public’s ambitions of territorial self-
government. Competing proposals have become a determinant element of party 
competition, alongside the use of territory to discredit the performance of parties in 
government, which has led to a dynamic of territorial proposals and counterproposals 
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that have contributed to an aggregate escalation of territorial demands. Party 
competition at the level of the stateless nations has also increased the relevance of 
territory in state-wide politics, with SWPs becoming quite involved in the territorial 
disputes.  
The empirical chapters will provide a rather comprehensive analysis on how party 
competition has triggered these dynamics of demand-response-demand, up to the point 
where deep constitutional change and secession is ranking atop the political debate in 




Chapter 3. Research Question, Methodology, 
and Research Methods 
 
1. Research Question 
 
Despite the decentralisation processes in Belgium, Spain, and the UK to accommodate 
the sub-state claims for self-government, territorial demands have persisted. In regards 
to party politics, the constitutional status of Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland is 
contested by significant political parties at the sub-state level, and the issue of 
‘territory’ usually acquires more saliency in regional political debates than the 
traditional socio-economic cleavage (Keating 2001c: 44; Hepburn 2009: 481). The 
saliency of the territorial cleavage in sub-state party politics has been enhanced by the 
advantageous conditions that decentralisation provides to stateless nationalist parties: 
it enables them to strengthen their position in the political system, increasing their 
visibility and therefore the territorial demands of the party. There is some support for 
this view from several scholars who claim that decentralisation –or federalism, as a 
particular case of decentralisation– in multinational states clearly favours those 
political actors –especially political parties– that seek to secede from the state (Alonso 
2012; Brancati 2006: 656; Falleti 2005: 331; Martínez-Herrera 2010: 155; Roeder 
2009: 204; Simeon and Conway 2001: 364). Others are more moderate in their 
conclusions and only suggest that decentralisation through political autonomy does not 
moderate the strength of secession claims (L. Hooghe 1992: 39; Lustick, Miodownik, 
and Eidelson 2004). Finally, a third group of political scientists contend that federal 
structures are effective both as a mechanism to avoid secession and to accommodate a 
plurality of nations within the same state. Federalism is thus considered a useful tool 
to moderate secession (Erk and Swenden 2010b: 11; Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 
306; Sorens 2004: 730; Watts 2007: 229). This debate in the literature discusses a 
puzzle that has been labelled as the ‘paradox of federalism’ (L. M. Anderson 2010), 
namely whether federalism –or more generally federal-type territorial agreements– 
induce or prevent secession.  
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This is a broad political problem which goes beyond federal systems. The UK cannot 
be regarded in any way as a federal country (McCrone 2003), and still the territorial 
question is paramount despite devolution. Thus, the attempt to accommodate 
peripheral nationalism via political decentralisation, regardless of the specificities of 
the territorial organisation of the state, generates a particular sub-state politics that 
stateless nationalist parties in particular will be able to exploit. The nature and scope 
of decentralisation arrangements may therefore be questioned by political actors at the 
sub-state level –and also at the centre– and demands for change may appear. Such 
demands have appeared, in different scopes and intensity, in several Western liberal 
democracies, including Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country, and 
Quebec. 
In light of this, the research question at the heart of this thesis is ‘What are the 
dynamics that lead political parties in decentralised stateless nations to raise further 
territorial demands?’ The saliency of the territorial cleavage in stateless nations is a 
by-product of the relative importance –in terms of electoral share of the vote and 
electoral presence– of SNRPs in the sub-state political system (Hepburn 2009). This 
kind of parties tend to question the territorial status quo and their main raison d’être 
is to empower the sub-state institutions of their home territory (De Winter 1998a). The 
effect SNRPs have on the party system includes responses to their political proposals 
by other parties, either SWPs or other SNRPs in the stateless nation’s territory. The 
presence of significant SNRPs therefore introduces a ‘contagion effect’ that affects the 
party system as a whole (Hepburn 2014). Such interactions lead to fierce party 
competition around territory, involving proposals and counterproposals for 
constitutional change.   
The primary hypothesis of this research is that competition between parties produces 
a dynamic process of evolving demands that generates on aggregate an increase in 
support for territorial change across political parties, although of course some parties 
will aim at deeper changes than others, while other parties may be fervent defenders 
of the territorial status quo. Party competition is therefore worth analysing as an 
explanatory factor of the instability of territorial arrangements in cases like Catalonia, 
Scotland, and Flanders. In short, then, this thesis seeks to examine whether party 
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competition drives territorial demands and to provide an explanation of the nature of 
dynamics that lead to further territorial demands to be espoused by one –or more– 
political parties in stateless nations. 
Arguably, political party competition does not operate on its own and other factors 
may influence the observed outcome of persistent demands for constitutional change 
in some stateless nations. To take the complexity of such a problem into account, this 
study will also consider the intervening effect of central governments and SWPs as the 
decisive actors that provide responses to territorial demands from the periphery and 
have the last word on constitutional change. The strategies of territorial 
accommodation that central political actors use will likely have an impact on the 
outcome of territorial demands, as political parties in the stateless nation may respond 
in turn to the central government’s actions by praising or condemning the latter’s 
territorial policy to challenge their political opponents on the constitutional issue. The 
second hypothesis is thus the intervening effect that central governmental action 
produces on the political parties’ territorial objective and discourse. Lastly, the 
dynamics of competition between political parties are also affected by popular views 
on self-government and the constitutional status of the stateless nations, since political 
parties –especially those aiming for a ‘catch-all’ strategy– will bear in mind the 
constitutional preferences of the population when putting forward territorial claims. 
The effect of public views on territorial issues is the third hypothesis. 
This research question is timely and important in understanding the role of party 
competition in constitutional change in light of several recent debates on independence 
in West European multinational states. Federalism scholars often rely solely on 
institutional aspects to explain the effect of political decentralisation on enhanced 
territorial demands and particularly on whether federalism is a useful tool to avoid 
secession. However, the complexity of the political problem is rarely unpacked and 
the specific role of political parties is not analysed in depth (for some exceptions, see 
Alonso 2012; Hepburn 2010; Massetti 2009; Toubeau 2011; Toubeau and Massetti 
2013). Conversely, scholars on party competition in multi-level contexts often analyse 
in more detail the nature of competition between SNRPs and SWPs. Their conclusions 
however tend to focus on the intra-party effects of such competition rather than 
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focusing on the overall effects of competition between parties on constitutional 
change.  
This thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between party competition and 
demands for constitutional change by analysing a highly relevant case study in depth. 
The dynamics of party competition in Catalonia provide a successful explanation to 
the escalation of territorial demands occurred in the last decade, and the validity of the 
explanation will be complemented by looking at the effect of party competition on the 





2.1. The Dependent Variable: Territorial Demands 
The dependent variable in this study is ‘territorial demands.’ Several typologies exist 
in the literature classifying peripheral nationalist movements’ demands related to 
different spheres: economic, cultural, and political, as explained in the previous 
chapter. Territorial demands may range from a scope of individual rights –e.g. cultural 
demands such as allowing individuals to communicate with the government in a 
minority language– to concessions that are essentially collective in nature, namely 
political demands for autonomous institutions to represent and articulate the interests 
of the peripheral national community. 
I define territorial demands as any claim raised by a political party for territorial rights 
or empowerment in the cultural, fiscal, symbolic or governmental domains. This 
definition is broad enough to include demands for constitutional change towards 
increasing the powers of sub-state self-governing institutions; but it also includes 
demands in the other domains that might not necessarily imply a formal change of the 
constitution. These may include fiscal or economic claims such as a demand for a 
rearrangement of fiscal resources or a decrease in the amount of interregional solidarity 
funds; cultural demands like the recognition of the use of a minority language in state-
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wide institutions; or symbolic elements like the recognition of the national character 
of the stateless nation in a multinational state.  
Demands can therefore be grouped in four ‘domains.’ First, cultural demands are 
particularly important, especially for actors in sub-state nations with a distinct 
(minority) language (Hepburn 2009: 483). Cultural demands, and particularly issues 
regarding language, are especially relevant in Flanders and Catalonia, where the Dutch 
and Catalan languages coexist with French –especially in and around Brussels– and 
Spanish, respectively.  
Second, fiscal demands include demands for fiscal autonomy, that is, control of the 
sub-state budget, the creation and management of taxes, and tax-collecting (van 
Houten 2004: 4-5). According to Jeffery, ‘[f]inance is an easily politicized issue that 
has potent capacity to divide, to set the centre against the regions and the regions 
against each other’ (2003: 183). Precisely because of the delicacy of fiscal matters, 
solidarity transfers between regions produce conflicts, especially when stateless 
nations excessively contribute to the other regions’ economic development. Thus, 
demands for a fairer –and a more transparent– system of interregional solidarity will 
be also taken into account.  
Third, symbolic demands include a formal recognition of the stateless nations as a 
special or differentiated ‘national community’ within the multinational state (Keating 
2001b: 102). This claim to national recognition is usually accompanied by a demand 
for special status, which creates a certain degree of asymmetry within the institutional 
framework of the decentralised state (McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 191).  
Last, but certainly not least, are governmental demands which imply transfers of 
authority from the central government to the sub-state institutions. Given that some 
sub-state governments already have substantial autonomy in many areas of public 
policy, parties that demand extended powers focus on constitutional change that would 
enable the sub-state government to take responsibility for increased competences, 
leaving only a handful of competences to the central government, such as defence, 
foreign affairs, and macro-economic policy. Inevitably, further powers for the sub-
state parliaments and governments do include fiscal powers, which could be placed in 
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two of my categories. In any case, these kind of demands will focus on the political 
parties’ aims at extending their ‘internal’ powers, which can be achieved by ‘forms of 
autonomy within contemporary Europe that amount to something less than secession’ 
(Hepburn 2009: 488). Yet, under the premises of extending –or maximising– internal 
powers, the option of secession or independence might also be considered as a 
governmental demand since it represents the most extreme form of constitutional 
change. The clearest effects of secession would undoubtedly be territorial, although it 
is true, as van Houten (2007: 548) suggests, that ‘secessionist demands include by 
definition all […] other forms of demands, as the creation of an independent state 
would imply the transfer of all competencies’ to the new state. 
The classification of territorial demands in these four domains allows the researcher to 
analytically separate different kinds of demands. However, as van Houten’s example 
of the demand for secession shows, political parties can put forward territorial 
demands that include claims in more than one particular domain. Secession is a clear-
cut example, but demands for further fiscal powers may be justified by the specific 
distinctiveness of the stateless nation, thus adding symbolic demands to those of a 
more fiscal and economic nature. Similarly, demands for further autonomous powers 
in education policy may be justified by strengthening the role of a minority language 
in the education system, which results in the amalgamation of cultural and 
governmental demands. Put simply, territorial demands may be accumulated.  
Territorial demands have a complex nature as a result of the different domains 
embodied in them. As a result, it is rather difficult to measure demands in a quantitative 
manner. Certainly, some demands within a single domain are easily measured in a 
quantitative way. For instance, a demand to allocate the entirety of powers related to 
taxes to the sub-state level is more assertive than demanding the allocation to the sub-
state institutions of a specific percentage of the revenues produced by the regional 
income tax. Similarly, a demand for independence is indeed more assertive than claims 
to transfer more fiscal powers. However, the quantitative measurement of territorial 
demands is not always that straightforward. It is certainly difficult to determine 
whether a demand for larger fiscal powers is more assertive than a symbolic 
recognition of the stateless nations’ specific national character; or whether a demand 
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to grant state-wide official status to a minority language is more assertive than 
regionalising social security. As a result, territorial demands will be assessed in a 
qualitative manner, by identifying the particular demands of political parties and 
analysing them in relation to the four domains described above. This qualitative 
measurement of demands will also permit a greater detail of comparative analysis 
between the demands put by one political party and those put forward by its 
competitors, as well as establish links and contrasts between demands posed by 
different parties across different cases. 
 
2.2. Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
This thesis aims at providing a plausible explanation of the ongoing dynamics that lead 
political parties in decentralised stateless nations to put forward more ambitious 
territorial demands. There are three primary factors that may have an impact on the 
continuing high saliency of the territorial debate in multinational contexts. One such 
factor is the manner in which territorial demands are dealt with by central 
governments. When demands are quickly spurned, implacably rejected or even 
violently repressed, it is likely that this kind of central government behaviour may lead 
to a radicalisation of territorial demands from the periphery (Rudolph and Thompson 
1985). On the other hand, positive responses to territorial demands may lead stateless 
nationalists to ask for more. This implies a complicated balance that central 
governments must deal with. The rejection of demands, broken promises, or 
conversely a carte blanche to the nationalists’ aspirations can all impact the evolution 
of further territorial demands, and therefore central governments’ territorial strategies 
are a very important factor in explaining the dynamics of territorial demands from the 
periphery. 
Second, sub-state political parties are channels of representation of the sub-state 
population: ‘They are an instrument, or an agency, for representing the people by 
expressing their demands’ (Sartori 1976: 27, original italics). In stateless nations, a 
substantial part of the population do have a sort of differentiated national identity 
(Guibernau 1999). Furthermore, the territorial cleavage in such contexts tends to be 
rather important and voters tend to have positive views on self-government, and 
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support for independence may not be irrelevant. In such contexts, political parties will 
have to adapt their message in order to maximise their electoral appeal by emphasising 
issues related to sub-state national identity and regional self-government. Due to the 
representative nature of political parties, if a substantive change on the constitutional 
preferences of the population occurs, it may motivate an adaptation of the parties’ 
message(s), especially of those vote-maximising parties that aim to be the best 
representatives of the interests of a majority of the population.  
Notwithstanding the important effect of these two factors in explaining the dynamics 
of territorial demands, the argument of this thesis highlights a third factor –party 
competition– as the main explanatory variable for this phenomenon. Political parties 
react to all the previous enumerated factors when designing the territorial and 
constitutional horizons for the stateless political community, and certainly contextual 
changes may lead political parties to adapt or revise their territorial strategy and goals. 
However, party objectives cannot be analysed independently of the actions and 
discourses of its political competitors. A political party comfortably in power at the 
sub-state level may not have incentives to vary its territorial discourse even if the 
central government shuts down the possibility of further devolution or there is a 
substantial, albeit limited, support for independence amongst the population. However, 
if a secessionist party capitalises on that and becomes a real challenger for power, the 
party in power may be forced to adapt to new circumstances and modify its political 
discourse by increasing its territorial ambitions. In this sense, party competition is 
identified as the main independent variable in this research, whereas central 
governments’ territorial management strategies and public opinion will also be 
included in the analysis as intervening variables. 
 
2.2.1.Party Competition as the Main Driver of Territorial Demands 
Political decentralisation in multinational states creates a new arena for party 
competition, that of the sub-state level, in which political parties compete for votes, 
office, and influence in the sub-state institutions, most notably regional parliaments 
and governments. As a result of decentralisation, the meso-level of party politics 
constitutes its own sub-state party system, which may or may not be different from the 
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existing party system in the state-wide political arena. A party system is ‘the system of 
interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question 
bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function […] 
of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties’ (Sartori 
1976: 44, original italics). In stateless nations, an important element of interaction 
between political parties is the territorial cleavage, which is determinant in shaping the 
party system by territory and stateless nationalism being the main raison d’être for a 
specific type of political parties present in such contexts, the SNRPs. 
However, SNRPs are not the only political parties present in stateless nations. SWPs 
operate and run for election throughout the territory of the state. Party systems in 
stateless nations thus contain both SNRPs and SWPs which compete for votes not only 
on the traditional left–right dimension but also on a territorial basis. On the latter 
dimension, parties state their views on the current territorial structure of the state and 
the constitutional status of the stateless nation. Because of this bi-dimensional cleavage 
structure, involving both socio-economic and territorial issues, sub-state party systems 
tend to be quasi-autonomous from state-wide party systems (De Winter 1998a: 243), 
with a different agenda, a different composition and different dynamics. All these 
treats influence the positioning of political parties in both the left–right and centre–
periphery axes. As Thorlakson rightly states, ‘[p]arties are affected by their 
competitors as they shape party strategies and define themselves in response to 
opposition, including the number and ideological position of their political opponents’ 
(Thorlakson 2006: 39).  
Party competition seems of vital importance to understand the positioning of each 
party in the territorial cleavage. The interactions between parties that define the nature 
of the party system respond, in particular, to the parties’ competing views on the 
constitution and the degree of self-government that the stateless nation should have. In 
this regard, two dimensions of party competition are relevant. On the one hand, the 
competition between SNRPs and SWPs, with the former championing the stateless 
nations’ interests and national character while the latter aim at satisfying those interests 
within the wider framework of a larger state. On the other hand, there may exist more 
than one SNRP in a given context. In such a case, party competition on the territorial 
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issue may be fierce as well between SNRPs, with these parties competing to claim the 
role as the best spokespeople for the stateless national community.  
Although the party system is specific of each stateless nation, the political process in 
multi-level states is inevitably linked to state-wide politics. As a result, party 
competition occurs at two levels. At the sub-state level parties –both SNRPs and 
SWPs– compete for votes and office at that level. However, party competition in 
stateless nations also affects party politics at the state level. In this sense, SNRPs may 
put forward a claim to better represent the stateless nation’s interests in the central 
state institutions, whereas SWPs may argue that the most useful tool to represent such 
territorial interest is precisely by empowering them, since SWPs are the better 
positioned actors to reach office at the central level. Therefore, party competition in 
stateless nations has a dual character: competition for office and to claim the 
representative role at the sub-state level, but also a multi-level element including 
competitive views on territorial representation at the centre and views of how the 
multi-national state should be organised territorially. 
 
Party Competition 
The presence of a SNRP in a stateless nation introduces a substantial variation to the 
territory’s party system compared to the state-wide party system and it will arguably 
increase the saliency of the territorial question. Furthermore, the presence of more than 
one of this kind of parties might make territorial demands increase in the long-term 
(Massetti 2009: 515; van Houten 2007: 561). The reasoning underlying this 
assumption is that since SNRPs are competing against each other, they have to 
differentiate themselves from their nationalist competitors in several aspects, and 
provided that SNRPs consider territory and the stateless nations as their most 
characteristic features, it is arguable that such parties will try to distance themselves 
from their competitors by increasing its territorial demands.  
In order for SNRPs to affect party competition, these parties must pose an electoral 
threat to the SWPs. Such a threat does not necessarily require that a SNRP be the first 
party in a given context. When such a SNRP has the potential to become a government 
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party –either on its own or by establishing a coalition with another party– it is more 
likely that its presence and the prospect of being in government affects party 
competition on the territorial question. When SWPs are threatened by SNRPs they will 
try to incorporate elements of the latter’s discourse, which include the adoption of a 
certain degree of defence of the stateless nation’s self-government (Detterbeck and 
Hepburn 2010; Swenden and Maddens 2009). As a result, the saliency of territory in 
the political debate will be consolidated and demands on aggregate will increase –i.e. 
the SNRPs demanding more autonomous powers with the SWPs countering this by 
demanding some powers as well as to limit the electoral appeal of the stateless 
nationalists. 
Political decentralisation and the electoral success of SNRPs have allowed them to be 
in office at the sub-state level. Many SNRPs have participated in sub-state executives, 
either alone or in coalition with other parties (Hepburn 2009: 478). Being in office 
clearly strengthens the claims for constitutional change from political parties, since 
parties add to the legitimacy of ruling the sub-state institutions more visibility both 
internally –within the stateless nation– and externally –within the state as a whole. As 
van Houten (2007: 554) states, ‘demands made by governing politicians provide more 
challenging and consequential pressures for state restructuring than demands by 
oppositional politicians.’  
Not only SNRPs in power give more visibility and strength to territorial demands. 
Parties in the opposition may try to challenge the party in power by stressing the 
territorial component of the political debate. This can be attempted by the opposition 
either as an attempt to outflank the territorial aims of the party/parties in government 
or to counterbalance the government’s support from the voters on territorial grounds. 
As we shall see in the empirical chapters, both SWPs and SNRPs can do that while in 
opposition to SNRPs.  
Competition with SNRPs has important effects on the internal organisation and 
discourse coherence of SWPs, whose branches might see their autonomy curtailed 
especially when their state-wide partner holds office at the central level (Fabre and 
Méndez-Lago 2009: 117; Swenden and Maddens 2009: 22). The reasoning for this is 
that SWPs at the central level value congruence between the two tiers of government 
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and want to appear to the public across the state as a cohesive and internally strong 
party. However, this attitude might endanger the electoral chances of the SWP branch 
competing in a stateless nation with SNRPs (Hepburn 2009: 491). As a result, party 
politics at the state-wide level also matter when analysing the dynamics of territorial 
demands in specific stateless nations. A SWP regional branch might be eager to 
demand constitutional change when its central party is in the opposition but may have 
this strategy backfire if by the time the SWP has reached office at the central level is 
not able to deliver what was promised.  
As a result of party competition –including the presence and influence that SNRPs 
have in the party system, the weakness of parties in opposition to SNRPs, and the 
effects of sub-state competition on the organisational structures of state-wide parties– 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) is presented: 
H1. Strong SNRPs increase the saliency of the territorial issue, especially if they hold 
office. Especially if they are in opposition, SWPs will counter SNRPs proposals with 
their own to be more appealing to voters, which may require decentralising power to 
sub-state branches of the party, and as a consequence territorial demands will 
increase. 
 
State Accommodation Strategies 
An intervening factor in territorial party competition is the efforts made by the state to 
accommodate sub-state territorial demands.  
An effective accommodation of national diversity within a state requires that almost 
all the citizens of the federation feel comfortable in terms of identity regardless of the 
national group they feel they belong to (Requejo 2004: 264). Although dichotomies 
between good/bad or successful/unsuccessful accommodation strategies of the 
plurinationality of the state are tricky, it seems reasonable to think that providing some 
sort of national recognition of the stateless nations would make the inhabitants ‘feel 
more comfortable’ in the wider polity (Watts 2007: 244-5). Moreno argues (2001a: 
202) that federalism is a good strategy to achieve this aim because ‘regional devolution 
and federalization aim to articulate an institutional response to the stimuli of a plural 
61 
 
society comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, history or 
traditions.’ However, federalism may not be enough because it requires structures that 
are thought to be applied uniformly across the regions of the state (Keating 2001a: 51), 
and thus some form of asymmetric recognition seems to be necessary. 
However, asymmetry might potentially lead to differences between citizens from the 
minorities and the majority, for example on the services they receive, such as 
education, subsidies, health care, etc. (Jeffery 2003: 188). These imbalances may 
encourage citizens from the majority nation to demand to be treated equally to the 
citizens of the minority, which in turn will stress their distinctiveness and will want a 
special treatment. This pattern generates a centrifugal dynamic between minority 
nations and –other regions of– the majority nation which compete for further regional 
powers and privileges (L. M. Anderson 2010: 135; Benz and Colino 2011: 395). In 
contexts where this centrifugal dynamic prevails, SWPs in government will try to 
avoid too many asymmetries within the system since that will threaten their electoral 
prospects in the majority nation, since they will be regarded as favouring a minority 
or bending the knee to the minority nationalists’ demands (Brancati 2006: 659). As a 
result, central governments in multinational states that apply a symmetrical logic of 
decentralisation and reject to recognise its internal national plurality will be setting the 
ground for nationalist movements, and specifically for parties in stateless nations to 
demand that their perceived national differences are recognised constitutionally.  
Constitutional change necessarily involves negotiations between the government at the 
centre and the government(s) in the periphery. Negotiations may be more fluid or more 
problematic depending on the party –or parties– in government at the sub-state level 
and its territorial demands on the one hand; and the party –or parties– at the central 
level and its willingness to accommodate the territorial demands raised by the sub-
state government. The characteristics of intergovernmental negotiations between 
governments might have an effect on how sub-state governments phrase their 
territorial demands. A clear example of the effect that bi-lateral negotiations between 
governments have in exacerbating further demands is the importance that central 
governments deliver what was promised –in terms of self-government capacities, 
symbolic recognition, etc.– to the sub-state governments. Not doing so will create 
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resentment amongst the political elite –and perhaps amongst the population as well– 
at the sub-state level and further territorial demands will be raised, both to claim what 
was not initially delivered and through an increased hostility towards the centre for 
unfulfilling its previously agreed commitments (Sorens 2004: 733, 741). Similarly, 
continuous rejection from the central government to negotiate the territorial demands 
raised by the peripheries might encourage the latter to modify their strategy to claim a 
right of self-determination and make more assertive territorial demands (Tully 2001: 
31). 
When relationships between government parties at both levels are tense and 
unproductive, parties in the stateless nation often use a strategy of ‘victimisation,’ 
which consists in criticising the central government and the parties that form it and 
portraying the stateless nation and its government as victims of the central government 
inconsideration (van Houten 2004: 19). This strategy may fuel the sense of territorial 
grievances and lead to fierce competition between the parties supporting the sub-state 
government and the central government party branch. Similarly, this sense of central 
government inconsideration towards peripheral demands may occur when a SWP is in 
power at the sub-state level. In this case, the other parties will be eager to portray the 
regional branch as mere ‘puppets’ of the SWP leadership and try to exploit the sub-
state government lack of delivering constitutional change by presenting themselves as 
more useful political options to deliver territorial change. Hypothesis 2 (H2) relates to 
the effect of central government accommodation strategies on political parties’ 
territorial demands: 
H2. When central government parties do not deliver constitutional change or respond 
to the stateless nations’ concerns for special (asymmetrical) treatment, SNRPs 
(although not just them) will present themselves and the stateless nation as victims of 
central government policy and demand further territorial change. 
 
Public Attitudes on Constitutional Change 
A second intervening factor under consideration is public attitudes on constitutional 
change. Public opinion matters to political party leaders (Fitjar 2010: 8), who, in order 
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to decide what they offer to the electorate on territorial issues, will take into account 
what the ‘median voter’ thinks about the constitutional question (Sorens 2004: 732). 
Conversely, it has been also acknowledged that political leaders can influence public 
opinion (Henderson 2010: 441; Martínez-Herrera 2010: 143, 146) through regionally-
focused media or by implementing certain policies of nation-building. It is therefore 
reasonable to accept that the relationship works both ways (Keating, Loughlin, and 
Deschouwer 2003: 27; Türsan 1998: 6) and that politicians certainly will both try to 
‘convince’ the electorate that their constitutional options are the better for the sub-state 
national community, but will also be ready to modify their territorial aims if they 
perceive that citizens want something different from what the parties are offering. 
Political parties do take into account the constitutional preferences of the citizens and 
they tend to offer extended, even maximised, political autonomy rather than 
independence when the electorate is not overwhelmingly in favour of secession, thus 
acknowledging the territorial preferences of the medium voter (Keating 1988: 240; 
Sorens 2004: 730). Quantitative scholars have argued that the share of vote of SNRPs 
is a good indicator to measure the level of ‘regionalism,’ or ‘nationalism,’ or even 
‘separatism’ of a given territory (Fitjar 2010: 26; Henderson 2010: 443).  
National identity plays a determinant role in justifying territorial demands. In stateless 
nations, which are self-defined ‘nations’ by a wide range of the population and by 
many –if not all– political parties (Erk 2010: 426; Fitjar 2010: 4). The self-definition 
as a nation clearly implies that a certain degree of self-determination goes attached to 
it, meaning that the community can decide its own political future (Keating 2001b: 3). 
However, as Gourevitch (1979: 304) pointed out, ‘regions are not actors, their 
inhabitants are,’ and we need to look at people’s identities to have a clue about the 
characteristics of each nation’s self-consciousness and identity. Dual identities –
people that identify both with the ‘stateless nation’ and the ‘state-nation’– are present 
and significant in all three cases, and although high levels of dual identity in the 
population underpin radical constitutional change –i.e. secession– it does not make 
political accommodation automatic (McEwen and Lecours 2008: 224). Following 
from this, the higher sub-state national identity is in a stateless nation, it is more likely 
that popular demands for enhanced self-government or independence will be also high 
64 
 
(Moreno 2001a: 203). As a result, political parties might react by adapting their 
preferred constitutional horizon to the one preferred by a substantive share of the 
population, as the following hypothesis suggests: 
H3. Broad support for further constitutional change and a strong sub-state national 
identity will encourage political parties to accommodate their demands to the main 
constitutional preference of the electorate and public opinion against secession can 
constrain them. 
Table 1 summarises the three hypotheses of this research linked to each of the three 
variables presented in this section: party competition, state accommodation strategies, 
and public opinion. 
 
Table 1. Explanatory and Intervening Variables 
Variable Hypothesis 
Party Competition 
SNRPs in office will make territorial demands 
more salient. SWPs will make counterproposals 
and decentralise party structures, especially if 
they are in opposition to the SNRP in power 
H1 
State Accommodation 
SNRPs will present themselves and the stateless 
nation as victims of SWPs’ central territorial 
policy if state fails to accommodate territorial 
demands, especially if claims for special 
treatment (asymmetry) are not met. Rejection of 
change leads to emboldened territorial demands. 
H2 
Public Opinion 
Parties will adapt to public constitutional 





3. Methodology: Case Study Analysis 
 
The main aim of this research is to provide an explanation for the ongoing dynamics 
of territorial demands that lead political parties in stateless nations to ask for further 
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constitutional change, even though such territories already enjoy significant self-
governing powers. One way to look at it is in what ways different factors interact in 
the context of a few specific cases to produce an outcome –e.g. claims for more 
political autonomy–, and thus the case study method is indeed very valuable to 
discover, identify or validate the causal mechanisms that produce the outcome that the 
researcher wants to study (Bennett and Elman 2006: 459; Gerring 2004: 348). Case 
study analysis is a common method in political science, and most particularly in the 
field of comparative politics (Peters 1998: 137), which consist of an in-depth analysis 
of a single unit or case ‘to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena’ 
(Gerring 2004: 341). In this sense, it has been argued that doing qualitative research in 
a case that is ‘intensively examined’ (Lijphart 1971: 691) facilitates a causes-of-effects 
approach that might be satisfactory ‘in explaining the outcome of a particular case or 
a few cases’ (Bennett and Elman 2006: 458). A case is ‘an instance of a class of 
events,’ which ‘refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest […] with the aim of 
developing theory’ (George and Bennett 2005: 17-8). The type of event that this study 
focuses on is the persistence of territorial demands in stateless nations and in particular 
the role that political party competition plays in explaining the dynamics that lead to 
the persistence of territorial demands in decentralised stateless nations.  
Case studies might provide a basis for generalisation to other similar cases if we choose 
the crucial cases (Gerring 2004: 341-2; Lijphart 1971: 692). Similarly, the comparative 
logic used to move across different contexts can provide the sufficient scope to 
generalise the explanation of the phenomena under study (Mason 2006: 17). It is even 
desirable to have generalisation –the extrapolation of the findings in the cases studied 
to a wider set of cases– as a goal, and therefore we should aim to select as many cases 
as possible (Peters 1998: 32). This is not always possible due to several restrictions –
e.g. funding, time, data available– and  thus we need to be really cautious about 
generalising from a small set of cases (Bennett and Elman 2006: 473). However, 
studying a small number of cases and aggregating their results to make a coherent 
theoretical argument could permit the accumulation of extensive case material into a 
theoretical structure (Peters 1998: 138). In the context of this research, this means that 
the analysis of territorial demands in certain cases that are specifically selected will 
not explain the nature of the demands in every other single case, but could potentially 
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explain certain aspects of the self-government claims and the importance of party 
competition as the main explanatory factor of this phenomenon. The analysis of the 
effect of party competition on territorial demands in a small number of cases is most 
appropriate, since ‘[c]ase studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in 
individual cases in detail,’ and therefore allow the researcher to ‘look at a large number 
of intervening variables and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the 
operation of a particular causal mechanism or help identify what conditions present in 
a case activate the causal mechanism’ (George and Bennett 2005: 21).  
In order to better comprehend the nature and dynamics that have boosted territorial 
demands it is worth considering more than one case. As Mason puts it, ‘a qualitative 
comparative logic works by seeking to understand the distinctive dynamics, mechanics 
and particularity of each case’ (2006: 16), and thus the comparative method is also 
helpful to analyse the nature of the existing demands in a stateless nation vis-à-vis 
other comparable cases. However, the number of decentralised multinational states is 
quite limited (Gagnon 2007; Keating 1988; Requejo 2003; Rokkan and Urwin 1983; 
Rudolph and Thompson 1989) and therefore only a few cases are available. When the 
number of cases is small, then the comparative method is appropriate (Lijphart 1971: 
684-5). The use of comparative techniques will be helpful to understand the nature and 
persistence of parties’ demands for more self-government with the aim to provide an 
explanation of why demands have not stopped after territorial decentralisation by 
carrying out an in-depth study of a small number of cases combined with explicit cross-
unit analysis. In sum, I will be analysing a relatively small number of cases, which is 
not an uncommon procedure in political research, since ‘the case study method can 
and should be closely connected to the comparative method’ and ‘case studies can 
even be considered implicit parts of the comparative method’ (Lijphart 1971: 691). 
The main case study of this research is Catalonia, but the analysis of the role of party 
competition in boosting territorial demands will be complemented with cross-case 
comparisons with two similar contexts: Flanders and Scotland. The comparative 
dimension of the study will strengthen the analysis by testing our hypotheses in a small 
number of cases, which will make the results of the primary case-study more robust, 
‘since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences 
from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case and cross-case 
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comparisons within a single study or research program’ (George and Bennett 2005: 
18). 
This research design presents three limitations. First, the number of selected cases for 
this type of qualitative analysis needs to be small and thus there is the issue of the 
small-N problem: too many variables and too few cases (Lijphart 1971: 685), which 
makes it almost impossible to control for all the intervening variables in the process. 
A cross-unit study implies extra difficulties and costs, such as money, time and 
learning new languages (Gerring 2004: 353) that need to be adapted to the scope of a 
doctoral research. This is why just three cases will be analysed. As Gerring puts it, 
there is a trade-off between representativeness –considering many cases– and 
comparability –having cases relatively homogeneous– that is intrinsic to the case study 
research design (Gerring 2004: 348), or to put it differently, there is a trade-off between 
knowing less about more and knowing more about less.  
Secondly, I select my cases on the outcome of my dependent variable, that is, I only 
consider stateless nations where territorial demands have persisted. Case selection on 
the dependent variable has been criticised (Bennett and Elman 2006: 460), but ‘like 
most sins it is one that is practised frequently’ (Peters 1998: 31). However, ‘selecting 
on a positive value on the dependent variable may provide strong inferences on the 
validity of the theory’ (Bennett and Elman 2006: 462), which translated to my research 
topic would imply that if demands have not ceased in all three cases and if some 
common factors exist, these might be the possible explanations of why demands have 
not stopped. The purpose of this study though is not to determine when party 
competition boosts territorial demands and when it does not. The objective is to 
provide an explanation of the mechanisms and dynamics that lead political parties in 
some cases to put forward further territorial demands, which is grounded on the 
competitive relationship between parties in the territorial arena. 
Thirdly, the three cases will have a different weight in the analysis. As stated above, 
the main case study of this research is Catalonia. This presents a clear limitation to the 
generalisability of the results. However, the inclusion of the Flemish and Scottish 
cases, even if in a secondary role, will help us understand the dynamics of territorial 
demands in such contexts by analysing the effects of the variables under study in each 
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case. Thus, the two complementary cases will help us to better understand how party 
competition plays a predominant role in explaining the ongoing territorial demands 
posed by political parties in Catalonia. As a result of this research design, the bulk of 
the analysis focus on the Catalan case whereas the two other cases will be dealt with 
jointly in Chapter 7, alongside cross comparisons with the evidence on the Catalan 
case provided in the previous chapters. Albeit this limitation hinders our ability to 
generalise from our results, both regarding to the whole universe of stateless nations 
and in particular to the Scottish and Flemish cases, the comparison will nevertheless 
become very useful to better understand the existent dynamics of territorial demands 
in Catalonia. 
 
3.1. Case Studies: Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland 
The main case study of this research is Catalonia. Political decentralisation following 
Spain’s democratic transition was aimed at providing some degree of political 
autonomy to Catalonia –alongside other stateless nations within Spain– to 
accommodate the country’s territorial and national diversity. The constitutional status 
quo was eventually questioned and a wide majority of the Catalan Parliament 
demanded a reform of the Statute of Autonomy, which has led to an escalation of 
territorial demands up to the call for a referendum on independence. The effect that 
party competition has had in launching the increasing dynamics of territorial demands 
in the Catalan case will be complemented by an analysis of two similar cases where 
territorial demands have also been enhanced in the last decade.  
In Scotland, political decentralisation was marked by the re-establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999. The electoral victories of the SNP, though, have led to a 
revision of the constitutional settlement and eventually to a referendum on Scotland’s 
independence held in September 2014. Similarly, SNRPs in Flanders have also 
recorded substantial gains in recent years and territorial disputes between French- and 
Dutch-speaking parties have produced two governmental deadlocks between 2007 and 
2010. The horizon for a definite territorial settlement –ruling out independence– is not 
near in any of the three cases, and thus the analysis of these three specific cases seems 
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appropriate to better understand which are the dynamics that lead political parties to 
put forward further territorial claims. 
 
3.1.1.Catalonia 
Catalan nationalism grew during the second half of the 19th century consolidating 
Catalan identity around language, territory, and a history that included a long tradition 
of self-government until 1714, when the Catalan Generalitat was abolished by the 
Bourbon king Phillip V following the War of Spanish Succession. The Spanish, 
Castilian-centred nation-building process was never entirely completed and Catalan 
language and identity persisted, providing the cultural grounds for Catalan nationalism 
to flourish and turn political, with modest demands for autonomy already present at 
the turn of the 20th century. Catalan nationalism was also espoused by some political 
parties, most notably the Lliga Regionalista, or Regionalist League, that campaigned 
for Catalan autonomy within Spain. Self-government institutions were first granted 
after 1714 in the form of the short-lived Mancomunitat de Catalunya or Catalan 
Commonwealth, an amalgamation of Catalonia’s four provinces with limited 
autonomous powers. The convulse history of democracy in Spain saw the 
Mancomunitat quickly abolished during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in 
the 1920s, but Catalan self-government was re-introduced following the proclamation 
of Spain’s Second Republic in 1931, with a Catalan Statute of Autonomy passed in 
1932 which led to the re-establishment of the Catalan Generalitat. Yet, Catalan self-
government did not last long: Catalan autonomy was suspended and the President of 
the Generalitat imprisoned in 1934; and although self-government was restored in 
1936, the breakout of the Spanish Civil War resulted in the victory of the Spanish 
Nationalists and a 39-year long dictatorship by General Franco, based on 
authoritarianism, Catholicism, and exacerbated Spanish nationalism. All sub-state 
institutions, most notably the Catalan Generalitat, were supressed and all regional 
languages and symbols of sub-state identities were banned and heavily repressed.  
Nevertheless, Franco’s dictatorship did not crush Catalan identity and Catalan 
nationalism showed public strength during the transition to democracy following the 
dictator’s death in 1975. Catalan nationalist parties run in the first democratic election 
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of 1977 and other state-wide parties in Catalonia, most notably the Catalan Socialists 
and the Catalan Communists, had significant intra-party autonomy and thoroughly 
campaigned for self-government. Spain’s democratic constitution of 1978 recognised 
the right to autonomy of regions and nationalities, which paved the way to the approval 
of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 and the new re-establishment of self-
government with the Catalan Generalitat, including a regional executive and 
parliament with considerable powers. 
The first Catalan election of 1980 resulted in the victory of Convergència i Unió (CiU), 
a moderate Catalan centre-right nationalist party that has won every single election  
–in votes– in Catalonia since then. CiU was in power at the sub-state level 
uninterruptedly until 2003. Another nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC), of a centre-left ideology, has been supporting Catalonia’s 
independence since 1992, although its electoral gains were limited up until 2003 when 
they got an extra ten seats in Parliament and joined a centre-left tripartite coalition to 
oust CiU from power. The other two leftist parties in that coalition are formally state-
wide parties but with a quite substantial autonomy from their state-wide sister parties. 
The Catalan Socialists (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya–Verds (ICV) have been 
traditional proponents of federalism in Spain and supported increased powers for the 
Catalan institutions. A party system with two Catalan nationalist parties and two SWPs 
supporting enhanced autonomy for Catalonia led to a 2003 Catalan election which 
resolved mainly around the demand for a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. A 
reform proposal, hotly debated but eventually agreed between these four parties, was 
voted in the Catalan Parliament in September 2005, receiving the combined support of 
around 90% of the representatives –the only party voting against the reform was the 
Catalan branch of the Spanish right-wing party, the Partido Popular (PP). 
After a long process of negotiation in the Spanish parliament, the Catalans supported 
a Statute reform in a referendum held in 2006 that did not recognise the national 
character of Catalonia and came short on the self-government powers from what was 
agreed in the Catalan parliament (Requejo 2010b). The Spanish-wide PP challenged 
the new Statute to Spain’s Constitutional Court on the grounds that the new self-
government powers granted to Catalonia went beyond the limits of the Constitution. 
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The Court eventually ruled 14 articles as unconstitutional, which provoked a massive 
response in a demonstration led by the Catalan government and supported by the main 
Catalanist political parties on July 10th 2010 in Barcelona. The subsequent Catalan 
election in November 2010 saw a clear victory of CiU, which claimed during the 
campaign that the Catalan government would demand further fiscal autonomy as a first 
step of what Artur Mas, CiU’s presidential candidate and current President of the 
Catalan executive, called the ‘road to the right to decide’ in a ‘national transition.’ 
After the demand for further fiscal powers was outwardly rejected by the central 
government, CiU called for a snap election in which the party put forward a more 
assertive –and challenging– territorial demand: the holding of a referendum on 
Catalonia’s independence. 
The events of the last decade in Catalonia are of a notorious political and academic 
interest. Public support for independence and the electoral strength of ERC were rather 
law in 2003, when even this pro-independence party was adamant to engage and 
support the new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. In 2014 three parties demanded a 
referendum on independence –CiU, ERC, and ICV; whereas the PSC had a somewhat 
ambivalent position, i.e. the party supported a constitutional referendum but not on 
independence. This substantial switch in the parties’ constitutional aims is 
corresponded by a substantial increase in public support for independence, while the 
Spanish state institutions’ dealing of the Catalan Statute reform most surely accounts 
for a great deal in the current episode of territorial tension. However, the Catalan case 
is most relevant to analyse the dynamics of party competition in generating aggregated 
demands for constitutional change. The substantial increase of territorial demands 
experienced in Catalonia mainly responds to the progressive increase of the territorial 
ambitions of CiU, with this party facing huge competition both by the PSC and ERC 
and having to respond to its ousting of office following the 2003 election. The analysis 
of how party competition dynamics have worked in Catalonia will shed light on the 




3.1.2.Flanders and Scotland 
When Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830 the established border responded 
to religious issues –Belgium was largely a Catholic country while the Netherlands 
were mainly Protestant; whereas the language border between French- and Dutch-
speakers was placed further south, effectively dividing Belgium in half. However, 
language was not only territorially divided in Belgium but also in terms of class, with 
French being the language of the elites and Dutch being the language of the populace 
in the north of the country. Flemish identity and nationalism grew around Flemish 
language and the ‘Flemish Movement’ campaigned in the turn of the century for a 
fairer recognition of Dutch language in the Belgian state. However, until the Second 
World War religion, not territory, was the most salient cleavage in Belgium (Witte, 
Craeybeckx, and Meynen 2009), and the country was largely ruled in a consociational 
manner with elite-driven pacts between the three socio-political pillars, spearheaded 
by the three traditional parties: the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists, and the 
Liberals (Lijphart 1981). After the war, however, the settling of the Royal question 
took a territorial dimension with the king’s return being supported in Flanders but 
largely opposed in Wallonia; and the resolution of the secular cleavage with the School 
Pact of 1958 led to an increased prominence of the territorial question. The Volksunie 
(VU), or People’s Union, was a small nationalist party that started receiving electoral 
support through the 1960s. The escalation of territorial tensions between French- and 
Dutch-speakers led eventually to the split of the three Belgian traditional parties. This 
split gave free hands to the Flemish wings of the traditional parties to challenge the 
VU’s demands for federalisation by demanding constitutional reform on their own.  
As a result of the effective split of Belgium’s party system, the country has transformed 
from a unitary state to a formal federation (L. Hooghe 2004: 55) where the Flemish 
and the Walloons have their own regions and linguistic communities with their 
respective institutions. Yet, territorial conflict has not disappeared entirely. The 
bilingual status of Brussels and its neighbouring municipalities, where Francophone 
minorities have settled in Flemish territory and want to keep their linguistic rights is 
still a salient matter of political discussion between parties north and south of the 
language border (L. Hooghe 2003). Conflict about the linguistic status of Brussels 
surrounding municipalities, the rights of the francophone minority, and a possible 
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redrawing of the boundary of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) district kept a 
deadlock in the federal government without an agreement between Flemish and 
Walloon parties to constitute a federal executive for more than 500 days after the 2010 
federal election (Govaert 2012). This agreement included a demand of the Flemish 
parties to carry on a new constitutional reform and the Francophone parties eventually 
agreeing to the split the BHV electoral constituency.  
The success of the secessionist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), ranking first in 
Flanders and consequently in Belgium conditioned the political debate and the party 
has been campaigning for independence in the long term, while further decentralisation 
is aimed in the short term. Following the regional and federal election of 2014, the N-
VA retained its position as the first party in Belgium while also securing office as the 
first party in the Flemish Parliament.  
Scotland has a long history as an independent kingdom going back for centuries before 
the parliamentary union with England of 1707. Albeit the Scottish Parliament voted 
its own dissolution, the Act of Union granted the persistence of several idiosyncratic 
Scottish institutions of the civil society, such as the law, education, and religion. 
Scottish identity remained and developed while there was no significant attempt by the 
British state to Anglicise Scotland (Keating 2001a). British governments were 
traditionally pragmatic when implementing policy in Scotland by granting a 
substantial degree of local autonomy, while specific institutional arrangements, such 
as administrative devolution in the form of the Scottish Office were implemented to 
better execute public policy in the country.  
The SNP, the main SNRP in Scotland, was founded in 1934 and rapidly set, after some 
vociferous internal debates, its main territorial goal to achieve Scotland’s 
independence (Finlay 1994). However, Scottish nationalism was broadly spread 
amongst other parties in which support for the union was seen as the best way to serve 
Scotland’s interests (Kidd 2008). The electoral breakthrough of the SNP in the 1960s 
posed an electoral threat to the Labour Party, which attempted a half-hearted attempt 
to implement legislative devolution in Scotland in the 1970s. The requirement of 
devolution to be backed by at least 40% of the population in a referendum in 1979 was 
not met following a highly divided campaign, and the election of a Conservative 
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government in Westminster settled the issue of devolution for the time being. 
Conservative policies undertaken by Mrs. Thatcher’s government became highly 
unpopular in Scotland and the Scottish Conservatives suffered a steady decline in their 
electoral fortunes north of the border. This represented a democratic deficit, as claimed 
by the Scottish Constitutional Convention, resulting from Conservative policies being 
implemented in Scotland with received little electoral support. The Convention re-
opened the path to legislative devolution with the support of the Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, and Labour agreed to re-establish the Scottish Parliament in case of victory 
after the 1997 British General Election.  
The electoral victory of Labour led to a quick referendum on the issue of devolution 
which received ample support in Scotland following a rather more united campaign, 
with Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the SNP, supporting a Scottish Parliament. 
The re-opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 returned a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, but the SNP established itself as the main competitor of Labour 
for office. The SNP, which never stopped campaigning in favour of Scottish 
independence, eventually won the Scottish Parliament election of 2007, with the 
promise to hold a referendum on the issue. 
As a result of the 2007 election victory of the SNP, the unionist parties –Labour, the 
Conservatives, and the Liberal-Democrats– created a Commission on Scottish 
Devolution that reported that further autonomy –most notably fiscal autonomy– should 
be given to Holyrood. The unexpected victory of the nationalists with an overall 
majority in the last Scottish election opened the way for a referendum on Scotland’s 
independence to be held on 18 September 2014.  
Scotland is also a highly relevant case in order to analyse the effects of party 
competition on territorial demands. In a timespan of fifteen years Scotland has had two 
referendums: the first to implement legislative autonomy and the second to decide on 
the country’s independence from the UK. The electoral success of the pro-
independence SNP prompted the unionist parties to evaluate the working of devolution 
and to suggest further transfers of powers to the Scottish Parliament. The debate on 
devolution has been further enhanced by the overall majority achieved by the SNP 
which led to the call of a referendum on independence. Not surprisingly, the territorial 
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debate became most salient under such a scenario but the parties that defend Scotland’s 
permanency in the UK put forward proposals to enhance the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament to secure a ‘No’ vote in September 2014. After the rejection of 
independence at the polls, constitutional change will continue in Scotland following 
the promises of the unionist parties for more devolution. The analysis of party 
competition in the Scottish case will therefore contribute to identify the dynamics that 
have led to this myriad of constitutional proposals. 
 
3.2. Case Choice Justification 
These three cases are Western liberal democracies with a multinational composition 
and a decentralised territorial organisation of the state. Other similarities, apart from 
the existence of demands for more self-government, are that the three states are 
members of the European Union and that their political systems are constitutional 
monarchies. Furthermore, the populations in the stateless nations chosen for the 
analysis show a high level of duality of both the cultural/national and state identities. 
The territorial cleavage is highly salient in the three cases, with substantive demands 
being put forward and renegotiated, and some sort of constitutional change delivered 
in the recent past. Demands have not stopped, though, and political parties do 
campaign and confront each other on their desired constitutional status for the stateless 
nation.  
The three cases consist of party systems that contain both SNRPs and SWPs, in which 
the former either hold or have held office and are front runners at the sub-state level in 
every election. Party competition is defined by the struggle between –at least– one 
SNRP and a SWP. However, the three cases present substantial variation amongst 
themselves, which will increase the validity of the comparison. There is fierce 
competition between SNRPs in Catalonia with CiU and ERC dominating the Catalan 
nationalist ground. In Flanders, the N-VA has competition in the Vlaams Belang (VB), 
but also faces strong competition by the Flemish traditional parties. After the split of 
the main Belgian parties, the three Flemish traditional parties –Christian-Democrats, 
Socialists, and Liberals– have accentuated their regionalist profiles. In Scotland, by 
contrast, the SNP is the only relevant SNRP. 
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The three cases also vary in terms of their territorial organisation. Spain is a 
regionalised state with decentralistion applied tout court in a rather symmetric fashion 
and no specific recognition of Catalonia’s national status. Belgium is a fully-fledged 
federation of regions and communities, with the particularity that is basically a dual 
federation of Flemish- and French-speakers. The UK is a regionalised state but highly 
asymmetrical, with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland having devolved 
institutions, but no self-government is devolved to England as a whole or the English 
regions. National recognition is given easily to the UK constituent nations, and 
specifically in the Scottish case the right of self-determination is effectively granted 
by Westminster. Public support for self-government varies across cases as well.  
While a majority of Catalans and Scots support further powers for their devolved 
institutions, support for further powers is lower amongst the Flemish. Likewise, 
support for Flanders’ independence is very low compared to moderate support for the 
independence of Catalonia and Scotland. Interestingly, while support for Scotland’s 
independence has been stable for many years, support for independence in Catalonia 
has increased dramatically since 2010. Finally, although the three cases are 
economically sufficient, Catalonia and Flanders contribute a great deal more than 
Scotland does in taxes and solidarity transfers to other regions. Likewise, although 
Scotland’s distinctive culture and traditions are well known, language plays no part 
there as most Scots are English-speakers, notwithstanding the tiny minority of speakers 
of Scottish Gaelic. Conversely, language is one of the most differential elements of 
Catalans and Flemish vis-à-vis Castilian Spanish and Francophone Belgians, 
respectively, and language protection and policy occupy a great deal of the parties’ 
territorial concerns. 
The three cases of Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland have been widely studied in the 
fields of territorial politics, nationalism, and party politics in multi-level contexts. The 
similar characteristics these three cases share allow for a viable comparison between 
them while its differences will also contribute to a better understanding of the 




3.3. Research Timeframe and Research Methods 
This study focuses on the dynamics of territorial demands since the last major phase 
of constitutional change in each case. In Belgium, my analysis focuses on the 
establishment of a formal federation following the 1993 constitutional reform, which 
led to the direct election of regional and community representative bodies 
(Deschouwer 2009b). For the UK, devolution following the 1997 electoral victory of 
the Labour Party and supported by referendum by the Scots is the starting point. 
Finally in Catalonia, the debate around the reform of the Statute of Autonomy, which 
started in 2003, and the eventual conclusion of the reform with the ruling of Spain’s 
Constitutional Court set the ground for the escalation of the most recent demands for 
independence. The analysis since the last episode of constitutional change is 
convenient because it provides a starting point to analyse the evolution leading to the 
current territorial demands posed by political parties.  
The analysis will therefore try to explain the dynamics around party competition in 
each case by means of process-tracing, a technique ‘which attempts to trace the links 
between possible causes and observed outcomes’ (George and Bennett 2005: 6). In 
this case, it is argued that party competition drives territorial demands and the in-depth 
case-study analysis of Catalonia, along with those of Scotland and Flanders, will shed 
light on the specific mechanisms and dynamics of party competition that contribute to 
a progressive escalation of territorial demands in these stateless nations. In order to do 
so, this study relies on a wide range of empirical data consisting of party and 
government documents, election manifestos, and a selection of party leaders’ and 
spokespersons’ statements in the media. Two three-month long fieldwork trips were 
also carried out to Catalonia and Flanders in order to access relevant primary and 
secondary sources for each case, and to conduct semi-structured research interviews 
with party leaders and officials. 
Finally, due to the different weight of the three cases in the analysis more data has 
been gathered and is used in relation to the Catalan case. Unfortunately, some 
restrictions have also undermined the capacity of the researcher to gather a large 
amount of data for the Flemish and Scottish cases. This handicap has inevitably 
contributed to the redesign of this research by incorporating Flanders and Scotland as 
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two minor, complementary cases, instead of carrying out a balanced three-way 
comparison. Due to economic factors, the trip to Flanders was limited to just three 
months and the fact that the researcher is not proficient in Dutch severely undermined 
his capacity to access several documents written in this language. Additionally, 
interviews could only be carried out with members of one party, failing to get 
favourable responses from any of the other parties. This limited the scope of views 
from political actors about the Flemish parties’ role on constitutional change in 
Belgium. Similarly, due to the upcoming of the 18 September 2014 referendum, most 
Scottish politicians contacted to be interviewed by the researcher were unable to 
schedule an interview and thus the data for the Scottish and Flemish cases is mostly 
based on documentary evidence.  
These caveats on data collection undoubtedly had an impact on the generalisability of 
the results of this research for the cases of Flanders and Scotland. This limitation has 
driven the decision to treat these two cases as complementary to the Catalan case, 
which represents the main focus of the analysis and also responds to the author’s main 
research interest. However, even with limitations, the comparative element with 
Scotland and Flanders will help us to better understand the nature of the dynamics of 
territorial demands that are going on in Catalonia, even if such results cannot be 
entirely generalised to Flanders and Scotland, and consequently to other similar cases 
of stateless nations. In any case, though, the amount of data for Catalonia is rich and 
substantial and provides for a consistent base to analyse the role that party competition 




Chapter 4. Political Parties and Territorial 




The accommodation of Catalonia within Spain is a paradigmatic case of how territorial 
decentralisation is implemented to satisfy stateless nations’ demands for self-
government, especially on policy matters that are very relevant to the region’s 
autochthonous culture and language. Political autonomy is however not granted 
unselfishly by the central government, since its ultimate aim is to deter secessionist 
sentiment and foster a solid integration of the stateless nation within the institutional, 
economic, and social frameworks of the state overall. Finding the exact characteristics 
of such agreement is by any means an easy task, which results in both central and 
peripheral actors contesting the status quo: the stateless nationalists tend to demand 
more than what they have got and the central government tends to avoid relinquishing 
any extra powers. Negotiations between the centre and the periphery are therefore 
inevitable and this leads to a dynamic of demand-response-demand that is clearly 
identifiable in the case of Catalonia. 
Ongoing negotiations on the scope and character of Catalan self-government were 
intrinsic to the development of Spain’s decentralisation process, while territorial issues 
and nationalism have played a crucial role both in Catalan and Spanish politics since 
then. Discussions on self-government have been constant since the negotiations 
leading to the passing of Spain’s democratic Constitution. This process used to follow 
a consistent pattern of moderate demands from Catalonia followed by moderate 
responses by the central government up until the demand to reform the Catalan Statute 
of Autonomy in 2003. Before that significant change, territorial discussion was rather 
stable with two clear actors playing the main roles: the Spanish government on one 
side, and the Catalan government, led continuously by moderate Catalan nationalists 
from 1980 until 2003, on the other.  
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The relative stability of the Spanish decentralised system led many scholars to qualify 
it as a ‘success’ in terms of the management of territorial demands from the periphery 
and internal national-cultural diversity (Linz 1993; Moreno 2010). It has been 
therefore argued that Spain is a satisfactory example of the usefulness of federalism 
and federal-like arrangements to accommodate ethnic and national diversity (De 
Schutter 2011; McGarry and O’Leary 2007; 2009; O’Leary 2001; Stepan 1999; 
Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). 
The debate on the usefulness of federal arrangements to accommodate national 
diversity is still an open one (Erk and Anderson 2009), given that decentralisation and 
federalism ‘lead to the strengthening of regional and local orders of government’ (Erk 
and Swenden 2010b: 3) and regional institutions are thus able to provide ‘the 
infrastructure to shape identity-formation’ and ‘may allow secessionism to be 
reproduced’ (Meadwell 2009: 230-1). The Catalan case rightly illustrates the relevance 
of this debate if the events related to the territorial question in the last decade are 
considered. The moderate territorial demands of the Catalan government in the 1990s 
have turned into a demand to hold a self-determination referendum, and support for 
independence among Catalans has recently surpassed 50% according to some opinion 
polls (CEO 2011). The ‘success’ of the Spanish territorial model to accommodate 
Catalan demands for self-government is undeniably under a serious challenge today, 
and the lack of significant demands for change in the 1990s could have been 
erroneously taken as a prove of the successful accommodation of stateless nations by 
the so-called Estado de las Autonomías. 
Although it is of course feasible to attribute the constitutional challenge to Spain’s 
unity partly to the ‘opportunism’ of political elites in promoting secession (Meadwell 
2009), it should also be feasible to attribute part of it to the own dynamics of Spain’s 
decentralisation process. For a start, the symmetrical nature of Spanish 
decentralisation is completely blind to the recognition of the multinational character 
of Spain; and this has less to do with the scope of self-government that is granted to 
non-nationalist regions than to a symbolic recognition of ‘difference,’ the so-called 
‘hecho diferencial.’ ‘For many Catalan […] politicians and opinion-formers, it is less 
the concession of specific powers that matters than the recognition of their distinct 
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national identity’ (Keating 1999: 84). The ‘success’ of the Estado Autonómico was 
taken for granted because decentralisation was effectively accomplished while the 
recognition of the distinct national identities has been traditionally neglected. 
‘Decentralizing a state is not the same as accommodating the distinct national identities 
that coexist within it,’ and in this sense Spain’s ‘Estado de las Autonomías worked 
relatively well when it had to decentralize the previous authoritarian state, but it is a 
model that blurs the landscape when through it one tries to create a rosy picture of the 
recognition and the political accommodation of the multinational character of the state. 
It is somewhat contradictory to treat the different national demoi as though they were 
just ‘Spanish autonomous regions’ like others’ (Requejo 2005: 90, original italics). 
In the following lines the evolution of territorial demands from Catalonia will be 
discussed, as well as the different central governments’ territorial management 
strategies to accommodate them. This evolution fits in the aforementioned dynamic of 
demand-response-demand, which has been in place until Catalan parties kept on 
pushing for more claims after the tortuous reform of the Statute of Autonomy: since 
then, the Spanish government has consistently rejected any further territorial demands 
posed by Catalan nationalists without putting any counteroffer on the negotiation table. 
Section 2 introduces the Catalan political parties and presents their characteristics, 
trajectories and their stance on constitutional issues and their views on Catalan 
nationalism and identity. Section 3 discusses the evolution of Catalan territorial 
demands since Spain’s transition to democracy. This evolution can be divided in five 
phases. The first phase consists of the initial steps of Spain’s decentralisation process: 
the negotiation and approval of Spain’s constitution and the original plan to quickly 
decentralise powers to those regions with a different culture, language, and a strong 
sense of regional identity, which had been heavily repressed during the dictatorship 
(Aja 2001; Montabes 1994). This initial asymmetrical scheme was challenged in the 
early 1980s to expand autonomy to all regions and establish a symmetric decentralised 
organisation of the state. 
In the second phase a substantial increase of territorial demands was produced in a 
context of two successive hung parliaments at the centre, in which Catalan moderate 
nationalists exchanged their support to the Socialist (1993-1996) and Conservative 
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(1996-2000) Spanish governments for more autonomy concessions (Guibernau 2003; 
Keating 1997; van Biezen and Hopkin 2006).  
The third phase represents the end of the exchange of autonomy concessions for 
parliamentary support at the centre when the Catalan moderate nationalists were no 
longer needed to provide parliamentary support in Madrid. The change of political 
alliances at the centre resulted in a period of hostility towards further decentralisation.  
The fourth phase is the direct outcome of such central government hostility towards 
self-government demands from Catalonia. It led to a cross-party venture to reform the 
Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 
Finally, the fifth phase stresses the territorial ongoing dynamic of demand-reform-
demand in Catalonia by presenting the aftermath of the Statute of Autonomy reform 
after the new law was heavily contested politically and eventually watered down by 
Spain’s Constitutional Court. The tumultuous process of self-government reform led 
to a perceived unsatisfactory outcome by Catalonia’s nationalist parties, which 
triggered further demands first for full fiscal autonomy and eventually for a 
referendum on Catalonia’s independence. 
 
2. Political Parties and Party System in Catalonia 
 
Party competition in Catalonia includes the traditional left-right socio-economic axis 
but also a clear territorial component, where parties position themselves on what the 
relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain should be. This axis runs from the 
defence of the territorial status quo backed by some parties, which normally espouse a 
Spanish-nationalist discourse and deny the existence of the Catalan nation; to Catalan 
nationalist or Catalanist parties that promote further self-government and recognition 
for Catalonia, from a development of Spain’s constitution towards a more clear-cut 
federation, more fiscal powers for Catalan institutions or straightforward 
independence from Spain. Currently, seven parties are represented in the Catalan 
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Parliament but up to eleven parties have gained seats since the first Catalan election in 
1980.  
Convergència i Unió (CiU) has been the dominant party in Catalonia, winning every 
single election in number of seats since the recovering of autonomy, while its 
traditional main competitor has been the Catalan Socialists, the Partit dels Socialistes 
de Catalunya (PSC), putting on a close fight particularly in the 1999 and 2003 Catalan 
elections. However, the PSC has steadily decreased its vote share in the last decade 
and ultimately lost its runner-up position to Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC), in number of seats, after the 2012 election. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution 
of the electoral results of Catalan political parties for sub-state elections in number of 
seats and vote percentage, respectively. 
Figure 1. Electoral results in Catalonia in number of seats (1980-2012) 
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Figure 2. Political Parties’ vote percentage share in Catalan elections 
(1980-2012) 
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya. 
CiU enjoyed the political hegemony in Catalonia from the mid-1980s until the mid-
1990s with three successive overall majorities in the Catalan Parliament, and its vote 
share started to decline after the 1995 Catalan election (Barberà and Barrio 2006).  
A similar declining trend occurred to the PSC, albeit the party got its best result in the 
1999 Catalan election. However, this successful result was partly due to the fact that 
the PSC run in coalition with Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) in that election, 
except in the Barcelona constituency. The Socialists finally ousted CiU from 
government after the 2003 election thanks to the tripartite coalition with ERC and ICV, 
but 1999 marked the beginning of a continuous electoral decline that brought them 
down to the vote share levels of ERC and the Partit Popular (PP) in the 2012 election, 
as is clearly shown in figures 1 and 2. 
Besides CiU and the PSC, three parties have consistently been represented in 
parliament. The ERC, the PP, and the ICV, although the latter two originally run 
elections as the Alianza Popular (AP), or Popular Alliance, and as the Partit Socialista 
Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), or Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, which had 
strong links with the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). These three parties have 
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the vote. ERC achieved its best result in 2003 with 23 seats and got back in strength 
with 21 seats in 2012, after returning only 10 in 2010 after its second tripartite 
government experience. The PP has consistently gathered around 10% of the vote and 
has been increasing its share of seats constantly in the last decade with a best result of 
19 in the last 2012 election. 
From 1992 until 2006 only these five parties were represented. The Unión de Centro 
Democrático (UCD) appeared in the first parliament before its implosion in 1982, most 
of its voters switching afterwards to the AP as it did happen in the state-wide arena, 
while the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), a centre party founded by former PM 
Suárez made a short and moderate appearance in the 1988 election. The first election 
also saw the Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA) gaining two seats with the aim of 
representing citizens with Andalusian roots in Catalonia (Barrio et al. 2010), but the 
party did not contest any further elections after 1984. In 2006 a new party, Ciutadans–
Partido de la Ciudadanía (C’s) entered parliament, gathering three seats under the 
banner of anti-Catalan nationalism (Barberà, Barrio, and Rodríguez 2009). The 
increasing saliency of the territorial cleavage and the high levels of polarisation around 
Catalan independence has further benefited the party’s results with a successful gain 
in vote share, which resulted in the party trebling its number of seats after the last 2012 
election.  
In 2010, building into the discontent of the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute 
of Autonomy, Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (SCI) was created shortly 
before the 2010 election to gather support from pro-independence voters under a 
straightforward slogan of a unilateral declaration of independence for Catalonia. The 
party recruited high-profile independence paladins such as Joan Laporta, former 
Futbol Club Barcelona chairman, and several former members of ERC. However, the 
party lost all of its seats in the 2012 snap election in which the party’s pro-
independence voters had plenty of other options available, including traditional 
parties, such as CiU and ERC. Another pro-independence party, the Candidatures 
d’Unitat Popular (CUP), or Candidates of Popular Unity, entered parliament after a 
lengthy trajectory in local politics under the triple banner of Catalan independence  
–including the so-called Països Catalans or Catalan Countries, which include the 
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Valencia region and the Balearic Islands apart from Catalonia, plus the territories 
usually referred to as ‘Northern Catalonia’ that were transferred to France in 1659 
Treaty of the Pyrenees–, socialism, and democratic regeneration. The CUP gathered 
three seats in the 2012 election. 
Electoral competition in the 1980s and 1990s mainly involved CiU and the PSC, which 
represented the main parties on the centre-right and centre-left respectively. On 
territorial grounds, CiU traditionally espoused a progressive expansion of Catalan 
institutions’ competences and a recognition of Catalonia’s national distinctiveness, 
whereas the PSC backed Catalan self-government within the framework of a 
‘federalisation’ of Spain. Each of the other three minor parties supported different 
views on Catalonia’s constitutional status. The ICV followed the federalist trend and 
argued for further decentralisation and a constitutional reform that transformed Spain 
into a fully-fledged federation. The PP supported the status quo, arguing that the 
Estado de las Autonomías had been beneficial for Catalonia and no further powers 
were needed.  
Finally, ERC has supported independence in Europe since 1992 (Guibernau 1997; 
Keating 1999). The developments during the last term of President Jordi Pujol in office 
saw the Socialists led by Pasqual Maragall to put forward a proposal to reform 
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, a move that was supported by ICV and ERC and 
eventually followed by CiU. The support for the Statute reform was opposed, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, by the PP; and after the Statute was approved and 
new elections were called late in 2006 the new party Ciutadans, also campaigned 
against the reform, labelling it as a ‘failure’ and claiming to support any challenge to 
the newly approved law put to the Constitutional Court (C’s 2006), thus aligning itself 
with the PP’s views on Catalan self-government. As shown on figure 1, C’s returned 
three seats in the Parliament in 2006 and their discourse against Catalan nationalism 
and lately also against Catalan independence has undoubtedly contributed to the high 
saliency of the independence debate in the last election campaign of 2012, which 
proved also successful for the party since it trebled its number of seats. 
The Statute reform per se did not change the positions of the main Catalanist parties 
on the territorial question. CiU and the PSC still defended the outcome of the Statute 
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reform of 2006 and even ERC, which campaigned for independence, was eager to 
develop and apply the new competences granted by the reformed Statute, most notably 
the reform of the funding system of the Autonomous communities, while being in 
government. However, the ruling of the Constitutional Court triggered a change in the 
parties’ territorial horizons as will be explained below. 
 
3. The Evolution of Territorial Demands in Catalonia 
 
3.1. Democratic Transition and the Establishment of Autonomy: 
From Asymmetry to Simmetry, 1978-1993 
The death of Franco and the willingness of the Spanish political elite, including most 
notably King Juan Carlos –Franco’s successor as Spain’s head of state–, to transform 
Spain into a modern European liberal democracy opened up the possibility for the 
dormant Catalan nationalism to raise demands for political autonomy. Catalan 
language and any form of nationalism had been repressed during the dictatorship 
(Harvie 1994; Keating 1988; Llobera 1997), although the remnants of Catalan 
nationalism –which is commonly referred as ‘Catalanisme’ (Moreno 2007: 93)– were 
strong enough to be politically relevant during the democratic transition. 
The Constitution of 1978 ‘recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the 
nationalities and regions’ in its Article 2, which also stresses that the ‘Constitution is 
based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’1 and thus reinforces the 
centre’s ultimate authority (Agranoff 2004). The capitalised ‘N’ in Nation evidently 
stresses the supremacy of the concept compared to the subjects of authority, the regions 
and specially the nationalities, whose ‘exact definition was never fully agreed’ and 
they ‘appear nowhere else in the Constitution’ although the term is indeed used in 
several statutes of autonomy ‘generally to distinguish the ‘historic regions’ […] from 
                                                 
1 Author’s translation from the original in Spanish. Article 2 reads: ‘La Constitución se fundamenta en 
la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española […] [y] reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía 
de las nacionalidades y las regiones […].’ 
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the rest’ (Brassloff 1989: 31). It has been commonly accepted that the ‘historic regions’ 
of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia were to be regarded as ‘nationalities,’ 
and in fact the fast-track to autonomy embedded in Article 151 refers to these three 
territories without naming them by keeping the fast-track route to the territories that 
had received or voted for autonomy in the past.2 The Constitution was passed by the 
Spanish parliament and endorsed in a referendum in December 1978, including an 
overwhelming majority of about 90% of the Catalan voters.3 Following the approval 
of the Constitution, the Basque and Catalan Statutes of Autonomy were quickly passed 
in March 1979.  
The Spanish government under the UCD aimed at containing autonomy demands to 
these two most assertive territories and forcing all other regions to accept the slow-
route emanating from Article 143 of the Constitution, which allowed for a more limited 
scope of powers to the regions. The UCD even wanted to bring Galicia under the slow-
track to autonomy, albeit it was constitutionally entitled to the fast route, but Galician 
back-benchers from the UCD helped bringing down this proposal. Autonomy demands 
triggered in Andalusia as well, where local elites pushed for a referendum on 
Andalusia joining the fast-track alongside the ‘historic nationalities.’ With the aim of 
containing the fast-track and maximum autonomy to the historic nationalities, the UCD 
campaigned for abstention while the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE),4 
which was already strong in the south of Spain, campaigned for a yes vote, which 
achieved a majority in the referendum (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006: 22-3). This 
represented a blow for the UCD, which had to strike an agreement with the PSOE to 
                                                 
2 Catalonia had received its Statute of Autonomy in 1932 and the Basque Country in 1936, while 
Galician autonomy was proposed, although a Statute was never passed due to the start of the Civil War. 
The specific reference to the territories that had voted on autonomy in the past is included in the Second 
Additional Clause –‘Disposición Adicional Segunda’– of the Spanish Constitution. 
3 1978 Referendum on the Spanish Constitution results available from the Department of Governance 
of the Catalan Government website. Available at: 
http://www10.gencat.cat/pls/gov_eleccions/p12.consultar_res_cat?v_tipus_eleccio=R&v_any_eleccio
=1978&v_num_eleccio=1. 
4 The PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, is federated with the PSC. 
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include Andalusia as a fast-track autonomous community.5 The latter’s role in 
supporting Andalusia in moving up to the fast route to autonomy ‘proved to be crucial 
in the final application of the State of Autonomies’ since Andalusia ‘turned into a 
model for the rest [of the regions] to emulate.’ The PSOE ‘capitalized on these 
autonomic and pseudonationalist referents and turned them into the cornerstones of its 
political opposition to the central Government and to the UCD, […] a strategy that 
yielded excellent political results’ (Montabes 1994: 137-8), with victories for the 
PSOE in the first Andalusian regional election of May 1982 and in the general election 
in October that same year. The Andalusian episode was effectively the turning point 
that would bring a regionalisation tout court in Spain.  
The commitment of the PSOE to enhance Andalusian autonomy and ultimately that of 
all the other regions in the 1980s after the party’s victory in the 1982 general election 
explains the decision to abandon a specific territorial accommodation of the historic 
nationalities for a decentralisation process that is essentially of a symmetric nature. 
The logic of symmetric decentralisation responds to the fact that the ‘regions left out 
of the process protest, and the central government does not wish to appear to reward 
secessionism or to be responding too obviously to the pressures of secessionist 
movements’ (Sorens 2004: 740-1). 
The symmetric turn that Spain’s decentralisation took in the early 1980s therefore set 
the ground for Catalan nationalists to demand either more powers or demand to keep 
those agreed in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, since there was a fear that 
decentralisation tout court would bring a watering down of autonomous powers in 
favour of state-wide autonomous policy control directed from Madrid. 
                                                 
5 Although there was a majority for the fast route to autonomy in Andalusia overall, the requirement 
that a majority was needed in each province was not met. The Socialist regional leader Escudero rejected 
any outcome not consisting of Andalusia achieving the same status as the ‘historic nationalities,’ and 
eventually the UCD had to agree to this demand, which was completely backed by the PSOE. ‘The 
political will of the people of Andalusia,’ a commentator wrote, ‘imposed itself this time over the legal 
difficulties designed and applied to force a territorial model of the State of Autonomies divided in two 




In March 1980 the moderate Catalan nationalists won the first election to the Catalan 
parliament. Jordi Pujol’s Convergència Democràtica de Catalunnya (CDC) reached a 
stable pact with the Christian-Democrats and moderate Catalan nationalists of Unió 
Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) in 1979, and both parties have run together in the 
coalition of Convergència i Unió (CiU) since. ‘The element for unification was 
catalanism, the defense of Catalonia and the expression of a program of national 
construction’ (Marcet 1994: 171). Jordi Pujol became the party leader and its main 
ideologist, and CiU was thought to be ‘a party that brings together all the ideological 
references with a common denominator which is Catalan nationalism and which tries 
to overcome the left-right cleavage to become the national party of the Catalan people’ 
(Barberà and Barrio 2006: 117).  
The success of the party, which has won all the Catalan elections –in number of seats– 
since 1980, was attributed to Pujol’s leadership and charisma, and the role of CiU as a 
wide Catalan nationalist party-movement, with a moderate programme for the 
construction of Catalonia (Marcet and Argelaguet 1998: 74-6); which implied a 
process of nation-building of the Catalan nation through the newly recovered Catalan 
institutions while putting its emphasis on the preservation and defence of the Catalan 
language. At the same time, though, Catalan nationalism has traditionally stressed its 
civic character, early emphasised by Pujol’s phrase that a Catalan is anyone ‘who lives 
and works in Catalonia and wants to be a Catalan’ (quoted in Guibernau 1997: 91). 
The nationalist coalition of CiU achieved comfortable overall majorities in the next 
three Catalan elections of 1984, 1988, and 1992. The electoral outcomes and the 
comfortable position of CiU leading the Catalan executive on its own may well serve 
to establish a proxy between CiU’s territorial demands during the 1980s and 1990s to 
those of the Catalan government. Thus, especially during the 1980s, CiU tried to 
consolidate Catalan self-government by putting a lot of emphasis in securing the status 
and every-day use of the Catalan language, especially in areas such as education, 
culture or public administration (Aja 2001). During this period CiU was a true heir to 
traditional Catalan nationalism from the early-to-mid 20th century, which had tried to 
strengthen self-government in Catalonia combining it with playing an important role 




The strategy followed by CiU and the Catalan government could be described as a 
‘defensive’ one, aiming at the fulfilment of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and 
demanding the effective transfer of the competencies allocated to the Catalan 
institutions. The first serious challenge that Catalan self-government faced came rather 
quickly in the form of the Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico 
(LOAPA) (Organic Law for the Harmonisation of the Autonomy Process). Bearing in 
mind the atmosphere after the attempted coup d’état on February 23rd 1981 and the 
worries amongst the Spanish Army that the decentralisation process was going too far 
and too fast, the ruling UCD and the PSOE struck a series of agreements to ‘rationalise’ 
the autonomy process. These bilateral agreements left aside the other SWPs and the 
main SNRPs in Catalonia and the Basque Country; and apart from aiming at an 
harmonisation of the regional powers, they also ‘sought to draw back some of the 
powers already agreed with the Autonomous Communities and to force regional 
parliaments to look to the central government for ratification of their laws’ (Brassloff 
1989: 34). The Catalan and Basque governments challenged the LOAPA to the 
Constitutional Court, which declared it partly unconstitutional, but some homogeneity 
principles remained and it provided for the non-historic communities to catch-up with 
the historic nationalities in terms of the scope of autonomy powers. This regional 
symmetrisation ideal was carried through  by the PSOE central government after the 
party’s October 1982 general election victory by ‘supporting certain territories’ 
decisions to take on important competencias such as health and education,’ thus 
increasing the number of Autonomous Communities in the authority transfers 
negotiations, which served ‘partly to dilute the political bargaining effect of the 
Basques and Catalans’ (Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín 1997: 15).  
The role of the Constitutional Court during the years after LOAPA was a crucial one, 
with the central and regional governments –especially the Basque and Catalan 
executives– challenging ‘hundreds’ of laws and decisions of the other tier of 
government to the Court in a zealous attempt to clarify the allocation of powers and 
competencies (Keating 1998b: 210). After the initial steps of asymmetrical 
decentralisation following the democratic transition, the LOAPA triggered a second 
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phase consisting of the safekeeping and development of autonomy. This strategy was 
marked by the UCD-PSOE autonomy agreements which were highly influenced by 
centralisation and the establishment of a ‘homogenising model’ which lasted until 
1993 (Requejo 2001b).  
Symmetric decentralisation was further strengthened in the early 1990s through the 
Pactos Autonómicos of 1992 between the ruling PSOE and the PP, which had taken 
over from the UCD as the main opposition party since the 1982 general election. The 
1992 Autonomy Pacts between the two main Spanish parties, echoing the Autonomy 
agreements that led to the LOAPA in 1981, ‘evened out competencies among all 
seventeen regions’ in order to ‘achieve a greater parity of treatment;’ which was 
justified on the grounds of the constitutionally entrenched principle of solidarity 
between regions that had been already put into effect on fiscal redistributive policy: an 
Interterritorial Compensation Fund (FCI) ‘distributes funds to the less well-off 
regions’ from the regions that are better off economically (Agranoff and Ramos 
Gallarín 1997: 14). However, two Autonomous Communities, the Basque Country and 
Navarre are not part of the common system of fiscal funding since they enjoy the so-
called ‘concierto económico’ and ‘convenio’ respectively, which provides for full 
fiscal autonomy for the two autonomous governments and dispenses them from 
contributing to the interregional solidarity mechanisms (Agranoff 1993; Clark 1989; 
Keating 1988). These two special fiscal systems that are constitutionally granted due 
to historical reasons –Navarre and the Basque province of Araba/Álava even enjoyed 
these prerogatives during Franco’s dictatorship– have been widely considered as one, 
if not the most, asymmetrical institution in decentralised Spain (Keating 1999; 
Swenden 2006). During the 1990s fiscal autonomy for the other regions in the common 
fiscal system was deemed to be rather low (Brancati 2008) and the centre was –and 
still is– the main, if not only responsible, for both the tax-raising process, and the 
interregional distribution of economic resources (Jeffery 2003). 
As a result of the 1992 Pactos Autonómicos, ‘the autonomous communities powers in 
areas directly affecting citizens are identical for practical purposes’ and ‘the most 
important differences of substance lie in the specific historical, legal, and linguistic 
aspects of some autonomous communities’ (Aja 2001: 244). The homogenisation of 
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powers encouraged SNRPs in Catalonia and the Basque Country to demand further 
decentralisation (Beramendi and Máiz 2004) and thus the ‘centrifugal pressures’ of the 
Spanish decentralisation model have been running since, where territorial demands 
that lead to the (re-)establishment of asymmetries –especially, if not exclusively from 
the Basques and Catalan SNRPs– would be challenged in turn by the political elites in 
the other regions, which will demand a re-symmetrisation of the system (Hombrado 
2011; Moreno 2001a). Thus, re-symmetrisation triggered in turn demands from 
stateless nationalists contributing to the establishment of the pattern demand-response-
demand that has characterised Catalan territorial demands since the re-establishment 
of self-government institutions. 
 
3.2. The ‘Peix al cove’: Exchanging Autonomy Concessions for 
Parliamentary Support at the Centre, 1993-20006  
The political opportunity for SNRPs to pose territorial demands –and have them 
attended– quickly followed the 1992 homogenisation agreements when the PSOE lost 
its overall majority in the Spanish parliament and required the support of SNRPs to 
ensure governability. An identical scenario occurred again after the 1996 election 
when the conservative PP won the Spanish general election for the first time and 
required the support of SNRPs to consolidate its parliamentary majority. Thus, during 
these period, CiU –alongside the Basque PNV and the Coalición Canaria (CC) of the 
Canary Islands– gave its support to the minority governments of both PSOE (1993-
96) and PP (1996-2000) in parliament, but this support evidently came at a price. The 
particular configuration of a hung parliament in Madrid gave CiU a ‘powerful 
brokerage’ or ‘blackmail potential’ which the party used to extract ‘regional resources 
in exchange for supporting a statewide government’ (Swenden and Maddens 2009: 8).  
 
                                                 
6 ‘Peix al cove,’ literally ‘A Fish in the Basket,’ is the popular name by which the strategy pursued by 
CiU in the 1990s was known. Any concession related to autonomous powers that the centre was willing 
or forced to make (the ‘fish’) should be seized whatever the costs. 
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The price paid by central governments in terms of further decentralisation during the 
1990s was basically a greater share of economic resources for the regional institutions 
and a transfer of several competences. CiU managed in the 1993 agreement with the 
PSOE to retain the 15% share of tax-share and a substantial development of pending 
transfers of competencies included in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Guibernau 
2003), while after the 1996 election the negotiations between CiU and the PP delivered 
‘an increase in the income tax sharing arrangements from fifteen percent to thirty 
percent, substantial reduction in the influence of prefectural administration [the powers 
of the central government’s representative in Catalonia], control over new 
competencies within Catalonia, such as ports and traffic control, and assumption of the 
Catalan [autonomous community] deficits in health care and delivery,’ although the 
increase in tax-sharing would be extended to all other regions (Agranoff and Ramos 
Gallarín 1997: 33), excepting the Basque Country and Navarre, which had their own 
specific fiscal arrangements.  
The 1996 agreement was regarded by CiU as a big step forward for Catalan self-
government and it is even considered positively by several party officials, as was 
recalled by a CiU Catalan MP, which argued in an interview with the author that the 
PP ‘had to negotiate, which is what occurred with the Majestic Pacts of 1996, because 
the biggest cessions of ‘sovereignty’ [i.e. political authority and economic resources] 
to Catalonia were actually the product of an agreement between Convergència i Unió 
and the Partit Popular;’ while he also stressed the brokerage potential that CiU 
enjoyed, arguing that the PP would not have willingly transferred powers to Catalonia 
if CiU’s support had not been required.7 Notwithstanding the claims that the transfers 
realised during the 1990s, particularly those struck with the PP in the 1996 agreement, 
were a considerable step forward, the truth is that CiU refrained from demanding any 
substantial alterations to the constitutional status quo. Significant or more assertive 
demands such as full fiscal autonomy, formal constitutional change through a reform 
                                                 
7 Interview with a Catalan MP from CiU. Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘[el PP va] 
tenir que negociar, que és el que va passar amb els Pactes del Majestic del 96, perquè les cessions més 
grans de sobirania cap a Catalunya en realitat van ser el producte d’un pacte de Convergència i Unió 
amb el Partit Popular. És a dir, per què? Perquè el Partit Popular ho creia? No. Perquè la necessitat de 
la negociació política ens portava aquí’ (Montañola 2012). 
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of the Statute of Autonomy, or independence, which was first put forward in the 1990s 
by ERC, were constantly downplayed and rejected by Pujol and his party, which 
focused on securing and maximising cultural autonomy and the largest possible share 
of resources without demanding fiscal responsibilities (van Houten 2004; 2007).  
The political scenario turned highly competitive on the run to the 1999 Catalan 
election. On the one hand, CiU had started an electoral decline; on the other, the PSC 
autonomous condition was reinforced from the loss of power of the PSOE at the central 
level and the departure of long-term serving Spanish PM Felipe González, which 
loosened the central grip on the territorial party structure (Hopkin 2003). The PSC 
quickly re-asserted its Catalanist and federalist profile, most notably placing the 
charismatic former mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, as the presidential 
candidate for the 1999 election (van Houten 2009). The election results confirmed the 
recovery of the PSC, which received more votes than CiU, but the effects of the 
electoral system –with the rural areas being slightly overrepresented– resulted in CiU 
gaining more seats than the PSC. CiU returned 56 seats and was 12 short of a majority,8 
precisely the number of seats received by both the ERC and the PP. CiU could 
therefore choose between two prospective allies with opposite profiles, but Pujol 
preferred an alliance with the PP, thus consolidating the links between the two parties 
already present in the Spanish parliament (Argelaguet 2006). Congruent coalitions 
have been traditionally preferred and also deemed ‘preferable’ in multi-level party 
politics, as has been widely analysed, especially in the Belgian case (Buelens and 
Deschouwer 2007; Deschouwer 2009a; Swenden 2002); and there is little doubt that 
Pujol’s rationale to consolidate the links with the PP responded to a wish to maintain 
the territorial strategy developed during the 1990s of exchanging support for 
concessions.  
The strategy of exchanging parliamentary support for autonomy concessions looked 
reasonable by the central leadership of the PP, whereas the support of the PP to CiU 
                                                 






in Catalonia proved useful to block any other substantial demand, most notably a CiU-
led reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. A former leader of ERC confirmed 
that the stable cooperation between CiU and the PP included ‘amongst different 
agreements, not to reform the Statute [of Autonomy], which is the condition that the 
PP imposed.’9 The corollary of Pujol’s decision probably was that striking an 
agreement with ERC and thus establishing a Catalan nationalist coalition government 
involving the CiU and the ERC in the Catalan parliament would probably woo the PP 
to negotiate any further demands, considering that ERC might have demanded further 
authority transfers and full fiscal autonomy, which inevitably would have placed 
Catalan demands far beyond what CiU had hitherto demanded to the central 
government in exchange for its parliamentary support. 
 
3.3. Hostility From the Centre: The PP’s Halt to Decentralisation, 
2000-2003 
The quid pro quo agreement between CiU and the PP reached an abrupt end after the 
March 2000 Spanish general election, in which the PP achieved an overall majority 
and therefore CiU’s support was no longer required in Madrid. The overall majority in 
the Spanish parliament was translated into a significant attitudinal change of the PP 
towards decentralisation and territorial management. The 2000-2004 PP government 
pushed for a re-centralisation and a reinvigorated Spanish nationalism that was 
embedded in certain law proposals, such as a new education bill that was contested by 
the Catalan government, which argued that the Catalan language was to be 
‘marginalised’ in favour of Spanish (La Vanguardia, 27 March 2003). An active 
development of basic legislation also challenged the political autonomy of the 
autonomous communities, and overall the parliamentary term of 2000-2004 has been 
described as one that was marked by recentralisation, fierce opposition to the stateless 
                                                 
9 Interview with former ERC Secretary General, Joan Ridao. Author’s translation from the original in 




nationalisms, and PM Aznar’s authoritarian-style of government (Argelaguet 2006; 
Guibernau 2006; 2007).  
In this context, ERC urged Pujol to switch allies and establish a Catalan nationalist 
coalition government with ERC in order to stand against the PP’s recentralising 
policies, but Pujol refused these proposals several times and relied on the PP’s support, 
which even helped CiU in defeating a censorship motion posed by Pasqual Maragall 
(Argelaguet 2006; Barberà and Barrio 2006), a highly tactical movement by the PSC 
leader, which undoubtedly aimed to emphasise in front of the Catalan public Pujol’s 
dependence on the PP and the close links between the two parties. The ERC did not 
take kindly Pujol’s rebuffing to their alliance proposal.  
According to the current party spokeswoman, ERC offered President Pujol half-way 
through the 1999-2003 parliament to change alliances in order to make a significant 
step forward in Catalonia’s self-government; and warning him that he was in office 
thanks to the PP, which had vehemently shown that they did not support further 
decentralisation, and that later on it would be too late to switch allies. Pujol’s rejection 
of the proposition ‘was perceived by Esquerra as a humiliation to the party leader that 
offered him this possibility, Carod-Rovira. [...] [The offer] was undervalued, which 
coming from another [Catalan] nationalist party produced astonishment in ERC.’ This 
episode further tensed the relationships between ERC and CiU and the former, ‘given 
the lack of activity of Convergència i Unió [in expanding self-government], an 
agreement was developed and eventually crystallised with a joint document of the 
PSC, Esquerra, and Iniciativa, to change the political status and at least make a step 
forward in the bilateral relationship between the Catalan and Spanish governments 
with an updated Statute [of Autonomy].’10 Hence, the agreement between CiU and the 
                                                 
10 Interview with ERC party spokeswoman, Anna Simó. Author’s translation from: ‘estàvem a meitat 
de legislatura, des d’Esquerra se li va fer un plantejament al President Pujol de dir, ara ets a la meitat de 
la legislatura, ara ets a temps de fer un canvi de socis, però per fer un pas endavant nacional. Estàs 
governant [...] amb el suport d’aquells que no volen un avenç nacional pel país, de manera que ara és 
l’hora. Més tard, serà tard, i llavors no ens vinguis a buscar. [...] una resposta que aleshores va ser vista 
per Esquerra com a humiliant cap al líder que va formular aquesta qüestió, que va ser Carod-Rovira. 
Això es pot trobar, en què diguem-ne es va menystenir, venint d’un partit nacionalista, això va causar 
diguem-ne estupor a Esquerra.’ ‘A la pràctica, davant d’una falta de pro-activitat de Convergència i 
Unió, es va anar aglutinant un acord que es va cristal· litzar amb un document conjunt, de conclusions 
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PP indirectly facilitated cooperation amongst the other three opposition parties in order 
to discuss an embryonic demand for reforming the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 
  
3.4. The Reform of the Statute of Autonomy, 2003-2010 
The joint talks between the left-wing opposition parties in the Catalan Parliament after 
Pujol’s rebuffing of ERC’s offer to end its parliamentary alliance with the PP resulted 
in a preliminary proposal that led to the creation of a parliamentary committee to study 
the development of Catalan self-government –‘Comissió d’estudi per a 
l’aprofundiment de l’autogovern.’ The joint proposal made by the PSC, ERC and 
Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV) for the final report of the Commission advocates 
an extension of Catalan self-government in a broader sense, using any mechanism 
available to the Catalan institutions. Hence, the report states that ‘the Commission 
ascertains that so far the potentialities [of self-government] of the Constitution and the 
Statute have not been fully developed;’ and concludes that the Commission ‘has 
included in its recommendations all available instruments to obtain what is considered 
to be the desired outcome: political agreements, legislative reforms in the Catalan and 
Spanish Parliaments, appeals to the Constitutional Court and, eventually, the reform 
of the Statute and the Constitution’ (ICV, ERC, and PSC 2001).11 The parliamentary 
committee finished its works in November 2002 and a vote took place in which the 
commission endorsed the possibility of reforming the Statute of Autonomy.  
The commission members of CiU endorsed the demand for reform as well, thus 
confirming the party’s switch from its previous reservations to demand such a reform 
as a part of its parliamentary agreement with the PP. A representative of CiU even 
argued that the parliamentary committee’s conclusion was not ambitious enough, and 
                                                 
de PSC, Esquerra i Iniciativa, per tal de modificar diguem’ne l’estatus polític i almenys fer un salt en 
les relacions bilaterals Estat-Generalitat amb un Estatut que es posés al dia’ (Simó 2012). 
11 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘la Comissió constata que no s’han desenvolupat 
totes les potencialitats dels textos constitucionals i estatutaris’ (p. 3), and ‘[la Comissió] ha incorporat 
a les seves recomanacions tots els instruments disponibles de cara obtenir els resultats que es consideren 
desitjables: acords polítics, reformes legislatives al Parlament català i a les Corts espanyoles, recurs al 
Tribunal Constitucional i, finalment, reforma de l’Estatut i de la Constitució’ (p. 27). 
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assured his parliamentary peers that CiU, in the forthcoming election campaign, would 
‘put forward a new statutory text that will go far beyond, [and] will set new horizons 
of self-government’12 (Camp i Batalla 2002: 8). CiU joined thus the demand for a new 
Statute and the 4-party block in favour of the reform was established.  
The political consensus –excluding the PP– on the demand for a reform of the Statute 
implied that all four political parties included the reform in their 2003 election 
manifestos. CiU had changed its position on the issue due to two main reasons, 
according to a senior party official. First, the substitution of Pujol by Mas; and second, 
the pressure that the other parties, especially the PSC, which was the main electoral 
competitor of the nationalists, had exercised by openly demanding a reform. This party 
official admitted in an interview that ‘Pujol and his people for many years adopted a 
conformist attitude, surely, but Pujol […] also feared that opening a process of a 
Statute [reform] did not guarantee to move forward, but even to go backwards,’ while 
‘Pujol’s replacement also allowed for this new wave [of leaders] to appear in strength 
into the party leadership, which is also an important factor alongside […], to be very 
honest, the tactical movement played mainly, not even by the PSC, but by Pasqual 
Maragall.’13 The new leadership of CDC was formed by younger politicians, most of 
whom favoured further self-government; they were ‘proponents of sovereignty’ and 
thus regarded as ‘sovereignists’ (Barberà and Barrio 2006: 127).  
CiU’s proposal of Statute reform, which they labelled ‘Estatut Nacional de Catalunya’ 
(National Statute of Catalonia) included, among other features, national recognition 
for Catalonia, including language –for instance, the possibility of Catalan being 
accepted as an official language of the EU– and national sports teams; a model of 
                                                 
12 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘Nosaltres plantejarem un nou text estatutari que 
anirà molt més enllà, marcarà uns nous horitzons de l’autogovern.’ 
13 Author’s translation from the original interview in Catalan: ‘en Pujol durant molts anys [hi va haver] 
una part de comoditat i conformitat, segur, però a més [...] a en Pujol, també hi havia l’olfacte que obrir 
un meló com l’Estatut no era garantia d’anar a més, sinó potser inclús d’anar a menys,’ and ‘el relleu 
d’en Mas per en Pujol també permet doncs que aquesta onada aparaguei amb força a la direcció de 
Convergència i per tant que també és un factor, que es compagina [...], per dir-ho amb molta sinceritat, 
[...] amb un moviment molt tàctic qye va fer principalment, ja no m’atreveixo a dir ni el PSC, en Pasqual 
Maragall’ (Pujol 2012). 
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shared sovereignty, which would emphasise a bilateral relationship, rather than 
multilateral, between the central government and the Generalitat; and significantly, ‘a 
funding system inspired on the formula of the concert econòmic’ (CiU 2003: 102).14 
For its part, the PSC also stressed the demand that the Statute would include the 
national recognition of Catalonia, while putting a lot of emphasis in the existent 
national pluralism of Spain and its aim that ‘the new Statute leads the way towards [a] 
federal horizon’ (PSC 2003: 11).15 The PSC did not demand full fiscal autonomy à la 
Basque like CiU did, and put forward a claim to review the current fiscal model 
assuring that the new one would grant more resources for the Catalan institutions. 
The Catalan election of November 2003 was once again won by CiU, which returned 
46 seats. The PSC led by Maragall fell shortly behind with 42, although the PSC won 
in votes by a scarce margin of 7,000. Both parties fell short of a parliamentary majority 
in any case and a coalition government was inevitable. The PP returned 15 seats which 
only added to 61 if the CiU’s representatives were counted, falling seven short of the 
required 68 for a majority, which meant that the agreement long favoured by Pujol 
could not be renewed. CiU could have kept the presidency of the Generalitat thanks to 
ERC which won 10 extra seats and returned 23.16 The success of ERC, which was the 
only open pro-independence party, has been linked to a response of the electorate to 
the PP’s centralising policies at the central government and also as a punishment to 
CiU for its alliance with the Spanish Conservatives (Barberà and Barrio 2006; 
Guibernau 2006).  
However, the ERC prioritised a left-wing alliance with the Socialists and ICV, in 
which the warning given to CiU during the previous parliament that seeking ERC’s 
support in the future would be ‘too late’ was eventually confirmed. The reform of the 
Statute, however, notwithstanding the cooperation between the three left-wing parties 
                                                 
14 Author’s translation of ‘un finançament inspirat en la fórmula del concert econòmic.’ 
15 Author’s translation of ‘el nou Estatut avanci cap a aquest horitzó federal.’  





that had resulted in the creation of the parliamentary committee to study such a 
possibility, did not play a major role in the coalition negotiations. The Statute reform 
was ‘a commonly accepted fact and the variables that played a part were others: 
government and political change, democratic regeneration, etcetera.’17 Thus, the PSC 
candidate, Pasqual Maragall, was elected President of the Generalitat, ending CiU’s 
spell of 23 years in power at the sub-state level. 
Discussions to draft a Statute reform proposal started in the Catalan parliament. The 
reform process of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy was detailed in its Article 56, which 
requires the approval of the proposal by a majority of two-thirds of the Catalan 
Parliament, then the proposal needs to be passed –and de facto re-negotiated– as an 
Organic Law in the Spanish Parliament, and finally the resulting text must be ratified 
by the Catalans in a referendum. The two-thirds majority is aimed at ensuring a broad 
consensus and the 2003 election results effectively gave CiU a veto power on the 
reform. Furthermore, the necessity of the reform to be passed in the Spanish parliament 
was not facing very promising odds given that the PP led by Aznar still controlled the 
Spanish Parliament with an overall majority of seats. This situation was completely 
reversed after the 2004 Spanish election in which the PP was ousted from power 
following the Madrid train bombings of 11 March, which occurred only three days 
before the election. The PSOE won the election, albeit short of a majority, and José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected Prime Minister. The PSOE’s election manifesto 
included a certain positive attitude to any prospective demand for reforming Statutes 
of Autonomy and, without mentioning explicitly the Catalan case, conceded that ‘the 
PSOE will facilitate the statutory reforms that are put forward in agreement with the 
Constitution and backed by a broad democratic consensus’ (PSOE 2004: 59).18 
Previously, in a political rally before the Catalan election in November 2003, candidate 
                                                 
17 Interview with ERC’s Secretary General. Author’s translation of ‘és un fet comunament acceptat i les 
variables que entren en joc són altres: l’alternança, el canvi polític, la higiene democràtica, etcètera’ 
(Ridao 2012). 
18 Author’s translation of the PSOE’s 2004 election manifesto, which reads: ‘el PSOE posibilitará las 




Zapatero assured that he would support the Statute reform approved by the Catalan 
Parliament and lead on the construction of the ‘España plural’ (El País, 14 November 
2003).  
The victory of the PSOE and Zapatero in the 2004 Spanish general election reinforced 
the optimism of Catalan parties in a successful outcome of the Statute reform. Even 
pro-independence ERC bought Zapatero’s commitment to a ‘plural Spain’ and the 
Catalan secessionists gave their support to Zapatero in the Spanish parliament 
(Argelaguet 2006). Joan Puigcercós, which was later President of ERC and the party’s 
parliamentary leader in Madrid at the time, affirmed in an interview that Zapatero had 
told him ‘when he came into office during a meeting in Moncloa that “I will make a 
Spain so plural that you will not want to leave”.’19 On the other hand, the PP expressed 
its fears that the new Catalan Statute would endanger Spanish unity and vociferously 
campaigned against its reform elsewhere in Spain (van Houten 2009). 
Discussions in Catalonia lasted for one-and-a-half years and a final draft was approved 
by the Catalan parliament on 30 September 2005. The proposal included three key 
points that related to three different types of demands. First, in the symbolic sphere, 
the proposal demanded the formal recognition of Catalonia as a nation within a 
plurinational Spain, alongside other cultural considerations, such as the equality of 
treatment of the Catalan language with Spanish. Second, in terms of authority powers, 
included a long list of competencies to be secured as exclusive of the Catalan 
institutions, in order to back off any influence from the central power. Also, other types 
of competences, such as shared or concurrent competences were also established, 
which allowed for a participation of both tiers of government in developing public 
policies. In a nutshell, what the proposal tried to do is to clarify the responsibilities of 
each level of government. Third, regarding fiscal demands, the Statute advanced the 
principles of the new territorial funding system, which accounted for the creation of a 
Catalan tax agency that would work alongside the Spanish treasury in order to levy 
                                                 
19 Author’s translation from: ‘A mi en Zapatero em va dir, quan va començar a governar, en reunions a 
la Moncloa, m’havia dit, diu: “Voy a hacer una España tan plural que no te querrás ir”’ (Puigcercós 
2012). Moncloa is the Spanish PM residence. 
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and administer all taxes raised in Catalonia; and finally, the proposal also reaffirmed 
the principle of territorial solidarity amongst regions, but introduced the so-called 
‘ordinal principle’ –‘principi d’ordinalitat.’ This principle establishes that the relative 
position of a region’s income before the redistribution of economic resources takes 
place cannot be altered once the redistribution has been completed. To sum up, then, 
the proposal included the national recognition of Catalonia in a plurinational Spain; 
more powers –and more clearly delimited; and a substantial change in the funding 
system (Requejo 2010b). 
The draft passed by the Catalan Parliament in September 2005 turned out to be quite 
an ambitious proposal in any case in the eyes of the PSOE and a threat to Spain’s future 
in the eyes of the PP. The proposal was renegotiated in the Spanish Parliament in a 
mixed committee consisting of representatives of both Catalan and Spanish 
parliaments. ‘The debates and negotiations led to a revised draft, which watered down 
the statute on several fronts. Most significantly, it reduced the tax shares that Catalonia 
can keep and it omits the clause declaring Catalonia a ‘nation.’ This version was 
approved by the Spanish parliament in March 2006, with the PSOE and PSC 
representatives voting in support’ (van Houten 2009: 180). The PSC thus completely 
sided with the PSOE in ‘watering down’ the content of the Statute draft, which led to 
criticisms from the two nationalist parties, CiU and ERC. This kind of attacks are 
common amongst SNRPs, which ‘will challenge statewide parties’ ethnoregionalist 
‘credentials,’ and seek to portrait the regional representatives of the statewide parties 
as puppets of the national leadership’ (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006: 15). For instance, 
CiU’s Secretary General claimed in an interview that the PSC ‘disappeared’ in the 
negotiation in the Spanish Parliament and that situation led to the only possible 
outcome which was CiU taking a leading role in the negotiation to close a deal on the 
Statute directly with the PSOE (Pujol 2012). That was achieved in a bilateral meeting 
between PM Zapatero and Artur Mas, the leader of CiU, in Madrid in late January 
2006, which implied the acceptance of a watered down text by the nationalists.  
Following the agreement between the PSOE and CiU on the final draft of the Statute, 
ERC voted against it in the Spanish Parliament for considering that the Catalanist 
parties had given up too much, and also asked people to vote ‘No’ in the June 2006 
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referendum to validate the Statute reform. The split between the government coalition 
partners led Maragall to expel ERC from the government before the referendum, which 
received a clear support with 73.24% of the votes, whereas the ‘No’ received 20.57%. 
However, turnout was quite low and barely reached 49%.20 
The PP not only had asked for a negative vote to the Statute in the referendum in 
Catalonia, it also challenged the law passed by the Spanish parliament to the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that the new Statute was unconstitutional. 
Meanwhile, the expulsion of ERC from the government following the Statute episode 
left the PSC and ICV in a minority position in the Catalan parliament, which led 
Maragall to call for a snap election on 1 November 2006. Maragall was replaced as 
candidate by José Montilla, the PSC’s Secretary General and also the Spanish Minister 
of Industry until right before the election. The 2006 election results did not change 
substantially and the leftist tripartite government was renewed. 
During this second spell in government, the leftist parties focused its energy in the 
territorial arena on developing the principles of the new funding system contained in 
the Statute of Autonomy. A multilateral agreement was struck involving the 
autonomous communities and the central government, in which the Catalan 
government played a leading role. The agreement, which did not imply a significant 
change in the model, most remarkably delivered an increase in the percentage of shared 
taxes –income tax and VAT– up to 50% available to regional governments. 
However, uncertainties about the final outcome of the Statute of Autonomy pending 
the ruling of the Constitutional Court were evident amongst the Catalan political elite. 
For instance, in a speech in 2007, Artur Mas argued that ‘the Catalans exercised by 
referendum [on the Statute] their right to decide. To decide something at that precise 
moment on a specific issue. If the Statute does not come out of the Constitutional Court 
                                                 





unmodified, the right to decide of the Catalans would be altered’ (Mas 2007: 43).21 On 
28 June 2010 the Constitutional Court published its ruling on the Statute of Autonomy, 
which declared 14 articles to be against the Constitution and required several others to 
be interpreted in a specific way. The reaction of both Catalan(ist) parties and the 
nationalist civil society was one of complete rejection. A demonstration was called 
soon after the ruling was published, on 10 July in Barcelona that gathered hundreds of 
thousands of people to reject the ruling of the Court. People marched under the slogan 
‘Som una nació, nosaltres decidim’ (We are a nation, we decide). The march was 
called by the Catalanist cultural organisation Òmnium Cultural, and the Catalanist 
parties, the CiU, the PSC, the ERC, and the ICV, joined in.  
A new Catalan election was scheduled for November 2010 and this allowed all parties 
to re-position themselves on the territorial issue. A cross-party rejection of the 
Constitutional Court ruling nevertheless led to different territorial proposals. ERC 
considered the autonomy phase to be over and openly called for a referendum on 
independence to be held during the next parliament, emphasising that the tripartite left-
wing government had already approved a referendum law (ERC 2010). CiU argued 
that the ‘Constitutional Pact established during the transition to democracy has reached 
its limit, especially after the interpretation made by the Constitutional Court ruling on 
the Statute of 2006, which was approved by referendum by the citizenry of Catalonia. 
[…] [T]here is a need to change the policy we have followed until now. Catalonia’s 
self-government is based upon its democratic and inalienable right of every nation to 
decide its future’ (CiU 2010).  
This may represent a bit of a switch of paradigm in CiU’s traditional approach to 
territorial politics. Sorens (2008: 328) distinguishes between regionalists parties, 
which ‘reject independence explicitly’ even though they defend regional autonomy, 
greater economic resources and some regional rights; and radical-autonomists which, 
according to him, favour ‘a right to independence, independence as a long-term aim, 
                                                 
21 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘els catalans varen exercir en referèndum el seu dret 
a decidir. A decidir en aquell moment i sobre un tema concret. Si l’Estatut no surt íntegre del Tribunal 
Constitucional, el dret a decidir dels catalans quedaria alterat.’ 
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or far-reaching autonomy amounting to de facto independence.’ It seems that CiU’s 
stress of the ‘right to decide’ of the Catalans, without ruling out independence, clearly 
makes a difference from the times of Pujol when the independence option was openly 
rejected. Therefore, it could be argued that CiU moved from being a regionalist party 
to a radical-autonomist, following Sorens’ typology. Furthermore, the party remained 
ambiguous about independence in the 2010 campaign but put forward a demand for 
fiscal independence, that is, a new fiscal agreement akin to the Basque concierto 
económico.  
The PSC’s reaction was milder and the party proposed to try to develop the Statute as 
much as possible, to strictly apply the funding system agreed in 2009, and to keep 
working in the perennial demand to reform the Spanish Constitution in a truly federal 
fashion (PSC 2010). However, reactions to the Court’s ruling were rather different 
amongst Catalan Socialists. A Catalan MP that evaluated the effects of the ruling in an 
interview, said: ‘[s]ome people argue from a legal point of view if the effects [of the 
ruling] are significant or not. I think this debate is not really interesting because what 
really mattered was the political and democratic perspective, because a law that had 
been voted by the people was later on modified by a Court, which also happened to be 
in certain conditions, right? […] What really mattered was that for many people, some 
of them very Catalanists […] and some others maybe a bit less, but all of them thought 
it was unacceptable that something that had been voted was modified. It is then when, 
I think, at the very, very end of the whole process, the attempt of the Statute to place 
the relationship between Catalonia and Spain in a different framework actually fails. 
It is understood as one side which unilaterally modifies the agreement we had 
reached.’22 However, other colleagues in the PSC and the PSOE were quite satisfied 
                                                 
22 Interview with a Catalan MP from the PSC. Author’s translation: ‘Hi ha gent que es discuteix des del 
punt de vista jurídic, si l’afectació és molta o poca. Des del meu punt de vista és un debat que no té 
massa interès, perquè el que va fer, o va tenir més impacte és des del punt de vista polític i democràtic, 
pel fet de que una llei votada per la gent va ser alterada després per un tribunal, que a més estava en 
unes determinades condicions, no? [...] El que sí que és evident és que per molta gent, alguns diríem 
molt catalanistes [...] i altres potser no tant, però en canvi, uns i altres no van considerar acceptable que 
una cosa ja votada doncs fos modificada. I llavors jo crec que finalment, al final, final, final de tot el 
procés, el que era l’intent de l’Estatut de situar en un altre terreny les relacions de Catalunya i Espanya 
107 
 
with the ruling. This division of opinions, which undoubtedly echoes the traditional 
existing division in the PSC between its factions in favour and against of Catalan 
nation-ness and expanded self-government would resurface bitterly since the end of 
the Statute process and the reinforced saliency of the territorial cleavage after 2010. In 
a very influent newspaper article, the then Spanish Minister of Defence and PSC 
parliamentary leader in the Spanish Parliament, Carme Chacón, and former Spanish 
PM Felipe González, argued that ‘the legal effects of the ruling on the Statute are little 
[…] because almost all the text has been validated.’ Furthermore, they criticised those 
who ‘[a]fter the Barcelona demonstration have already claimed that self-government 
should be put behind [and a move towards independence is required],’ while insisting 
that once the uproar calmed down ‘and the situation is looked at with serenity, it will 
be proven that there is no actual turning point’ (El País 26 July 2010). Recent events 
since the 2010 election seem to have proven them wrong. 
 
3.5. The Fallout and Radicalisation of Territorial Demands: From 
Full Fiscal Autonomy to a Referendum on Independence 
The November 2010 election delivered a comfortable victory for CiU. The Catalan 
nationalists returned 62 seats and thus fell only six short of an overall majority. The 
incumbent parties all lost seats, especially the PSC –28 seats, a loss of 9– and ERC –
10 seats, 11 less than in the last parliament. The PP returned 18 seats, its best result 
ever.23 CiU’s leader, Artur Mas, argued in the parliamentary debate before being 
elected Prime Minister that ‘the crisis in the relationship between Catalonia and the 
State, clearly exemplified on the Constitutional Court ruling against the Statute, 
requires a redefinition of this relationship on renewed terms.’ Furthermore, he claimed 
that ‘the Constitutional Court has eliminated any possibility for Spain to evolve into a 
                                                 
de fet fracassa. Perquè és llegit com que una de les parts modifica de forma unilateral l’acord al que 
s’havia arribat’ (Iceta 2012). 





plurinational state’ and insisted that ‘Catalonia has to face its own national transition.’ 
Although this might point at a wish to Catalan independence, Mas nevertheless 
emphasised the necessity of reaching internal consensuses. In this sense, ‘the ‘right to 
decide’ […] requires that the issues which we decide upon be sustained by strong 
majorities […] so we avoid a division of Catalan society in two halves, which involves 
a risk of social and national breakup.’ Independence was deemed to be a too divisive 
issue and thus CiU’s renewed territorial demand was, ‘following the route to this 
Catalan transition that we begin based on the ‘right to decide,’ the definition of a 
specific territorial fiscal system for Catalonia: a ‘pacte fiscal’ […] which generates a 
great consensus amongst Catalan society’ (Mas 2010).24 
Mas also stated that the Catalan government’s top priority was the economic crisis and 
that the demand for a new fiscal system would not be formally presented until after the 
forthcoming Spanish election. The election ousted the PSOE from the central 
government and brought the PP back in office in strength, since the PP achieved an 
overall majority in Congress. The clear victory of the PP ruled out the ‘blackmail 
potential’ of CiU in the Spanish Parliament, which the party was hoping to be able to 
exploit, as it had been done in the past, in order to bargain for the new territorial fiscal 
deal (CiU 2011: 138).  
On 25 July 2012 the Catalan Parliament voted a resolution that ‘encouraged the 
Catalan Government to initiate a negotiation process with the Spanish government to 
                                                 
24 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘la crisi de relació entre Catalunya i l’Estat, 
evidenciada de manera prou clara amb la sentència del Tribunal Constitucional contra l’Estatut, que 
obliga a redefinir sobre noves bases l’esmendatada relació Catalunya-Espanya’ (p. 4); ‘El Tribunal 
Constitucional ha tallat de soca-rel qualsevol possibilitat de fer evolucionar Espanya cap a un estat 
plurinacional’ (p. 11); ‘Catalunya ha d’encarar la seva pròpia transició nacional’ (p. 11); ‘el dret a 
decidir [...] requereix, que els temes sobre els quals s’exerceixi descansin sobre majories àmplies 
qualificades o reforçades [...] [i] també d’evitar dividir la societat catalana en dues meitats, amb el risc 
de fractura social i nacional que això comporta’ (p. 11); ‘en el camí de la transició catalana que iniciem, 
basada en el dret a decidir, la definició d’un model propi de finançament per a Catalunya: el pacte fiscal 
[...] [que] genera grans consensos en la societat catalana’ (p. 11). 
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achieve a specific territorial funding system for Catalonia during 2012.’25 This model 
should include, most remarkably, the management of all tax-related activities through 
the newly established Catalan Tax Agency –‘Agència Tributària de Catalunya;’ the 
transfer of full normative capabilities on taxes to the Generalitat; a bilateral negotiation 
to decide the amount to be paid to the State for the services that the latter provides in 
Catalonia and the amount of interregional solidarity; and, finally, the maintenance of 
the so-called ‘ordinal principle’ in terms of interterritorial solidarity that was 
mentioned above (Parlament de Catalunya 2012c: 3). The resolution was endorsed by 
CiU, ERC, and ICV, thus achieving a clear majority. The PSC supported parts of it. 
The Socialists considered that the reform of the territorial fiscal system was necessary, 
but rejected the formula of full fiscal autonomy (Parlament de Catalunya 2012b). 
After the parliament’s vote, Mas was set to meet the Spanish PM and PP leader, 
Mariano Rajoy, to discuss the proposal. Before the meeting, though, on 11 September 
2012, Catalonia’s national day, a demonstration organised by the Assemblea Nacional 
Catalana (ANC) (Catalan National Assembly), a civil society organisation that lobbies 
for independence, gathered more than one million people in Barcelona marching under 
the clear-cut pro-independence slogan of ‘Catalunya, nou estat d’Europa’ (Catalonia, 
new state of Europe). The massive demonstration marked the political agenda during 
the week before the Mas-Rajoy summit, which took place in Madrid on 20 September.  
In an interview two days before the meeting between the two political leaders, the 
Secretary General of CiU was quite pessimistic of Rajoy’s answer to the demands of 
the Catalan Parliament, partly because ‘the fiscal agreement akin to the concert 
econòmic has little margin for negotiation; […] it is not about the content of the 
proposal but about the timing [of implementation].’26 The position of CiU was 
therefore to negotiate for the acceptance or rejection of the model and avoid long 
discussions about money transfers or tax shares, which had traditionally characterised 
                                                 
25 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘El Parlament de Catalunya insta el Govern de la 
Generalitat a iniciar un procés de negociació amb el Govern espanyol per a assolir un model de 
finançament propi per a Catalunya, dins d’aquest any 2012.’ 
26 Author’s translation of: ‘el contingut de la proposta del pacte fiscal en la línia del concert econòmic 
no té massa marge de negociació [...], el marge no és tant dels continguts, sinó del temps’ (Pujol 2012). 
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previous negotiations on the reform of the fiscal system. Rajoy rejected the proposal 
and Mas admitted that there was no willingness in the central government to concede 
the Catalan demand for full fiscal powers. Mas faced a debate a few days later in the 
Catalan Parliament and argued that the new fiscal agreement was CiU’s main proposal 
to better satisfy the accommodation of Catalan demands in Spain. Given that he 
thought that option had no chances of success, and taking into account as well the 
popular mobilisation in favour of independence, he called for an early election in 
which CiU would put forward a demand to hold a referendum on Catalonia’s 
constitutional future. According to Mas, ‘the project of the fiscal agreement has not 
been perceived by the central government and the state institutions as a good 
opportunity to renew the relationship between Catalonia and the rest of the state and 
to counterbalance the increasing fatigue [in Catalan society]. The fiscal agreement has 
not been perceived as a solution, but as a problem.’ He assured that ‘Rajoy told me to 
take the fiscal agreement to the Spanish Parliament […] and my answer was no, 
because I would not allow to go through another [process like the Statute reform] and 
through another humiliation. This time the Spanish Parliament will not vote, this time 
the Catalan people will vote;’ and, after announcing a new parliamentary election, he 
put forward CiU’s new proposal by stating that ‘this Parliament has voted more than 
once that Catalonia has a right to self-determination. It is time to execute this right, 
democratically, peacefully, in a constructive manner.’27 The substantial change in 
CiU’s demands inevitably focused the election campaign on territorial issues, 
especially on the prospects of a constitutional referendum and the outcomes of 
independence. 
                                                 
27 Author’s translation of parts of Mas’ speech in the Catalan Parliament on 25 September 2012. ‘El 
projecte de Pacte Fiscal no s’ha entès pel Govern central i per les institucions estatals com una bona 
oportunitat per refer la relació entre Catalunya i la resta de l’Estat i capgirar la fatiga creixent. El Pacte 
Fiscal no s’ha vist fora de Catalunya com una sol· lució, sinó com un problema’ (p. 3); ‘Rajoy em va dir 
que portés el Pacte Fiscal a les Corts [...], la meva resposta va ser no, perquè no estava disposat a passar 
per un nou via crucis i una nova humiliació. Aquest cop no votarà el Congrés, aquest cop votarà el poble 
de Catalunya’ (p. 34); ‘Aquest parlament ha votat en més d’una ocasió que Catalunya té dret a 
l’autoderminació. Ha arribat l’hora d’exercir aquest dret. De manera democràtica, pacífica, 
constructiva’ (p. 35) (Mas 2012). 
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The electoral manifesto of CiU did not mention the word ‘independence,’ albeit the 
party’s aim was clearly stated: ‘[w]e want to build up a broad social majority so that 
Catalonia can have its own state in the European framework’ and committed the ‘next 
Catalan government to promote a consultation during the next parliament so the people 
of Catalonia can decide, freely and democratically, its collective future’ (CiU 2012).28 
Not surprisingly, ERC, as long-term independence claimants, welcomed CiU’s 
demand for a constitutional referendum. However, taking for granted that the Spanish 
government would not willingly deliver it, the party did not rule out the possibility of 
a unilateral declaration of independence from the Catalan Parliament (ERC 2012).  
Finally, the PSC also responded to the high saliency of the referendum debate during 
the campaign and the party, while rejecting independence, also included the necessity 
of a referendum to be held as a way to solve the constitutional question. The Catalan 
Socialists’ openly demanded ‘the renewal of the constitutional agreement through a 
federal construction’ of Spain, arguing that ‘the federalist alternative is the only one 
able to implement an equilibrated institutional system in which Catalonia remains a 
part of Spain without forsaking its identity.’ This would be achieved through ‘a 
constitutional reform that will recognise Spain as a plurinational, plurilingual, and 
pluricultural state which will guarantee Catalan national identity, its specificity within 
Spain through […] its language, culture, civil law, and self-government institutions.’ 
The constitutional reform proposal would also include a clearer delimitation of 
competencies for the central and sub-state governments, a renewed Senate, and a 
mixed Catalan-central state tax agency that would administer all taxes levied in 
Catalonia, while guaranteeing solidarity with other regions albeit observing the 
‘ordinal principle’ amongst them in terms of how much they give and receive.  
This proposal of constitutional reform was to be considered, according to the PSC, 
alongside a constitutional referendum, albeit the purpose of it remained rather 
ambiguous. The PSC electoral manifesto stated that ‘the citizens of Catalonia will have 
                                                 
28 Author’s translation from the original, which reads: ‘Volem construir una majoria social àmplia 
perquè Catalunya pugui tenir un estat propi dins del marc d’Europa’ (p. 12) and ‘el proper Govern de 
la Generalitat impulsarà una consulta la propera legislatura per tal que el poble de Catalunya pugui 
determinar lliurement i democràticament el seu futur col· lectiu’ (p. 13). 
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to freely decide on any substantial proposition of change in the relationship between 
Catalonia and Spain, which has to be agreed between both Catalan and Spanish 
institutions, through a referendum with a clear question […] to accept or reject the 
project under discussion’ (PSC 2012).29 It is not clear whether this referendum would 
be on independence or rather to ratify a prospective constitutional reform proposal,30 
but in any case the three parties, CiU, ERC, and PSC, alongside with ICV, are 
considered to back some sort of constitutional referendum. On the other hand, the PP 
and Ciutadans (C’s) opposed any form of consultation. 
The November 2012 election result delivered the confirmation of a substantial change 
in the Catalan party system. CiU won the election as usual but lost 12 seats, returning 
50 and thus 18 short of an overall majority. The PSC lost its traditional runner-up 
position –in number of seats– for the first time, being surpassed by ERC with 21 seats, 
which levelled its 2006 results. The PSC returned 20 MPs and was closely followed 
by the PP, which received an additional seat and increased its share to 19. The ICV 
returned 13 and C’s trebled its results and returned 9 seats.31 This left an open scenario 
in which CiU had to look for an ally to secure a parliamentary majority. Due to the 
                                                 
29 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘és el moment de renovar el pacte constitutional a 
través de la construcció federal’; ‘L’alternativa federalista és l’única capaç d’articular un sistema 
institucional equilibrat, en el qual Catalunya formi part d’Espanya sense renunciar gens a la seva 
identitat’ (p. 5); ‘La reforma que proposem reconeixerà Espanya com un Estat plurinacional, 
plurilingüístic i pluricultural i garantirà el reconeixement de la identitat nacional catalana, de la seva 
singularitat dintre d’Espanya, [...] que es manifesta especialment en la seva llengua, la seva cultura, el 
seu dret civil i les seves institucions d’autogovern’ (p. 7); ‘els ciutadans i les ciutadanes de Catalunya 
hauran de decidir lliurement sobre qualsevol proposta de canvi substancial de les relacions entre 
Catalunya i Espanya, acordada entre les institucions catalanes i espanyoles, a través d’un referèndum 
en el qual es plantegi una pregunta clara [...], acceptant o rebutjant el projecte sotmès a consulta’ (p. 
10). 
30 In this sense, while the PSC leaders are open to consider a referendum if it is agreed with the central 
institutions, the PSOE leader stated that the only possible way for the Catalans to vote is through a 
reform of Spain’s constitution. He said: ‘I want the Catalans to vote. I want them to vote a reform of the 
Constitution and then a new Statute [of Autonomy].’ Also, he added that amongst the two options of 
‘voting to break-up and voting to be together,’ the Spanish Socialists would only accept a vote on the 
latter (La Vanguardia, 25 October 2013g). 





emphasis that the campaign had placed on the referendum, the PP and the PSC rejected 
supporting Mas unless he withdrew his demand for a referendum and the pursuit of 
independence, so the ground was ripe for an agreement with ERC. This agreement was 
formalised on 19 December 2012 and included the commitment of ERC to support the 
government of CiU –ERC would not formally enter a coalition– and also the 
remarkable commitment of both parties to ‘call for a consultation so the Catalan people 
can decide on the possibility of Catalonia being a State in the European framework’ 
(CiU and ERC 2012: 2, Annex 1).32 
On 23 January 2013 the Catalan Parliament voted a resolution entitled ‘The 
Declaration of Sovereignty and the ‘Right to Decide’ of the People of Catalonia’ which 
declared that ‘the people of Catalonia has, due to reasons of democratic legitimacy, 
the character of a sovereign political and juridical subject’ and accordingly will 
exercise its right to decide its future through ‘a negotiation with the Spanish State, the 
European institutions and the international community;’ while ‘using all the existing 
legal frameworks to effectively […] exercise the right to decide’ (Parlament de 
Catalunya 2013a).33 The resolution was passed by CiU, ERC, ICV and another MP 
from a minority pro-independence party, thus numbering 85 votes in favour, a majority 
of 17. The PSC voted against the resolution because, according to the PSC’s Secretary 
General, ‘the Declaration of Sovereignty was not included in the PSC’s election 
manifesto and the agreement needed to be based on the ‘right to decide’;’ and criticised 
CiU and ERC for ‘declaring sovereignty first, and asking the citizens of Catalonia 
later.’ He further argued that the fact ‘that the Catalan Parliament unilaterally declares 
the sovereignty of the people of Catalonia is to promote independence, thus making 
any eventual consultation unnecessary’ (Navarro i Morera 2013: 44).34 The PSC voted 
                                                 
32 Author’s translation from the original: ‘Convocar una consulta perquè el poble de Catalunya es pugui 
pronunciar sobre la possibilitat que Catalunya esdevingui un Estat en el marc europeu.’ 
33 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘El poble de Catalunya té, per raons de legitimitat 
democràtica, caràcter de subjecte polític i jurídic sobirà’; ‘es negociarà amb l’estat espanyol, amb les 
institucions europees i amb el conjunt de la comunitat internacional’; and ‘S’utilitzaran tots els marcs 
legals existents per a [...] l’exercici del dret a decidir.’ 
34 Author’s translation from the original speech in Catalan: ‘aquesta declaració de sobirania no forma 
part del programa electoral del PSC i que l’acord s’havia de fomentar en el dret a decidir’; ‘vostès opten 
per declarar la sobirania, primer, i per preguntar als ciutadans i les ciutadanes de Catalunya després’; 
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against the declaration, although five of its twenty MPs from the most Catalanist 
faction decided not to cast a vote on the grounds that the party’s election manifesto 
supported the Catalan people’s right to decide. This episode emphasised the highly 
divisive nature of this issue within the PSC. 
In any case, the Declaration of Sovereignty was immediately challenged by the 
Spanish government to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it clearly violated 
the Spanish Constitution. This episode very clearly exemplified the position of the 
Spanish government related to the demand of the Catalan political parties to hold a 
referendum on independence, which is considered unconstitutional and accordingly 
the central government has rejected so far any initiative leading to the holding of a 
constitutional referendum.  
This section has highlighted the latest episodes concerning Catalan territorial demands. 
As the above lines suggest, this is still an ongoing process and the Catalan parliament’s 
will to hold a constitutional referendum faces complete opposition from the Spanish 
government; which assures that constitutional tensions in Spain will keep being high 
in the near future.  For the purposes of the analysis, the evolution of Catalan territorial 
demands will cover until the commitment of a majority of the Catalan Parliament to 
hold a constitutional referendum in Catalonia. 
 
4. Conclusion: The Dynamics of Territorial Demands in 
Catalonia  
 
The above lines discussed the evolution of Catalan territorial demands contained in 
five phases. In order to explain the change from one phase to another, one can consider 
party competition dynamics, territorial management strategies, and public preferences 
for constitutional reform. 
                                                 
‘Que el Parlament de Catalunya declari de forma unilateral la sobirania del poble de Catalunya és 
apostar per la independència, fent sobrera qualsevol consultar posterior al respecte.’ 
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In terms of party politics, the PSC’s commitment to reform the Statute challenged 
CiU’s territorial strategy of bargaining at the centre; and also assured that ERC, which 
was on the rise due to the PP’s centralist-oriented policies, would support the PSC in 
demanding such a reform. CiU’s produced more assertive demands while in opposition 
while trying to cast doubt on ERC’s pro-independence credentials and emphasise the 
support that the secessionists were giving to the PSC, and consequently to the PSOE. 
A Statute reform was nevertheless agreed by CiU in Madrid; and even though its scope 
had been considerably watered down by the PSOE government, the reform was ratified 
by the Catalan people in a referendum. However, CiU did not recover power as the 
party expected after the 2006 Catalan election and kept raising the profile of their 
demands from the opposition, especially regarding fiscal autonomy. CiU, having 
reasserted its territorial demands while in opposition could not go back to its traditional 
moderate position, especially after facing raising public support for independence, 
constant mobilisation from the Catalanist civil society, and the electoral threat of ERC.  
Territorial management also has an effect on territorial demands. The demand for a 
reform of the Statute of Autonomy was a direct consequence not only of party 
competition in Catalonia, but also of the centralising policies implemented by the PP 
after 2000 when the support of CiU in Madrid was no longer necessary. The 
radicalisation of Catalan territorial demands after 2010 followed the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling that declared some articles of the new Statute of Autonomy 
unconstitutional. Finally, the rejection of full fiscal autonomy by the central 
government led CiU to continue the escalation of territorial demands by proposing a 
referendum on independence, which seems to be widely supported by the Catalan 
population according to several polls (CATN 2013). The actions of central institutions 
therefore have also had an impact on the political parties’ framing of their territorial 
demands, and seem to reinforce the dynamics of demand-response-demand introduced 
at the beginning of this chapter. 
Last, but certainly not least, the mass mobilisations against the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling on the Statute in 2010 and the pro-independence March of 2012 indicate that 
the public also contributes to influence the actions and strategies of political actors, as 
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the swift call for a snap elections by PM Mas after the 11 September demonstration 
suggests.  
The next two chapters will look into the role of these three factors, namely, party 
politics, central state territorial management, and public opinion and mobilisation, in 
influencing the evolution of political parties’ territorial demands in the last two phases 
of Catalan self-government that have been defined: the Statute reform process and the 




Chapter 5. Party Competition as the Driver of 




This chapter aims to explain the political dynamics that have led to an escalation of 
Catalan territorial demands. The symmetric regionalisation scheme deployed in the so-
called Estado de las Autonomías has not satisfied the main Catalan political parties, 
which initially backed an expansion of autonomy and a recognition of Catalan 
distinctiveness through a reform of the Statute of Autonomy. After this process of 
Statute reform ended controversially with the Constitutional Court’s ruling that 
modified the text that had been approved by the people of Catalonia in a referendum, 
Catalan nationalist parties exacerbated their demands by introducing a new concept on 
the political agenda based on the Catalans’ ‘right to decide’ their political future, that 
is, that Catalans should be able to decide which form of territorial organisation they 
prefer for their country. This ‘right to decide’ paradigm was used by CiU after the 
party’s victory in the 2010 election when they campaigned for full fiscal autonomy for 
Catalonia, which was nevertheless rejected by the Spanish government, and led to a 
further escalation of territorial demands in the form of a cross-party backed referendum 
on Catalonia’s constitutional future. Even the PSC formally backed a referendum 
although only if it was agreed between both the Catalan and Spanish institutions. The 
party made it clear though that it would reject independence if the referendum is 
eventually delivered, while it also insists on a federal reform of Spain’s Constitution 
to accompany the demand for a referendum. 
In this chapter, the effect of political party competition as the main driver of territorial 
demands in Catalonia is analysed. Party competition in Catalonia involves two 
different dimensions. First, in a similar token to other stateless nations, party 
competition exists between State-wide and stateless nationalist parties. This 
competition is clearly exemplified in Catalonia regarding CiU and ERC on one hand, 
and the PSC on the other. SWPs in stateless nations confront relatively strong SNRPs 
that will challenge their sub-state credentials and might force SWPs to assume some 
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of the nationalists’ positions on the territorial cleavage in order to be electorally 
competitive amongst an electorate that tends to be in favour of the empowerment of 
the sub-state tier of government (Elias 2011; Fabre 2008; Hepburn 2009; Libbrecht, 
Maddens, and Swenden 2013; van Biezen and Hopkin 2006). The effects of this type 
of electoral competition have also resulted in internal organisational changes for 
SWPs, which tend to give more autonomy to regional party branches in order to better 
accommodate the particularities of electoral competition in the sub-state context 
(Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010; Fabre and Méndez-Lago 2009; Swenden and Maddens 
2009). In this sense, the case of the PSC in Catalonia has been largely described as 
paradigmatic. The party holds a semi-independent status from the Spanish-wide PSOE 
that provides for almost complete autonomy on internal Catalan matters, albeit 
maintaining the ties with the Spanish central party organisation (Deschouwer 2006; 
Fabre 2011; van Houten 2009). The specific episodes of party competition between 
the PSC on the one hand, and CiU and ERC on the other, influenced the shaping of 
territorial demands in Catalonia, especially regarding the Statute reform as will be 
argued in the second section of this chapter.35 
The third section will argue that competition between SNRPs also increases territorial 
demands. In a scenario where (at least) two SNRPs compete against each other, a 
moderate and electorally more successful party will be put under pressure by a 
relatively smaller party but with more radical territorial aims (Newman 1997). This 
scenario clearly fits the Catalan case with a moderate, ruling CiU facing the pro-
independence ERC in opposition until 2003 (Marcet and Argelaguet 1998). SNRPs, 
                                                 
35 The Partido Popular (PP) will take a minor part in the analysis as it has normally espoused a committed 
defence of the territorial status quo, also in Catalonia, due to its centralist and unitary view of Spain 
(Fabre 2008; Hopkin 2009; Maddens and Libbrecht 2009). Moreover, its traditionally lower electoral 
influence –compared to the PSC– has limited the relevance of the party in Catalan politics. The party in 
Catalonia has recently reacted to the demand for a referendum on independence by putting forward a 
counter-proposal based on a ‘singular’ funding system for Catalonia. Although this confirms the 
tensions and dynamics between SWPs’ central leadership and regional branches in stateless nations 
pointed out above, it is worth mentioning that such a proposal was radically rejected by the central PP 
leadership when the Catalan leader presented it in Madrid (La Vanguardia, 8 October 2013f). The 
escalation of Catalan demands up to the holding of a Constitutional referendum have led the Catalan PP 
to introduce some counteroffers, but the level of internal tension with the party’s state-wide leadership 
remains far lower than that of the PSC with the PSOE. 
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especially those in opposition which support radical constitutional change, including 
independence, have been described as ‘parties that adhere to the democratic rules of 
the game, but prefer to exert pressure on policies only from the opposition,’ in what 
has been labelled as a ‘tribune strategy’ (De Winter 1998b). Arguably, being in 
opposition makes it easier for a party to demand independence than carrying it through 
while being in government. Therefore, entering government might suppose a crucial 
dilemma for these parties (De Winter 1998a; Elias and Tronconi 2011), especially if a 
compromise needs to be reached with other parties to form a coalition that will 
inevitably lead to a watering down of the party’s ambitious territorial aims.  
As it will be shown in the analysis of party competition in Catalonia, the government 
and opposition role of the parties is more crucial than their initial moderate or radical 
stance on constitutional change. When ERC entered a coalition government in 2003 
alongside the PSC and the ICV, they had to put down their aim of independence and 
compromised on the demand to reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. During the 
Statute reform negotiations, and beyond, CiU, which was in the opposition, 
considerably raised its constitutional change proposals thus following their particular 
‘tribune strategy’ in order to put ERC in an uncomfortable position in front of its pro-
independence voters. The increase on the ambitiousness of CiU’s territorial demands 
–including the ambitious scope of the new Statute of Autonomy and their demand for 
it to include full fiscal autonomy– while in opposition made it politically unviable to 
abandon this kind of demands once the party got back to power in 2010. As for ERC, 
their coalition experience with the PSC has been regarded, as we shall see, as a failure 
by the party leadership and, following a split in the party –i.e. Reagrupament, see 
below– and the appearance of Solidaritat Catalana (SCI) as a single-issue party that 
advocated unilateral independence, the party also ‘radicalised’ its territorial position 
and made it clear that they would not pact again with the Socialists. This whole process 
–alongside the spectacular electoral recovery of ERC in 2012– flattened the ground 
for the pro-referendum agreement between CiU and ERC after the 2012 Catalan 
election. Albeit the two parties had had bitter disagreements, electoral competition 
between them eventually led them to put forward a territorial demand they could both 
agree on: a referendum on independence. 
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2. Party Competition in Catalonia 
 
2.1. Competition between SWPs and SNRPs 
One of the main characteristics of SNRPs is that they aim at the empowerment of the 
sub-state institutions in their home territory and portray themselves as the best 
representatives of the sub-state nation’s interests (De Winter 1998a; van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2006). Thus, SWPs competing in stateless nations must adapt to regional-
specific party competition in order to combine the specificities of the particular 
territory to a wider coherence across the state. One of the strategies to achieve that aim 
is to grant autonomy to sub-state party branches in order to provide for more flexibility 
and adaptation to the relevant issues at the sub-state level (Detterbeck and Hepburn 
2010; Fabre 2008; 2011). Thus, when SNRPs put forward demands for constitutional 
change, SWPs need to consider responses to these challenges and a way to proceed is 
to put forward some proposals for constitutional change of their own (Swenden and 
Maddens 2009), which may lead to conflicts with their party colleagues in the central 
party leadership or in party branches in other regions. This conflicts may arise when 
constitutional change from a specific region is regarded with scepticism for a lack of 
will to reform the system from the central level or for the concerns from party members 
in less self-assertive regions that constitutional change may lead to formal asymmetries 
and thus a concession of privileges to the region seeking further constitutional powers 
(Sorens 2009).  
Party competition may therefore result in an escalation of territorial demands on 
aggregate terms, since parties will put forward the issue of constitutional change in the 
political agenda, which in turn will be challenged with other proposals by other parties, 
but will remain a salient topic of competition between them. Although it is widely 
assumed that it will be SNRPs who will put forward the most ambitious reform 
proposals, SWPs may in some cases be more assertive just to undermine the 
nationalists’ claim that the latter better represent the regions’ interests. In fact, this is 
the starting point of our analysis regarding the Catalan case in which the Catalan 
Socialists initially put forward the demand to reform the Statute of Autonomy while 
the nationalists of CiU were not pushing for such an outcome because of their 
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parliamentary agreement with the centralist-minded PP. Hence, the example of the 
PSC clearly shows that SWPs do in fact use the territorial cleavage to compete and 
undermine their nationalist opponents.  
 
2.1.1.The PSC: A strong ‘regionalist’ State-wide Party 
The relationship between the PSC and the PSOE has been a highly debated topic in 
the literature. The PSC is regarded as a highly autonomous branch of the Spanish 
socialists, formally constituted as a separate political party that enjoys almost full 
autonomy regarding Catalan domestic affairs and that nevertheless is involved in the 
governance of the PSOE at the state-wide level, with PSC members participating in 
the central party decision-making bodies (Fabre 2011; Swenden and Maddens 2009; 
Thorlakson 2009; van Houten 2009); while some other authors have stressed the 
independence of the PSC from the PSOE, classifying it as a completely separate, non-
state-wide party and defining the PSOE governments in Spain as government 
coalitions between the PSOE and the PSC (Barrio et al. 2010). In spite of the particular 
definition of the two parties’ relationship, it is undeniable that the PSOE and the PSC 
have close ties and share similar interests in spite of some important differences that 
they have had in the past and still have, which concern above all territorial politics and 
the state’s territorial structure. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to treat the PSC as 
the PSOE’s representative in Catalonia. 
The PSC’s autonomy de facto increased after the PSOE lost power at the central level 
in 1996, which led to former PM Felipe González to step down and to a quest for a 
new leadership which allowed in parallel the regional party branches to act more 
autonomously (Hopkin 2003). This new scenario was followed by the appointment of 
Pasqual Maragall as the PSC’s candidate to the Catalan Generalitat, which was 
regarded as being closer to the Catalanist positions and a strong defendant of furthering 
Spain’s federalisation process (van Houten 2009).  
Maragall led the PSC to its best result in the 1999 Catalan election in which the party 
received more votes than CiU, although the nationalists were able to keep Pujol as 
Catalan PM thanks to the electoral system –CiU received more seats, see figure 1– and 
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the parliamentary support of the Catalan PP. Maragall’s position was strengthened in 
spite of not achieving power in Catalonia, whereas the new PSOE leadership suffered 
an astonishing setback in the 2000 general election, which resulted in the PP achieving 
an incontestable majority in the Spanish Parliament. This precipitated another 
leadership contest within the PSOE, in which the PSC and Maragall supported José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The election of the latter as the leader of the PSOE opened 
up the possibility for a renewed vision of Spain, one which would further recognise its 
internal pluralism regarding languages, cultures, and nationalities. The Zapatero 
victory in the PSOE leadership introduced the rhetoric of the “España plural” –plural 
Spain– and Maragall and the PSC decided to invest and exploit that through a proposal 
to reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy.  
This substantial movement of the PSC’s regarding Catalan self-government was also 
due to internal Catalan politics, with the CiU rejecting to reform the Catalan Statute 
due to its agreement with the PP and the then opposition parties, the PSC, the ERC and 
the ICV looking forward to extend Catalonia’s self-government. Thus, as a leader of 
the ERC put it, ‘the PSC tactically modifies its position because they thought Esquerra 
would put forward [the Statute reform] as a condition [to establish a government 
coalition], and also because the PSC’s state-wide counterpart also changed its view on 
the issue’ of self-government.36 The PSC’s tactical movement to put forward the 
Statute reform was eventually matched by CiU, which supported the reform as well 
while forsaking the agreement the party had with the PP. This cross-party support for 
the Statute reform was positively received by the PSOE, with Zapatero promising to 
accept the reform proposal if he was elected Prime Minister after the next Spanish 
election, as it eventually happened.  
The promise of the Socialist candidate Zapatero was rather vague and the scope of the 
reform that the PSOE leadership had in mind was far more moderate indeed that the 
reform proposal voted in the Catalan parliament on 30 September 2005. The 
                                                 
36 Interview with former ERC secretary general. Author’s translation from the original: ‘políticament el 
PSC varia la seva actitud sobre els seus electors perquè tàcticament està pensant que Esquerra 




negotiations between the Catalan parties that led to the reform proposal reflected the 
tensions between the nationalist parties, CiU and ERC, on the one hand, and the PSC 
–and also ICV– on the other, about how far the reform proposal should go.  Thus, CiU 
and the ERC had enough votes in the parliamentary committee to put forward 
ambitious demands that put the Catalan Socialists in an uncomfortable position 
because the nationalists’ aims on certain issues would most surely be unacceptable for 
the PSOE. As a leading negotiator of ERC put it, CiU ‘radicalised its positions to put 
Esquerra in an uncomfortable position towards its voters. Thus, a political competition 
takes place within the parliamentary committee […] so the PSC finds it difficult to 
follow up with the committee’s proposals and Convergència i Unió and Esquerra have 
a majority in the committee to establish certain proposals’ which eventually resulted 
in ‘a highly ambitious reform proposal that made the PSOE profoundly uncomfortable 
and Zapatero’s pledge to accept the Statute approved by the Parliament impossible to 
fulfil.’37 The demands that clearly exemplified the nature of the conflict were CiU’s 
intention to introduce a system of full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia, in which the 
Catalan institutions would be able to collect and administer all taxes in the country and 
the inclusion of the ‘historical rights’ –‘drets històrics’– of Catalonia, implying that 
Catalonia had a historical right to self-government, previous to the Spanish 
Constitution, and so Catalan self-government was not granted by the Constitution, but 
merely recognised by it (Ferret Jacas 2011).  
The tensions around the proposal for the fiscal system lasted until the debate in which 
the Statute reform proposal was approved in September 2005, and the final debate 
clearly shows the emphasis that CiU put in achieving a system of full fiscal autonomy 
akin to the Basque ‘concierto económico.’ This was opposed by the PSC which 
defended a reform of the current system with expanded tax-sharing capacities and 
                                                 
37 Ibid. Author’s translation from the original: ‘Convergència i Unió [...] va ser intentar desbordar per 
la banda catalnista, intentar radicalitzar les seves posicions [...] per incomodar Esquerra davant del seu 
electorat. Amb la qual cosa s’estableix una competició en termes polítics dins de la ponència [...] de tal 
manera que al PSC li dificulta seguir els treballs de la ponència, de tal manera que Convergència i Unió 
i Esquerra tenen prou majoria dins la ponència per arrencar determinats compromisos.’ ‘[E]fectivament 
aixequen el llistó de l’exigència i fa que el PSOE estigui profundament incòmode, de tal manera que 
aquell compromís de Zapatero d’acceptar l’Estatut que aprovés el Parlament, en aquell moment era 
impossible’ (Ridao 2012). 
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more authority on tax regulation. The CiU leader, Artur Mas, referring to this fiscal 
proposal, argued that ‘it is not us […] who need to read the Spanish Constitution in a 
restrictive way. […] It is not for us, as representatives of the Catalan people, to lower 
down our expectations. Experience shows, and you all know that very well, that the 
limits will be put on us from outside, because limits have always been put on us from 
outside; so there is no need for us to help set those limitations.’38 Similarly, also during 
the same debate, Mas’ party colleague Mr Felip Puig argued that other parties had 
supported full fiscal autonomy but they were not willing to include it in the statute 
because of the PSC, and ultimately the PSOE. He argued that ‘Convergència i Unió, 
Esquerra Republicana and Iniciativa per Catalunya want the ‘concert econòmic’ [full 
fiscal autonomy].  […] What has happened in one-and-a-half years to those parties that 
defended that in their election manifestoes but they do not do so today?’ and 
challenged those who claimed full fiscal autonomy to be against the Spanish 
Constitution to point out the article that prevented Catalan institutions ‘to aspire to a 
finance system akin to the ‘concert econòmic’.’39 
The resulting proposal voted in the Catalan parliament included a fiscal system that 
would entail Catalonia to have full autonomy in tax collection and regulation, through 
the creation of a mixed agency involving the Spanish central treasury and a newly 
created Catalan treasury. The PSC was suspicious of this system and presented 
amendments to it, although the party supported the reform overall to facilitate its 
passing, albeit keeping the amendments for the forthcoming negotiation in Madrid 
(Colino 2009). Hence, the PSC gave up on opposing full fiscal autonomy because they 
                                                 
38 Mas’ speech during the Statute reform parliamentary debate. Author’s translation from: ‘[N]o som 
nosaltres [...] els que hem de fer lectures restrictives de la Constitució espanyola [...]. No ens correspon, 
com a responsables i directes representants del poble de Catalunya, aplicar-nos rebaixes nosaltres 
mateixos des de dintre de casa. L’experiència ens demostra, i tots vostès ho saben molt bé, que les 
limitacions ens vindran des de fora, perquï sempre ens han vingut des de fora; no cal que hi ajudem des 
de casa mateix en aquest procés’ (Mas 2006 [28 September 2005]: 31). 
39 Felip Puig speech during the Statute reform parliamentary debate. Author’s translation from: 
‘Convergència i Unió, Esquerra Republicana i Iniciativa per Cataluna defensen el concert econòmic. 
[...] Què passa, en un any i mig, que avui hi ha partits que en el seu programa electoral defensaven i 
avui no defensen aquesta interpretació, aquesta proposta?’ and ‘[e]m poden llegir quin article, 
literalment, que diu que Catalunya no pot aspirar a tenir un model de finançament assimilat al concert 
econòmic?’ (Puig 2006 [28 September 2005]: 47-8). 
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relied on the PSOE doing it anyway during the Statute reform negotiation in Madrid, 
as it eventually occurred.  
The double negotiation process of the reform, in the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, 
allowed the PSC to keep silent in front of the nationalist parties’ high expectations on 
fiscal autonomy because they trusted the PSOE would do the ‘dirty job.’ In the central 
parliament phase of the negotiation, the PSC ‘disappeared’ (Pujol 2012), although the 
party justified that low profile precisely on the dual character of the negotiation, where 
the PSC was relevant in Catalonia and the PSOE took charge in Madrid (Iceta 2012). 
However, this strategy resulted in the Catalan parliament’s proposal to be quite 
ambitious and any outcome of the Statute after the central parliament’s say on the 
reform could be perceived as a ‘watered down’ Statute. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, this turned badly for the PSC since ERC rejected the outcome of the Statute 
and was subsequently expelled from the Catalan government, which led to the PSC 
and ICV to be left in a minority government and to a snap election to follow only a 
few months after the Statute was ratified by the Catalan people in the June 2006 
referendum. 
During the Madrid phase of the negotiation, though, CiU had to lower down its 
ambitions and settle for a ‘watered down’ reform. The party, which had been ousted 
from power in 2003, built up on the low-profile role of the PSC during the later stages 
of the Statute negotiation and struck a deal with the PSOE leadership to support CiU 
to recover office at the Catalan level after the next election. This was exemplified by 
the PSOE pressure to remove Pasqual Maragall as the PSC candidate to the Generalitat 
and a commitment from the PSOE to promote a CiU-PSC coalition in Catalonia (van 
Houten 2009). However, CiU did not make significant wins in the 2006 election amd 
saw the PSC renewing the coalition agreement with the ERC and ICV under the 
presidency of José Montilla, who was regarded as a less Catalanist leader than 
Maragall and closer to the PSOE leadership –he had in fact been a minister in the first 
Zapatero government up until a few months before the Catalan election. This episode 
marvellously exemplified the long claimed full autonomy that the PSC enjoys vis-à-
vis the PSOE and which is constantly criticised by the party’s competitors (van Biezen 
and Hopkin 2006). The links between the Statute final negotiation and the government 
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coalition formation after the 2006 election were plainly explained by a member of the 
PSC’s leadership in an interview, in which he explained that  
‘the expectations of Convergència were that they would be in office after [the 
Statute reform], even with the support of the PSC. So, their attempts that 
Pasqual [Maragall] would not run again, that they closed the deal [on the 
Statute], [and] also opinion polls showed they were far ahead… They thought 
that developing the new Statute would depend on them because of the election 
results, but also because of their crucial role in the negotiation and, if needed, 
with the PSC’s support because there was this thesis, highly shared in Madrid 
as well, that said that if the two parties [CiU and PSC] had brought forward 
the new Statute, so its development should rely on these two parties too. The 
PSC somehow does not accept that. It does not accept it and argues that it 
has a more strategic vision of leftist governments and therefore if the 
possibility exists, the party will do it. So, against the PSOE’s position, the 
PSC re-edited the [coalition] agreement. Also, there was the issue of the 
replacement of Pasqual [Maragall] and the way this happened… Since the 
PSC leader [Montilla] was running as candidate and the election results 
allowed the coalition to be re-built, the fact is that renouncing to do it was 
especially complicated.’40 
Once the Statute was approved and the new elections kept CiU in opposition, the 
territorial debate in Catalonia focused on the negotiation of the new financial system, 
which was a mandatory condition of the newly approved Catalan Statute. CiU urged 
to design a specific fiscal model for Catalonia (CiU 2008) and eventually rejected the 
outcome of the 2009 fiscal system reform for not even reaching the indications 
outlined in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In the run up to the 2010 Catalan election, 
                                                 
40 Interview with Miquel Iceta, former PSC member of the party leadership. Author’s translation: ‘les 
expectatives de Convergència era que ells governarien després, i fins i tot, fins i tot potser amb el PSC. 
És a dir, els seus intents de que el Pasqual no es tornés a presentar, ells tancar l’acord, de que sempre 
les enquestes els hi donaven per davant. Per tant, pensaven que el desplegament estatutari els hi 
correspondria a ells per raó de les urnes, però per raó també del seu protagonisme en el fet i, en tot cas, 
si ho necessitave, diríem amb el PSC, perquè hi havia una tesi que a Madrid era també molt compartida, 
de dir, bueno, si els dos partits hem fet l’Estatut, pues el futur també l’hem de fer aquests dos partits. I 
mentre doncs el PSC d’alguna manera no, no accepta això no. No accepta això i diu, no, no, jo tinc una 
visió més estratègica de governs d’esquerres i per tant si hi ha la possibilitat ho faré, no? I per tant, i en 
contra de la posició del PSOE, doncs el PSC va reeditar el pacte. També pel PSC hi havia un tema 
d’alguna manera, com la substitució del Pasqual va anar com va anar i com va anar, doncs home, ja que 
es feia el primer secretari del PSC era el candidat i que el resultats permetien reeditar el govern, doncs 
renunciar a fer-ho era, en fi era molt especialment complicat' (Iceta 2012). 
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just a few months after the Constitutional Court ruling on the Statute had been 
published, CiU put forward the new paradigm of the Catalans’ ‘right to decide’ and 
the demand for what they had already looked forward a few years before during the 
Statute negotiation: full fiscal autonomy, which the party labelled as a ‘fiscal pact’  
–‘pacte fiscal’– between the Catalan and Spanish institutions. The CiU’s 2010 election 
manifesto read that the party ‘supported the right to decide the level of self-government 
that the Catalan people wants and claims;’ while ‘placing as one of the top priorities 
of this right to decide the complete administration of our economic resources through 
a specific funding system, such as the ‘concert econòmic.’ We aspire to financial 
sovereignty […] but also to more political sovereignty and more self-government 
capacities’ (CiU 2010: 82).41 The PSC, facing an election campaign that would feature 
its coalition partner, ERC, openly campaigning for a referendum on independence after 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute (ERC 2010), adopted a much more 
moderate approach than CiU during the campaign, claiming to ‘recover’ the parts of 
the Statute that had been declared unconstitutional through specific legislation; and, 
regarding the fiscal issue, the party declared its willingness to defend the recent fiscal 
model approved in 2009 and to demand the fulfilment of the state’s commitment to 
reduce Catalonia’s indirect money transfers to other regions; as well as its long-
standing claim to propose a federal reform of the Spanish constitution (PSC 2010).  
The victory of CiU in the 2010 election led to the resignation of José Montilla both as 
PSC party and parliamentary leader. With CiU back in power, the nationalists have 
been able to set the political agenda, which from the perspective of territorial politics 
implied the discussion and negotiation of full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia during the 
2010-2012 period. Since then, the PSC has adopted several counterproposals in 
reaction to CiU’s main territorial demands. The late attitude of the PSC more 
accurately resembles the SWPs’ strategies devised in the literature on how SWP 
                                                 
41 Author’s translation from the original in Catalan: ‘apostem pel dret a decidir per assolir les cotes 
d’autogovern que el poble de Catalunya reclama i necessita.’ ‘Situem com una de les primeres prioritats 
d’aquest dret a decidir la gestió plena dels nostres recursos econòmics a través d’un model de 
finançament propi, com ho és el concert econòmic. Aspirem a la sobirania financera al servei de més 
benestar per als catalans i d’un millor progrés econòmic, però també per disposar de més sobirania 
política i més capacitat d’autogovern.’ 
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branches need to adapt to region-specific contests (Deschouwer 2006; Detterbeck and 
Hepburn 2010; Thorlakson 2009). The PSC has followed suit CiU’s demands in its 
form, but moderating the ambitiousness or content of such demands. Two clear 
examples will illustrate this pattern, the debate on full fiscal autonomy and the most 
recent scenario of the demand for a referendum on self-determination for Catalonia. 
First, regarding fiscal autonomy, the PSC claimed that CiU was putting forward a very 
ambiguous and unconstitutional proposal, which would generate frustration amongst 
the citizenry because it would not be possible to achieve. Also, the Catalan Socialists 
argued that the late fiscal reform of 2009 was in itself a ‘fiscal agreement’ between the 
central government and Catalonia (PSC 2011). Although the 2009 reform was led by 
the Catalan government following the Statute reform, it was yet another multilateral 
agreement between the central government and the 15 Autonomous Communities of 
the common fiscal regime (Herrero Alcalde, Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell, and Vizán 
Rodríguez 2010). The Catalan Parliament voted a resolution to demand full fiscal 
autonomy which was widely supported by a clear majority, and the PSC voted in 
favour of some aspects of it and abstained in others. For instance, the party endorsed 
the claim that Catalonia contributes too much to interregional solidarity and that the 
so-called ‘ordinal principle’ between regions should be observed, and that a new fiscal 
system was needed based on Catalonia’s full decision-making capacity on taxes. 
However, the party did not endorse the most substantial part of the resolution which 
demanded the creation of a separate Catalan Tax Agency with full responsibilities on 
tax administration in Catalonia (Parlament de Catalunya 2012a).  
Second, after the proposal for full fiscal autonomy was completely rejected by the 
Spanish government, Catalan President Mas called for a snap election in which CiU 
campaigned for a referendum for Catalan voters to decide whether Catalonia was to 
have its own state, following the demand for independence of the one million-strong 
demonstration in Barcelona on 11 September 2012. The PSC again matched the 
demand of the nationalists, this time for a referendum on the constitutional status of 
Catalonia, albeit making it clear that the party did not support Catalonia’s 
independence. The party put forward a somewhat more detailed proposal to reform the 
Spanish Constitution in a federal way, albeit emphasising that the ‘citizens of 
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Catalonia will have to decide freely about any substantial proposal aimed at changing 
the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, agreed between the Catalan and Spanish 
institutions, through a referendum with a clear question and a clear answer, accepting 
or rejecting the proposed project’ (PSC 2010: 10, emphasis added).42 Thus, the PSC is 
formally in favour of a constitutional referendum in Catalonia, although it does not 
provide a clue whether the vote would be on independence or on something else; for 
instance, on the party’s proposed reform of the Spanish Constitution. The party 
leadership has kept supporting a referendum to take place, although making it crystal 
clear that it has to be agreed with the Spanish central government.  
The PSC even presented its own resolution to the Catalan Parliament stressing the need 
for the referendum to be negotiated with the Spanish government, following a previous 
resolution that had declared Catalonia a ‘sovereign political subject,’ which the PSC 
failed to support –see previous chapter. The PSC-sponsored resolution demanding a 
referendum received 104 votes out of 135 in the Catalan Parliament, thus adding the 
PSC to the wide cross-party support for a constitutional referendum in Catalonia 
(Parlament de Catalunya 2013b). It is also important to note that the PSC had 
supported a similar resolution a few weeks before in the Spanish Parliament that did 
not go through due to the thorough opposition of both the PP and the PSOE. However, 
the PSC MPs voted differently from the PSOE for the first time –except for the 
parliamentary leader, Mrs Carme Chacón, who did not take part on the resolution vote 
(La Vanguardia, 26 February 2013b). This episode led to a severe crisis between the 
PSC and the PSOE, reflecting on the effects that the territorial question and the 
pressures of nationalist parties have in internal SWPs relations.43 The PSC is putting 
                                                 
42 Author’s own translation from the PSC’s 2012 Catalan election manifesto: ‘els ciutadans i les 
ciutadanes de Catalunya hauran de decidir lliurement sobre qualsevol proposta de canvi substancial de 
les relacions entre Catalunya i Espanya, acordada entre les institucions catalanes i espanyoles, a través 
d’un referèndum en el qual es plantegi una pregunta clara a la qual s’hagi de respondre de forma 
inequívoca, acceptant o rebutjant el projecte sotmès a consulta.’ 
43 A similar episode occurred again on 28 October 2013 when the Spanish Parliament debated a motion 
presented by the ‘Unión, Progreso y Democracia’ (UPyD), a small, state-wide party that emphasises 
Spain’s unity and rejects any concession to the peripheral nationalisms. The resolution read that the 
‘right to decide belongs solely to the Spanish people as a whole’ and that ‘under any circumstance may 
a faction of the people decide on the territorial organisation of the state.’ The resolution was backed by 
its promoters, the PP, and the PSOE, while the MPs of the PSC abstained, thus voting differently than 
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pressure on the PSOE to accept a referendum on Catalonia, but the Spanish Socialists 
are not willing to accept this as a possibility. However, the PSC is insisting that the 
PSOE should sponsor a federalist reform of Spain’s Constitution, which the PSOE has 
started to debate internally (PSOE 2013). 
 
2.1.2.Victim of its own strategy: the PSC playing the regionalist card 
triggered more radical demands 
The territorial question has been vivid in the political agenda in Catalonia (Guibernau 
1997; 2000b; Keating 2001a). This has remained so in the last decade, and SWPs have 
engaged in the territorial debate as much as the nationalist parties. In the early 2000s 
the PSC, led by Catalanist leader Pasqual Maragall, put forward a reform of the Statute 
of Autonomy of Catalonia to use the Catalan self-government card against the 
incumbent CiU, which was tied up by the Spanish PP on the promise of not demanding 
such a reform. This coincided with a leadership crisis in the Spanish-wide PSOE which 
led to the election of Zapatero, who favoured a more pluralistic vision of Spain and 
was enthusiastically backed by the PSC to lead the PSOE. Furthermore, the PSC would 
probably need support from other parties to oust CiU from the Catalan government. 
The pro-independence ERC would demand a substantial step forward in Catalonia’s 
self-government, so to put forward a Statute reform was a good investment to secure 
the ERC’s eventual inclusion into a coalition government.  
The PSC led a tripartite coalition with ERC and ICV and CiU was left in opposition, 
although the nationalists remained a crucial veto player for the Statute reform to 
succeed. CiU increased its demands, most notably demanding a model for full fiscal 
autonomy to be included in the Statute reform, to put pressure both on the PSC and 
ERC, and therefore aiming at breaking up the government coalition. After pressuring 
the PSC by setting a wide scope for the Statute reform, CiU ended up striking a deal 
with the PSOE that ‘watered down’ the Statute’s content and pressured to assure that 
                                                 
the PSOE a second time in the Spanish Parliament because of their disagreement on the position towards 
a constitutional referendum in Catalonia (La Vanguardia, 29 October 2013h). 
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the PSOE would force the PSC to support CiU in government after the next election, 
which took place after the Statute was passed and the government coalition had broken 
up due to the expulsion of ERC for rejecting the outcome of the Statute reform. 
However, the 2006 election left CiU an extra four years in the opposition in which the 
party kept demanding the promised new fiscal system and the transfers that the central 
government had agreed to, especially regarding the funding of infrastructures in 
Catalonia –the third additional clause of the new Statute.  
In the wake of the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute and facing crescent 
public support for independence, CiU put forward a demand for full fiscal autonomy 
to compensate for the Statute deception. The PSC, again in opposition, has been 
following CiU’s demands since, although moderating their scope. When CiU 
demanded full fiscal autonomy, the Socialists agreed that a new system was needed, 
although it could not be specially designed for Catalonia. Later on, when CiU put 
forward the demand for a referendum on independence, the PSC supported a 
constitutional referendum, although emphasising that the only way this can be 
delivered is through an agreement with the Spanish government.  
Competition between SWPs and nationalist parties has triggered Catalan demands on 
aggregate terms. The PSC kick-started formal constitutional reform by demanding a 
reform of the Statute of Autonomy, which CiU followed suit. In later stages, the PSC 
has been following, albeit with significant reservations, CiU’s territorial demands for 
expanded fiscal autonomy and ultimately for a constitutional referendum. This attitude 
contrasts the straightforward rejection of further territorial demands and the thorough 
defence of the status quo posed by the PP, the other SWP operating in Catalonia, and 
the C’s –technically a regional party but claiming to represent Spanish-wide interests 
in Catalonia. The position of the PSC, which puts them in line with its Catalanist 
tradition, enlarges the cross-party consensus for further demands in Catalonia, 
exemplified by the clear majorities in the Catalan parliament supporting first a new 
fiscal system for Catalonia in 2012 and a constitutional referendum –with the terms 
yet to be clearly defined– in 2013. Furthermore, with a majority of public opinion in 
favour of a constitutional referendum to take place in Catalonia, according to several 
opinion polls (CATN 2013), it is complicated for the PSC, which aims at being the 
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party that better represents the Catalan people, to side with the PP and the C’s in 
opposing a referendum. 
It has been shown in this section that the attitude of the PSC towards a Statute reform 
helped moving the position on the issue of the CiU. Also, it has been showed how the 
PSC has been following the CiU’s re-positioning on the territorial debate. The latter’s 
territorial vision has changed considerably in the last decade, though, as it was detailed 
in the previous chapter, ranging from the neglect to reform the Statute of Autonomy 
to demanding a referendum on independence in just a decade. CiU has also suffered 
fierce competition from another nationalist party, ERC, which has been supporting 
Catalan independence since the early 1990s. The effect of competition between 
nationalist parties on the aggregate territorial demands in Catalonia is what we turn 
our attention to in the next section. 
 
2.2. Competition between Stateless Nationalist Parties: CiU 
against ERC 
Political decentralisation constitutes a new arena for politics to take place, which not 
only in sub-state nations but also in regions with non-differentiated identities may 
provide incentives for the creation of regional or regionalist parties (Hamann 1999; 
Heller 2002). SNRPs’ primary goal is to represent and stand for the interests of their 
respective sub-state community (De Winter 1998a), and usually the best way to do so 
is to achieve office at the sub-state level (Jeffery and Hough 2003). Once political 
decentralisation is achieved, SNRPs may seek to extend the levels of autonomy of their 
homeland’s sub-state institutions (Fabre and Martínez-Herrera 2009), an objective that 
may be given extra strength and legitimacy if it is demanded from the sub-state 
governments, which serve both as a platform to legitimise and publicise further 
territorial demands (Elias and Tronconi 2011; Jeffery 2009a). In some cases a plurality 
of SNRPs coexist and several of these parties gain seats in the sub-state parliament. 
The literature on SNRPs has emphasised the heterogeneousness of this kind of political 
parties regarding both their ideological positions and their territorial aims (De Winter 
1998a; De Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Lynch 2006; Hepburn 2009; 
Massetti 2009). The latter category is especially relevant in this research. Competition 
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between SNRPs may be based on different positions on the constitutional status of the 
sub-state nation, ranging from ‘regionalist’ parties that aim at extending the range of 
competencies and powers of the sub-state institutions but do not put into question the 
state’s territorial integrity; to ‘radical-autonomists,’ which do not rule out 
independence in principle, although prefer to aim to far-reaching autonomy in the short 
term; to ‘independentist’ parties that seek to break away from the parent state and their 
homeland territory to become an independent country (Sorens 2008).  
In contexts where parties with two different territorial aims compete against each 
other, if one party loses ground in terms of votes to another party with a different 
policy, there might be an incentive for the first party to approach the latter’s policy 
position. The combination of votes, policy, and office helps explaining political 
parties’ behaviour (Strøm 1990). In a nutshell, the combination of electoral switch, 
territorial policy changes, and alternation in office clearly sheds light on the pattern of 
competition between CiU and ERC in Catalonia during the last decade. The 
competition between the two parties has also been reinforced by the left-of-centre 
position of the ERC versus the right-of-centre approach of the CiU. However, the 
relationship between incumbency and electoral results may explain change on party 
policy preferences, particularly regarding each party’s constitutional desired aim. This 
pattern of competition started even before the Statute reform process. ERC adopted, 
after successive leadership crises, a clear position in favour of Catalonia’s 
independence in 1992, and a leftist discourse in order to avoid being perceived as just 
‘the radical wing of CiU’ (Argelaguet 2006: 148; Marcet and Argelaguet 1998). These 
policy changes were followed by modest electoral gains during the mid- and late-
1990s, and the republicans achieved its best result ever in the 2003 election, returning 
23 MPs in the Parliament (see figures 3 and 4). The 2003 election coincided with the 





2.2.1.Government-opposition dynamics: Being in opposition boosts 
territorial demands 
The tripartite coalition meant the passing of CiU into the opposition, so Catalan politics 
remained the same in a particular way: one nationalist party was in government and 
another one was in opposition. Accordingly, the territorial issue would keep being 
prominent in the debate between government and opposition, as it had been before. 
Sub-state nationalist parties in opposition have often been regarded as usual employers 
of ‘tribune strategies’ (De Winter 1998a), that is, to heavily rely on playing the 
nationalist card while in opposition in conjunction with mobilisation strategies, such 
as demonstrations and other kinds of protest actions. However, often the claims made 
in opposition are difficult to achieve once the party gains office, especially in a 
coalition government in which the nationalists are but a junior partner. Therefore, sub-
state nationalist parties face the dilemma of entering government or not, with the 
former allowing them to influence policy albeit with some important limitations 
compared to the political claims launched while they were in opposition (Elias 2009; 
Elias and Tronconi 2011; Tronconi 2012).  
ERC provides a clear-cut example of this phenomenon. The party supports Catalan 
independence and, despite its successful result in the 2003 election, the aim of 
independence was a chimera given the minority position of ERC in parliament and the 
fact that their senior government coalition partner was the PSC. A government 
coalition with CiU, which was also arithmetically possible, would not have brought 
the ERC’s desired goal either, since majority Catalan nationalism, represented mostly 
by CiU, had traditionally rejected independence (Guibernau 1997; 2003; Keating 
1997; 1998b). Indeed, the reasons behind ERC’s decision to choose the Socialists 
instead of CiU were mainly based on the perceived necessity of government change 
after 23 years of conservative CiU governments, the strength of the leftist profile of 
the party leadership which favoured a left-wing government, and the perceived 
humiliating attitude that CiU had showed ERC during the previous years marked by 
CiU’s agreement with the PP (Ridao 2012; Simó 2012).  
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ERC was committed to reform the Catalan Statute, which they initially interpreted as 
a gradualist strategy towards independence. As a former secretary general of the party 
describes it,  
‘the Statute is not a scenario of rupture of the state, first and foremost because 
Esquerra does not have a majority. Second because the reform requires a 
wide social and political consensus, therefore it does not seek independence, 
what it seeks is to take advantage of the interpretative margins within the 
Constitution and to take advantage of the most favourable doctrine of the 
Constitutional Court during the phase in which the Court was more in favour 
of autonomy.’44  
And he also added that 
‘[f]rom a political point of view, what are Esquerra’s calculations? Honestly, 
Esquerra knows that it will be difficult, almost impossible for this project to 
be successful, because we knew it was extremely difficult to overcome the 
Spanish views [on self-government]. We supported the reform because it was 
a joint government project and it was a ‘sort of test’ [‘la prova del cotó’]: If 
it goes well, [excellent!]; and if it goes wrong, well, then it was the last 
attempt to show that the accommodation [of Catalonia] was unviable. And 
we were perfectly conscious that this was the most likely scenario given the 
attitudes of the two main Spanish parties.’45  
During the negotiation of the Statute, as it has been already said, the competition 
between both nationalist parties made tensions to be high in the parliamentary 
                                                 
44 Interview with the ERC’s secretary general. Author’s translation from: ‘l’Estatut no és un 
plantejament rupturista amb l’estat, primer perquè Esquerra no té majoria, així de clar, segon perquè 
necessita un ampli consens polític i institucional, i per tant la reforma no és una reforma independentista, 
és una reforma que va en la línia d’aprofitar al màxim tot el potencial i el marge interpretatiu de la 
Constitució i a partir d’aquí també aprofitar sobretot la doctrina més favorable del Tribunal 
Constitucional en la seva etapa més pro-autonòmica' (Ridao 2012).  
45 Ibid. Author’s translation from: 'Des del punt de vista polític, quin és el càlcul que fa Esquerra? 
Honestament, Esquerra sap que és difícil, per no dir gairebé impossible que això acabi anant endavant, 
entre altres coses perquè és conscient de la dificultat de saltar la paret, sobretot diguem-ne a nivell 
espanyol [...] nosaltres inicialment l’aposta estratègica per un nou Estatut té a veure amb la col· laboració 
amb uns socis de govern i té a veure també amb el que no nosaltres eufemísticament dèiem ‘la prova 
del cotó’: És a dir, si anava bé, de ‘puta mare,’ i si no anava bé era l’enèssim intent per demostrar la 
inviabilitat de l’encaix. I nosaltres, t’he de dir la veritat ja érem conscients al principi de la dificultat, 




committee that drafted the reform, since CiU put forward demands that were never put 
before while the party was in government, such as a new fiscal system based on the 
Basque model. This had the clear intention, as we said, of increasing the tensions 
between the PSC and ERC to provoke a break-up of the government coalition (Colino 
2009). The PSC gave up to the most controversial points put forward by CiU, with the 
support of ERC, on the hope that the negotiation in Madrid would eventually drive the 
PSOE to reject the higher claims –mostly involving fiscal autonomy and Catalonia’s 
national recognition. Indeed, during the process in the Spanish parliament, the PSOE 
rejected and modified many parts of the Statute, although the competition between 
ERC and CiU to negotiate bilaterally with the PSOE continued. As described above in 
length, the PSOE struck a deal with CiU which included the rejection of any other 
amendments proposed by ERC, so CiU would appear as the bargaining party that got 
the best deal achievable (see Colino 2009; Ridao 2012, previous chapter).  
After a lengthy internal process of discussion, Esquerra ended up rejecting the 
reformed Statute in the Spanish Parliament, and consequently supported a ‘No’ vote 
in the June 2006 referendum, which forced the party’s expulsion from the Catalan 
government (van Houten 2009). Soon after, the new election late in 2006 left ERC yet 
again in a pivotal position, with the party choosing to repeat the leftist government 
coalition with the PSC and ICV. Bitterness towards CiU outweighed the bitterness 
towards the PSC for having expelled them from the previous government, and the ERC 
decided to keep on the truncated job in government due to the Statute reform process. 
According to the then secretary general of the party, three reasons justified the decision 
taken by the party leadership:  
‘First is that the experience with Maragall failed and the oldest generation 
[of the party leadership] puts a lot of pressure to be back to government. The 
second cause was the ‘treason’ of Convergència for striking a [bilateral] deal 
with Zapatero and [thus] they do not deserve to be in government. Third is 
that we should keep developing the political project we first started with 
Maragall which was halted by the Statute divergences.’ Furthermore, he 
insisted on the attitude of CiU during the Statute negotiation. ‘[W]e knew 
what to expect of the PSC, we knew the role they played during the Statute 
process, but also the role played by Convergència i Unió. Sometimes we 
consider that the PSC was more honest than Convergència i Unió, which had 
raised [their demands on the scope of the Statute] to eventually reach an 
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agreement in Madrid.’ ‘Because I have a theory […] that there was a 
previous pact between Convergència and the PSOE. Zapatero and Mas 
agreed, even before we voted the Statute reform in the Catalan parliament, to 
expand the scope of the reform here and to lower it down there […]; and the 
second thing was that if [CiU] got more votes in the next election, [they 
would] take office and you [PSOE] keep your fellows quiet. This was the 
agreement. So we revolt against this agreement between Mr Mas and Mr 
Zapatero and if the PSC offers us [a coalition] agreement, then we take it.’46 
Competition between the two nationalist parties thus prevented a change in the 
government coalition, in spite of President Maragall’s decision to expel ERC from the 
government before the referendum on the Statute. According to a former ERC 
minister, there was resentment in ERC against Maragall for his decision, especially 
because he was seen as ‘the most Catalanist leader’ in the PSC, but a new opportunity 
is grasped by ERC in the second tripartite government due to ‘the leadership change 
in the PSC and our willingness to finish the job and to start a new phase; not to forget 
about self-government but to […] control and keep an eye from the government on the 
development of the new Statute.’47 This prospect looked better than to giving the 
Catalan government back to CiU. The rivalry between the CiU and the ERC made any 
agreement between the nationalists very difficult, according to the then Secretary 
General of ERC, especially since ‘the [election] campaign that Convergència did was 
                                                 
46 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: 'La 
primera experiència amb el govern Maragall és fallida, i aquesta generació, més gran diguéssim, 
pressiona molt per tornar al govern. Hi ha una segona causa que és dir, escolta, Convergència ens ha 
traït pactant amb el Zapatero, i no és just que Convergència ara estigui al govern. I tercera és que hem 
de poder seguir fent el projecte polític que teníem ja encapçalat amb el Maragall i que tot el procés 
estatutari ens ha escapçat.' 'Perquè jo tinc la teoria, i ho sé, el que passa que no ho puc demostrar perquè 
no hi era, de que hi havia un pacte previ amb Convergència i PSOE abans d’aprovar-ho aquí. És a dir, 
Zapatero i Mas pacten abans d’aprovar-se al Parlament de Catalunya l’Estatut. [...] Hi ha un acord de 
dir, tu apuja aquí i ja el baixarem allà. I pacten això. Deixa-me’l pujar aquí, diu Convergència i Unió, 
jo te l’abaixaré allà, i la segona cosa que acorden és bueno, dir, però jo si tinc més vots a les properes 
eleccions, convocarem eleccions, jo governo i tu em neutralitzes els teus. I aquest és el pacte. Per això, 
esclar, nosaltres ens rebelem contra aquest pacte i diem, escolta, perdona, que el Senyor Mas i el Senyor 
Zapatero hagin pactat, si el PSC ens diu de pactar doncs nosaltres [ERC] pactem’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
47 Interview with a former ERC Catalan minister and party spokesperson. Author’s translation from: ‘el 
líder més catalanista’; and ‘un canvi de cap de llista al PSC i hi ha una voluntat de poder acabar una 
feina que va quedar estroncada i de poder encetar alguna etapa nova. No per deixar enrere l’autogovern, 
sinó per intentar, per una banda, controlar al màxim o estar vigilants des del govern al desenvolupament 
d’aquell Estatut’ (Simó 2012). 
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so… so aggressive towards us that it did forsake any possibilities for an agreement.’48 
The harshness of CiU’s election campaign towards the PSC and ERC was duly 
admitted by a senior party official of CiU, which argued that ‘the way we attacked the 
government, we do it very negatively […] and back then there was no [economic] 
crisis.’ ‘We were very tough in the content and in the ways we criticised them. We 
were angry, offended, that was too evident. And the elections, after the Statute 
[reform], the tripartite coalition had been broken and the three parties could redefine 
their discourses separately. So we could criticise their government action, but [we] did 
it in a really negative manner; […] and besides we were attributed an embarrassing 
role, which was the agreement between Mas and Zapatero.’49 
After re-establishing the government coalition, the ERC focused on the new funding 
system which was introduced on the new Statute. Meanwhile, CiU, in the opposition, 
duly criticised the government on the success of the funding system negotiations, 
alongside other perceived grievances of the PSOE government, which were blamed on 
the PSC, as the PSOE’s ally, and on the ERC, for supporting the PSOE. This phase 
coincided with the first adoption by CiU of the rhetoric of the ‘right to decide’ and the 
rising concerns that the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute would restrain even 
further the contents of the newly approved autonomy charter (Mas 2007). Also, the 
criticisms of CiU heavily rose political tensions between government and opposition, 
and between the Catalanist parties and the PSOE government in Madrid. ‘The PSOE 
acted very disloyally with the PSC, by increasing the number of hours of Spanish 
language lessons in school, by not compelling to the agreements on infrastructure 
                                                 
48 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘la 
campanya que havia fet Convergència era tant... tant agressiva amb nosaltres que no predisposava un 
terreny d’acord’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
49 Interview with the former Secretary General of CiU. Author’s translation: ‘El que passa que l’actitud 
amb la qual nosaltres ataquem, et recordo que no hi ha crisi ni hi ha res, eh? Ataquem la dinàmica del 
govern, nosaltres ho fem amb molta negativitat.’ '[N]osaltres érem molt durs en els fons, i sobretot, més 
que en els fons, gairebé, el que ens traïa molt era una dinàmica de forma. Nosaltres estàvem enfadats, 
ofesos, això se’ns notava molt. Però encarem aquestes eleccions amb això, amb un Estatut, amb totes 
les seves problemàtiques, amb un tripartit partit, per tant ells poden re-situar-se cadascun amb el seu 
discurs, i ens quedem amb un discurs contra la gestió del tripartit, però en les formes sempre havíem 
estat molt negatius. Aquí som protagonistes, però sens atribueix un protagonisme vergonyant, el pacte 
Mas-Zapatero’ (Pujol 2012). 
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investments, with the implementation of the funding system […]. Convergència in the 
opposition played its cards in a way that heavily tensed the situation, […] but they 
acted in a disloyal way too, because everything [we achieved] was nothing for them,’50 
reflected a senior official and former member of the Catalan government from ERC. 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute forced a re-positioning of the 
nationalist parties, which perceived the ruling as humiliating. Esquerra, faced already 
with one split and the appearance of another pro-independence party, made a move 
towards more ambitious territorial aims, demanding a referendum on independence as 
a pre-condition to any prospective coalition agreement (ERC 2010). The 
Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute, which triggered the 1-million strong 
march in Barcelona on 10 July 2010 under the banner ‘We are a nation, we decide’ 
confirmed the relevance of the territorial question on the electoral agenda and ERC 
put all its efforts on trying to capitalise on the growing public discontent with Madrid. 
However, two other straightforward pro-independence parties run in the 2010 election. 
These two parties, Reagrupament, a split from ERC, and the newly created Solidaritat 
Catalana per la IndependènciaI (SCI), which also included some former members of 
ERC, tensed the competition among the pro-independence voters, and ERC put more 
emphasis on its commitment to independence and downplayed the role played in 
office. The agreement with the PSC was seen as not having implied any substantial 
steps towards the achievement of independence and thus, also given the fierce 
competition for the independentist voters, set the party candidate to officially claim 
that another coalition agreement with the PSC would not be sought. 
However, the strategy pursued by ERC in the 2010 to focus its message on the Court’s 
ruling on the Statute of Autonomy and the demand for a self-determination referendum 
was criticised by a senior party member afterwards. He argued that  
                                                 
50 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘el 
PSOE jugava de forma deslleial amb el PSC, amb el tema de la tercera hora de castellà, amb temes 
d’infrastructures, d’inversions, amb compliment del mateix model de finançament.’ ‘Convergència a 
l’oposició tenia les seves cartes, i va jugar a tensar molt la situació […]. Però Convergència va jugar 
molt deslleialment, perquè tot era poc’(Puigcercós 2012). 
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‘there was a strategic mistake by candidate Joan Puigcercós on the design of 
the election campaign because the issue of self-government indeed had an 
important role on the political agenda, but at that time the people’s concerns 
were not the Statute, in spite of the 10 July and the demonstration, but the 
economic crisis, and government and political change. In this scenario, the 
most logical thing to do was to give priority to economic issues.’  
He believed that what was needed to be done instead was  
‘to claim the good job done in the government, while putting it alongside 
other horizons such as the issue of the independence referendum. Curiously, 
the candidate and the leadership of Esquerra at that time try to take 
advantage of the Constitutional Court’s ruling and the grievance feelings it 
generated, the 10 July [demonstration], and put forward a big offer, which 
was the referendum, and that strategy clearly failed.’51  
Indeed, ERC saw its representatives cut by half (from 21 MPs to 10) and CiU benefited 
from the combined loses of the government parties, the PSC and ERC, to secure a 
comfortable position in Parliament, albeit slightly short of an overall majority.  
The same party official attributed the electoral defeat, aside from the strategic mistake 
to prioritise the independence issue above economic concerns, three other causes, 
while emphasising the fierce competition on territorial issues that the ERC faced. He 
claimed that the party’s ‘voters did not have a positive impression of the second 
tripartite government coalition and did not value Esquerra’s contribution to other 
issues like those of a more social nature […]. Second, Convergència again 
extraordinarily radicalised its positions and after having agreed on a low-profile 
Statute flies the banner of the funding system. Third, there has been an atomisation 
                                                 
51 Interview with the former Secretary General of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘hi ha un error de 
plantejament per part del candidat Joan Puigcercós en el disseny de la campanya electoral perquè 
efectivament el tema de l’autogovern ocupa un lloc destacat a l’agenda, però en aquest moment la 
jerarquia de preocupacions dels mortals no està al tema de l’Estatut malgrat el 10 de juliol i la 
manifestació, sinó que està a la crisi econòmica i al canvi i l’alternança política. I davant d’aquest 
escenari lu lògic era prioritzar aspectes de caràcter econòmic'; and 'positivitzar la feina feta al govern, 
fent-ho compatible amb altres horitzons, com el tema de la consulta per la independència. Curiosament, 
el que fa el candidat, i la direcció d’Esquerra en aquest moment és intentar optimitzar el tema de la 
sentència del TC, i cavalcant sobre la crispació que genera tot plegat sobre el 10 de juliol, al voltant 




process of Catalan independentism and new options appear and Esquerra, which is a 
government party, has problems competing with these other parties, because [ERC] 
lacks its own distinctive discourse to satisfy voters that have become more radicalised.’  
These three factors added to the party’s own strategic choice in the campaign to 
account for the party’s defeat, while he also stated that CiU, on the one hand, ‘offered 
first a government change, and thus to oust the current coalition; second, the issue of 
the [new] fiscal agreement; and third, socio-economic proposals. So they combined 
three factors. On the other hand, Joan Puigcercós, […] sets the economic crisis aside, 
[and] he believes the issue of the fiscal agreement is, so to say, ‘nothing,’ compared to 
a referendum.’52 Esquerra had to fight against the effect of incumbency in a context 
of a nascent economic crisis while being perceived by its voters as not having delivered 
enough regarding the desired outcome of independence through its alliance with the 
Catalan Socialists; and at the same time faced competition from two fronts with 
competitive proposals on territorial grounds. CiU put forward the demand for a new 
fiscal agreement akin to the Basque system of full fiscal autonomy, apart from its long 
tradition of being a government party, and the most-likely scenario after the election 
that they would lead the next executive in a strong position. On the other hand, the two 
minor pro-independence parties focused almost exclusively on independence and were 
serious candidates to attract the most radical voters of ERC. 
In the 2010 election aftermath CiU came back to government and set up a calendar to 
put forward the demand for a new fiscal deal, although the severity of the economic 
crisis initially put economic measures as the government’s top priority (Mas 2010). 
                                                 
52 Ibid. Author’s translation from: ‘el nostre electorat no valora positivament el segon tripartit i no passa 
en valor l’executòria d’Esquerra en altres qüestions, de caràcter social, etcètera, etcètera, dos, 
Convergència torna a radicalitzar extraordinàriament les seves posicions i després d’haver pactat 
l’Estatut ara pues agafa com a bandera i com a gran esquer el tema del finançament. Tres, crec que hi 
ha hagut un procés d’atomització de l’independentisme i apareixen noves opcions emergents i això, i 
Esquerra, que és un partit de govern, li costa competir en discurs propi i a l’hora de complimentar un 
electoral més radical’; and ‘una oferta primer pel canvi, per fer fora els que hi ha i posar-se en el govern; 
dos, amb el tema del pacte fiscal; i tres, amb propostes de caràcter socio-econòmic. Per tant combina 
els tres factors. I en canvi, Joan Puigcercós, i ho personalitzo amb ell perquè és un desig i una voluntat 
molt concreta d’ell com a candidat, aparca la crisi econòmica, el tema del pacte fiscal li sembla, per 
entendre’ns, una ‘mariconada,’ perquè si estàs per una consulta no estàs per no sé què’ (Ridao 2012). 
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Also, since the new proposal had to forcefully be negotiated with the central 
government, CiU wanted to gain some time by waiting until the next Spanish election 
took place. Meanwhile, the electoral defeat of ERC led to a full leadership renewal and 
an analysis of the situation. The new party president argued that the strategy followed 
so far based on left-wing coalitions had not been understood by many voters as 
bringing independence closer. The main aim, according to him, was ‘to pull the […] 
Catalan Socialist Party, which was the main centre-left party, through a left-of-centre 
government in order to pull the [PSC] to increasing the social and political majority 
which would aid the transition of the country towards a pro-independence majority.’ 
This strategy, especially after the reform of the Statute process ended in the way it did, 
‘seemed not to deliver the desired objectives, […] which led many people to think that 
the strategy was wrong.’ He also added that ERC did not forsake its aim of 
independence, as the other minor pro-independence parties had claimed, but that it 
could not deliver it simply because of its junior partner status in the government: ‘the 
independence option was not viable because Esquerra did not have enough 
representation, we did not have a majority to proclaim independence; and the leftist 
values, on the other hand, were backed by a majority [in the government] and therefore 
they were implemented. So the leftist elements were more relevant than the 
independentist elements precisely because the leftist elements were backed by other 
parties that shared them and represented a majority, while the independentist elements 
were not shared by anyone else and therefore [ERC] could not implement them on its 
own, but I do not think that the party had forsaken the aim at all.’53  
                                                 
53 Interview with ERC’s party president. Author’s translation from: ‘en un moment determinat va 
intentar arrossegar el partit majoritari del centre-esquerra a Catalunya, que era el Partit Socialista de 
Catalunya, amb l’esperança que si sumava aquest partit, que era el majoritari del centre-esquerra, si feia 
un govern de centre-esquerra, doncs l’arrossegaria cap a aquesta majoria social i política i afavoriria el 
trànsit de la majoria del país, cap a una majoria independentista’; ‘el fet que l’estratègia que seguia no 
semblés que donava els objectius que es buscaven, és a dir, no s’avançava en el camí que es buscava, 
va fer que molta gent pensés que l’estratègia estava equivocada’; and 'el valor independentista no es 
podia portar a terme perquè Esquerra no sumava prou, no tenia prou majoria per proclamar la 
independència, i en canvi els valors de l’esquerra sí que hi havia una majoria que en sumava prou per 
intentar-los aplicar. I per tant, van destacar més els elements esquerranosos que els elements 
independentistes precisament perquè els elements esquerranosos hi havia altres partits que els 
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In its renewed role in opposition, the ERC decided to commit to the CiU’s government 
demand for full fiscal autonomy, and eventually voted in favour of the demand to be 
formally posed to the Spanish government during the summer of 2012. Albeit short of 
independence, full fiscal autonomy would be a considerable step forward for 
Catalonia’s self-government and, unlike the party’s refusal to support the new Statute 
of Autonomy after it was modified in the Spanish parliament, the ERC adopted a 
progressive approach to independence and backed the demand introduced by CiU.  
The former president of ERC, which remained as parliamentary leader after the 2010 
election, argued in an interview, while discussing CiU’s proposal of full fiscal 
autonomy a few days before the parliamentary resolution was voted, that ‘we cannot 
give priority to a party strategy instead of a situation which I think is good for the 
country. The fact that Convergència makes a step forward is not a problem of electoral 
competition, it is good for the country. So we, if Convergència goes on with this, will 
be on their side […]. No one would understand that Esquerra voted against 
Convergència’s demand to keep all our taxes. Look, this is good for us. It is not what 
we want, but it is good for us.’54 The support of both nationalist parties to the demand 
for full fiscal autonomy achieved therefore a majority of support in the Catalan 
parliament, strengthening its legitimacy accordingly. The new leadership of ERC was 
satisfied that the CiU was putting forward more substantial territorial demands. This 
represented a change from the previous leadership of ERC, which, while the party was 
in government, saw the demands put forward by CiU as mere opportunistic in its 
attempts to outbid ERC and portray them as conformists in order to maintain power 
through its alliance with the Catalan Socialists. 
                                                 
compartien i que feien majoria absoluta, i els elements independentistes no els compartia amb ningú i 
per tant no els podia aplicar tota sola, però en cap cas jo crec que hi hagués renunciat’ (Junqueras 2012).  
54 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘el que 
no podem és supeditar una estratègia més de partit o més tàctica a una situació que jo crec que és bona 
pel país. És a dir, que Convergència faci un pas endavant no és un problema de competència electoral, 
és bo pel país. I per tant nosaltres, si Convergència fés aquest pas estarem al costat […]. Ningú entendria 
que Esquerra votés en contra de que Convergència demana quedar-se tots els impostos, escolti, ja ens 
va bé. No és el que volem, però ja ens va bé’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
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The new president of ERC plainly stated this thought in an interview, arguing that 
‘Convergència i Unió perceived that a way to attack the [tripartite coalition] 
government was to increase the tension among independence supporters, so they 
introduced discourses that left the door open to independence. And so they did, perhaps 
because they actually believed it, although they had not believed it until then, or 
perhaps they did it for tactical reasons to attack the government. Whatever the reasons, 
it is evident that they did it and this… introduction of this kind of discourse has given 
Convergència i Unió excellent results, right? It has allowed them to come back to 
office […] and it is one of the main elements of their political discourse right now, or 
in the last years. So from an independentist perspective, it is clear that today there are 
more independence supporters than ever, so, given that we support independence 
ourselves, we are happy about it.’55 The ERC leadership, albeit leading the party in the 
opposition and having suffered a severe electoral defeat, was eager to get some credit 
in CiU’s renewed ambitiousness on the constitutional future of Catalonia and the 
nationalist federation’s discourse change based on the Catalans’ ‘right to decide.’ 
Notwithstanding the mild applause that the ERC leadership gave CiU’s open discourse 
on independence, several party leaders regarded the demand for full fiscal autonomy 
as just a way to win time and the election. The former party president and 
parliamentary leader during the 2010-12 parliament argued that for Convergència, the 
‘fiscal agreement’ followed this rationale: ‘If there is no agreement with Spain [i.e. 
Spanish institutions], we will put forward a clear-cut proposal of independence. This 
is the theoretical paradigm of Convergència.’ He went on affirming that ‘there is a part 
of Convergència’s electorate that does not want independence. […] [T]his electorate 
                                                 
55 Interview with ERC party president. Author’s translation: ‘Convergència i Unió va tenir la percepció 
que una manera de desgastar el govern era incrementar la tensió entre el terreny independentista, no, i 
que intentant introduir discursos que obrissin el camí cap a la independència. I això ho va fer, bueno 
potser perquè s’ho creia, encara fins a aquell moment no ho havia fet, o fins aquell moment no s’ho 
havia cregut, ho va fer potser per qüestions tàctiques de desgastar el govern, ho va fer per la raó que fos, 
però en tot cas és evident que ho va fer i aquest... i aquesta introducció d’aquest discurs li ha donat bons 
resultats a Convergència i Unió, no? Perquè li ha permès retornar al govern, etcètera, etcètera, i 
constitueix un dels elements centrals del seu discurs polític en aquest moment, o des de fa uns quants 
anys, i per tant des d’una perspectiva independentista, és evident que ara hi ha més independentistes 
que mai, i per tant, atés que nosaltres som, també en gran mesura, un partit independentista, d’això ens 
en sentim satisfets’ (Junqueras 2012). 
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thinks we are doing ok, perhaps they want a bit more, but they think it is ok as it is. 
They have another part of their electorate though that is starting to get tired; and to ask 
them for an explanation, because they have been increasing the tension for seven years 
[2003-10], and this must be for a reason.’ Finally, he guessed that the negotiation for 
full fiscal autonomy in Madrid would fail and Convergència would renegade on the 
ambitiousness of its demands: ‘When Madrid formally says no, maybe they will not 
say ‘no’ straight away, but we all will know it is a ‘no’ to the fiscal agreement, then 
Convergència will have to take a decision. Or perhaps not. […] Nothing will happen. 
[…] I think Convergència will be very demanding and when Madrid says ‘no’ [CiU] 
will say: ‘OK, that’s fine.’ We do not abandon it but we will wait until there is another 
political scenario in Spain. They will say that and that’s it. And most of their voters 
will say ‘OK.’ […] Convergència will do that, nothing more. Neither a referendum 
nor a consultation, nothing.’56  
The scepticism on CiU’s determination was shared by another former member of 
ERC’s leadership, who argued that ‘if the outcome of the ‘fiscal agreement’ is a 
negative one, then this leads to a snap election and in this election everyone will have 
to ‘show their cards’ and other scenarios may open […], but uncertainty is 
considerable. There is also another scenario, which is quite traditional in 
Convergència’s behaviour, which is to try to get a low profile agreement and present 
it to the public as a wonder, with the help of the media, etcetera.’57 
                                                 
56 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘Si no 
hi ha acord amb Espanya, fem una proposta clarament independentista. Això és el paradigma teòric 
convergent’; ‘hi ha una part de l’electorat de Convergència que no vol la independencia [i] en aquest 
electorat ja els està bé com està, potser en volen una mica més, però ja els està bé com està. Però ells 
tenen un altre electorat que comença a estar cansat. I comença a demanar-los explicacions, perquè durant 
set anys han tensat la corda i això ha de ser per alguna cosa’; ‘Quan Madrid formalment digui que no, 
que potser no dirà mai que no, però tots entendrem que ha dit que no al tema del pacte fiscal, i 
Convergència haurà de prendre una decisió, o no’; ‘No passarà res, ni això. Jo tinc la teoria particular 
que, no sé com acabarà, però crec que Convergència serà super exigent i quan Madrid li digui que no 
dirà, bueno, d’acord. No hi renunciem i esperarem a una altra conjuntura política a Espanya. Diran això 
i es quedaran tant amples. I la majoria de l’electorat convergent dirà, doncs vale’; and ‘però faran això 
Convergència, no faran res més. Ni referèndum, ni consulta, no farà res’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
57 Interview with a former Secretary General of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘si el desenllaç del 
pacte fiscal és negatiu, evientment això precipita unes eleccions i en aquestes eleccions tothom haurà 
d’ensenyar les cartes de cara a la pròxima legislatura, i aquí és on sí que efectivament es poden obrir 
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Concerns on CiU’s determination to increase their demands if the proposal for full 
fiscal autonomy did not succeed were shared by the current leader of ERC, who casted 
doubt on CiU’s readiness to espouse independence if the Spanish government rejected 
extending Catalonia’s powers on fiscal issues. While discussing how to achieve 
independence in an interview, the president clearly emphasised CiU’s reservations 
towards independence. As he puts it, ‘you can proclaim independence if you have a 
majority in the Catalan Parliament. Why don’t we do that? Because Convergència i 
Unió doesn’t want to. Otherwise, we would have already done it. […] So, could 
Convergència i Unió be an ally on this issue? It could, but it doesn’t want to. It is not, 
it doesn’t want to be. It doesn’t want to do it.’58  
The outcome of the brief ‘negotiation’ on full fiscal autonomy is well known and has 
been detailed above. The Spanish PM rejected the proposal for a new fiscal agreement 
put forward by Artur Mas and backed by the Catalan Parliament. The events following 
from this episode proved the concerns of the ERC leadership wrong since Mas 
dissolved the Parliament and called for a snap election, while CiU put forward the 
demand for a constitutional referendum to be delivered. In terms of party competition, 
had Mas taken the ‘no’ of the Spanish PM to the fiscal agreement proposal and done 
nothing about it, most surely ERC would have criticised CiU for not delivering what 
was promised and doing nothing about it. This pressure, which was also increased by 
the 1-million strong demonstration on Catalonia’s national day demanding 
independence, forced CiU to take the initiative and to put forward the demand for a 
referendum on Catalonia’s independence, thus matching ERC’s demand of 2010.  
However, it is doubtful that Mas’ decision to call for a snap election was taken in a 
rush, and the events were more likely to be part of a broader plan. The leadership of 
                                                 
altres escenaris […]. Però la incertesa és molt notable. I també hi ha un altre possible escenari, molt 
tradicional en la manera de fer de Convergència de tota la vida, que és intentar sublimar un acord a la 
baixa, presentant-lo com una meravella índia i utilitzant els prescriptors mediàtics i tal’ (Ridao 2012). 
58 Interview with the President of ERC. Author’s own translation from: ‘es pot proclamar la 
independència si tens la majoria del Parlament de Catalunya. Per què no la proclamem? Perquè 
Convergència no vol. […]Per tant, Convergència i Unió podria ser un aliat en això? Podria ser-ho, però 
no ho vol ser-ho. No ho és, no ho vol ser. No ho vol fer’ (Junqueras 2012). 
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CiU knew that ERC as a political competitor would put forward the independence 
issue anyway, and also the demonstration in Barcelona had confirmed the saliency of 
the issue and confirmed the growing support for independence that opinion surveys 
had shown since 2010. Thus, according to the CiU’s secretary general, who admitted 
a few days before the Spanish government’s rejection to the ‘fiscal agreement’ 
proposal that it had a slim chance of success, CiU, and more specifically CDC, had 
already traced a plan to push for independence: ‘President Mas said that this 
parliamentary term [2010-12] would mean the beginning of Catalonia’s ‘national 
transition’ […]. That was a first step. This was followed up by Convergència, at its 
party conference, which sets, not the next step, but the final station, our own state. By 
this we aim to keep it gradual.’59 
The 2012 election result showed CiU support cut down to 50 MPs and thus its 
government position relying on the support of ERC, which got back in strength with 
21 MPs, matching their 2006 result. The two parties struck a deal that would have ERC 
give parliamentary support to the CiU government on the promise to deliver a 
referendum on independence by 2014 (CiU and ERC 2012). As it has been described 
above, the agreement has led to two parliamentary resolutions, one that declared 
Catalonia a ‘sovereign political subject’ and commanded the government to bring 
forward a negotiated constitutional referendum with the Spanish government, whereas 
another resolution approved on 27 September 2013 commanded the same Parliament 
to send to the Spanish Parliament a proposal of a date, question, and legal mechanisms 
to deliver the referendum before the end of 2013. The resolution obtained a majority 
with the votes of CiU, the ERC, the ICV and the CUP (La Vanguardia, 27 September 
2013e). 
                                                 
59 Interview with CiU’s Secretary General. Author’s translation from: ‘el President Mas dient, aquesta 
ha de ser la legislatura on s’inicia clarament ja la Transició Nacional, Espanya la va fer, amb la 
democràcia als anys 80, nosaltres la volem fer ara, eh? I marca un primer graó. I certament surt després 
Convergència, al congrés, i marca, gairebé, no el proper graó, sinó gairebé l’estació final, un estat propi. 
Amb això nosaltres intentem mantenir la gradualitat’ (Pujol 2012). 
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2.2.2.Enemies but Allies: Competition between CiU and ERC has led 
them to pursue a similar objective 
If looked at from a historical perspective, the bitter relationship between the CiU and 
ERC in the last government of President Jordi Pujol –when he rebuffed ERC’s offer 
for a nationalist alliance and CiU was not willing to push for a reform of the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy– has evolved into a stable parliamentary agreement between both 
parties and the joint commitment to deliver a referendum on Catalonia’s independence. 
The change in just a decade is substantial. Although support for independence –and 
the ERC– did not represent a majority within Catalan mainstream nationalism in the 
late 1990s and early 2000, the boost received by ERC in the 2003 Catalan election and 
2004 general Spanish election was a hint that there was some unrest among Catalan 
nationalist voters, which probably turned to independence during the second Aznar 
government (Guibernau 2007). That electoral boost made the ERC a key player in 
Catalan politics (Argelaguet 2006).  
The decision to send the CiU into opposition had two consequences. First, a pro-
independence party entered government and the saliency of the territorial issue 
increased, and part of this saliency could be attributed to conflicts and tensions 
between the coalition partners, with a specific relevance to the expulsion of ERC from 
the first tripartite government after the secessionists failed to support the new Statute 
as it was agreed in Madrid (van Houten 2009).  
Second, CiU was left in the opposition for the first time in its history, and the party 
played the nationalist card to outbid the postulates that ERC had defended in 
opposition –and that CiU claimed the ERC was not fulfilling in government– on the 
territorial issue, precisely to increase the tensions between the ERC and the PSC. This 
was plainly evident during the negotiation of the Statute of Autonomy reform (Colino 
2009). The reform of the Statute, ultimately agreed between the CiU and the PSOE, 
did not bring the nationalists back into power in Catalonia and the tripartite coalition 
was reedited.  
Throughout its second successive spell in opposition, CiU continued to put forward 
ambitious demands for extended fiscal autonomy and criticised the Catalan-led reform 
of the overall Spanish regional funding system agreed in 2009. The party had to keep 
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its position on fiscal autonomy right before the 2010 election, so CiU promised to 
bring forward a proposal of full fiscal autonomy based on the recently coined ‘right to 
decide’ of the Catalans, and building up on the crescent public discontent following 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute of Autonomy. 
For its part, ERC was faced with a split and the appearance of more radical pro-
independence parties that questioned the republicans’ independentist credentials and 
criticised its agreement with the PSC, forcing in turn the ERC to abjure of the 
government experience, declare that another agreement with the PSC would not be 
reached, and putting forward a demand for a referendum on independence. The return 
of CiU back to power after the 2010 election under the high profile promise to deliver 
a new fiscal agreement effectively tied the nationalist federation’s hands behind its 
back: if the promise could not be delivered, in a scenario of increasing public support 
for independence, the party would face serious challenges from ERC if it backed off 
and accepted the Spanish government’s rejection of the Catalan parliament’s proposal 
for full fiscal autonomy. When the latter scenario was a fact, CiU put forward the 
demand for a referendum that ERC had coined a few years before.  
Therefore, competition between the CiU and the ERC has triggered territorial demands 
on aggregate terms. ERC had supported independence since the early 1990s as its 
political horizon. When CiU was ousted from government, it played the nationalist 
card to erode the government coalition and increased its territorial ambitions. Once the 
party returned to government in 2010, the scenario had changed significantly and 
independence was already an important issue in the political agenda. With ERC, albeit 
debilitated after the 2010 election, keeping the pressure on CiU’s determination to 
bring forward the promise of full fiscal autonomy, the latter had few options after this 
ambitious aim fell through in Madrid, but to rival ERC’s bid for a referendum on 
independence to take place. Ultimately, the rivalry between CiU and ERC has led 
mainstream Catalan nationalism from being autonomist in nature during the 1990s and 




3. Conclusion: Party Competition as the Driver of Territorial 
Demands in Catalonia 
 
Party competition in Catalonia, as in other similar cases of stateless nations, involves 
two dimensions of political competition: a classic left-right axis on socio-economic 
issues, and a territorial axis in which parties compete on the level of self-government 
that the nation’s institutions should have (Hepburn 2009; Massetti 2009). Since the 
late 1990s, different governments have been in place in Catalonia, involving both 
SNRPs and SWPs, and territorial demands have not ceased to increase on aggregate 
terms. How can political party competition explain the persistency of territorial 
demands in Catalonia? This section has outlined two different dynamics of party 
competition: first between SNRPs and SWPs and, second, between SNRPs 
themselves. Traditionally, the main two parties in Catalonia have been the Catalan 
nationalist federation of CiU and the Catalan Socialist Party. Parties in opposition have 
often played the nationalist card to erode the government’s credentials as the best 
representative of the stateless nation’s interests. The reliance of CiU on the PP in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s was exploited by the PSC by putting forward a reform of 
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia that the CiU had agreed to avoid to keep its 
parliamentary stability in Catalonia with the support of the PP. The Socialists took 
advantage of this situation alongside a leadership change in the Spanish-wide PSOE 
that appeared to be friendlier towards Catalan demands. However, the inclusion of 
ERC in the government provided more visibility for the pro-independence party and 
CiU tried to exploit the ideological differences between ERC and the PSC to break up 
the coalition. The way to achieve this was to increase CiU’s demands in the negotiation 
of the Statute reform, although the PSC chose to give in to many of the proposals 
knowing that the text had to be ultimately accepted by the Spanish government in 
Madrid. However, this expanded the scope of the Catalan proposal, which set the 
Catalan demands far beyond what the PSOE would be ready to accept. 
The leadership of CiU was convinced they would get back into government after the 
inevitable election following the Statute’s 2006 referendum triggered by the expulsion 
of ERC from the government after rejecting the Statute’s outcome. However, the 
tripartite coalition was re-established and CiU was kept in the opposition, where they 
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kept increasing their demands, particularly on fiscal autonomy. The Constitutional 
Court’s ruling changed the paradigm of party competition and popular support for 
Catalonia’s independence started to increase. Party proposals have shifted and the 
SNRPs are leading the way, with the PSC sharing some of the postulates –i.e. the need 
for a better funding system and ultimately a constitutional referendum– but cutting 
short the aspirations of both CiU and ERC. 
Competition between the PSC and CiU explains the demand for a new Statute of 
Autonomy; the reform was an electoral proposal of the PSC back in 2003 to put 
forward a serious bid to achieve office. The process was supported by the SNRPs, 
which nevertheless outstripped the PSC and President Maragall of its leadership in the 
reform process, which was ultimately placed in the hands of the PSOE and CiU. 
However, the government-opposition dynamics of CiU and ERC show that the CiU 
looked for outbidding ERC from the opposition, trying to show that the Republicans 
were not delivering what they had promised. This led CiU to put forward a substantial 
demand in the form of full fiscal autonomy, and on that promise, first included in the 
Statute package and then presented on its own as an electoral campaign proposal for 
the 2010 Catalan election, they eventually recovered office. But under the 
impossibility to deliver it, the party decided to put forward more ambitious demands 
facing a vigilant ERC, which recovered surprisingly fast from the electoral 
consequences of incumbency. To sum up, the decade-long dynamic of territorial 
demands in Catalonia started with the PSC’s bid to reform the Statute of Autonomy, 
to which CiU responded and eventually contributed to deliver. The government 
change, though, provided more visibility to ERC and the underlying competition 
between SNRPs ultimately explains the substantial change in CiU’s position. The PSC, 
because of its SWP nature, cannot –and will not– match ERC’s independence aim. 
CiU can, and the fact that they have done so proves that the competition between both 
parties is high more relevant. Furthermore, the electoral decline of the PSC, which is 
also ripped between its more pro-Catalan and pro-Spanish wings, highlights even more 
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the relevance of the role of CiU and ERC, the main two parties in Catalonia right now, 
a trend that is confirmed by recent opinion polls.60 
The ongoing outbidding between the PSC, ERC, and CiU on territorial demands has 
ultimately led to an escalade of the territorial aims of CiU, which has matched ERC’s 
aim for independence. The PSC has been completely overwhelmed by such an 
evolution and the current situation of CiU and ERC competing to be the first party in 
Catalonia makes it rather difficult for any of these two parties to back off on their 
commitment to a referendum on independence, especially after the increasing public 
backing that independence has gathered amongst a substantial share of the Catalan 
voters. 
  
                                                 
60 Recent opinion polls suggest that ERC would win the election, with CiU being a second position; 
while the SWPs would lose out to C’s. Furthermore, in May 2014 ERC won the European election with 
CiU running a close second. 
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Chapter 6. Explaining Territorial Demands: The 





Party competition cannot explain on its own the dynamics of territorial demands in 
Catalonia, since competition has been going on for three decades and the escalation of 
the demands is quite recent. The demands for constitutional change that Catalan 
political parties have endorsed in the last decade have been negotiated in Madrid with 
the Spanish government, State-wide parties, and other central state institutions. In this 
sense, the second explanatory variable is the territorial management strategies 
followed by the Spanish central institutions in order to respond and accommodate the 
territorial demands from Catalan political parties. The acceptance of the territorial 
demands from the periphery implies increased powers for the sub-state institutions and 
thus a prospective restrain on further demands from the sub-state political elites, which 
may be satisfied with the newly acquired powers. However, strengthened sub-state 
institutions give more power to regional political actors in their ability to influence 
policy outcomes and public opinion in favour of further devolution, which would 
eventually lead to further territorial demands and potentially a ‘slippery slope’ towards 
the stateless nation’s political independence. This paradox, that federal-like solutions 
can either contain or exacerbate territorial demands, has been widely discussed in the 
literature and still remains an open discussion (Erk and Anderson 2009; McGarry and 
O’Leary 2009).  
However, if decentralisation would eventually lead to the state’s disintegration, why 
did states decentralise in the first place? Rejectionist strategies or repression, which 
had been hitherto used by non-democratic governments, including Franco’s Spain, 
could lead to territorial demands turning violent or irremediably secessionist in nature. 
The prospect of violence is however one that central governments tend to be willing 
to avoid and thus demands, including decentralisation, were to be negotiated and 
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eventually granted (Horowitz 1981; Rudolph and Thompson 1985; 1989). Nowadays, 
the prospect of violence in Western democracies due to central state intransigence to 
territorial demands is rather low, and violent means are ruled out by most stateless 
nationalists in order to achieve their political objectives, even in the high-profile cases 
of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country as the recent events leading to a 
pacification of those conflicts seem to suggest.  
However, rejectionist strategies implemented by central governments might lead to a 
radicalisation of demands from the sub-state political actors. The Catalan case clearly 
reflects this pattern. For instance, electoral support for ERC, which favours Catalan 
independence, was boosted in the 2003 Catalan election and the 2004 Spanish election 
following four years of PP-led neo-centralist and Spanish nationalist policies and 
discourses. Similarly, the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy led the Catalan nationalist parties to exacerbate their demands. CiU 
proposed full fiscal autonomy and ERC campaigned openly for a referendum on 
independence in 2010. The subsequent rejection of full fiscal autonomy by the central 
government led CiU to further radicalise its territorial aims, thus openly campaigning 
for a referendum on Catalonia’s constitutional future.  
The Catalan experience seems to suggest that accommodative strategies do contain 
territorial demands, at least across the population’s preferences. Following a small 
peak of support for a federalist reform of the Spanish Constitution in 2003 and 2004, 
public support for Catalonia being an Autonomous Community within Spain received 
a clear majority support of around 60% of the Catalans in the aftermath of the new 
Statute of Autonomy’s approval. However, after 2010 support for autonomy decreased 
substantially and public support for independence rocketed to be the preferred 
constitutional option in Catalonia by 2012. As it will be detailed below, the Spanish 
central institutions’ strategy of rejecting further Catalan demands –either by non-
negotiating them or by curtailing the powers and economic resources already granted 
to the Catalan institutions– has provoked an increase in the public support for 




Finally, the second section of this chapter will discuss the effect of public attitudes and 
civil society mobilisation on parties’ enhanced territorial demands. Political parties 
will want to include popular policies amongst the electorate in order to maximise their 
votes in elections. Thus, support for particular constitutional options, such as further 
self-government or independence may lead political parties to readapt their political 
discourse in order to include widely-accepted constitutional options. In the Catalan 
case, CiU has applied this logic undoubtedly. Capitalising on the public discontent 
following the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute of Autonomy, the party 
adopted the new paradigm of the Catalans’ ‘right to decide,’ echoing the July 2010 
demonstration slogan of ‘We are a nation, we decide’ that gathered hundreds of 
thousands in Barcelona to protest against the Constitutional Court’s decision. The 
party initially set its main objective on full fiscal autonomy, which gathered more 
supports amongst the Catalan public than independence; but when this proposal was 
rejected by the Spanish Prime Minister, a few days after another massive 
demonstration in Barcelona that demanded independence under the banner of 
‘Catalonia, the next state in Europe,’ CiU espoused the demand for a constitutional 
referendum to be held in the next parliament so Catalans could decide whether they 
wanted their own state.  
 
2. Territorial Management in Spain and its Impact on 
Furthering Territorial Demands 
 
Constitutional change is almost an exclusive competence of the central government 
and therefore the role of political actors at the centre is determinant. As a result, 
demands for constitutional change from political actors in sub-state territories cannot 
be treated in isolation, and the reaction of the centre’s to the demands posed by the 
periphery will shape the evolution of future demands. Hypothetically, this could work 
in many ways. For instance, a thorough rejection of the demands posed by peripheral 
actors may lead to a persistence in asking the same over and over, or perhaps to the 
cessation of the demands if deemed as unviable, or even to a radicalisation of the 
demands. Likewise, a partial acceptance of the demands raised by peripheral political 
156 
 
actors may lead to different scenarios: demands can stop if the negotiated outcome is 
satisfactorily enough for the sub-state actors or they may be increased following the 
final agreement between central and sub-state institutions if there is a feeling that 
something more could have been achieved. Even when constitutional change is fully 
accepted by the central government, that is, in the unlikely scenario that all sub-state-
sponsored demands will be met by the central political actors, the evolution of 
demands may vary; demands can stop if all the objectives were fulfilled in the reform; 
or increased sub-state powers may ultimately lead to further renewed sub-state 
territorial claims. The literature has pointed out that constitutional change in 
multinational states, once devolution has been implemented, remains an unstable 
scenario by nature and that some flexibility is required in order to keep everyone more 
or less happy with the constitutional status quo (L. M. Anderson 2010; Erk and 
Anderson 2009; Erk and Swenden 2010a; Gagnon 2007; Horowitz 1993; Keating 
2001b; Linz 1997; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; O’Leary 2001). 
The recent evolution of Spain’s Estado de las Autonomías clearly exemplifies the wide 
possibilities for different scenarios to arise that were just mentioned. With Catalonia 
in mind, the last decade has seen demands that have been partially accepted –e.g. a 
Statute of Autonomy reform, the negotiation of a new regional fiscal system in 2009–, 
while others that had been thoroughly rejected, such as the possibility to implement a 
system of full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia; and even more recently the frontal 
opposition of the Spanish government to allow a referendum on Catalonia’s 
constitutional future. What is evident is that the premise of this thesis, that territorial 
demands have persisted in stateless nations after devolution was firstly introduced, 
remains a fact. Thus, this section asks to what extent the territorial management 
strategies implemented by the central government have exacerbated territorial 
demands from Catalonia. By territorial management, I follow Keating’s definition of 
‘the efforts of central elites to cope with the territorial dimension of policy problems 
and to contain territorially-based challenges to the central power structure’ (1988: 18).  
This section will be divided in four parts. First, I will briefly discuss the main features 
of historical territorial management in Spain, with a special emphasis on the central 
government’s desired aim of achieving a symmetrical decentralisation and the way 
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challenges from the peripheral nationalisms to introduce further asymmetries in the 
decentralisation process were avoided by sticking to a symmetrical framework of 
decentralisation, the so-called ‘café para todos.’ Second, I will analyse the challenge 
posed by the reform proposal of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy to this framework 
and the way the central government dealt with it, also taking into account both 
territorial and party dynamics. Third, I will analyse the ultimate outcome of the reform, 
with a particular focus on the controversial Constitutional Court’s ruling, which 
declared some parts of the Statute to be contrary to the Spanish Constitution, and the 
diverse reactions to the ruling both at the centre and in Catalonia, which provide a clear 
turning point in the evolution of demands for more autonomy. Fourth, I will argue that 
the central government’s strategy after the Statute ruling was published is directly 
linked to the consolidation of a climate of political confrontation between Catalan and 
Spanish institutions and the eventual bid for independence posed by the Catalan 
nationalist parties. 
 
2.1. The underlying logic behind Spain’s decentralisation: the 
‘café para todos’ 
The Spanish Constitution states that Autonomous Communities are either ‘regions’ or 
‘nationalities,’ although it does not say which is which or if there are any differences 
between the two types (Guibernau 1997). The practicality of the decentralisation 
process in Spain has tended to a homogenising model in which the regional 
governments tend to have the same powers, especially after the two reforms of the 
early 1980s and 1990s (Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín 1997; Keating 1998b). The 
Estado de las Autonomías is not completely symmetric. Indeed, some important 
asymmetries exist, most notably the Basque and Navarrese funding system, based on 
the recollection of all taxes in their territory, with a negotiated amount to be transferred 
to the central government for the services it provides in the two regions (Agranoff 
1993; Keating 1988). The other fifteen regions are included in the so-called ‘common 
regime’ system –‘régimen común’–, in which the central government collects all taxes 
and transfers the money to the regions (Castells 2001). Further asymmetries include 
the different timing for regional elections in the ‘historic nationalities’ –i.e. the Basque 
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Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia –whereas the other 13 regions hold 
elections at the same time, alongside municipal elections (Hamann 1999); and the fact 
that some of the regions have their own police forces (Heller 2002), some of these are 
regarded as ‘historical nationalities’ such as the Basque Country and Catalonia, but 
Navarra, for example, also has its own police force. Therefore, Spanish decentralised 
system contains some asymmetries, but the logic underlying it is profoundly 
symmetric. 
Asymmetries in federal or quasi-federal systems has been widely studied in the 
literature. In multinational societies, it is argued that asymmetry may be a good 
technique to recognise the particularities of stateless nations within the state, or, to use 
the Spanish variety of the term, its ‘nationalities’ (Conversi 2007; Fossas 1999; 2001; 
Gagnon 2001; Keating 1998b; 1999; Requejo 2001a; 2003; 2005). However, others 
rightly point out that conceding extra powers or special recognition to stateless nations 
might lead the other non-identity-based regions to complain about what they consider 
to be unfair ‘privileges’ and to demand equal treatment; which leads to a spiral of 
demands for asymmetry from the ‘nationalities’ that are eventually matched by the 
other regions in what has been labelled as ‘centrifugal dynamics’ or ‘re-
symmetrization processes’ (Hombrado 2011; Requejo and Nagel 2009; Roeder 2009). 
The tension between these two visions, the one from the ‘nationalities,’ that claim to 
have some distinctive elements, and the one from the non-identity-based regions, 
which claim that all regions should receive the same treatment and reject any kind of 
‘privilege’ for the ‘nationalities,’ ultimately makes asymmetrical agreements ‘stability 
challenging’ (Zuber 2011: 565).  
This tension lies on different conceptions of state and nation, and is highly evident in 
the Spanish case. For nationalists in stateless nations, the state is composed of one 
demos but several demoi, thus implying that stateless nations and regions of the 
majority identity should not be treated the same way (Erk 2011; Requejo 2010a). 
Those who reject these claims argue that there is only one demos, one nation, and that 
the state is not ‘multinational’ but embedded with a plurality of cultures and/or 
languages. The latter interpretation is the dominant one in Spain’s non-identity regions 
and certainly that of the central government, based on the reinforcing nature of the 
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central state embedded in Article 2 of the Constitution, which grandiloquently declares 
the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’ (Agranoff 2004: 31). Thus, when 
demands for special recognition have appeared from sub-state nations in Spain, the 
recognition of the ‘nationality’ character has been extended to other Autonomous 
Communities, beyond the largely regarded triad of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
Galicia, such as Andalusia, Aragon, or the Valencian Community. The underlying 
strategy of the ‘café para todos’ is, then, as was effectively put by Keating, that 
‘everybody is allowed to be special and therefore nobody is’ (Keating 2001c: 54). 
Examples of this strategy, or the way Spain is understood, exist aplenty and some will 
be given when discussing the process of reform of the Catalan Statute below. However, 
this rejection to ‘privileges’ and the notion that ‘everybody is special’ have remained 
to this day. With the debate on independence becoming ever more salient in Catalonia, 
with the Catalan nationalist parties aiming to hold a referendum on independence and 
the regional funding system due to be renewed late in 2013 or in 2014, some regional 
leaders fear more fiscal autonomy could be offered to Catalonia in order to cut down 
support for independence. Regional leaders from both the PP and the PSOE rejected 
conceding any privilege for Catalonia on fiscal issues. Ignacio González, the PP 
regional president of Madrid, declared that ‘changing money for sovereignty is not 
admissible’ and claimed that he would ‘demand a public consultation if anyone has 
the temptation to give a fiscal regime à la carte’ to the Catalan Government (El País, 
7 October 2013d).61 This debate is also vivid within the ranks of the Spanish Socialists, 
the PSOE, which have recently put forward the possibility to reform the Spanish 
Constitution ‘towards a federal structure of the State’ (PSOE 2013) in order to appease 
secessionist demands in Catalonia. This would be achieved, according to the former 
Spanish Deputy PM and former PSOE leader, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, by the 
Constitution explicitly recognising the ‘singularities’ ‘singularidades’ of Catalonia. 
He did not specify however what is meant by ‘singularities,’ although he made it clear 
that ‘singularities yes, privileges no’ (La Vanguardia, 12 January 2013a).  
                                                 
61 Author’s translation from: ‘Cambiar dinero por soberanía es inadmisible’ and ‘consulta ciudadana si 
alguien tiene la tentación de dar un régimen fiscal a la carta.’ 
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The former PSOE deputy leader, Ms Elena Valenciano, although admitting that the 
Constitutional reform discussed within the PSOE responds to ‘a concrete issue to be 
sorted out: Catalonia,’ insisted on sticking to Spain’s logic of territorial management, 
that is symmetry, by arguing that ‘federalisation is something that would affect 
everyone’ (El País, 12 January 2013a).62 Furthermore, it seems that Catalan 
‘singularities’ would not relate to regional funding. Mr Rubalcaba joined in the debate 
on whether the reform of the regional funding system could be used to appease Catalan 
secessionists by ruling out any singular treatment of Catalonia on financial matters. He 
said: ‘The funding system must be the same throughout Spain. The fact that it needs 
to be reformed is another issue, but it must keep being the same for everyone’ (El País, 
9 October 2013e, emphasis added). Interestingly, the necessity for the funding system 
to be the same ‘throughout Spain’ is silent about the specific models of full fiscal 
autonomy existing in the Basque Country and Navarre, two rich regions in Spain that 
do not contribute at all to inter-regional solidarity (Castells 2001; Herrero Alcalde, 
Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell, and Vizán Rodríguez 2010). This, as pointed out above, 
clearly represents an asymmetry which is duly tolerated.  
A few months before Mr Rubalcaba’s statement, though, Mr Pere Navarro, the former 
leader of the Catalan Socialists (PSC), shook up the political agenda for a few days by 
claiming that the Basque ‘concierto económico’ was a ‘privilege’ and suggested that, 
‘if what we desire is a fair funding system, we should start by getting rid in the 
Constitutional reform [that the PSOE is debating] of the privileges that exist today,’ in 
a message directed ‘to all those who talk about false Catalan non-solidarity’ (El País, 
13 June 2013c).63 Mr Navarro’s proposal outraged many. Not surprisingly, the Basque 
government, led by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), answering through different 
officials, deemed the suggestion was of ‘extraordinary gravity’ and denounced it as a 
‘frontal attack to [Basque] self-government,’ of which the ‘concierto económico’ was 
                                                 
62 Author’s own translation from: ‘una cuestión concreta que resolver: Cataluña’ and ‘La federalización 
es algo que afectaría a todos.’ 
63 Author’s translation from: ‘Si queremos una financiación justa, empecemos por eliminar en la reforma 




‘an essential piece.’ The PNV was not alone in defending the Basque’s full fiscal 
autonomy regime. The PSOE and the PP backed it as well. The Basque leader of the 
PSOE-PSE, Mr Patxi López, argued that the ‘‘concierto’ is unquestionable’ and a 
Basque PP spokesperson claimed that the ‘’concierto económico’ is not a privilege’ 
(El País, 13 June 2013b). Indeed, the Basque and Navarrese models were confirmed 
by the PSOE’s state-wide leadership in the working paper that introduced a future 
federal reform of Spain’s Constitution (PSOE 2013: 17). Hombrado argues (2011: 
479) that ‘[n]ationalists in Catalonia have seen with jealously the fiscal privileges and 
constitutional treatment granted to Basque and Navarrese,’ which led the former to 
demand the same. As we have seen, demands for full fiscal autonomy from Catalonia 
were indeed posed through the Statute reform process, and afterwards, and have 
constantly been rejected. Catalan PM Artur Mas argued that the last rejection of this 
proposal in the late summer of 2012 drove CiU to put forward a demand to hold a 
referendum on Catalonia having its own state (Mas 2012). The discussion around the 
funding system clearly exemplifies the instability inherent in asymmetric 
arrangements. On the one hand, both the PP and the PSOE claim there cannot be any 
privileges for anyone, but they defend full fiscal autonomy for the ‘foral’ territories, 
which is an asymmetry. Arguably, once autonomy is granted it is politically very 
difficult to take it back (O’Neill 2003), but if the central institutions and regional 
leaders in non-identity-based regions think it legitimate to demand as much as the 
Catalans get, why should it not be legitimate for the Catalans to demand what the 
Basques have? Catalan parties have certainly put that claim forward. 
The paradigm of symmetry may have worked relatively well when the demands of the 
Catalans could be contained. That point experienced its zenith during the 1990s when 
the Catalan government of CiU bargained for extra tax allowances and further 
competencies with the PSOE and PP minority governments in the centre (Agranoff 
and Ramos Gallarín 1997; Heller 2002). Most gains that the Catalan government 
received where extended tout court, following a symmetric logic. This was acceptable 
because the other regions were ready to accept what the Catalans got. At one point, 
though, just when the debate for a new Statute was starting to become salient in 




According to a leading CiU official,  
‘[s]ome presidents of autonomous communities told, already in 2002, or 
2001, President [Jordi] Pujol and Mas, who was then Head Minister. “Look 
Pujol, you know what? We do not want more [powers] for you, because we 
do not want anything else”. This was not in 2005, nor in 2010. This happened 
in 2002, in the early 2000s. […] Some [Autonomous] Communities were 
forced to take in the competencies on health care, they were forced to. It was 
necessary to reproduce what Catalonia had to the other communities of the 
common regime. Some communities at a certain point said “enough, we do 
not want anything else. We must stop that spearhead that is making us [follow 
suit]. Stop it. How? Giving them no more”.’64 
However, the specificities of Catalan politics, with a Catalanist-led PSC willing to 
reform the Statute of Autonomy and a PSOE under a new leadership made it possible 
to furthering the scope of Spain’s Estado de las Autonomías. This challenged again 
the symmetric ideal of the state decentralised organisation, and the Spanish state’s 
management of this process certainly will help us understand why Catalan demands 
did not stop once the Statute of Autonomy was reformed. 
 
2.2. The Reform of the Catalan Statute: The Perspective from the 
Centre 
The second Aznar government, in which the PP enjoyed a comfortable overall majority 
in the Spanish parliament, was characterised by an authoritative government style that 
had effects on territorial politics, especially due to the PP’s mono-national and unitary 
vision of Spain. Some conflicts related to the sub-state powers, such as the number of 
hours of Spanish to be taught in Catalan schools or the decision to deviate water from 
                                                 
64 Interview with the Secretary General of CiU. Author’s translation from: ‘Alguns presidents de 
comunitats autònomes dient-li ja a l’any 2002, 2001, al President Pujol, i a en Mas que era conseller, en 
Cap, dient-li coses com les següents: ‘Mira Pujol, ¿sabes qué pasa? Que no queremos más para vosotros, 
porqué ya no queremos más para nosotros.’ Això no passa ni el 2005, ni el 2010, això passa el 2002, a 
principi dels 2000s. […]Algunes comunitats se’ls va obligar a agafar les competències en sanitat, se’ls 
va obligar. Perquè calia reproduir allò que tenia Catalunya a la resta de comunitats de règim comú. 
Algunes comunitats va arribar un moment que van dir prou, i van dir, escolta, no, és que no en volem 
més per nosaltres. Cal que s’aturi aquella locomotora  que ens està fent a tots... Ature-la. Com? No 
donant-li més' (Pujol 2012). 
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the river Ebro to south-east Spain, produced outrage among Catalanist parties. 
However, the authoritative style in territorial politics was perhaps even more relevant 
in the Basque Country in the early 2000s, with the illegalisation of Herri Batasuna for 
its alleged links with ETA and the rebuffing of the so-called Plan Ibarretxe, a new 
Statute for the Basque Country that was rejected straight away by the PP in the Spanish 
parliament, with the legislators not even debating on its content (Jiménez Sánchez 
2006; Keating and Bray 2006). However, Aznar’s second term increased the political 
tension not only regarding the territorial question, but also with regards to particular 
policy issues, such as the way that the disaster of the Prestige was handled, the sinking 
of the tanker was a natural disaster; and even more controversially was Spain’s support 
to the US-led invasion of Iraq which was hugely unpopular amongst Spaniards.  
These tensions undoubtedly contributed to explain the 2003 election result in 
Catalonia, with Catalan voters partly turning their backs on CiU for its alliance with 
the PP (Barberà and Barrio 2006), which favoured the good result of the PSC and the 
considerable boost received by the ERC (Guibernau 2006; 2007), thus placing them in 
a pivotal position and becoming a key player in Catalan politics (Argelaguet 2006). As 
mentioned above, during that campaign, Mr Zapatero, the new leader of the Spanish 
Socialists (PSOE), which had been elected with the support of the Catalan Socialists, 
among others, expressed its commitment to reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy 
if elected Spain’s next Prime Minister. The support for Zapatero was a strategic move 
from several regional party leaders, Pasqual Maragall from Catalonia, but also Manuel 
Chaves from Andalusia, to secure his nomination on the compromise of considering 
the reform of some regions’ Statute of Autonomy; and collaterally aimed at preventing 
Mr José Bono, which was regarded as a more centralist regional ‘baron’ from leading 
the party (Hopkin 2009).  
Zapatero won and made his promise during the 2003 election campaign. The tripartite 
government was constituted and the Catalan parliamentary committee charged with 
drafting the new Statute started its work. The 2004 Spanish election followed suit, on 
14 March, just three days after the terrible Madrid train bombings that completely 
filled the last days of the campaign, and in which the incumbent PP government tried 
to attribute the massacre to the Basque organisation ETA, although it was clearly 
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evident that the terrorist attacks had been carried out by radical Islamists in retaliation 
for the Spanish government’s support to the invasion of Iraq. The election delivered a 
victory for the PSOE, albeit short of an overall majority. The PSOE had committed to 
make the State reforms possible, only requiring them to be ‘in agreement with the 
Constitution,’ a clear hidden reference to the rejected Ibarretxe Plan, and ‘backed by a 
high degree of democratic consensus’ (PSOE 2004: 59).65  
This opened the way to the Catalan reform, indeed, but it was not the only one that 
was proposed. Up to eleven out of seventeen autonomous communities started the 
reform process of their Autonomy Statutes; of those, one was rejected –the Basque, 
the so-called Ibarretxe Plan–, two were withdrawn, those of the Canary Islands and 
Castilla-La Mancha, and seven were reformed, those of Catalonia, Andalusia, the 
Valencian Community, Aragon, Navarre, Castile-and-León, and Extremadura (Grau 
2011), the last one being the one of Extremadura in January 2011. The focus of this 
work will be mainly on the Catalan Statute, but it is evident that there was some 
openness to reform the Estado de las Autonomías on a case-by-case basis in the part 
of the PSOE. Hence, the ‘Zapatero government, in stark contrast to the centralizing 
discourse of his conservative predecessor Aznar, adopted an open attitude to the 
possibility of further decentralization, in large parts as a result of internal dynamics 
within the PSOE’ (Hopkin 2009: 194).  
This new wave of decentralisation in Spain, in contrast to the decentralisation 
agreements of the early 1980s and 1990s was not led and directed by the centre, and 
therefore of a symmetrical nature (Colino 2010), but by the regional governments and 
parliaments (Grau 2011). Arguably, this opened up the possibilities of re-introducing 
asymmetries between Spanish Autonomous Communities, particularly among the 
opposition PP, which feared the Catalan reform might go too far and started even 
public campaigns to protest about the Catalan parliament’s intentions.66 The attitude 
                                                 
65 Author’s translation from the original in Spanish: ‘de acuerdo con la Constitución’ and ‘respaldadas 
por un alto grado de consenso democrático.’ 
66 The PP collected 4 million signatures demanding the Spanish government to put the Catalan Statute 
proposal to a referendum to be held throughout Spain, arguing that the initiative was ‘to defend the 
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of the PP in the opposition put a lot of pressure on the PSOE (van Houten 2009), with 
several votes at stake in many regions of Spain and thus wary that the Statute could be 
seen as a ‘concession’ or ‘privilege’ given to the Catalans that the PP would try to 
exploit. This pressure combined with the internal political dynamics in Catalonia 
discussed in the previous section made the whole content of the Statute proposal 
unacceptable to the PSOE government; and it goes without saying that the PP in 
opposition was outraged and even voted against taking the proposal into consideration 
(Colino 2009: 270). 
The main concerns about the Catalan proposal ‘were the funding arrangements and the 
distribution of competencies, the regulations on the justice administration, the bilateral 
institutions established, the tax arrangement, and more symbolic issues such as the 
declaration in several articles of Catalonia as a Nation. It seemed clear, however, that 
the main stumbling block was the economic aspect of the proposal’ (Colino 2009: 
271). Facing this substantial problems, both bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
started between the PSOE and the different Catalan parties, most notably CiU and 
ERC, with the final outcome being the agreement between Mas and Zapatero on 21 
January 2006 on the Statute content. 
The final document was voted in the Spanish Parliament in March 2006 and set the 
path towards its ratification by referendum. The PSOE and CiU supported the Statute 
bill and thus the PSC and the nationalists campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote in the June 
referendum; whereas the ERC and the PP voted against the bill and supported the 
rejection of the Statute reform, albeit for opposite reasons (van Houten 2009). ERC 
perceived too much had been cut off from the original Catalan proposal and the PP 
kept its frontal opposition to the reform, challenging the text to the Constitutional 
Court under the charge that it was against the Spanish Constitution.  
The support of both the CiU and the PSC to the re-negotiated text passed by the 
Spanish parliament and the support of the PSOE was translated into a comfortable 
                                                 
Spanish Constitution,’ ‘the Spanish nation and the equality between all Spaniards’ (El País, 25 April 
2006). It did not go through. 
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support in the Statute referendum, with around three-quarters of voters validating the 
new Statute. Hence, the outcome at this stage was perceived as satisfactory, an 
agreement reached between both Catalan and Spanish institutions and ratified by the 
Catalan electorate. Even the ERC admitted the validity of the outcome despite having 
opposed the final draft of the Statute.  
The approval of the new Statute set the basis of an agreed framework, which included 
substantial elements of constitutional change, most notably on the issue of the 
development of a new regional funding system and certain compromises from the 
central government to invest in Catalonia. The period between 2006 and 2010 was 
marked by the implementation of these compromise, with the Catalan parties claiming 
that the central government was not fulfilling its part of the deal, which led to the 
progressive increase of territorial tension. The latter was further exacerbated by the 
uncertainties regarding the outcome of the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute 
of Autonomy, with claims that the Constitutional Court was highly polarised and 
discredited. This is the main topic of the next section. 
 
2.3. The Outcome of the Statute Reform: The Willingness to Put an 
End to Decentralisation 
Catalan political parties, especially the CiU and the PSC, celebrated the agreement 
reached and the approval of the new Statute, albeit all of them also put emphasis on 
being vigilant to the fulfilment of the agreements by the central government. For 
example, the PSC celebrated that ‘[d]espite the opposition of the fundamentalist and 
intolerant Spanish right [the PP], today Catalonia has a new Statute, which makes it 
the most autonomous European’ stateless nation; and urged a swift implementation of 
the new Statute through a bilateral commission between the Generalitat and the central 
government, along with the new regional fiscal system, which would imply ‘that the 
revenues of the Generalitat come entirely from the benefits of the taxes paid by the 
citizens of Catalonia through the increase of the Generalitat’s share in the main state 
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taxes: the Income Tax from 33% to 50%; VAT from 25% to 50%; and the special taxes 
[on alcohol and tobacco] from 40% to 58%’ (PSC 2006: 7, 363).67  
CiU also demanded that the new regional funding system should reduce the amount of 
solidarity transfers from Catalonia to the other regions, to apply the Statute clause 
regarding the central government’s investment on infrastructures and urged the 
creation of the Catalan Tax Agency. CiU also maintained the demands that had been 
ruled out in the new statute, such as the competency on the management of Barcelona’s 
airport, unemployment benefits or the possibility that Catalan sports teams could play 
international competitions, arguing that these competencies and others ‘were included 
in the Statute proposal approved by the Catalan Parliament and were subsequently 
vetoed or rejected by the Socialists’ (CiU 2006: 184).68 Statements like this one clearly 
exemplify the maintenance of the tension on territorial issues translated to the 
competition between the PSC and CiU in the 2006 election, where the nationalists 
aspired to come back into office. However, at the same time they failed to mention that 
the CiU leaders themselves had agreed to this ‘vetoes’ and ‘rejections’ by the Socialists 
by agreeing to the content of the Statute and supporting its final version. The election 
result that left CiU in the opposition yet again reinforced CiU’s demands and paved 
the way for the nationalist federation to claim that the PSOE government was not 
delivering their part of the agreement. 
Before the 2008 Spanish general election, CiU demanded the publication by the central 
government of the ‘balances fiscals,’ that is, the net money transfers between regions 
after the central government had redistributed resources; the fulfilment of the Statute 
disposition ‘regarding state investments in Catalonia for 2007-2013, which implies a 
                                                 
67 Author’s translation from the original: ‘Malgrat l’oposició de la dreta espanyola, fonamentalista i 
intolerant, avui Catalunya té un un nou Estatut, gràcies al qual s’ha convertit en la comunitat nacional 
europea que gaudeix de més autonomia política, respecte de l’Estat del qual forma part’; and ‘garanteix 
que els ingressos de la Generalitat procedeixin totalment del rendiment dels impostos pagats pels 
ciutadans de Catalunya a través de l’augment dels percentatges de participació de la Generalitat en els 
grans impostos estatals: l’IRPF, del 33% al 50%; l’IVA, del 25% al 50%; els impostos especials, del 
40% al 58%.’ 
68 Author’s translation from: ‘CiU continuarà reivindicant aquells aspectes puntuals que figuraven a la 
proposta d’Estatut aprovat pel Parlament de Catalunya i que els socialistes van vetar o rebutjar.’ 
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transfer of 1.5 billion Euros that the state still has to transfer to Catalonia from the 
years 2007 and 2008’ and the effective transfer of new competencies such as ‘regional 
train services, education scholarships, immigration, water policy, Social Security 
administration, [and] justice’ (CiU 2008: 5-6).69 The pressure of CiU in this regard, 
which has been advanced in the previous section on party competition, obviously 
tensed the relationship between the PSC and the PSOE because the PSC had to stick 
to what had been agreed to in the Statute process and the PSOE government not always 
fulfilled its part of the deal. A leader of the PSC admitted that the ‘disloyalty of the 
Spanish central administration’ (Iceta 2012) was one of the consequences that fiscal 
demands had later shifted to full fiscal autonomy, attributing it to the view that 
controlling all tax resources in Catalonia would prevent the central government’s 
involvement and thus failing to provide what had been previously agreed.  
This sentiment of growing territorial tension and distrust towards the Spanish 
government to fulfil its compromises was also accompanied by the Constitutional 
Court’s deliberation on the appeal against the Statute put forward by the PP. The 12-
member Court was completely divided following party lines, i.e. a progressive faction 
and a conservative faction. Although members of the Constitutional Court are 
supposed to be impartial, the nomination system based in the Spanish parliament and 
government, which is dominated by a two-party system favours that the PP and the 
PSOE support each other’s candidates. Several scandals also affected the long 
deliberation process. For a start, a Catalan member of the Court was prevented to take 
part into the Statute ruling because he had written a report on the constitutionality of 
the Statute reform proposal before he was a member of the Court. The vote to set him 
aside was close, 6 to 5, showing the divisive nature of the whole issue (El País, 5 
February 2007a). Furthermore, by spring 2010 four members of the Court had their 
mandates already expired and the Catalan Socialist President of the Generalitat and 
                                                 
69 Author’s translation from: ‘respecte a les inversions de l’Estat a Catalunya en el període 2007-2013, 
cosa que implica l’abonament dels 1.500 milions d’euros, que l’Estat té pendent de transferir a 
Catalunya, corresponents als anys 2007 i 2008’; and ‘entre les quals cal incloure els serveis ferroviaris 
de rodalia i els regionals, els aeroports, l’atenció a la dependència, les beques, la immigració, les 
polítiques d’aigua, la gestió de la Seguretat Social, la justícia.’ 
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the CiU urged the Spanish political parties to renew the Court even if the Statute ruling 
was not ready yet.  
The PP however argued that the referees could not be replaced while the ‘match’ was 
under way, while the PSOE blamed the PP for blocking the reform, with the PP willing 
to maintain the current balance between Conservatives and Progressives judges. Mr 
Montilla, the PSC Catalan PM claimed that the renewal of the Court’s members with 
expired mandates had to be tackled ‘with the Constitutional Court and its prestige in 
mind, because it is very deteriorated because of these lamentable circumstances’ (El 
País, 19 April 2010a).70 In addition, another member of the Court died in 2008 and 
was not replaced either, due to the disagreement between the PP and the PSOE to 
nominate a consensus candidate (El Mundo, 14 April 2010). 
In a nutshell, the 12-member Constitutional Court charged with examining the 
constitutionality of the new Catalan Statute was reduced from 12 to 10 members, due 
to a death and a Catalan judge being left aside from the deliberations by his peers after 
the appeal made by the PP. From the ten remaining members, four had their mandates 
expired, a situation that echoing President Montilla’s words left the image of the Court 
deteriorated and severely damaged. The ruling, published on 26 June 2010, declared 
some articles unconstitutional and reinterpreted several others. The outcome led to a 
lively discussion both amongst academics and politicians on the effects of the ruling 
and its political and legal scope. However, the reaction of the main Catalanist political 
parties and civil society organisations was that of a complete rejection since the Statute 
had been perceived as a pact between the Catalan people and the Spanish institutions 
and the latter, through the Constitutional Court, unilaterally changed the agreement. It 
has been argued that the party dynamics that led the Catalan proposal to be far too 
ambitious, even though it was substantially modified in the Spanish parliament, 
implied that ‘the Court [was] compelled to issue a ruling that may possibly contradict 
the will of two parliaments and the electorate of Catalonia’ (Colino 2009: 280). Indeed, 
the Constitutional Court overruled a law that had gone through two parliamentary 
                                                 




procedures and a referendum, but under any circumstance can the Constitutional Court 
be considered a neutral political actor that was limited to interpreting the Constitution 
from a strict legalistic point of view. The serials on the status of the Court’s members 
throughout the ruling’s deliberation process, with the two Spanish parties blocking the 
replacement of members with expired mandates had a clear political intention, to affect 
the outcome of the ruling by influencing the Court’s composition.  
The two parties clearly reacted favourably to the ruling, although from different 
perspectives. The Spanish Prime Minister and PSOE leader, Mr Zapatero, described 
the ruling as ‘satisfactory,’ emphasising that the Statute was ‘basically constitutional’ 
and the ruling confirmed ‘more than ninety per cent of [the Statute’s] initial content’: 
‘Objetivo cumplido’ or ‘objective fulfilled’ he said (La Vanguardia, 1 July 2010a). On 
the other hand, a PP spokesperson, Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, stated that ‘the most 
important thing is that the Court has taken into account the appeal of the PP and casts 
doubt on 50 articles’ of the 114 articles that the party had appeal against and on her 
view the PP ‘wanted a Statute that fits into the Constitution. We value that the resulting 
Statute is fully constitutional. We have done what we had to do. Furthermore, it is 
clearly stated that the term ‘nation’ in a [legally] binding character only refers to the 
Spanish nation’ (El País, 29 June 2010b).71 The reading of the ruling by the Spanish 
parties was basically in terms of Spanish politics: the PSOE was satisfied because most 
of the PP’s appeal had been rejected and the latter was satisfied because some 
amendments had been accepted. This reaction just added to the Catalan nationalist 
parties’ stupefaction and all quickly backed the civil society-led march on 10 July 2010 
to reject the Statute ruling. The PSC also joined the demonstration. The reaction from 
the Catalanist parties questioned the democratic nature of the ruling, with the Statute 
having been passed by a referendum, and also the clear-cut positioning that Catalonia’s 
nation-ness was completely rejected. 
                                                 
71 Author’s translation from: ‘Lo importante es que el tribunal ha estimado en parte el recurso del PP y 
cuestiona 50 artículos’; and ‘Queríamos un Estatuto constitucional. Valoramos que el Estatuto 
resultante es plenamente constitucional. Nosotros hemos cumplido con nuestra obligación. Además, se 
deja bien sentado que el término nación con carácter vinculante solo corresponde a la nación española.’ 
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Amongst the most Catalanist leaders of PSC the ruling was perceived as a turning 
point. A former PSC minister in the Catalan government argued that  
‘[i]t is not admissible that after ratifying an organic law by the citizenry the 
Constitutional Court may modify the [people’s] will expressed through 
universal suffrage. It appears like if the Court had more power than universal 
suffrage;’ and she added that ‘the surprise is incredible when, after the 
referendum, and thinking that […] some parts had been lowered down in the 
Spanish Parliament, we [believed] that that was our Statute because it had 
been ratified and there [were] twelve people […] that had decided otherwise. 
This has never been accepted and has boosted a sentiment that casts doubt 
on the state’s organisation regarding the recognition of its historical 
nations.’72  
Another member of the PSC leadership, after qualifying the whole Statute reform as a 
‘failure,’ put the emphasis on the difficulty of successful constitutional change if made 
against the wishes of the PP. According to him, ‘in Spain there is not a minimum 
consensus to move [decentralisation and federalism] forward. Therefore, trying 
something without or against the PP had all possible difficulties as it was eventually 
proven,’ and argued that the next step after the ruling, in the view of the PSC, was to 
‘recover with politics those elements affected by the ruling’ and to ‘keep putting 
forward federal reforms,’ albeit admitting that this ‘has an evident political difficulty, 
that any reform you want to implement, including the Statute, but also of other state 
structures, you have to do it with the PP. You will not do it against the PP.’73 
                                                 
72 Interview with the former Catalan Minister of the Interior (2003-06) and Justice (2006-10). Author’s 
translation: ‘No és admissible que després de ratificar una llei orgànica per la ciutadania el Tribunal 
Constitucional pugui modificar la voluntat explicitada en sufragi universal. És com si el Tribunal tingués 
més pes que el sufragi universal’; and ‘'la sorpresa és màxima quan, una vegada ratificat en referèndum, 
i pensant que... havia tingut alguna retallada a les Corts Generals, però que aquell era el nostre Estatut 
perquè havia estar ratificat, hi havia un... un, dotze persones que reunides podien decidir una altra cosa. 
I això ha estat una cosa que no, que no s’ha acceptat mai i que ha creat un sentiment com de posar en 
qüestió l’estructura organitzativa de l’Estat pel que fa als temes de reconeixment de les nacions 
històriques’ (Tura 2012). 
73 Interview with a leader of the PSC. Author’s translation: ‘recuperar per la via política doncs aquells 
elements que la sentència ha malmès’; and ‘seguim impulsant les reformes federals espanyoles que 
s’han de fer. Ara, això amb una dificultat diria política evident, tu... tota reforma que vulguis fer, tant 
de l’Estatut, però sobretot que són d’estructures d’Estat espanyoles, ho has de fer, doncs amb el PP, no 
podràs fer-ho contra el PP’ (Iceta 2012). 
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The feeling that the PP, which has been traditionally hostile to decentralisation and the 
recognition of Spain’s multinational character (Guibernau 2007; Hopkin 2009; 
Maddens and Libbrecht 2009), and the PSOE, which had believed that the ruling was 
not that bad and could finally be rid of the Catalan question, provoked the discourse 
switch in the Catalan nationalist parties to the right to decide. Both CiU and ERC 
assumed that the Court’s ruling meant that the accommodation of Catalan demands 
would always be objected by the Spanish parties and set the agenda for the Catalans 
going their own way, albeit at different paces. The ERC called for a referendum on 
independence and CiU put the emphasis on fiscal autonomy first.  
Reflecting on the consequences of the whole process of Statute reform, a senior official 
of ERC argued in an interview that the Statute ‘was a historic opportunity, the best 
imaginable political context in Spain, a friendly president [Zapatero] who stands for a 
plural Spain says he will approve whatever the Catalan Parliament decides. The 
Catalan Parliament brings in a new Statute proposal, ambitious, with a clear federal 
shape […]. A big step forward was perceived, but this has not worked. […] The Statute 
process has claimed many victims […], some of them were very important in 
Catalonia, such as federalism. Federalism is over. The Statute process has killed 
federalism.’74 The aftermath to the Statute ruling indeed coincided with the sharp 
electoral decline of the PSC, the main party that pursues federalism, and public support 
for independence as shown earlier rocketed after 2010. The effects of the ruling in 
particular enhanced the perception by many Catalan nationalists, including many in 
CiU, that the Spanish parties had no intention of recognising Catalonia as a nation 
within Spain in what has been described as ‘nation of nations,’ featuring confederal 
elements (Moreno 2010).  
                                                 
74 Interview with the ERC parliamentary leader in Madrid from 2011 onwards. Author’s translation: 
‘una oportunitat històrica, hi ha la millor cojuntura imaginable a Espanya, políticament parlant, amb un 
president amic que es proclama defensor de l’Espanya plural i que diu que aprovarà tot el que aprovi el 
Parlament de Catalunya. Un Parlament de Catalunya doncs que acaba consensuant un Estatut nou, molt 
més ambiciós, de tall federal clarament’; ‘era un moment en què es preveia que hi podria haver un salt 
endavant enorme. I bé, què passa? Doncs que això no ho ha funcionat’; and ‘el procés aquest de l’Estatut 
[…] s’ha endut moltes víctimes per endavant […], [es] va emportar altres coses que també eren molt 
importants a Catalunya com per exemple el federalisme. El federalisme s’ha acabat. El procés de 
l’Estatut ha petat el federalisme’ (Bosch 2012). 
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The leader of CiU, Artur Mas, argued in his speech prior to becoming President of the 
Generalitat that the Court’s ruling emphasises a ‘crisis in the relationship between 
Catalonia and Spain’ and that a ‘new framework was required,’ while claiming that 
the ‘Constitutional Court has cut down any possibility that Spain evolved into a 
plurinational state’ and Catalonia should therefore start a ‘new path’ in what he called 
a ‘national transition’ (Mas 2010).  
The political climate since the Statute ruling has undoubtedly shifted towards the 
prospect of Catalan independence. With the CiU-led proposal for full fiscal autonomy, 
the nationalists aimed at getting both more resources and specific recognition in an 
attempt to compensate for the amputation of the Catalan Statute. As the party’s 
secretary general observed, CiU ‘have been the first co-operator for three decades to 
achieve a modern Spanish state. We wanted this state to be comfortable for us […]. In 
the last decade, [the central government] has not responded in the same fashion. This 
is fine, perhaps they did not say it, they did not want to, they did not want it to be 
evident, but nonetheless they have been doing it; and what we looked for which was a 
comfortable state that would allow us […] to move forward and establish a prosperous 
Catalonia, [...] this now we feel it is not possible any more. So for Catalonia to keep 
existing it needs its own state’ and added that a new ‘fiscal agreement is the last known 
step. […] Beyond this, or facing a rejection of the fiscal agreement, this leads us, 
everybody, us, but also them, to an unknown scenario.’75 
As pointed out above, the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute was interpreted 
by the Catalanist political parties as a turning point. The fiscal agreement, consisting 
of full fiscal autonomy, was presented by CiU as a last offer. When the proposal was 
                                                 
75 Interview with CiU’s Secretary General. Author’s translation from: ‘Nosaltres hem estat tres dècades 
col·laborant com el primer en l’articulació d’un estat que pogués ser molt modern. Un estat que volíem 
confortable per nosaltres’; ‘fa, aproximadament una dècada cap aquí, vostès no han respost amb la 
mateixa moneda. No passa res, potser no ho havien dit, no volien ser, no ho volien fer evident, però ho 
han anat practicant, i allò que nosaltres buscàvem, que era un estat confortable, que ens permetés, no 
només sobreviure, sinó tirar endavant i dibuixar una Catalunya pròspera, etcètera, etcètera, com que ho 
veiem inviable […], [i] perquè Catalunya continuï sent, necessita estat’; and ‘el pacte fiscal és per ells 
la última estació coneguda. El pacte fiscal és l’última estació coneguda. Superat el pacte fiscal,  o una 
negativa al pacte fiscal, ens aventura a nosaltres, a tots, a nosaltres, però també a ells, a una estació 
desconeguda’ (Pujol 2012). 
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rejected from scratch by the PP Spanish government, CiU’s put forward the demand 
for an independence referendum, which was seconded not only by ERC, but also by 
ICV, and even the PSC.76 In the post-Statute scenario of growing polarisation of the 
independence issue, the rejection by the Spanish government to any further demands 
by the Catalan parties that go beyond the Statute helps consolidating this climate of 
tension, both amongst political parties and the civil society. We draw amongst this 
issues briefly in the last part of this section. 
 
2.4. Rejectionist Strategies lead to Polarisation: From the 
Statute’s Ruling to a Referendum on Independence 
The aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Catalan Statute led to the 
2010 Catalan election campaign in which the three main Catalanist parties put forward 
territorial demands that would alter the status quo marked by the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy. As we have seen, ERC put forward a proposal to hold a referendum on 
independence. The CiU, although not ruling out independence in the long-term by 
defending the Catalans’ ‘right to decide’ pushed for full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia. 
The PSC, tied up by the PSOE, which was still in office at the centre, insisted on 
‘recovering’ the parts of the Statute that had been declared unconstitutional through 
political negotiation, and claimed that the party would try to convince the PSOE to 
adopt its long-term aim to reform the Spanish Constitution to make Spain a clear-cut 
federal state, which the party perceived as the best option to accommodate Catalan 
self-government ambitions and recognition of the specific Catalan identity.  
This constitutional change proposals can be codified on the basis of three constitutional 
outcomes: ‘independence,’ ‘more autonomy,’ and ‘status quo;’ with the three parties 
ordering its preferences in a different fashion. For the ERC, independence would come 
first, followed by more autonomy –e.g. the party supported CiU’s proposal of full 
fiscal autonomy– and maintaining the status quo would be the ERC’s least preferred 
                                                 
76 As pointed out above, the PSC supports a referendum, albeit emphasising that it must be agreed with 
the central institutions and if the referendum was delivered the party would reject independence. 
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option. Similarly, CiU would have the status quo as their last option, but would prefer 
more autonomy –i.e. full fiscal autonomy– to independence. Finally, the PSC would 
support ‘more autonomy,’ but would rather maintain the status quo than support 
independence, which would be the party’s last choice. The party’s complete rejection 
of independence was evident in one of the slogans used in the 2010 Catalan election 
campaign that read ‘Ni de dretes, ni independentistes’ –‘neither right-wingers nor 
independentists.’ Following Sorens (2008: 328), the ERC thus adopted a clear-cut 
‘independentist’ position, the CiU a ‘radical-autonomist’ position, and the PSC a 
‘regionalist’ stand. On the other hand, the order of preferences of the central 
government facing constitutional change traditionally is quite the opposite. Central 
governments’ top priority is to maintain the status quo and conceding independence is 
the last option, whereas granting more autonomy to the region(s) would be considered 
a less evil scenario than independence that central governments would use to cut down 
separatist ambitions (Zuber 2011; see also Rudolph and Thompson 1985; 1989).  
This pattern accurately exemplifies the scenario on Catalan-Spanish dynamics since 
June 2010. CiU comfortably won the 2010 election and the Catalan parliament 
supported a cross-party demand for full fiscal autonomy, which also received the full 
backing of ERC and a more diffuse support from the Catalan Socialists. The newly 
elected Spanish government of the Partido Popular, however, flew the banner of the 
status quo and rejected the proposal for full fiscal autonomy, while counteroffering a 
revision of the current regional funding system in late 2013 or 2014. As pointed out 
above, this reform would not challenge the tout court logic of application of the current 
system. Artur Mas and the leadership of CiU felt the counteroffer was not enough and 
decided to call for a snap election, in which the party put forward the demand to hold 
a referendum on independence.  
Following again the triad of preferred constitutional options, CiU switched from a 
‘radical-autonomist’ position to a more ‘independentist’ one. CiU’s preferred option 
was full fiscal autonomy, although after acknowledging that the PP’s central 
government would stick to their preference for the territorial status quo, the nationalist 
federation switched to its second preference: independence, by putting forward a 
demand to celebrate a referendum on the issue in order to legitimise the decision.  
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When looking at the Statute reform process from a wider perspective, it can be argued 
that the main nationalist parties in Catalonia have been progressively switching their 
positions to favouring independence. Indeed, demands for more autonomy such as the 
Statute reform were initially met with a will to negotiate by the PSOE’s central 
government. However, the evolution of the reform, marked by the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling, was perceived as a unilateral breach of the compromise achieved, thus 
adding fuel to the perception of Catalan nationalist parties that the centre is 
untrustworthy. This leads to the scenario where any action taken by the centre is to be 
perceived as suspicious or determinedly hostile against the interests of the sub-state 
nation, which some claim it has led to Catalan leaders enhancing sentiments of 
‘victimism’ (Colino 2009). However, it is clear the leaders in the periphery may take 
advantage of this considered grievances and will draw upon the separate (or 
differentiated) national identity of many citizens in the region to denounce this 
grievances and put forward projects, such as independence, which in well-off regions 
are presented and regarded as a viable option (Guibernau 2000a; Sorens 2004).  
The last 2012 Catalan election returned a majority in the Catalan parliament for CiU 
and ERC, which alongside ICV and the CUP, have passed resolutions declaring the 
right of the Catalan people to decide their constitutional future and the determination 
to call for a referendum on Catalonia’s future. Having opposed granting further fiscal 
autonomy to the Catalan institutions, the Spanish government of the Partido Popular 
has thoroughly opposed such a referendum to take place, arguing that it would be 
against the Spanish Constitution, which in its Article 2 consecrates the ‘indissoluble 
unity’ of the Spanish nation. The rejection to the Catalan demand to hold a referendum 
by the Spanish government has been accompanied, as we have seen, by the offer to 
reform the regional funding system although without conceding any ‘privileges’ to 
Catalonia; whereas the PSOE is debating a reform of the Constitution to counter the 
demand for a referendum on independence. 
 It yet remains to be seen if CiU is only using secession as a threat to force the central 
institutions to give up some concessions involving further self-government powers, 
possibly involving fiscal autonomy. This kind of ‘opportunism,’ however, carries it 
risks, since once used it might be difficult to realistically prove that it will not be used 
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again (Meadwell 2009), thus inviting the central government to not give way to further 
decentralisation because the threat is not credible; or on the other hand it might lead 
‘sincere’ secessionists, to use Meadwell’s adjective, to benefit from the former party’s 
dubitation. It is rather difficult to predict which way the Catalan scenario will evolve 
to, but the willingness to compromise is fairly evident amongst the UDC, the junior 
party within CiU, whose leader Duran i Lleida openly claims that the right to decide 
and the referendum does not equate to independence and that he defends a ‘confederal’ 
third way (La Vanguardia, 23 September 2013d). The hypothesis that the ambiguity 
and open discrepancies between leaders in the two parties within CiU may contribute 
to enhancing an image of dubitation, implying that the call for a referendum is just 
used as a threat to settle for something less than independence. A tendency that may 
confirm this hypothesis would be a switch of the voters to support ‘sincere’ 
secessionists –i.e. the ERC. Recent polls seem to suggest that the ERC would outbid 
CiU if Catalan elections took place, thus opening the door for a complete shake up of 
Catalonia’s party system (El Periódico, 27 October 2013).  
The blocking attitude of the central government to further constitutional change has 
been perceived by Catalanist political parties as a legitimisation of independence as 
the only viable option and as the consequence that the satisfactory accommodation of 
Spain’s minority nations is impossible. This attitude, according to several Catalanist 
politicians, not only has an effect on the progressive support of independence by 
political parties, but also amongst the general public, as recent polls since the 
publication of the ruling on the Statute have shown (see Figure 3). The President of 
ERC straightforwardly claims that ‘the state creates independentists,’ and that the 
reform of the Statute, as pointed out by other leaders of ERC, ‘was a possible 
alternative to independence, the agreement with the Spanish state. Over and over again 
the Spanish state shows there is no margin for an agreement and thus makes it crystal 
clear that the independentists are right. […] What has changed between the 80s and 
now is that back then people hoped there would be another way. This hope is slightest 
every day because consistently there are less ‘other ways’.’77 Were ‘other ways’ to be 
                                                 
77 Interview with the President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘l’estat... fa independentistes’; and 
‘era possible una altra alternativa en paral· lel a la de la independència amb l’altra, que era la de l’entesa 
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seriously and sincerely proposed by the central government, as another former 
president of Esquerra claims, support for independence would fall dramatically:  
‘If Rajoy wins the election and says, […] “the [economic] crisis is terrible, 
but we need the Catalans. I will guarantee you [Catalans] that once the crisis 
is over I will let you collect all taxes, I will not bother you any more with your 
language or culture. Do whatever you want. If you want to forbid bullfighting, 
do it, anything regarding symbols. I also guarantee you that as much as I can 
I will invest all that is needed, the Mediterranean [rail]way, because it is in 
my own interest that things work and that you do well economically”. If Rajoy 
made this kind of discourse, we are done’ (Puigcercós 2012).  
However, the same leader strongly believes that this scenario will never happen: 
‘Spain is thought and designed in such a way that this is […] impossible. [In Spain] 
no one can compete with Madrid save for Barcelona, and there is a grand project here 
that has been going on for long, which is territorial hegemony. They used to have it 
administratively, they have achieved it economically […] and they also want it 
culturally, they have always fought for it. This Castilian [core] of Spanish governments 
makes a solution impossible, so they will keep creating independentists every day.’ 
Finally, he even admitted that if such a hypothetical scenario such as the one described 
above was presented, he himself would have problems supporting independence. ‘I am 
an independentist, but if I was given the ‘concert econòmic,’ Catalan sports teams, and 
they promise not to bother me again with language issues, then it would be extremely 
difficult to argue in favour of Catalonia’s independence. […] Independentists would 
become something marginal.’78 
                                                 
amb l’estat espanyol. Cada vegada que l’estat espanyol demostra que no hi ha cap possibilitat d’entesa, 
doncs fa més evident que els independentistes tenim raó. […] El que ha canviat és que als anys 80 hi 
havia gent que tenia l’esperança que hi hagués algun altre camí possible. I aquesta esperança doncs cada 
vegada és més petita. Perquè cada vegada hi ha menys ‘altres camins possibles’’ (Junqueras 2012). 
78 Interview with the former Secretary General and President of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘si el 
Rajoy agafés i guanya les eleccions i diu, senyors, això de la crisi és terrible. Però necessitem els 
catalans. A vostès els hi garanteixo que passada la crisi els hi deixaré recaptar tots els impostos, no els 
molestaré més amb la llengua, no els molestaré més amb la cultura, facin el que vulguin. Si no volen 
fer places de toros, no facin toros, elements simbòlics. Però jo els hi garanteixo que en la mesura que jo 
pugui faré totes les inversions, faré el corredor Mediterrani, perquè vostès m’interessa que funcionin i 
econòmicament vagin bé. Si el Rajoy fa aquest discurs, ens desarma’; ‘Espanya està pensada de tal 
manera i dissenyada de tal manera que és inviable... és inconcebible’; ‘'ningú és competència de Madrid, 
179 
 
The perception that attitudes of the central government towards Catalan demands for 
self-government have a direct impact on the recent developments leading to an 
increased polarisation of the territorial question and saliency of the debate on 
Catalonia’s independence is shared by some former leaders of the PSC, with former 
Catalan PM José Montilla claiming it has led to a well-established sentiment of 
‘disaffection’ from Catalonia towards Spain (El País, 8 November 2007b). A former 
Socialist minister in the Catalan government recognised that this sentiment amongst 
the public indeed existed. She pointed out that this sentiment of ‘disaffection and 
separation from Spain is growing’ and was due to the ‘perception that there is a 
reiterative incomprehension […] that the sentiment of belonging to the Catalan nation 
is undermined […]. I think that an important part, even probably most of this sentiment 
[of disaffection] is related to the lack of reaction of the state’s institutions. I mean, the 
state cannot aim to rule with a blind eye regarding different singularities, of different 
kinds […] [including] territories with a strong feeling of belonging to a historical 
nation.’79  
Hence, the rigidness of the central government in attending Catalan demands is 
directly linked not only to parties’ positioning on the independence debate, but also 
directly linked to the growing support for independence among the population. 
Arguably, popular views on independence might have an effect on political parties’ 
territorial proposals, which is what will be discussed in the third section of this chapter. 
                                                 
extret de Barcelona. I aquí hi ha un projecte atàvic [...] hi ha un projecte atàvic que ve de lluny, que és 
l’hegemonia territorial, la van tenir administrativa, l’han aconseguit econòmica, però se’ls està 
enfonsant, i la volen també cultural, l’han batallada sempre. I això, la matriu castellana dels governs 
espanyols fa inconcebible una solució, per tant, cada dia aniran fent més independentistes’; and ‘'jo sóc 
independentista substancial, però clar, a mi em donessin el concert econòmic, seleccions catalanes 
esportives, i no em molestessin amb la llengua, doncs òstia, seria molt difícil defensar la independència 
de Catalunya. […] [E]ns quedem amb una cosa marginal els independentistes’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
79 Interview with a former PSC Catalan Minister. Author’s translation from: ‘el sentiment de que... de 
desafecció i despreniment amb Espanya cada vegada és més gran perquè ho és’; and ‘'la sensació de 
que aquesta incrompensió reiterada una i una altra vegada de que el sentiment de pertinença a la nació 
catalana doncs és menystingut [...]. Per tant, jo crec que en molt bona part, per no dir la immensa majoria 
d’aquest sentiment hi té a veure la manca de reacció de les institucions de l’Estat. És a dir, l’Estat no 
pot intentar governar tapant-se els ulls de que té una singularitats diverses, del tipus que siguin [inclosos] 




2.5. Does Territorial Management Exacerbate Territorial Demands 
in Catalonia? 
The inherent ambiguousness of Spain’s Constitution allowed Catalan nationalists, 
exemplified by CiU’s position on self-government, to feel more or less comfortable 
with a Constitutional framework that gave Catalonia the title of ‘nationality’ within 
the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation.’ This constitutional ambiguity allowed 
for flexibility both in symbolic issues and decentralised allocation of powers to the 
seventeen Autonomous Communities, although successive reforms culminated in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s confirmed the ‘symmetrical’ logic of the decentralisation 
system (Colino 2010; Guibernau 1996; 1997; Keating 1998b). The neo-centralist 
policies of the second Aznar government and a reinforcement of the mononational 
character of the Spanish state accounted for a certain discontent in Catalonia, which 
was translated to an electoral boost for the independence supporter of the ERC in the 
2003 Catalan elections (Guibernau 2007). After a double government change in 
Barcelona and Madrid, both executives opened the possibility to reform the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy, which nevertheless was part of a wider plan to expand the self-
government of other regions through reforms of several Statutes of Autonomy (Grau 
2011).  
The negotiation process of the Statute of Autonomy, with a significant modification of 
the initial Catalan proposal after bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the 
PSOE and the Catalan parties (Colino 2009), was eventually approved by the Catalan 
voters in a referendum in 2006. The reform, however, had been completely opposed 
by the PP (van Houten 2009), which claimed that the Statute threatened Spain’s unity 
and appealed against the new Catalan Statute to the Constitutional Court. Political 
parties in Catalonia, even the ERC, which had opposed the reform in the late stages 
due to considerations that the will of the Catalan Parliament had not been respected in 
the Madrid phase of the negotiation, assumed the verdict of the Catalan people and 
considered the Statute to be the political outcome of a compromise between Catalonia 
and Spain, with both parliaments supporting the reform, validated by the Catalan 
voters. The Constitutional Court’s ruling that declared part of the Statute to be 
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unconstitutional was perceived as a unilateral breach of the aforementioned agreement 
by the main Catalanist parties –the CiU, the PSC, the ERC, and the ICV. On the other 
hand, both the PSOE and the PP were satisfied with the ruling. The former understood 
that the party’s view had been ‘basically’ validated, quoting PM Zapatero, whereas the 
PP took praise that because the party had done their ‘duty,’ the Statute was entirely 
within the boundaries of the Spanish Constitution. 
The Court’s ruling added up to the perceived grievances of the central institutions to 
Catalonia, mainly denounced by the nationalist parties; but also admitted by the PSC 
regarding the actions of their state-wide counterpart, the PSOE. In the aftermath of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling a massive demonstration was called in Barcelona to 
ascertain the Catalanists’ claim that Catalonia is a nation and is therefore entitled to 
decide its constitutional future. With several parties, most notably ERC, openly 
campaigning for independence, the more moderate views of CiU were backed by the 
voters and led to the proposal of full fiscal autonomy for Catalonia as a last opportunity 
to avoid independence. The central government’s rejection to this proposal triggered 
the implicit threat of CiU and the party campaigned for a referendum on independence, 
a position that was backed by other Catalanist political parties. 
Mainstream Catalan nationalism was traditionally regarded as non-separatist 
(Guibernau 1997; 2000b; Keating 1997; 1998a). This has undoubtedly changed in a 
very few years. To what extent is the state’s behaviour responsible for this 
breakthrough of independence support, not only amongst the CiU, but also amongst 
the Catalan public? It seems clear that the Catalan political parties wanted to negotiate 
a new deal with the central government; that was the reform of the Statute of 
Autonomy. The Court’s ruling confirmed the perception amongst Catalan parties that 
the state had not fulfilled its part of the deal, which led to a renegotiation, exemplified 
by the demand for further fiscal autonomy. Before the ruling, the Catalanist parties 
understood the agreement to be valid and, although negotiations remained open –e.g. 
on the regional funding system reform of 2009– the Statute was not put into question, 
not even by the ERC. The perceived unilateral breaking up of the agreed constitutional 




However, the rejection to negotiate further autonomy on behalf of the central 
government has led political parties, most notably the CiU, to forsake this option and 
pursue higher demands, which are exemplified in the claim to hold a referendum on 
independence. Unsurprisingly, the central government has so far rejected any approach 
for a referendum on the constitutional status of Catalonia to take place. This rejection 
is challenged by some that ask for an offer for more autonomy to be made to avoid 
secession, such as the federal reform of the Constitution long demanded by the PSC 
and currently under debate among the PSOE leadership (PSOE 2013) or the suggestion 
that a ‘third way’ should be offered or at least considered in an hypothetical 
referendum, as it has been argued by the leader of Unió. However, if flexibility and a 
will to negotiate is not shown on the part of the central government, the Catalan 
government is considering to exacerbate its position by calling a new election and 
declaring independence unilaterally if the parties that support this possibility achieve 
an overall majority (CATN 2013). 
When discussing the processes of decentralisation in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the literature on territorial politics has traditionally asserted that granting autonomy 
was a better strategy than denying the claims from the periphery or challenging them 
with violence, since violence and denial might reinforce such claims, whereas 
flexibility through the decentralisation of political authority was regarded as a 
satisfactory mechanism both to minimise violence and to maintain the unity of the state 
(Brancati 2006; 1994; Horowitz 1981; 1993; Keating 1988; Rudolph and Thompson 
1985; 1989). The current scenario may provide similar outcomes. Albeit the use of 
violence seems to be completely out of the scene in Catalonia, the inflexibility of the 
central government of the PP to stick to a vision of Spain as a mono-national state 
without taking into account the demands of Catalonia may lead to a polarisation of 
views in the country among those who deem independence as the only solution and 
those who claim that no further concessions should be granted. The middle ground, 
today represented by the PSC is pulled out by the two sides and its political relevance 
is shrinking in accordance with the party’s last electoral results. Catalan SNRPs, as 
clearly exemplified by CiU, seem to point out that the state is not willing to give ‘voice’ 
nor ‘recognition’ to Catalan demands. Lacking those elements, they seem to push for 
the ‘exit’ option (McEwen and Lecours 2008). 
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The lesson in Catalonia is that while the negotiation for a new status was openly 
discussed and agreed, further territorial demands were contained both amongst 
political parties and the electorate. However, once the agreement that the Statute of 
Autonomy was unilaterally broken by the state, the lack of a state-led response to 
amend the situation has led to a rapid increase of the demands for a solution, and once 
this was rejected in turn, support for enhanced demands appeared in strength through 
a cross-party support for a referendum on Catalonia’s independence. This demand has 
been accompanied by increased popular support for independence and astounding 
levels of mobilisation amongst the Catalan independentist civil society, as will be 
discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
 
3. Public Support for Constitutional Change and Civil Society 
Mobilisation  
 
Political parties intend to maximise their votes as a way to gain office and implement 
their preferred policy choices (Strøm 1990). Consequently, parties that aim at 
controlling office might be more responsive to the electorate wishes in order to 
increase their share of the vote. This framework may apply to different policy options, 
including territorial politics and the constitutional status of sub-state nations, where 
the territorial cleavage tends to be rather salient. Thus, if the so-called ‘median voter’ 
demands further autonomous powers for the sub-state institutions, it is feasible that the 
political parties will react to this demand. On the one hand, nationalist and regionalist 
parties may incorporate these territorial demands in their party manifestos while 
parties at the centre may want to attend the demand for more autonomy by transferring 
more authority to the regional governments in order to appease the demands and cut 
short support for more ambitious proposals, including support for independence 
(Sorens 2004). Thus, this last section explores whether public support for 




3.1. Constitutional Preferences 
The Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, ICPS –Institute of Political and Social 
Sciences– carries out an annual opinion survey in Catalonia. Figure 3 shows the results 
of the annual question on constitutional preferences, in which respondents are asked 
to choose their preferred constitutional status for Catalonia. The question offers four 
possible answers: ‘a region of Spain,’ ‘an Autonomous Community of Spain,’ ‘a State 
in a federal Spain,’ or ‘an independent State.’ It should be noticed that this type of 
question, albeit useful in perceiving the general public trends for the constitutional 
status of Catalonia, is not very precise in determining whether people desire expanded 
self-government or, for that matter, a reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. For 
example, a person that desired a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia could still be 
satisfied with Catalonia being an Autonomous Community in Spain, albeit with 
extended powers. The results on Figure 3 clearly show that throughout the period of 
the Statute reform process –from the early 2000s when the reform was initially 
discussed by the leftist parties up to 2010, when the Constitutional Court ruling was 
published– the first constitutional option of the Catalans was Catalonia being an 
Autonomous Community. However, we can notice two interesting variations during 
this period.  
First, support for an Autonomous Community status fell about ten points in 2003, and 
even a bit more in 2004. This period coincides with the last year-and-a-half of the PP 
in office at the central government and the government change in Catalonia, with 
Pasqual Maragall, a committed federalist, acceding to the presidency of the 
Generalitat. Simultaneously, it can be appreciated that support for the federal option 
precisely increased, thus compensating for the fall of support for Autonomous 
Community status. 
Hence, it can be interpreted that there was some increased support for further powers 
for the Catalan institutions, while taking into account, as argued above, that we cannot 
know through this question whether those who preferred to keep an Autonomous 
Community status wanted the reform of the Statute of Autonomy or not. 
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Figure 3. Constitutional preferences in Catalonia (1999-2012)
Source: ICPS annual opinion survey (1999-2012).80 
The second trend that can be appreciated is that in 2005 support for Autonomous 
Community status received the backing of a majority, with support for independence 
falling sharply. The increase in support for an Autonomous Community status kept 
growing up until 2007, when it reached a maximum of around 60% of support, and 
from then it started to decrease steadily. This period (2008-2010) coincides with the 
uncertainties pending the Constitutional Court ruling and is accompanied by a 
substantive and sharp increase in support for an independent Catalonia, to the point 
that in 2012 the latter is the preferred option for around 40% of the Catalans. This 
increase, which is sharper after 2010 –when the ruling on the Statute was published– 
indeed suggests that the Constitutional Court ruling meant a turning point in the 
popular views on Catalan self-government. This episode will be discussed in the 
following section and also in the following chapter when discussing public opinion in 
more detail. 
Back to the popular views on the Statute of Autonomy, the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (CIS) conducted another survey in December 2005, which included 
specific questions on the Statute of Autonomy. The survey reported that almost half of 
                                                 
80 The constitutional options in the original in Catalan read: ‘Una regió d’Espanya’; ‘Una Comunitat 
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the Catalans (48%) desired greater autonomy for the Autonomous Communities and a 
further 20.7% a ‘State that recognises the possibility for autonomies to become 
independent nations.’  
Figure 4. Public support to different aspects of the Statute reform 
proposal
Source: CIS (2005).81 
The same survey reported that a quarter of the respondents perceived a Statute reform 
to be ‘very necessary’ and a further 38.5% to be ‘quite necessary.’ On the other hand, 
a quarter of the respondents combined to perceive a Statute reform to be very or quite 
unnecessary (CIS 2005).82 Therefore reform of the Statute was backed by the Catalans, 
albeit with no exceptional enthusiasm, or put it differently, a reform was not 
                                                 
81 Author’s translation of the answers. These read in the original, from left to right as shown in Figure 
4 as follows: ‘Incrementar las competencias del gobierno autonómico’; ‘Lograr que todas las decisiones 
importantes se tomen en la Comunidad Autónoma’; ‘Tener una Agencia tributaria propia’; and 
‘Denominar ‘nación’ a su Comunidad Autónoma.’ 
82 Author’s translation of the answers of the constitutional question from the original: ‘Un Estado en el 
que las Comunidades Autónomas tengan mayor autonomía que en la actualidad’ and ‘Un Estado en que 
se reconociese a las autonomías la posibilidad de convertirse en naciones independientes.’ The phrasing 
of the answer that describes a State that would allow the Autonomous Communities to become 


















































thoroughly opposed. Finally, this 2005 survey also asked about the particular support 
for different issues embedded in the Statute reform. Figure 4 shows four of these issues 
and whether respondents were strongly/quite in favour; strongly/quite against; or 
neither in favour or against them. 
Figure 4 clearly illustrates the popular level of support at the time of the reform of the 
Statute for the three different areas that the Catalan legislators were aiming to reform: 
authority powers, fiscal powers, and symbolic recognition. In terms of authority, an 
overwhelming majority of around three-quarters of the respondents backed, either 
being strongly in favour or quite in favour, further decentralisation of powers, shown 
in the first two columns on the left-hand side of Figure 4. Extended fiscal powers 
through the establishment of a regional agency that would have at least a say on tax-
raising in Catalonia was also strongly backed, although support was slightly smaller 
than that for decentralisation of authority. Still, more than 60% of the respondents were 
in favour of the Statute delivering more fiscal powers. Finally, support was certainly 
lower regarding the symbolic elements of the Statute, exemplified by the controversial 
decision to define Catalonia as a ‘nation.’ Less than half of the respondents were in 
favour of the symbolic recognition of Catalonia as a nation. 
Survey data from the period when the Statute reform was discussed in the Catalan 
parliament suggests that the Catalans did not oppose such reform. They were generally 
in favour although it was certainly not the people’s top priority. Regarding the contents 
of the reform, it seems that Catalans gave priority to extending the authority powers 
of sub-state institutions, and also backed further fiscal powers. On the other hand, 
symbolic demands, exemplified by the definition of Catalonia as a ‘nation’ in the 
Statute received less backing from the respondents. 
As shown in Figure 3, the decrease in support for the status quo, which nevertheless 
remained as the majority option, was not transformed into an increase in the popular 
demand for independence, but showed a slight increase in the demand to transform 
Spain into a ‘federal state,’ which can be interpreted as a demand for more autonomy. 
However, discussions to reform the Catalan Statute preceded this opinion shift as we 
have seen, and even CiU openly supported the reform in the run-up to the 2003 Catalan 
election. Therefore, it seems that the demand to reform the Catalan Statute of 
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Autonomy was elite-driven rather than the Catalan public pushing the elites to demand 
further powers for Catalan institutions. Figure 4 confirms this assumption, with 
opinion polls showing that the reform was backed by the citizenry but without an 
exceptional enthusiasm.  
Public support for Catalonia keeping its status as an Autonomous Community 
recovered and even reached its zenith during the Statute reforms negotiations and 
approval during 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, the modest voter turnout (49%) may be 
an indication that the Statute reform was not perceived as a priority by the Catalans, 
thus confirming the mild indifference of the public towards the reform and discarding 
it as a result of popular mobilisation.  
However, once the new Statute was approved by referendum and it was time to 
develop its content and negotiate the reform of the regional funding system, a 
progressive decline of public support for Catalonia retaining its status as an 
Autonomous Community can be appreciated since 2007, alongside a progressive 
increase of the options of independence and federalism, with independence support 
coming from its lowest point in 2005. The progressive fall in the support for the 
‘autonomic’ status quo after 2006 was accompanied by the uncertainty on the final 
outcome of the statute pending the ruling of the Constitutional Court and also the 
sponsored demands by the Catalan parties to the central government to fulfil the 
Statute clause regarding the execution of the investments in public infrastructures in 
Catalonia.  
 
3.2. The Mobilisation of Catalan Nationalist Civil Society 
Pro-independence civil society had been active for years, although remaining with a 
limited scope, but other groups were starting to be created, such as the ‘Plataforma pel 
Dret a Decidir’ –‘Platform for the Right to Decide’– which organised a demonstration 
on 18 February 2006 in order to influence the negotiation process of the Statute in 
Madrid (CATN 2013); and another one, backed by the Catalan nationalist political 
parties on 1 December 2007, emphasising the economic dimension of the Statute 
content and marching through Barcelona under the slogan ‘We are a nation and we say 
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enough! We have a right to decide on our own infrastructures.’83 This march aimed to 
put pressure on the central government to execute the agreed investments in 
infrastructures on the Statute –the 3rd additional clause of the Statute that envisaged an 
investment in infrastructures equivalent to Catalonia’s share in Spain’s GDP– and 
which had become relevant particularly after several malfunctioning incidents in the 
Barcelona regional railway system (La Vanguardia, 2 December 2007). 
Civil society mobilisation experienced a turning point in September 2009 when a local 
non-binding referendum on independence was held in the coastal town of Arenys de 
Munt. The consultation had been organised by individuals with the support of the town 
council, and had significant repercussion in Catalonia after fascist Spanish nationalists 
travelled to the town to boycott the unofficial poll, although no relevant incidents 
occurred after a heavy police presence was deployed. This episode kicked off a 
contagion effect and in December 2009 many other consultations on Catalan 
independence were organised across Catalonia by recently created platforms based in 
each municipality, with a nation-wide organisation charged with the coordination and 
logistic support. Consultations kept taking place in different towns and in different 
waves, culminating in a consultation in Barcelona in April 2011.  
While these waves of unofficial and non-binding consultations organised by the civil 
society at the local level occurred, the ruling of the Constitutional Court was published 
in late June 2010. The following day, Òmnium Cultural, a Catalan organisation that 
defends and promotes Catalan language and culture (Guibernau 2000a), called for a 
demonstration in Barcelona on 10 July to reject the ruling. The main Catalanist parties 
immediately joined the call to march under the banner ‘Som una nació, nosaltres 
decidim’ –‘We are a nation, we decide.’ After several negotiations between the 
organisers and political parties, the former Presidents of the Generalitat and speakers 
of the Catalan Parliament led the march, followed by the the banner and senior leaders 
                                                 




of the CiU, the PSC, the ERC, and the ICV, in a reported one-million strong march 
that collapsed the streets of Barcelona (La Vanguardia, 10 July 2010b).  
 
3.3. Does Civil Society Mobilisation and Public Support for 
Independence Explain Territorial Demands?  
The effects of the ruling on the Statute translated this social mobilisation to the 
electoral arena, with the creation of ‘Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència’ (SCI), 
a broad single-issue coalition campaigning for the Parliament issuing a unilateral 
declaration of independence after the forthcoming 2010 election. The link between 
civil society mobilisation and the creation of this party was straightforward, with the 
party list being led by the former chairman of FC Barcelona, Joan Laporta, a 
charismatic personality that drew upon the recent sporting successes of the football 
team to increase the public appeal of the party; then Mr Alfons López-Tena, a jurist 
that had been the national representative of the country-wide organisation of the non-
binding referendums on independence; and Mr Uriel Bertran, which had been a leader 
of ERC. The newly created party represented a direct competitor to the ERC, which 
also influenced in the party’s demand for a referendum on independence in the 2010 
election campaign. The election resulted in the ERC share of MPs cut by half while 
the SCI returned four MPs in the Catalan Parliament. CiU, which comfortably won the 
election, had acknowledged the public discontent with the ruling but campaigned for 
full fiscal autonomy as explained above. In a TV debate amongst the candidates before 
the election, the ERC candidate challenged Mas to call a referendum on independence 
if he were to lead the next Catalan government; Mas however rejected such a 
possibility by claiming that independence was too a divisive issue and that full fiscal 
autonomy had a wider consensus amongst the Catalan people.84 
The CiU government set the agenda on demanding full fiscal autonomy but the most 
nationalist elements of Catalan civil society did not sit and wait and launch an open 
                                                 
84 2010 Catalan Election debate on Catalan public broadcaster TV3. ‘Debat Electoral. Debat a 6,’ 
available at: http://www.tv3.cat/3alacarta/#/videos/3227350. 
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pro-independence discourse. Soon after the non-binding referendum took place in 
Barcelona, the ‘Assemblea Nacional Catalana’ (ANC) was created on 30 April 2011 
with the aim of ‘mobilise a majority of the Catalan people to achieve, in a pacific and 
democratic way, the following national objectives,’ mainly Catalan political 
independence based on the right of self-determination through demanding the Catalan 
Parliament to call for a referendum on independence or a unilateral declaration of 
independence if the former option was forbidden by the Spanish institutions (ANC 
2011). Quickly after its foundation, local branches of the association were created in 
many Catalan municipalities and different activities, such as marches, conferences, 
and campaigns have been carried out by the association’s members in order to divulge 
the benefits of Catalan independence amongst the wider population. 
Most significant was the demonstration called on Catalonia’s national day, 11 
September 2012 under the banner of ‘Catalonia, nou estat d’Europa’ –‘Catalonia, next 
state in Europe’– that again gather one million people in Barcelona marching under a 
straightforward secessionist motto and that received the support of Catalan nationalist 
parties. This time, though, the PSC did not attend formally, although some of its most 
Catalanist members did (La Vanguardia 2012). The demonstration took place a few 
days before Catalan President Artur Mas formally demanded full fiscal autonomy for 
Catalonia, which was rejected by the Spanish PM and led Mas to dissolve the Catalan 
Parliament and call for a snap election. During the debate in which the new election 
was announced, Mas justified his decision also on the relevance of the popular claim 
for independence expressed in the Barcelona march. He said that ‘the voices in the 
streets, [expressed] massively and in strength, must be transferred to the ballot box. If 
our country has to begin a process of such a magnitude and complexity, the 
unequivocal avail of the Catalan people is required’ (Mas 2012: 2).  
The massive mobilisation of 2012 went hand in hand with some polls showing that 
support for independence has increased dramatically since 2010 and by 2012 was the 
preferred option by the Catalans (see Figure 3). This increase in support however is 
not perceived entirely by the political parties as exogenous. The nationalist parties, 
CiU and ERC, claim its share of responsibility in the current state of public opinion 
and high levels of Catalan nationalist mobilisation for independence. The ERC party 
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president argued in an interview that ‘there is a traditional independentism with a 
highly emotional character, based on linguistic, cultural and historical issues […] and 
this independentism has been reinforced by another kind of independentism which is 
more rational, more economic.’85 The addition of this rational or economic-based 
support for Catalan independence, which may have boosted the numbers of pro-
independence supporters is claimed by the former president of the party as ERC’s 
work. He argued that ‘independence in not only about cultural, national, or identity 
elements, but also about an economic reality, which is that with political dependence 
Catalonia has economic problems. To put together this two issues is not easy. Many 
other nationalisms have not achieved that. I think it says a lot about Esquerra that we 
managed to bring together these two elements.’86  
Similarly, CiU boasts that they have been able to pull towards more secessionist 
positions at least a majority within their electorate. According to the secretary general 
of CDC, the progressive increase of the party’s demands responded to the strategy of 
‘keeping demands gradual’ led to a constant ‘pulling of the people CiU to a certain 
positioning,’ although also admitting that the ‘ruling of the Constitutional Court and 
the dynamics of the [economic] crisis and the way [the Catalan government] has had 
to act in the crisis makes that all this [sentiment] has its own dynamics.’ Furthermore, 
he argued that the party’s position in government made them necessary, but not 
sufficient in making independence happen. He argued that ‘CiU has been essential and 
is essential. […] However, some in the state’s central institutions, the government, and 
the parties give as an almost exclusive role: they do not say that we have been essential, 
no, they claim it has been just us. So they say, ‘Mas, you have created this situation 
and you will solve it.’ This is a mistake. […] We have evolved and we have been 
                                                 
85 Interview with the ERC party president. Author’s translation from: ‘hi ha un independentisme 
tradicional, que té un caràcter molt emocional, diguem-ne, que té els seus fonaments en les qüestions 
lingüístiques, culturals i històriques […]i aquest independentisme doncs s’ha vist reforçat per un altre 
independentisme de base més racional, més econòmica’ (Junqueras 2012). 
86 Interview with the former President and Secretary General of ERC. Author’s translation from: ‘La 
independència no és un element només cultural, nacional, identitari, sinó que va lligat d’una realitat 
econòmica que amb la dependència política, Catalunya té problemes econòmics. Soldar aquests dos 
temes no és fàcil. Hi ha molts nacionalismes que no ho han aconseguit, jo crec que va a favor d’Esquerra 
que hem aconseguit soldar els dos temes’ (Puigcercós 2012). 
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skilful in interpreting [what was going on]. We have a lot of influence, but […] without 
President Mas or without Convergència i Unió the tension in the country would 
remain.’87 However, he also claimed that CiU had been the spearhead during the 1980s 
and 1990s in demanding more powers for the Catalan government, arguing that 
‘nobody asks us to have our own police forces [‘Mossos d’Esquadra’]. Nobody asked 
us to implement a linguistic system in Catalan in schools. […] The [11 September 
2012] demonstration sets a path and you can either follow it at a distance or completely 
embraced it, and we did the latter.’88  
After winning the 2012 elections with the promise of a referendum on independence, 
CiU seems to have taken in the message launched by the 11 September demonstrators, 
although claiming at the same time that without the party’s past actions regarding self-
government demands inspired many to adopt Catalanist positions. It remains unclear 
though if Mas had called for an early election –and put forward a demand to hold a 
referendum on independence– if the demonstration had not been a complete success; 
or even if Rajoy’s rebuffing of the ‘fiscal agreement’ proposal had not precisely a few 
days after the mobilisation occurred. Be that as it may, the fact is that CiU included 
the referendum on its 2012 election manifesto and, although the party suffered a 
setback in the election, a pro-referendum majority remains in Parliament as we have 
                                                 
87 Interview with the Secretary General of CDC. Author’s own translation from: ‘nosaltres intentem 
mantenir la gradualitat’; ‘assumim bastant clarament, que com a mínim a la gent convergent, que és un 
partit d’ampli espectre, els arrosseguem a una direcció determinada. El que aquí acaba passant en part 
és que, especialment per la sentència del TC del 2010, i sobretot per la dinàmica de la crisi i de com 
hem d’actuar sobre aquesta crisi, que tot això gairebé té vida pròpia’; andNosaltres jo crec que hem estat 
claus i estem sent claus. Però no només per una cosa que a vegades a Espanya analitzen malament […]. 
[A] alguns estaments importants de l’estat, i del govern de l’estat, i dels partits polítics de l’estat, ens 
donen un protagonisme pràcticament exclusiu: diu, no heu estat claus, no, ens diuen, heu estat vosaltres. 
Per tant, Mas, ‘tu has montado este lío, tu lo vas a desmontar.’ I això és un error. […]. Nosaltres hem 
mogut i hem sabut interpreter […]. Tenim molt protagonisme, però que ningú es pensi que mort el gos, 
morta la rabia. Sense el President Mas o sense Convergència i Unió, el bullir del país hi seria igual’ 
(Pujol 2012) 
88 Ibid. Author’s translation from: ‘Al país ningú ens demanava que tinguéssim els Mossos d’Esquadra, 
eh? El país no ens demanava que féssim... el país no demanava que féssim la immersió lingüística del 
català a l’escola, eh? Per tant, nosaltres... el que passa que materialment la manifestació ens permet, en 
aquest sentit, és a dir, la manifestació et marca un camí, llavors en aquest camí senzillament tu et pots 
posar a un extrem del vial, obert, eh, en una vorera, o et pots posar al mig del nom del carrer, i ens hem 
posat al mig del carrer’ (Pujol 2012). 
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discussed above. Civil society mobilisation has not stopped and still pressure for a 
referendum to take place as soon as possible. Spearheaded by organisations such as 
Òmnium Cultural and the ANC, pro-independence Catalan civil society has kept 
lobbying for the referendum or a unilateral declaration of independence, a set of 
demands that tend to be more assertive that the moderation and setting of a progressive 
tempo exhibited by CiU. Mass mobilisation remains impressive with another event on 
11 September 2013 labelled ‘Via catalana’ –‘Catalan way’–, a 400 km-long human 
chain that linked the country from the French border in the Pyrenees along the Catalan 
coast to the administrative frontier with the Valencian region, beyond the Ebro river 
(La Vanguardia, 11 September 2013c). The human chain showed that Catalan pro-
independence civil society is highly mobilised, although the multitude of polls 
published recently provide unclear notions on how strong support for independence 
may be. 
Territorial demands in Catalonia have been formally posed by political parties in the 
last decade. The decision to reform the Statute of Autonomy did not respond to 
episodes of mass mobilisation. Actually, after some decrease in the popular support 
for the status quo and a moderate increase of the support for a federal-like reform, it 
seems that the Catalan public felt convinced by the ongoing Statute negotiations in 
2005 and the approval of the Statute in 2006, with support for the Estado de las 
Autonomías reaching its peak. However, civil society elements were vigilant to the 
fulfilment of the agreed package between the Catalan and Spanish Parliaments and 
small mobilisations occurred. However, the real turning point was the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling on the Statute. The mobilisation called by the civil society was 
massively backed by the population and the issue of independence started dominated 
the political agenda. Furthermore, public opinion since 2010 has showed a substantial 
increase in the support for independence. The effect of the Court’s ruling on the Statute 
amongst the public accurately represents the scenario of ‘a promised offer of autonomy 
[that] falls through, [then] dashed hopes may lead to a greater resentment than would 
have existed if the offer had never been considered, and the secessionist alternative 
may benefit’ (Sorens 2004: 733). Precisely, the Court’s ruling perceive and presented 
as a flagrant humiliation by the Spanish institutions has triggered the secessionist 
ambitions of many Catalans, as suggested by opinion polls and pro-independence 
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mobilisations. Arguably, the growing support for independence has not influenced the 
position of ERC, which has been supported independence for years, but has clearly 
preceded CiU’s demand for a referendum on the constitutional future of Catalonia. In 
the current scenario, the ruling CiU may find it difficult to renounce the claim to the 
referendum while public mobilisation remains high, especially combined with the 
pressure –and electoral threat– of the ERC.  Therefore, mass mobilisation and 
increasing support for Catalan independence have definitely contributed to shape 
CiU’s constitutional horizon for Catalonia. Albeit some in the party claim that the party 
has been moving consistently towards independence since the assumption of the ‘right 
to decide’ as a paradigm in the mid-2000s, the demand for an independence 
referendum was not put forward until both public opinion and the effects of mass 
mobilisation were clearly evident that support for independence may contain a 
majority, which shows that civil society and public opinion have had an influence in 
the timing, if not the content, of CiU’s most assertive territorial demand so far. 
Admittedly, the repercussions of the pro-independence mobilisations have not pulled 
through all parties into supporting secession, the clearest example being the PSC. 
However, internal tensions have occurred and been prominent between party leaders 
on whether the party should support or oppose pro-independence mobilisations, as well 
as the parliamentary resolutions supporting the Parliament’s claim to hold a 
referendum. It seems therefore that mass mobilisation has affected political parties 
differently and cannot account on itself to explain the evolution of territorial demands 
in Catalonia. Thus, the following section concludes by trying to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the dynamics of territorial demands in Catalonia, 
combining the effects of party competition, the attitudes of the central institutions 
towards self-government, and the effects of public support for constitutional change 




4. Conclusion: What Explains the Dynamics of Territorial 
Demands in Catalonia? 
 
The last decade has seen an astonishing evolution of territorial demands in Catalonia. 
The Catalan Parliament has moved from endorsing a proposal to reform the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy in 2005 and to support a moderate reform of the regional funding 
system in 2009, to demanding full fiscal autonomy in 2012 and, failing that, declaring 
Catalonia a ‘sovereign political subject’ and committing to present a proposal for a 
date and question to be put to the Catalan people in a referendum regarding the 
secession of Catalonia and its constitution into a new state. How can this significant 
exacerbation of Catalan demands be explained? 
In the last two chapters three main factors have been highlighted in order to account 
for this evolution. First, the competition between political parties in Catalonia, both 
between SWPs and Catalan SNRPs and between SNRPs themselves. Second, the 
responses of central governments to previous Catalan demands and the logic of Spain’s 
regionalisation process, which has been framed as Spain’s territorial management 
strategies. Third, a crescent saliency of the territorial debate in Catalonia that has seen 
several mobilisations for Catalan self-government, including civil society-sponsored 
marches for independence. This wave of significant public mobilisation has been 
accompanied by a progressive increase in public support for the secession of Catalonia 
from Spain according to surveys. This concluding remarks will aim to propose a 
comprehensive explanation of the evolution of territorial demands in Catalonia. 
Two processes may be distinguished in the evolution of Catalan demands since the 
turn of the 20th century. On the one hand, the demand to reform the Statute of 
Autonomy and, on the other hand, the redefinition of the paradigm of self-government 
based on the Catalans’ ‘right to decide.’ First, the reform of the Catalan Statute was 
mainly motivated by Catalan party politics. As we have seen, the PSC proposed and 
led a left-wing initiative to reform the Statute of Autonomy to emphasise the 
dependency of the CiU on the PP. Facing this challenge, the CiU had to respond to its 
self-imposed role of ‘the party of Catalonia’ and matched the Socialists’ demand, 
which resulted in the Statute reform enjoying a wide consensus amongst Catalan 
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political parties. It is true that the 2000-2004 period also coincided with the PP overall 
majority in the Spanish Parliament and that the ERC got its best electoral result ever, 
but public surveys seem to suggest that, although showing a certain decline in the 
support for the Estado de las Autonomías, support for independence represented only 
a slim minority among Catalans.  
It is impossible to know what would have happened if the demand to reform the Statute 
had met the same frontal opposition that the Spanish PP did exercise from the 
opposition had it remained into government after the 2004 Spanish general election. 
In any case, the government change in Madrid facilitated the negotiation of the Statute, 
albeit party competition in Catalonia, especially between CiU and ERC, had set the 
scope of the reform far beyond what the PSOE was ready to accept. However, public 
opinion suggests that support for the Estado de las Autonomías in Catalonia had 
recovered its overwhelming support immediately after the ratification of the Statute 
Reform bill in the 2006 referendum. Support for secession was then at a minimum, 
and the ERC was happy to accept the will of the Catalans and deploy the new Statute 
from its position in government. 
The new Statute still had to pass the validation of the Constitutional Court, pending 
the appeal presented by the PP, which had thoroughly and emphatically opposed the 
reform, both in Catalonia and elsewhere in Spain. The attitude of the PP, heavily 
criticised by the Catalan nationalist parties and the PSOE, included the recollection of 
signatures against the Catalan Statute, and the appeal against articles of the Catalan 
Statute to the Constitutional Court that the PP had no hesitations to support when the 
same exact articles were included in the new Andalusian Statute of Autonomy (Colino 
2009: 266). This sort of action unavoidably showed a sense of anti-Catalanism 
sentiment in many parts of Spain which were countered in turn by what Catalan 
President Montilla had called the sentiment of ‘disaffection’ –‘desafecció’– of many 
Catalans towards Spain. This phenomenon was also accompanied by the uncertainty 
regarding the final outcome of the Court’s decision on the Statute, a Court which was 
furthermore heavily politicised and the perceptions that the PSOE government was not 
fulfilling parts of the agreed package of the Statute, eagerly denounced by the SNRPs 
and placing the ruling PSC in Catalonia in a highly uncomfortable position.  
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When the Court’s ruling was published, Catalan nationalist politicians quickly 
embraced the ‘right to decide’ paradigm and pointed out to the controversy that a law 
validated by the people in a democratic referendum was overruled by a Court which 
was controlled by and divided between the PP and the PSOE. Under the new scheme 
of the ‘right to decide,’ which represented a new phase in Catalan territorial demands, 
Catalan SNRPs have indeed increased their demands, first by supporting full fiscal 
autonomy and then demanding to hold a referendum on independence. In this last 
phase, party competition has remained important, with ERC aiming at independence 
and CiU, having not been able to deliver full fiscal autonomy as promised in 2010, 
was compelled to match the ERC’s demand for a referendum on independence.  
This demand is widely backed across the Catalan public and the level and capacity of 
civil society mobilisation clearly shows that some deep feeling of unrest is evident in 
the Catalan society. The massive march against the 2010 Constitutional Court’s ruling 
on the Catalan Statute, again, called upon by the civil society, not the political parties, 
could be understood as a punctual sentiment of rejection. However, public support for 
further autonomy –i.e. fiscal autonomy– and independence has reached the highest 
levels ever recorded in Catalonia. Furthermore, civil society organisations have 
remained active and have impressed in their mobilisation capacity, clearly exemplified 
with the 11 September 2012 clear-cut pro-independence march and the following 
year’s human chain that crossed Catalonia from the top to the bottom of the country. 
This level of mass mobilisation has evidently influenced not only SNRPs, like CiU, 
but also the PSC, which has been forced to support a referendum, which is nonetheless 
opposed by its PSOE colleagues, placing the relationship between those parties in a 
very difficult position.  
However, public mobilisation and a considerable support for secession amongst the 
Catalans is not the main reason for explaining the recent outburst of independence 
support in Catalonia. The main explanation relies on the reasons that explain this 
surprisingly high level of public mobilisation, which is the attitudes of central 
institutions to both Catalan demands and the way Catalan identity is perceived. 
Mobilisation and public support for independence remained rather low during the 
negotiation of the Catalan Statute. The Statute was perceived as a good opportunity to 
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accommodate Catalan nation-ness within Spain and the final outcome was accepted 
by a majority of Catalan voters. However, the way the Statute ended implied yet 
another failed opportunity. The praxis of the Spanish government since the Statute was 
passed was to maintain the central unilaterally-imposed status quo by rejecting all 
other Catalan demands. This strategy has not appeased them, rather the contrary –e.g. 
CiU’s proposal to go beyond full fiscal autonomy and seek a referendum on 
independence. Furthermore, public support for independence shows no signs of 
retreating and certainly the nationalist civil society mobilisation capacity is maintained 
at its highest.  
To sum up, in Catalonia any claims of asymmetry to recognise Catalonia’s specific 
national identity are –and have consistently been– rejected on grounds of the equality 
of all Spaniards and the unviability of any kind of ‘privileges’ for Catalans. This 
constitutional rigidness was particularly evident during the 2000-2004 PP central 
government, although the government change in Madrid allowed for a negotiation of 
the Statute of Autonomy that satisfied a majority of Catalans and most political parties. 
The unilateral change of the agreement reached through the reform of the Statute and 
the continued rigidness, especially of the PP, towards granting any concessions or 
negotiating any flexibility in Spain’s symmetric decentralised model has polarised the 
territorial issue in Catalonia and in Spain up to levels never known since democracy 
was restored. It is difficult to predict how the latest demand to hold a referendum on 
independence will evolve, but if a solution is not envisaged by the central government, 
either by allowing a referendum vote –highly improbable– or by offering a substantive 
counteroffer to appease secessionist demands, it is likely that many of those who 
determinedly support independence today will continue to do so in the near future. 
However, competition between Catalan(ist) parties had already triggered the dynamics 
of demand-response-demand since the push to reform the Catalan Statute of 
Autonomy. Therefore, the unsatisfactory outcome of the Statute reform –from the 
Catalan nationalist perspective– delivered by Spain’s central institutions only fuelled 
further arguments, or grievances, for Catalan nationalist parties to increase their 
territorial aims. This was crystal clear in the case of ERC, which abandoned any 
prospect of expanding self-government and campaigned for outright independence 
after the Statute was watered down by the Constitutional Court. It is also true in the 
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case of CiU, which countered that decision by demanding full fiscal autonomy. 
However, after facing yet another rejection to their demands, CiU increased territorial 
demands to match ERC’s support for a referendum on independence cannot be 
explained by the central government’s unwillingness to negotiate. Rather, it was a 
combination of public pressure and, above all, the nature of party competition with 
ERC which prompted Artur Mas to call for a snap election and to campaign for 




Chapter 7. The Dynamics of Territorial 




The previous chapters have explored the evolution and nature of territorial demands in 
Catalonia. Three variables have been considered: political party competition, including 
competition between SNRPs, and between SNRPs and SWPs; territorial management 
carried out by the central government in response to territorial demands; and the effect 
of public opinion on influencing parties’ aims and strategies in bringing forward 
enhanced self-government powers. 
The Catalan case has revealed the varying degree of influence of these three factors on 
explaining the dynamics of territorial demands put forward by political parties in 
stateless nations. The aim of this chapter is now to broaden the analysis of party 
competition and territorial demands by looking into two other cases: Flanders and 
Scotland. This comparative chapter will test whether the dynamics observed in the 
Catalan case are echoed in these other stateless nations. The comparison will help us 
refine our hypotheses on the relationship between party competition and territorial 
demands. The comparison with other stateless nations will also provide a certain 
degree of variation which will strengthen our study. 
 
1.1. Case Rationale 
The chapter will look in turn at the three variables under analysis: party competition, 
territorial management, and public opinion; which will be analysed for both cases. The 
case rationale behind comparing Catalonia with Flanders and Scotland is based on the 
similarities in sub-state mobilisation. In each case there are strong SNRPs which 
advocate stateless territorial issues and have often been in office at the sub-state level 
(De Winter 1998a; De Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Lynch 2006; Erk 2005b; 
Massetti 2009). Also, SWPs in these three cases have had to react to the presence and 
electoral relevance of SNRPs, which have involved a redefinition of their political 
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strategies in order to include the territorial cleavage, and has also led to changes in the 
internal organisation of such parties in order to effectively address the concerns and 
specificities of such territories (Deschouwer 2003; Fabre 2008; Swenden and Maddens 
2009). 
The three cases therefore represent distinctive national realities which have posed a 
historical challenge to the states to manage such national diversity, including political 
decentralisation in order to manage specific territorial concerns and to appease 
regional territorial grievances (Erk and Anderson 2009; Keating 1988; McGarry and 
O’Leary 2007). Also, in terms of public opinion, popular support for regional self-
government and even independence has been moderately high, alongside a 
considerable amount of voters claiming either exclusive sub-state identities –i.e. 
Catalan, Scottish, or Flemish– or the sub-state identity having primacy over the state-
wide identity (Keating 2001a; Maddens, Beerten, and Billiet 1998; Moreno, Arriba, 
and Serrano 1998; Swenden 2006).  
 
1.2. Analysis and Hypotheses 
The in-depth analysis of the Catalan case carried out in the previous chapters suggested 
that Catalanist political parties have followed a dynamic of demand-response-demand 
which has been driven by the competition between parties in Catalonia around the 
territorial cleavage, but also by the response of the central government to ongoing 
demands, and the change in the mood of a significant share of the Catalan population 
towards supporting further regional self-government. Having identified a clear 
demand-response-demand dynamic in Catalonia, we will now examine whether this 
dynamic is evident in Flanders and Scotland. 
In terms of party competition, the Catalan case shows us that both competition between 
SNRPs, namely between CiU and ERC, and between CiU and the PSC as competition 
between a SNRP and SWP has driven all these parties to exacerbate their demands. 
On that assumption, this chapter discusses whether such patterns of competition exist 
in Flanders and Scotland. The presence of strong SNRPs such as the New-Flemish 
Alliance, N-VA, and the Scottish National Party, in opposition to a regionally-strong 
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traditional party like the Flemish Christian-Democrats,89 or the Labour Party, with a 
traditionally strong power base in Scotland, suggests that party competition will be a 
sound driver to explain the dynamics of territorial demands in both cases. Although 
there are no significant other SNRPs in Scotland, the presence of the extreme-right and 
nationalist Vlaams Belang in Flanders is also expected to influence competition 
between SNRPs in this case. 
Empirical evidence of the Catalan case also suggests that a perceived unsatisfactory 
response to territorial demands by the political parties can lead to an escalation of the 
parties’ territorial aims, as has been exemplified by the process of reform of the 
Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Political parties in Catalonia, most notably SNRPs, have 
used the previous state management of territorial demands to denounce the grievances 
of the central government towards the stateless nation in order to justify enhanced self-
government powers or as a justification for demanding independence. Thus, it is 
necessary to analyse whether such actions undertaken by central governments –and 
more generally central political institutions, as seen in the Catalan case after the role 
played by Spain’s Constitutional Court– do have an influence on territorial demands 
in Flanders and Scotland.  
In the case of Flanders, where the central government must be constitutionally 
composed of an equal number of Flemish and Francophone ministers, the main 
political conflict in recent years has been the rejection of further state reform by the 
French-speaking parties facing such a demand for reform from the Flemish parties. 
After a severe government formation crisis after the 2007 election, in which 
institutional reform had to be left aside, the Flemish nationalists of the N-VA won the 
2010 election after which another government crisis ensued (Abts, Poznyak, and 
Swyngedouw 2012). The relationship between the blockade of constitutional reform 
and the dramatic electoral success of the N-VA in Flanders shall therefore be analysed. 
                                                 
89 The Christian-Democrats and Flemish, CD&V, are no longer a SWP since the split with the Belgian 
Christian-Democrats in 1968. However, the party is not a Flemish nationalist party. 
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In the Scottish case it is anticipated that the dynamic of demand-response-remand will 
also hold some weight. After the SNP won the Scottish parliamentary election in 2007 
the unionist parties started discussing further powers for the Scottish Parliament which 
culminated in a proposal to reform the Scotland Act, which provided devolution to 
Scotland. However, the recommendations of the Calman Commission were seen to fall 
short when the SNP was returned to office with an overall majority after the 2011 
election, which paved the way for the independence referendum held in September 
2014.  
Finally, as shown in the analysis of the Catalan case, support for independence has 
skyrocketed in Catalonia in the last years, following the escalation of territorial 
demands by political parties and the controversial conclusion of the Statute of 
Autonomy reform process. The final part of this chapter will therefore examine public 
opinion on constitutional preferences in Flanders and Scotland to see if there has been 
any significant changes in the recent years, and whether such changes (if any) have 
had any impact on the ongoing demands for constitutional reform posed by political 
parties in all three cases. 
 




Belgium, divided by the linguistic border which separates Dutch-speaking Flanders in 
the North from French-speaking Wallonia in the South, is a rather unique case in the 
sense that there are no federal SWP (Deschouwer 1997: 77). The three main Belgian 
traditional parties, the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists, and the Liberals, split up 
following linguistic and community tensions in the 1960s and 1970s and formed new 
political organisations that represented separately the Flemish and French-speaking 
sides of the country (Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen 2009). Thus the resulting six 
political parties broke all their organisational ties with their respective ideological 
colleagues north and south of the linguistic border, with each party having its own 
separate ‘party organization, party conference, party executive, party leader, 
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parliamentary groups, and electorate’ (Swenden 2002: 72). Thus, the Flemish 
Christian-Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals cannot be considered as SWPs as we 
have discussed them in Spain, but rather as traditional parties which are regionalised 
–and have acquired as a consequence a strong position and interests in representing 
Flemish regional interests– but they also still have high stakes on the governability of 
Belgium as a whole. The newly acquired regional dimension of the Flemish –as well 
as the Francophone– parties was clearly exemplified by the fact that Belgium’s 
decentralisation mainly occurred after the three party families had split. Such split 
drove political power from the unitary centre to decentralised loci of power (Swenden 
and Jans 2006).  
In terms of constitutional options, the three party families promote further 
decentralisation but with different degrees of intensity, with the Socialists being more 
moderate than the Christian-Democrats and the Liberals (De Winter 2006b: 86). The 
Socialists seemed to be quite content with the federal organisational structure 
implemented following the 1993 constitutional reform and made no substantial 
constitutional demands, with the exception of the all Flemish-backed demand of 
splitting the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) electoral district which included both 
Flemish-speakers in the province of Brabant alongside the population of Brussels, 
which is mainly French-speaking (Govaert 1996; 2003). The Flemish Socialists, 
currently named Socialistische Partij Anders (sp.a), or ‘Socialist Party Different’ has 
traditionally been, unlike in neighbouring Wallonia, a small party in Flanders 
(Wynants 2004: 155).  
The other two traditional parties, the Christian-Democrats, currently named Christen-
Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V) –Christian-Democratic and Flemish– and the 
Liberals, named Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD) –Open Flemish 
Liberals and Democrats– do support a further evolution of Belgian decentralisation to 
defend confederalism under its Flemish view. This would imply that ‘the subnational 
entities are at the centre of the organization and that they are responsible for the 
allocation of competences and budget to other political levels and not the contrary’ 
(Dandoy, Matagne, and Van Wynsberghe 2013: 347). The Open VLD does not define 
itself as a nationalist party (Breuning 1997) and has supported confederalism since 
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2002 (Wynants 2004: 162). The CD&V has traditionally been the party in power both 
in Flanders and in Belgium (Cartrite 2002) and has espoused confederalism in the last 
decade (Govaert 2007: 14-5). The party’s continuous support for further powers has 
also been influenced by its electoral alliance with a Flemish nationalist party, the N-
VA. 
The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), or New-Flemish Alliance, is the main SNRP in 
Flanders. It was created in 2001, but it was certainly not the first Flemish SNRP. The 
Volksunie (VU), or People’s Union, had been a rather successful Flemish nationalist 
party that had played a decisive role in influencing the traditional parties into taking 
the step towards federal constitutional reform in Belgium (Bouveroux 1998). 
However, following the country’s federalisation, the VU had accomplished its main 
territorial goal and had to redefine itself, pushing for further territorial decentralisation 
and eventually supporting independence (De Winter 2006a; Deschouwer 2009c). 
However, this new territorial profile of the party was not as widely accepted as its 
former federalisation proposal, and different factions arose within the party. The 
tensions between these factions were heightened when the party was in government at 
the regional level but in opposition at the federal level when the fifth constitutional 
reform was being discussed. Some in the party wanted to support the reform whereas 
other members wanted to reject it because it was not going far enough (Buelens and 
Deschouwer 2007). Danny Pieters, who was one of the VU MPs who voted against 
the constitutional reform, recalled the tensions that led to the implosion of the VU in 
an interview with the author: 
‘[there was] a kind of internal establishment, which was in the Flemish 
government at that moment […] and there was quite a discomfort with that 
[…], you have the kind of [rupture] between the bases, the people who voted 
for Volksunie, [who] were working for Volksunie in local entities, and then 
the party organisation, which was much more in this other direction, where 
the independence item was important, but no so important. […] The [new] 
party leader of the more grassroots […] was elected, Geert Bourgeois, but 
the party establishment was not changed, so you had the party leader, you 
had the bases, and in between you had other people, and that created more 
and more tensions, more and more problems’ (Pieters 2012). 
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Internal tensions led to a party conference that decided on the split, with a referendum 
that faced three options: one advocated the continuation of the party, a second wanted 
to focus on other issues beside territorial demands, and the third, Vlaams Nationaal  
–Flemish National– led by Bourgeois defended a radicalisation of the nationalist 
discourse and a clear push for Flemish independence. The rules of the referendum were 
that if one of the factions achieved a majority, the VU would survive and would follow 
the winning strategy, whereas if no faction achieved such majority the VU would cease 
to exist.  
The Vlaams Nationaal won the vote but fell short of a majority and thus the VU 
disappeared (Wauters 2005: 337-8). The winning faction decided then to create a new 
party, the N-VA, which has been regarded as the political heir to the VU (Deschouwer 
2009c: 567) and which followed the aim of the Vlaams Nationaal faction to achieve 
Flemish independence (Govaert 2002). Thus, the N-VA is a separatist party which 
‘calls for full independence of a Flemish republic within a federally integrated Europe’ 
(De Winter 2006a: 36). Regarding the strategy that the party would follow to achieve 
independence, the director of the N-VA noted that ‘we are not a revolutionary party. 
This will be following a step-by-step strategy and will be an evolution towards 
independence; […] so the main next step would really be a confederal reform towards 
a confederal structure’ (De Zaeger 2012). Confederalism is supported by the 
OpenVLD, the CD&V and the N-VA. This constitutional horizon would imply an 
almost complete transfer of competences to the regional level with only certain specific 
competences, such as defence and foreign policy, left at the central level which would 
be exercised by a joint government of delegates from both communities, the Flemish 
and the Francophone. 
Lastly, another regional party has become electorally relevant in Flanders. The Vlaams 
Belang (VB) –Flemish Interest– split from the VU in 1978 following a strategic 
disagreement between party factions after the party had cooperated with institutional 
reform (Erk 2005a). Although the VB was more ambitious that the VU at the time and 
campaigned for independence, its electoral breakthrough did not occur until 1987 
when the party openly espoused a racist, xenophobic, and anti-immigration discourse 
(Deschouwer 2009c: 572-3). The other Flemish parties quickly established a cordon 
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sanitaire to prevent such a party from achieving office. Although the party’s support 
for independence would suggest that it shall be regarded as a SNRP, it has been noted 
that only a minority of its voters support the VB based on its claim for independence, 
while the majority of its supporters give more weight to its far-right ideological and 
anti-immigrant stance (De Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Buelens 2006). In 
terms of its support then, the VB is therefore closer to the extreme-right party family 
than to SNRPs. 
Table 2 provides electoral results for the Flemish parties since 1999.  
Table 2. Electoral results in Flanders for Regional and Federal Elections, 
1999-2014 
 Regional Federal 
Party 1999 2004 2009 2014 1999 2003 2007 2010 2014 
CD&V 30 - 31 27 22 21 - 17 18 
N-VA - - 16 43 - 1 - 27 33 
CD&V/ 
N-VA 
- 35 - - - - 30 - - 
Open VLD 27 25 21 19 23 25 18 13 14 
VB 22 32 21 6 15 18 17 12 3 
sp.a 20 25 19 18 14 23 14 13 13 
VU 12 - - - 8 - - - - 
Source: Flemish Parliament and Belgian Federal Parliament 
Table 2 shows the strength of the N-VA after consolidating their position as the first 
Flemish party since the 2010 federal election. The CD&V have been the first party in 
Flemish regional elections until 2014 while the Open VLD overcame the Christian-
Democrats in 1999 and 2003, which led the CD&V to be in opposition at the federal 
level. Table 2 also shows the progressive decline of the VB, which is made more 




2.1.1.SNRPs Increase the Saliency of Territorial Issues in Flanders 
The influence of SNRPs on party competition was evident in Flanders long before the 
growth of the N-VA in 2010. The VU traditionally acted as a ‘whip party’ (De Winter 
1998b: 44), pressuring governing parties from the opposition to deliver constitutional 
change. Since the traditional party families split along linguistic lines as we saw 
earlier, it has been easier for Flemish traditional parties to incorporate elements of the 
decentralisation discourse of the VU. This is because they no longer faced internal 
party opposition from their Francophone colleagues (De Winter 2006b: 82). The 
pressure of the VU was significant in any case, and as it has been pointed out already, 
the traditional parties brought federalisation to Belgium in response to the demands of 
SNRPs –the VU in Flanders, but also from regionalist parties in Wallonia. The 
influence of the VU on the other parties continued when the former started demanding 
further constitutional change after the 1993 reform, which ultimately led to the 2001 
reform. Incidentally, that same constitutional reform led to the implosion of the VU 
because of the party internal tensions described above. The influence of the VU 
therefore had repercussions in terms of party competition, and ‘Flemish parties […] 
constantly feel this regionalist pressure and all of them therefore tend to defend the 
claims for more autonomy and extended financial means for the region’ (Deschouwer 
2004: 186). 
As the Catalan case shows, SWPs have to emphasise their sub-state credentials (van 
Biezen and Hopkin 2006) in order to be regarded as useful defenders of regional 
interests. The influence of the VU, in what has been termed ‘volksuniesation’ (De 
Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont 2006: 939), was also present in the name changes 
carried out by the Flemish Liberals and Christian-Democrats, which emphasised their 
‘Flemish’ nature –Flemish Liberals and Democrats and Christian-Democrats and 
Flemish, respectively. Furthermore, after the disappearance of the VU in 2001 the 
traditional parties tried to seduce former VU voters by paying more attention to 
territorial issues (Erk 2005a: 499). The influence of the VU was also noted in the 5 
resolutions voted by the Flemish Parliament in 1999 that set the blueprint for further 
constitutional reform, which included financial and fiscal autonomy, further 
competences in employment policy and the decentralisation of the social security 
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system (Deschouwer 2005: 100). All three traditional parties voted in favour of these 
resolutions as a ‘first step’ for the CD&V and Open VLD to support confederalism. 
The collapse of the VU did not imply the end of SNRPs influences on the traditional 
parties since the N-VA took up the position of its predecessor, the VU, though the first 
serious challenge of the nationalists, the 2003 federal election, was not very successful. 
The N-VA contested the 2003 federal election not campaigning for immediate 
independence, but demanding further decentralisation and making it crystal clear that 
they would not support any government if constitutional reform was not negotiated 
(Govaert 2003: 8). The aim of independence however remained the long-term goal 
which, according to the N-VA, would be achieved by a step-by-step process. The party 
was also confident that its long-term intentions were clear to the electorate. Discussing 
this policy of independence, Senator Danny Pieters stated that ‘we stand for something 
and we hope that the population follows and at the beginning they didn’t follow’ 
(Pieters 2012). Certainly, the 2003 federal election returned just one MP for the N-
VA, the party leader, Geert Bourgeois, and those were ‘dark times,’ according to 
Pieters. The meagre electoral results and the electoral law that put the electoral 
threshold at 5% of the votes led many small parties, including the N-VA, to seek 
coalitions with larger parties in order to survive. This eased the way for the N-VA to 
reach a coalition, or cartel, with the CD&V (Deschouwer 2009a: 26).  
The cartel was aimed at satisfying both parties, with the N-VA securing a larger partner 
that would ensure their political representation in forthcoming elections and the 
CD&V, which had already tried to capture the vote of the defunct VU by defending 
confederalism, would benefit from the alliance in the hope of getting some extra votes 
to become the first party in Flanders in a neck-to-neck race with the Open VLD 
(Gschwend and Hooghe 2008: 558). The alliance between the CD&V and the N-VA 
stressed the regionalist, confederalist profile of the former (Deschouwer 2009a: 27), 
especially after the 2004 regional election, which the cartel won. The CD&V, which 
had been in opposition at both levels since 1999, returned to office at the regional level 
alongside the N-VA and also the Open VLD and sp.a in order to prevent the Vlaams 
Belang from achieving office. The formation of this government in Flanders in 2004 
meant that the CD&V was in power at the regional level but in opposition at the federal 
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level, notably opposing its two main partners in the Flemish executive: the Open VLD 
and the sp.a (Buelens and Deschouwer 2007: 83). This generated a strong incentive 
for the CD&V to strengthen its regionalist profile, as the main Flemish government 
party vis-à-vis the federal government, which will be further discussed in the next 
section on government-opposition dynamics. What is also relevant here is that bringing 
on the N-VA reinforced this regional dimension of the Christian-Democrats. 
The influence of the N-VA in stressing the regionalist profile of the CD&V through 
the cartel was exemplified by the parties’ joint commitment for state reform as a 
precondition to enter the federal government. This was deemed as ‘historical’ by the 
Deputy Leader of the N-VA, who recalled that the cartel was sought by the N-VA, 
apart from securing ‘the survival of democratic Flemish nationalism,’ because of the 
commitment of the Christian-Democrats to promote a ‘great reform of the state’ 
(Weyts 2012). However, the strengthened regionalist profile of the CD&V had to be 
nurtured carefully by the party leadership, since the most moderate faction did not 
want to alienate moderate voters regarding the territorial issue (Sinardet 2008: 1021-
2). This desired equilibria reveals that the CD&V strongly resembles the same tactical 
movements made by CiU in Catalonia, but with an interesting difference: on one hand, 
CiU increased its territorial profile due to competition with ERC and the PSC by 
eventually putting forward demands for full fiscal autonomy and later on a referendum 
on independence, which created some internal tensions within the party federation and 
resulted in a significant loss of twelve seats in 2012. On the other hand, the CD&V 
strengthened its regionalist profile not by direct electoral competition with the N-VA, 
but through cooperation in an electoral cartel. 
The cartel was a successful initiative for both parties, not only because they won the 
2004 regional election, but also the 2007 Belgian federal election which opened up the 
possibility to negotiate the great state reform that the parties had vowed to deliver. 
Danny Pieters claims that the cartel was very interesting for both parties, by saying 
that: 
‘they [CD&V] were a bit worn out as an establishment party, they had this 
experience for the first time in opposition in [a] long [time], so they wanted 
to have some new… So for them it was interesting at that moment, certainly 
it was interesting for us’ (Pieters 2012). 
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The 2007 federal government negotiations however lasted long because the Flemish 
and Francophone parties could not agree on the scope of the federal constitutional 
reform. The lengthy process delivered an interim government under then current Prime 
Minister, the Flemish liberal Guy Verhofstadt, while negotiations continued. The N-
VA felt that the proposals for constitutional reform felt rather short, whereas the 
CD&V tried to pressure the N-VA to support government formation (Govaert 2009). 
The blockade was finally overcome by setting the constitutional reform aside, but with 
the CD&V becoming the leading party of the federal government, albeit the pressure 
exercised by the N-VA led to serious tensions between the two cartel members 
(Sinardet 2008: 1030). The decision of the CD&V to enter government at the expense 
of postponing constitutional reform preceded the split of the cartel.  
It is unclear who broke the cartel, whether the N-VA left (Abts, Poznyak, and 
Swyngedouw 2012) or conversely the CD&V broke it after the N-VA decided not to 
join the government (Deschouwer 2009c: 567). The split of the cartel meant that the 
N-VA could exercise pressure on the CD&V as an opposing partner, which may have 
led to speculation on the reasons of the CD&V to break it up. Ben Weyts, the deputy 
leader of the N-VA, suggested that the CD&V gambled by assuming that the N-VA 
would eventually accept government participation even if there was no constitutional 
reform. Also, he believes that the CD&V did not think that letting the N-VA go would 
be too electorally damaging to the Christian-Democrats. According to Weyts, the 
CD&V rationale would be as follows: 
‘[P]robably they [N-VA] won’t get any votes or just the hard-core Flemish 
nationalists but that’s it and that only amount[s] to 4% or something like that. 
That was their guess, but after a while with Bart de Wever as president we 
gained some support in Flanders because that was after the political 
negotiations for the forming of the federal government, there was [an 
awareness] of the Flemish public opinion, I think, and radicalisation’ (Weyts 
2012). 
The split certainly paid off eventually for the N-VA, which won the 2010 federal 
election with 27 seats to the Christian-Democrats’ 18, although the CD&V had 
retained their position as first party in Flanders in the regional elections of 2009, which 
the N-VA contested on its own and becoming just the fifth party in the Flemish 
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Parliament –after the three traditional parties and the VB. The split of the cartel was 
regarded by Danny Pieters as a consequence of the CD&V breaking the compromise, 
and guessed that if the Christian-Democrats had stayed in opposition at the federal 
level they would not have broken the cartel, while also suggesting that if that had been 
the case, ‘the Christian-Democrats would have been far better also later on’ (Pieters 
2012). Piet de Zaeger (N-VA Director) suggested that achieving office was far more 
important to the traditional parties than constitutional reform regardless of what they 
write on their party manifestos. He stated that: 
‘the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, also have in their official program 
confederation, a confederal reform in their program. The only thing is when 
it’s time to enforce that…on those issues they tend to be what they call 
‘statesmen’ and to make a compromise which is far from realising what’s in 
their program’ (De Zaeger 2012). 
The pattern between the CD&V and the N-VA closely resembles the episode of the 
Catalan Statute of Autonomy in which CiU and ERC were cooperating to bring 
constitutional change, and the negotiation ended bitterly. The bigger parties, CiU and 
CD&V, opted to compromise against the wishes of the smaller parties, which did not 
obtain electoral gains immediately –the N-VA in the 2009 regional election and ERC 
lost two regional MPs in the 2006 Catalan election. However, tensions between the N-
VA and CD&V on one hand, and CiU and ERC on the other, seem to have reinforced 
the salience of territory on the political agenda for which in the long term the ‘small’ 
parties –ERC and the N-VA– can put pressure on the bigger parties for their previous 
commitments and force them to adopt more ambitious proposals. The N-VA clearly 
enjoyed electoral success by winning both the 2010 and 2014 federal elections and the 
2014 regional election, which led the party to hold the presidency of the Flemish 
government. The success of ERC has been more moderate, with the party recovering 
11 Catalan MPs in the 2012 regional election to become the second party in 
Parliament. However, the party’s victory in the 2014 European elections, in which they 
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defeated CiU for the first time, may suggest that the Catalan election of September 
2015 could be highly competitive between the two Catalan SRNPs.90 
After the cartel split, the CD&V seems to have slightly moderated its regionalist 
profile, although the party still pushes for confederalism (Dandoy, Matagne, and Van 
Wynsberghe 2013). Following the election victory of the N-VA in 2010, in an electoral 
campaign that was heavily marked by the territorial question (Abts, Poznyak, and 
Swyngedouw 2012), the CD&V re-entered the federal government and carried 
forward, alongside seven other parties –including four Francophone parties– the sixth 
constitutional reform. Nevertheless, all the N-VA officials interviewed for this 
research claim that the reform is not ambitious enough, which ensures that further 
reform will be an issue that the N-VA uses to put pressure on the other parties, 
especially the CD&V. 
In terms of party competition, further to the role played by the N-VA, it is worth asking 
whether the Vlaams Belang has influenced party competition due to its policy of 
independence. The breakthrough of the VB in the late 1980s and early 1990s had an 
impact on the electoral results of the VU (Bouveroux 1998) while the implosion of the 
latter party in 2001 suggests that some nationalist voters turned to the VB (Billiet, 
Maddens, and Frognier 2006: 917-8). Due to the extreme-right, populist, and 
xenophobic character of the VB it has been argued that the territorial radicalisation of 
the Flemish elites and the cross-party moves to defend confederalism is more due to 
the influence of the VU than VB (De Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, and Buelens 
2006: 71). Conversely, the influence of the VB on other parties has rather been on the 
rightist agenda (Erk 2005a), with moderate right-wing parties having to strengthen 
their right-wing profile to effectively campaign against the VB. The N-VA is less 
concerned about the threat of the VB, especially since the party is winning election 
                                                 
90 At the time of writing, the competition between CDC and ERC surprisingly led to a coalition of both 
parties and independents to run together on a pro-independence platform in the 27 September 2015 
Catalan election. Although this seems a rather cooperative rather a competitive strategy, the coalition 
responds mainly to the pressure exercised by Mas towards ERC to run together and thus prevent the 
Republicans from wining the election. Had the ERC refused, Mas would not have postponed the 
election, thus reinforcing the competitive dynamic between both parties. 
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after election and the VB is retreating (Abts, Poznyak, and Swyngedouw 2012). Jan 
Jambon, an N-VA MP claims that even if both parties support independence, the VB 
is an unlikely ally because its participation would certainly dent any international 
sympathy towards Flemish independence. He argued that if both parties agreed on 
independence, then ‘all the people in [the] EU would scream’ (Jambon 2012). For its 
part, his party colleague Piet de Zaeger played down the influence of the VB by stating 
that ‘it will probably remain a party of about 10% getting a lot of extreme right, racist, 
xenophobic votes; and we are not making a strategy depending on that kind of people’ 
(De Zaeger 2012).  
 
2.1.2.Government-Opposition Dynamics in Flanders 
Party competition in Flanders is strongly linked to government-opposition dynamics 
as exemplified by the success of the VU in applying ‘tribune strategies’ (De Winter 
1998b), that is, criticising the government while being in opposition which led to some 
electoral gains for the VU and to decisively influence the territorial policies of the 
party’s rivals. However, the parties that tend to use this strategy usually have to face 
internal tensions regarding whether to enter the government following a satisfactory 
election result or keep their place in the opposition while risking losing some of the 
supports given due to political inaction. This dilemma was traditionally present in the 
VU, which had historically suffered from government participation (Breuning 1997: 
7). The fact that there is no state-wide party system any more in Belgium –but two 
distinct party systems, the Flemish and the Francophone (De Winter 2006b: 92)– is 
however a handicap for parties willing to use this strategy, since the traditional parties 
can easily hit back and increase their demands (Deschouwer 2009c). 
In Belgium, the specificity of the absence of SWPs makes government-opposition 
dynamics in a multi-level perspective even more relevant that what they are in the 
context of Catalonia. When a party is in government at the regional level but in 
opposition at the federal level, it can use its strong position regionally to play the 
‘regionalist card’ against the parties of the federal government (Buelens and 
Deschouwer 2007: 89). The uncoupling of regional and federal elections after 1999 
has made it more likely that different electoral results take place in the same region  
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–i.e. Flanders– depending on which type of election is contested (Swenden 2002: 85). 
As a result of the decoupled elections taking place in Belgium from 1999-2014  
–federal elections in 2003, 2007, and 2010; regional elections on 2004 and 2009– some 
incongruent coalitions have been formed with increasing potential for parties in power 
at the regional level to put pressure on their rivals ruling at the centre.  
The case that best helps explaining the relevance of government-opposition dynamics 
in Flanders is the result of the 2004 regional election won by the CD&V/N-VA cartel. 
While in opposition at the federal level, the CD&V strengthened its regionalist profile 
by leading the Flemish regional government. Such a strong regional profile was used 
by the Christian-Democrats to oppose the policies of the federal government, which 
also put pressure on their coalition partners in the Flemish government (Sinardet 2008; 
2010). Moreover, being in government at the central level also led the CD&V to put 
more emphasis on their governmental action at the regional level and downplaying 
their opposition role at the centre, which overall contributed to strengthening the 
regional profile of the party (Deschouwer 2009a: 29). Similarly, the N-VA entered a 
coalition with the CD&V after the 2009 Flemish election, after both parties had broken 
up the cartel mainly because of the entrance of the CD&V into the federal government. 
In this scenario, the CD&V returned to a congruent scenario in which the party was in 
government at both levels, but not the N-VA, which could use that advantageous 
position of not being responsible at the centre to put pressure on the CD&V 
(Deschouwer et al. 2010: 9). In Flanders, the effect of incongruent coalitions may be 
mitigated following the reestablishment of simultaneity in regional and federal 
elections from 2014 onwards.  
Government and opposition dynamics clearly play an important role in Flanders. 
Given the high degree of parliamentary fragmentation, all regional governments are 
large coalitions of parties and since 2003 they have all included both the CD&V and 
the N-VA. In this regard, multi-level government-opposition dynamics are pre-
eminent as political parties in power at one level tend to oppose their rivals in power 
at the central level. This is not an entirely exclusive phenomenon. The Catalan case 
showed us that CiU also blamed the PSC for not standing to their sister party –PSOE– 
when both parties were in power. In spite of the specificity of the Flemish party system, 
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it seems that parties in government at the regional level and in opposition at the central 
level will try to blame the parties in government at the centre for failing to deliver 
constitutional change, even if this involves embarrassing their coalition partners. The 
complaints of ERC in Catalonia about the role played by the PSC during the Statute 
reform process seem to confirm that. Government-opposition dynamics reinforce the 
influence that political parties with higher territorial ambitions put on other parties, 
whether the former are in power at the regional government and can use that as a 
platform to engage the other parties to responding to those demands; or whether they 
are in opposition and can therefore raise the stakes in their territorial ambitions, as was 
shown in the cases of CiU during the party’s spell in opposition, and the CD&V’s 
usage of the Flemish government to raise its regional profile. 
 
2.2. Scotland 
In spite of its union with England in 1707, during which the Scottish Parliament 
merged with the English Parliament in Westminster, Scotland retained several crucial 
institutions, such as the church, the education system, and the banking system 
(Paterson 1994). The survival of these autonomous institutions and the strength of 
Scottish civil society consolidated a distinctive sense of Scottish identity (McCrone 
2001). This distinctiveness gives Scotland a relevant position on the list of stateless 
nations that seek to (constantly) redefine its relationship with the rest of the UK. 
Scottish identity is so consolidated that all political parties aiming at being electorally 
competitive in Scotland must emphasise their Scottishness (Mitchell 2009: 136). This 
puts Scottish parties in a similar situation to their fellow Catalan and Flemish political 
counterparts. 
The three main British SWPs are present in Scotland, although they have quite 
different records on their constitutional preferences. The Scottish Liberal-Democrats 
have traditionally been a federalist party (Fabre and Martínez-Herrera 2009).  The 
party’s Steel Commission defined its policy to transform the UK into a fully-fledged 
federal state as the best way to accommodate Scotland within the Union (Scottish 
Liberal Democrats 2006). The Labour Party has been electorally successful in Scotland 
in the last decades (Bradbury 2006), although the party did not traditionally support 
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home rule. As we shall see, the party first supported devolution in the 1970s when it 
felt that the party was losing ground to the Scottish National Party (SNP), although 
several members of the party were still reluctant to devolve powers to Scotland. This 
internal tension made the first attempt of devolution to fail eventually, and it was not 
until the long years of Conservative rule in the 1980s and 1990s and the growing anti-
Tory sentiment that Labour decisively promoted home rule for Scotland –as well as 
for Wales and Northern Ireland. The party has since then been committed to devolution 
and has also developed a diffuse sense of Scottish nationalism (Keating 2004: 164). 
The Conservative Party, officially the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, was 
for long regarded as a party that truly defended Scottish interests and specificities 
within the Union, and was very successful in Scotland until the 1950s (Kidd 2008). 
However, electoral decline followed because of the unpopular Conservative UK 
governments in Scotland during the Thatcher years, with the party losing much of its 
power-base in Scotland and ultimately opposing devolution in the 1997 referendum  
after it had lost their last remaining MP north of the border (McCrone 2003). Once the 
Scottish Parliament was re-established, though, the Conservatives have accepted 
devolution and have developed a new commitment to working in the devolved political 
system (Jeffery 2009b). 
The Scottish National Party is the main –and certainly the only relevant– SNRP in 
Scotland. It was founded in 1934 as a rather heterogeneous party-movement that 
advocated Scottish home rule (Finlay 1994). As a typical feature of the SNRP party 
family, internal tensions were high in order to decide the SNP’s constitutional aim, 
with a faction defending home rule while another faction defended full Scottish 
independence; the latter being successful and independence being the party’s policy 
since 1942 (Lynch 2006: 237). The 2011 election manifesto details the party’s policy 
for independence by presenting an independent Scotland in a ‘partnership of equals’ 
with the rest of the UK and stressing that independence would imply that Scotland 
would become an EU member state (SNP 2011: 28). The way to achieve independence 
according to the SNP is through a referendum in which the Scottish people would 
decide on the matter. However, in a similar fashion to the N-VA’s gradual strategy, 
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the party also campaigned for further self-government by enhancing the Scotland Bill 
and demanding more fiscal powers for the Scottish Parliament. 
Table 3. Scottish Parliamentary election results in number of seats, 1999-
2011 
 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Labour 56 50 46 37 
SNP 35 27 47 69 
Conservatives 18 18 17 15 
Liberal-Democrats 17 17 16 5 
Others 3 17 3 3 
Source: Scottish Parliament. 
As shown on Table 3, the Labour Party dominated the first two Scottish elections after 
devolution, albeit the decision to use a proportional electoral system –Additional 
Member System, AMS– prevented from securing an overall majority, with the 
coalition governments of Labour with the Liberal-Democrats to follow. The AMS 
system was a concession of Labour to the Liberal-Democrats and although it made it 
very difficult for Labour to achieve a majority –which they would have certainly 
achieved if a plurality system had been used– it also was thought to prevent the SNP 
to achieve such majority that would ease the way towards Scottish independence 
(McEwen 2009: 69). However, the 2007 election produced a narrow victory for the 
SNP, which constituted a minority government, and the 2011 election saw the 
landslide victory of the nationalists which proved that a majority could still be 
achieved despite the proportional corrections introduced by the AMS electoral system. 
 
2.2.1.SNRPs Increase the Saliency of Territorial Issues in Scotland 
The electoral breakthrough of the SNP in the late 1960s and its consolidation as a threat 
to Labour in the 1970s led the Labour Party to introduce legislation to devolve powers 
to Scotland in order to undercut support for the nationalists (Bradbury 2006: 221; 
Lynch 2006: 232). After the first attempt at devolution failed (see below), Labour was 
ousted from government in London by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives. The 
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Conservative Party’s policies were vastly rejected in Scotland, with the Tories losing 
support and Labour becoming the dominant party in the 1980s and 1990s, which led 
Labour to emphasise its Scottishness to present itself in contraposition to the unpopular 
Tory governments (Mitchell 2009: 111).  
Also, fears that anti-Tory sentiment in Scotland in the 1990s might evolve towards 
secessionism explain the decisive commitment of Labour to Devolution in 1997.  
The election victory of the SNP in 2007 definitely put the territorial question on the 
agenda by sponsoring an independence referendum which nevertheless lacked enough 
support in parliament due to the minority position of the SNP and the unwillingness of 
the unionist parties to deliver it. This of course changed in 2011. The strength of the 
SNP, especially after achieving office, led the unionist parties to counter the SNP’s 
appeal with proposals of their own.  
 
2.2.2.Government-Opposition Dynamics in Scotland 
The Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition that ruled Scotland from 1999 until 2007 did 
not have many incentives to deliver constitutional change for two main reasons. First 
was because the SNP in opposition would find any improvement as not being enough, 
and secondly because the Labour government was also in office in London and there 
was no need to bring the territorial question on the agenda on a UK-wide scale.  
This worked well for the Labour Party, unlike the PSOE in Spain, because basically 
the Scottish Labour had not campaigned for further constitutional change unlike the 
Catalan Socialists did. Also, Labour had already delivered devolution in 1997 and not 
much time had passed since the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament. There was 
no necessity to further expand Scottish self-government if the SNP did not represent a 
potential electoral throat to Labour rule in Scotland, a scenario that seemed favourable 
to Labour after their comfortable wins in 1999 and 2003 and the corrective element of 
the AMS electoral system than made a SNP overall majority unlikely. 
However, once the SNP won in 2007 the unionist parties launched the Calman 
Commission as we have seen to propose a counterproposal to the SNP’s policy of 
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independence. The motivation for this was to persuade Scottish voters that the unionist 
parties could deliver further powers to the Scottish Parliament with no need to support 
the SNP and its view on independence. The unionist SWPs felt they had to offer 
something in order to dissuade the voters that had put the SNP in power from 
supporting a secessionist party if what voters wanted was further powers for the 
Scottish institutions.  
In this sense, the Calman Commission failed since there was not even time to enact 
the new Scotland Act before the SNP was returned with an overall majority after the 
2011 Scottish parliamentary election. That result meant that the referendum was 
inevitable. In the context of the run-up to the referendum the dynamic of demand-
response-demand works perfectly as the unionist parties campaigned against 
independence by discrediting what they thought to be the overoptimistic prospects of 
independence presented by the SNP and by stressing the advantages of remaining in 
the UK.  
The response to the SNP’s independence proposal was to reject it, although the 
unionists clearly emphasised that voting ‘No’ would not equal the constitutional status 
quo and that further devolution would follow. All three unionist parties set up 
devolution commissions in the run up to the independence referendum to explore 
further devolution for Scotland and made their proposals public well ahead of the vote 
to convince voters to reject independence in favour of a stronger Scottish Parliament 
within the UK.  
The Labour Party proposed, among others, to make the Scottish Parliament entrenched 
into the UK constitution so it could not be abolished, to increase the tax-varying 
powers of the Scottish Parliament from 10p to 15p to provide Scottish institutions to 
raise more revenue, and further powers on housing benefits, railways, and local 
government (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission 2014). In a longer, more 
detailed document, Labour developed its proposal to expand devolution by also 
acknowledging the powers that should be kept at the central level to strengthen what 
Labour defines as the political, social and economic union which is the UK. 
Furthermore, for Labour the Scottish Parliament should acquire more fiscal autonomy 
yet retaining the block grant paid by UK resources as its main funding resource, 
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whereas the tax-varying powers would ensure more accountability on the taxes levied 
by the Scottish autonomous institutions (Scottish Labour Devolution Commission 
2014: 253-256). 
The Conservatives also devised their own devolution proposals and suggested to give 
more financial autonomy to the Scottish Parliament, asserting the need for the 
Parliament to be more responsible for the taxes it raised and devolving accordingly the 
competence to the Scottish Parliament to set income tax rates and bands (Scottish 
Conservatives 2014). The Conservatives also state that their proposals could be 
implemented after the 2015 UK general election but also called for the devolution 
debate to be extended to the whole country, thus (re-)considering what devolution 
means for the other home nations, and especially on how England is governed and the 
issue of the West Lothian Question. 
Finally, the Liberal Democrats have long defended that the UK should evolve to a 
fully-fledged federal system with a proposal for Home Rule all round. This proposal 
was developed as early as 2012 by a committee chaired by Sir Menzies Campbell that 
set up a detailed proposal to transform the UK into a federal state, with a specific 
chapter focusing on the highly relevant issue of fiscal autonomy. On this issue, the 
Liberal Democrats push for fiscal federalism and suggest that the current Barnett 
formula consisting of a block grant allocated to the Scottish Parliament should be 
replaced by a needs-based formula (Scottish Liberal Democrats 2012). In a second 
report published closer to the referendum date, the Liberal Democrats emphasised that 
a ‘No’ vote in the referendum should be followed by more powers being transferred to 
the Scottish Parliament as an initial step to federalise the UK. They put the emphasis 
on the fact that the Parliament should raise more than what it spends and that its 
existence should be entrenched in the UK Constitution (Scottish Liberal Democrats 
2014). Furthermore, it also makes a call to the other unionist parties to include their 
proposals for further devolution in their manifestos for the 2015 General election, thus 
reinforcing a certain element of competition between the unionist parties themselves 
to champion the cause for further devolution. 
These proposals clearly emphasised the steps taken by the unionist parties to increase 
the autonomous powers of the Scottish institutions in the event of a ‘No’ vote by 
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convincing voters that rejecting independence did not equate to maintain the territorial 
status quo. This implies an element of party competition with the SNP to counter 
independence with a more appealing offer to Scottish voters who favoured further 
devolution instead of independence, but the proposals of the unionist parties, which 
varied in their scope, also enhanced competition between them. It is significant that 
even though these parties joined in a unified referendum campaign, Better Together, 
they presented their proposals for further autonomous powers separately. 
However, following the rejection of independence by the Scottish electorate on 18 
September 2014, the unionist parties had to converge on their proposals to deliver a 
common response to the popular mandate for further devolution. Thus, another 
parliamentary commission –the Smith Commission– has been set and further powers 
will be delivered in the future. This commission will also include the parties that 
supported independence –the SNP and the Greens– and aims at discussing and 
eventually delivering a new devolution settlement on Scotland based on the unionist 
parties’ proposals (HM Government 2014).  
As a result, the Scottish case shows that facing a rather explicit and constant demand 
–i.e independence– by a SNRPs party in power, the opposition SWPs put forward –
more limited–constitutional change in order to dissuade voters from supporting 
secession. In such a scenario, territorial demands nevertheless increase on aggregate 
terms. 
 
3. Territorial Management as a Driver for Territorial Demands 
 
The territorial organisation of the state and the way in which central governments 
respond to political parties’ territorial demands may impact the evolution, nature and 
scope of further territorial claims. The Catalan case shows how nationalist parties used 
central institutions’ management of the Statute of Autonomy reform to justify an 




Spain, Belgium, and the UK are decentralised countries and Catalonia, Flanders, and 
Scotland enjoy substantial political autonomy. In spite of this common starting point, 
the territorial organisation of each country and the manner in which party politics 
works at the central and sub-state levels differ considerably. This variation needs to be 
taken into account when analysing the impact of territorial management in explaining 
the persistence of demands raised by political parties in these three contexts. The 
discussion will analyse the effect of territorial management in Flanders and Scotland. 
 
3.1. Flanders 
Since 1970 Belgium has transformed from a unitary state into a fully-fledged 
federation through four constitutional reforms –up to 1993– and two extra reforms –in 
2001 and 2011– that have furthered regional and community powers. The first reform 
took place in 1970 and the regions of Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels were 
recognised alongside the three linguistic communities: Dutch-speaking, French-
speaking, and German-speaking. Further constitutional provisions included the 
creation of linguistic groups in the national parliament and the requirement that the 
executive had to have an equal number of French- and Dutch-speaking ministers. The 
second reform of 1980 brought forward the creation of institutions for the regions and 
communities, with the exception of Brussels. These institutions included regional and 
community executives and assemblies which were not directly elected but composed 
by each region’s members of parliament. The third reform of 1988 included the formal 
constitution of Brussels as a region, which could not be agreed upon in the previous 
reform of 1980. The Flemish side did not willingly accept this reform –since they tend 
to think of Brussels as a Flemish city– but were compensated by a special 
constitutional protection of the Flemish minority in Brussels. The 1993 reform 
consolidated the federal character of Belgium with the direct election of the regional 
assemblies and the transformation of the Senate into a chamber of the communities, 
while lists of competencies were drawn for both regions and communities. The last 
constitutional reform prior to the period of analysis, of 2001, slightly enlarged fiscal 
autonomy of the regional institutions, although such autonomy continued to be quite 
modest (Deschouwer 2009b: 48-64). 
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Belgian federalism has been labelled as ‘centrifugal and bipolar’ (Alen and Ergec 
1998). It is bipolar because of the dual character –Flemish and Francophone– of the 
federation and it is centrifugal because after initial decentralisation was applied there 
have been strong incentives for political elites to demand further transfers so as to 
evade tough negotiations with the other community. This practice has been viewed as 
leading to a ‘hollowing of the Belgian centre’ (L. Hooghe 2004). The aforementioned 
split of the Belgian party system decisively strengthens this dynamic and the central 
government is sometimes regarded as a forum of regional representatives (Cartrite 
2002: 61). Furthermore, the linguistic division between both communities and ongoing 
regionalisation have produced a substantial separation between both communities, 
with people from each one being socialised and receiving political inputs only from 
their own community, a fact which is further reinforced but the existence of only 
separate traditional media (Billiet, Maddens, and Frognier 2006). Regionalisation has 
tended to favour ethnic divisions in Belgium (Erk 2003: 203) and the fact that regional 
politics are more responsive to citizen demands –since citizens from one community 
cannot exercise any control on the political parties of the other– has driven further 
decentralisation (Deschouwer 1999: 106; Verleden 2009: 166). 
In this divided context, it comes as no surprise that the political preferences of the 
communities differ substantially. Whereas the Flemish parties as a block tend to favour 
further reforms (Dandoy, Matagne, and Van Wynsberghe 2013), the Francophone 
parties would have been quite satisfied if constitutional reform had stopped in 1993 
(Frognier 1996). This pattern is still the rule and in the government coalition 
negotiations following the 2007 federal election all Flemish parties wanted some 
reform whereas the French-speaking parties did not want any (Pilet and van Haute 
2008: 547). On that occasion, constitutional reform was postponed, which provoked 
as stated above the breakup of the CD&V/N-VA cartel, but similar approaches from 
the two sides led to a governmental coalition deadlock after the 2010 election which 
lasted more than 500 days (Govaert 2012).  
The complex negotiations for government formation of 2010-2011 included two topics 
that are seen from opposite angles by both linguistic groups and therefore give 
ammunition to the elites of both communities to increase or perpetuate their demands. 
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First, the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) had to be split 
according to the Flemish parties, with a special demand on that account coming from 
the CD&V/N-VA cartel, whereas the Francophones opposed such a split (Abts, 
Poznyak, and Swyngedouw 2012: 452). The main reason for both perspectives is that 
mainly Francophone Brussels is included in a larger electoral district which includes 
several Flemish municipalities. However, ample minorities of French-speakers live in 
the outskirts of Brussels, which are formally on Flemish territory. Thus, the Flemish 
parties wanted the split of the district so the votes of the Flemish-speakers would not 
be influenced by the large Francophone majority of Brussels, which tends to vote for 
French-speaking parties. Conversely, the Francophone parties did not want the BHV 
district to be split because the French-speaking voters living outside Brussels would 
become a minority –without the Brussels population being included– amongst the 
Flemish population of the larger Flemish Brabant province (De Winter and Baudewyns 
2009; M. Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011).  
This argument, eventually solved with the Francophone concession to split the district 
in return for extra funding coming from Flanders to the Brussels region (Govaert 
2012), was of a highly symbolical nature and was used by Flemish parties to defend 
what the Flemish consider to be their linguistic and political rights as Dutch-speakers. 
The position of the N-VA is plainly illustrated by Jan Jambon, discussing French-
speakers living in the towns nearby Brussels in Flanders: 
‘Today we see that people from Brussels come into Flanders, they say we live 
in Belgium, and Belgium is bilingual, so I speak French, and when I go into 
Antwerp, in Ghent, and here at the frontiers of Brussels, they are not forced 
[to speak Dutch]. [But] the borders are clear, they know that they are in 
another country, and so they have to adapt’ (Jambon 2012). 
Similarly, another N-VA politician considered that the economic compensation for the 
split of BHV was too much, whereas his view on the French-speakers’ position in the 
Brussels periphery also hints at the symbolic and political saliency of the language 
issue: 
‘They [French-speakers] don’t want any bilingual status of Wallonia, but 
they want a bilingual status for Flanders or a bit of Flanders and whenever 
they don’t manage to get that, they just want the expansion of Brussels, of 
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Brussels territory. So that’s what we should call, what we call imperialism’ 
(Weyts 2012). 
Hence, the symbolic nature of such controversies heats up the territorial debate in 
multinational contexts. Symbolic issues are also relevant in the Catalan case, 
especially concerning the situation of the Catalan language as a minority language vis-
à-vis Spanish, and also other symbolic issues like the definition of Catalonia as a nation 
that Spanish institutions insist is merely of a cultural nature. These symbolic issues 
when seen to be dealt with inappropriately by the state provide grounds for further 
escalating demands.  
A second element of controversy during the 2010 governmental coalition negotiations 
was interregional solidarity. It has been long noted that economic differences between 
regions in Belgium have escalated territorial tensions (Peters 2006: 1090) and that 
Flemish taxpayers are net-contributors to the federal budget –with the notable 
exception of pensions due to the ageing population in Flanders– whereas the regions 
of Wallonia and Brussels are net receivers (Bouteca, Devos, and Mus 2013). These 
kind of economic imbalances are quickly transformed into economic grievances by 
political parties which demand a correction of the situation by claiming further fiscal 
autonomy. This sort of demand clearly echoes that of Catalan nationalists discussed in 
previous chapters, based on the complaint that Catalan tax-payers contribute too much 
to interregional solidarity. As in the Catalan case, some N-VA leaders –De Zaeger, 
Jambon– openly acknowledged in interviews that they would like the Basque model 
of concierto económico, or full fiscal autonomy, although, like their Catalan 
counterparts, they state that they do not want to cut down interregional solidarity 
altogether.  
If economic transfers were to stop suddenly it has been suggested that poverty in 
Wallonia would increase significantly (Cantillon et al. 2006: 1052), and so the Flemish 
nationalist demands for fiscal autonomy are accompanied by a demand for more 
transparency and fiscal responsibility for the regions. Ben Weyts (N-VA) puts it in a 
relatively straightforward manner: 
‘[We want to] give more autonomy to the states so that they can govern their 
own problems with their own solutions, but also with their own responsibility, 
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including the financial responsibility, because nowadays you see that 
Wallonia has another policy. For example on unemployment, but the means, 
the budget is federal. So it’s very easy to have a different policy with 
somebody else’s money. Because the federal budget is funded mostly by 
Flanders. So we want more responsibility, more autonomy, but including 
more responsibility. […] It’s very easy to have a policy without a 
responsibility. So they don’t care. You have to be rewarded for good policies 
and you have to be punished for bad policies. But that’s not the case in 
Belgium’ (Weyts 2012). 
Yet, the sixth constitutional reform does not grant regions with fiscal autonomy, 
although it included a block transfer for the regions to pay for the services they 
provided. However, the aim of the N-VA was far ambitious than that –one of the 
reasons the party decided to stay in opposition following the 2010 federal election. Piet 
de Zaeger concludes that: 
‘the negotiations, it’s clear that the large portion of those demands were 
given up and it’s really the core of what was asked by the Flemish Parliament 
because it’s not that you have some fiscal… we… what was really intended 
was fiscal autonomy and fiscal responsibility. And that’s not what we are 
getting. You get more a… they give you a certain amount of money but you 
are not able to collect that money yourself’ (De Zaeger 2012). 
Falling short of getting what you asked for exacerbated demands in Catalonia. The 
sense of failure seems to be quite similar amongst the N-VA leadership, and their 
strong position in the Flemish and Belgian party systems does not suggest that they 
will back off any time soon. Thus, we see both in Catalonia and in Flanders that 
demands perceived to be ignored lead to a strengthening of territorial demands. 
Furthermore, different kinds of demands converge, as is the case in Flanders for fiscal 
and symbolic demands. Such demands, though, can quickly evolve into more radical 
and substantially different claims as the move launched by CiU in Catalonia which 
switched a demand for more fiscal powers to a constitutional referendum on 
independence.  
The nature of territorial management is clearly very different in Spain and Belgium. 
In Spain the Catalan nationalists are a minority nation in a larger polity with Catalanist 
parties trying to negotiate different constitutional arrangements –from a new Statute 
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of Autonomy to a referendum on secession– with a distant government. In Belgium, 
on the other hand, the particular bipolar nature of the country leaves less room for 
victimisation, as central territorial management basically includes bilateral 
negotiations between both communities, and the only complaints available to 
disillusioned Flemish nationalists are the unwillingness of the French-speaking parties 
to negotiate and veto constitutional change or the commitments that other Flemish 
parties make at the centre. This results in either no change at all or some minor changes 
perceived as unsatisfactory for the nationalists. Be that as it may, both scenarios 
contribute to the enhancement of territorial demands through political parties’ use of 
the outcome of constitutional negotiations at the centre. 
3.2. Scotland 
The accommodation of Scottish demands within the UK has traditionally been dealt 
with in a pragmatic way by the UK government and parties, which was based for the 
most part on administrative autonomy executed by the Scottish Office, created in 1886 
(Keating 2001a). Although Scotland had kept certain autonomous institutions since 
the Union of 1707, following the progressive interventionist nature of the state in 
public affairs throughout the 20th century several competences were transferred to the 
Scottish Office, so that Scottish policies could be addressed and administered in a 
Scottish manner (Paterson 1994). Although several attempts at the reestablishment of 
a Scottish Parliament had gained support in the first half of the 20th century, the Home 
Rule initiatives did not go through mainly because the political actors north and south 
of the border resorted to devolving administrative competences instead.  
However, this approach changed after the SNP won a by-election in Hamilton in 1967. 
The good result at the polls for a separatist party made the UK government set up a 
committee to study the possibility of devolving powers to a Scottish Parliament (A. 
Brown, McCrone, and Paterson 1998; Mitchell 2009). Although this initiative was 
short-lived, the 1974 elections delivered a real breakthrough of the SNP, with the 
nationalists winning 7 seats in the February election and returning 11 with 30% of the 
vote in the October election following the hung Parliament after the first 1974 election 
(Bogdanor 1999). After such a success, the Labour government started to discuss plans 
for devolving powers to Scotland. Devolution was such a divisive question within the 
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Labour Party, and Labour backbenchers managed to include an amendment to the 
Scotland Bill requiring that devolution had to be supported by at least 40% of the 
Scottish electorate (Mitchell 2009: 125). This requirement proved to be crucial putting 
a halt to devolution. In the 1979 referendum, 51% of the voters supported the 
establishment of a Parliament but a turnout of 64% meant that support amongst the 
whole electorate was around 33%, therefore falling short of the required 40% hurdle. 
The provisions of the Scotland Act were repealed as a consequence (A. Brown, 
McCrone, and Paterson 1998). The fall of the SNP in the 1979 election, and the 
government change under the Conservatives led by Thatcher, cooled down any 
immediate prospects of devolution. 
The policies of the Tories were regarded as highly unpopular in Scotland and as a 
result the Conservatives began a steady electoral decline with the Labour Party 
becoming hegemonic in Scotland. This scenario stirred up again some demands for 
Home Rule which the Conservative government tried to manage by delivering extra 
powers to the Scottish Office, such as regional aid. The enlargement of the authority 
of the Scottish Office however gave a wider dimension to the scope of Scottish 
administrative devolution and reinforced the Scottish political framework which eased 
the way for further demands (Keating 2004: 166). In this context, a Scottish 
Constitutional Convention was created under the leadership of the Labour Party to 
promote Home Rule for Scotland. The Convention also included the Liberal 
Democrats, trade unions and civil society organisations, but not the SNP which refused 
to take part because the Convention would not consider independence (Paterson et al. 
2001). The Convention was created in 1989 and was preceded by a declaration of 
several organisations known as the Claim of Right, which stated that the people of 
Scotland should be free to decide how they should be governed (Tierney 2003). The 
Claim of Right was supported by the Labour Party (Newell 1998: 110-1), which then 
spearheaded demands for devolution after the party got back into office in Westminster 
following the 1997 election. The September 1997 referendum confirmed the will of 
the Scots to have a Parliament with legislative powers and also some tax-raising 
powers. The referendum was sponsored by Labour as part of the fulfilment of a bargain 
for which they had campaigned for since the late 1980s (McCrone 2003: 140). 
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Devolution was approved by referendum by 74% of the voters and around 63% 
supported tax-raising powers for the new Parliament. 
Devolution in the late 1990s redefined the constitutional shape of the UK with sub-
state legislatures being introduced in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, which 
created an asymmetrical constitutional structure that has been nevertheless widely 
accepted across the UK (Keating 1999: 78). The fact that asymmetry is a common 
assumed element of the UK constitution heavily contrasts with the situation in Spain 
where asymmetries are regarded as ‘privileges’ for those regions or nationalities 
enjoying them. The different perception of asymmetries in both cases is illustrative 
because it derives from the constitutional and symbolic recognition –or lack of it– of 
the national character of the stateless nations. Thus, unlike in Catalonia, national 
recognition is given freely in Scotland (Keating 1998b: 202). The current push for a 
referendum on independence in Scotland has also shown that it is a common accepted 
fact in the UK that Scotland shall have independence if the Scottish people back this 
option (Keating 2009: 81), whereas this is certainly not the case in Catalonia. This 
difference in constitutional recognition also has an effect on the nature of demands 
posed by political parties in both cases, with Catalan parties putting more emphasis on 
symbolic issues: nation-ness, self-determination, language and cultural rights; whereas 
in Scotland demands focus more on policy powers and fiscal issues because the former 
are taken for granted. 
Another interesting pattern is that in Catalonia and Flanders sub-state actors –political 
parties and sub-state governments– are pro-active in putting forward demands and the 
central governments negotiates these and delivers a response– either a positive 
response or a rejection. This is done differently in Spain and Belgium, given the 
different nature of the central government in each country. However, in the case of 
Scotland it seems that the state actors –including SWPs– are more responsive towards 
demands. More specifically, SWPs are more active in responding to the electoral 
success of the SNP in order to cut down the possible appeal for Scotland’s 
independence. The last few years have been illustrative on that regard. After the SNP 
won the 2007 Scottish election the unionist parties started discussing constitutional 
change on their own, trying to counter the SNP intention to hold a referendum on 
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independence. This resulted in a reform of the Scotland Act to grant further powers to 
Scotland. The recommendations of the Calman Commission represented a modest 
advance in the legislative powers of the Scottish Parliament and Calman also argued 
for some elements of fiscal autonomy to make the Parliament more responsible for 
what it spends (Jeffery 2009b: 155). Meanwhile, the SNP’s proposed referendum did 
not go through in the 2007-2011 Parliament because the SNP lacked a majority and 
the other parties, instead of accepting a referendum, preferred to put forward a 
counterproposal for enhanced powers. 
This situation was replicated after the 2011 election which the SNP won with an 
overall majority, thus making the referendum a real possibility. The way in which the 
UK government accepted the demands of the SNP formalised in the so-called 
Edinburgh Agreement (2012) heavily contrasts with the complete rejection of the same 
demand for a referendum by the Spanish government in the case of Catalonia. Not 
only was the decision of the UK government based on the aforementioned recognised 
right of Scotland’s self-determination, but it was also illustrative that the SWPs were 
keen to put forward significant counterproposals to transfer more powers to the 
Scottish Parliament in the event of a ‘No’ vote in the September 2014 referendum.  
In this sense, the UK central actors are more accommodative than their Spanish 
counterparts. The pro-active stance of the Unionist parties certainly contribute to an 
escalation of demands and a progressive tendency toward decentralisation, but one that 
is controlled and managed. Opponents of devolution in 1999 argued that the 
Parliament was a stepping stone towards independence, while in the first years there 
were no grounds to support that claim (McCrone 2003). The holding of an 
independence referendum might lead us to think that those initial opponents of 
devolution were right; however, with the rejection of independence in September 2014 
the Scots showed that they wanted devolution, and certainly the SWPs offered more 
devolution. Probably, if the unionist parties had not offered anything the result of the 
referendum would have been different.  
The cases of Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders indicate that central government 
strategies of rejection of constitutional change may lead parties to radicalise their 
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demands, as the case of CiU clearly shows; or also to reinforce those political parties 
with a more assertive demand –i.e. independence– to which the recent electoral 
successes of the N-VA and the SNP seem to point out. On the other hand, when the 
UK government accepted to hold a referendum on Scotland’s independence it 
prevented the SNP from building on anti-London sentiment and victimisation and it 
set a long and rich constitutional debate where unionist parties offered 
counterproposals, a strategy which eventually carried the day. Thus, territorial 
management clearly influences how parties respond to central government strategies 
and how their territorial demands evolve. It also influences citizens: strategies of 
rejection and blockade of constitutional change lead voters in stateless nations to 
support more radicalised options while accommodative strategies including offers of 
further self-government may seduce voters with a renewed constitutional agreement 
that avoids the uncertainties of a secession process. 
 
4. Public Opinion as a Driver for Territorial Demands 
 
Political parties are mechanisms of representation of the population views and 
preferences. Accordingly, political parties do represent and indeed claim to represent 
the people’s interests in a wide range of topics, to which the territorial organisation of 
the state is no exception. The preferences of voters on constitutional change may thus 
be taken into account by political parties in order to define –or redefine– their territorial 
proposals. It has been argued that this has been the case in Catalonia, where a 
radicalisation of public opinion in favour of independence was intrinsically linked to 
CiU’s change on the party’s territorial discourse. The 2010 and 2012 demonstrations 
on Catalonia’s national day had a direct influence on the party’s actions, especially 
after the latter rally triggered Artur Mas’ decision to call for a snap election and put 
forward the demand of a referendum on independence to be held before 2016.  
The analysis of public views on constitutional change may thus shed some light on the 
dynamics of territorial demands that have been present as well in Flanders and 
Scotland. The two cases also show that sub-state national identity is very relevant to a 
234 
 
large share of the national population, which also provides incentives to political 
parties to play the ‘regionalist card.’ The combination of both indicators may therefore 




The construction of national identity built around the Dutch language led to territorial 
demands being made on the nation’s name (Vos 1998: 87). Although these demands 
were cultural at first, they quickly turned political –including economic and regional 
empowerment demands. The nationalist justification of political decentralisation and 
the establishment of sub-state institution has not strengthened Flemish identity at the 
expense of Belgian identity in the case of Flanders. Dual identities are therefore a 
common feature in line with other stateless nations in multinational states (Keating 
1998a; Moreno 2001b). Belgian identity has remained high in spite of political 
decentralisation and the ongoing social division experienced in Belgium between the 
Flemish and French-speaking communities (Billiet, Maddens, and Frognier 2006). As 
Table 4 shows, Belgian identity tends to be the first choice of identity for people in 
Flanders while those who described themselves as ‘Flemish first’ fell from 40% in 
1991 to just over a quarter in 2009. This decrease may be linked to the new 
generations’ lack of first-hand experience of the linguistic conflict that drove 
institutional reform –with tensions at the highest point in the 1960s and 1970s 




Table 4. First choice of identity in percentage, Flanders, 1991-2009 
1st Choice 1991 1995 1999 2003 2009 
Belgium 42 52 56 54 43 
Flanders 40 25 27 30 27 
Province 3 3 2 4 5 
City/Town 13 17 13 12 15 
Europe - - - - 9 
Other 2 3 0 0 1 
N 2379 2066 2497 1247 1531 
Source: Deschouwer and Sinardet (2010: 65). 
The high score of Belgian identity among the population certainly cuts down the 
appeal for Flemish secession amongst the population, with federal-like arrangements 
being preferred to better accommodate the vast majority of people who identify both 
as Belgian and Flemish (De Schutter 2011).  
The recent electoral success of the separatist N-VA in the Belgian federal election of 
2010, followed by even better results in the May 2014 federal and regional elections, 
may suggest that secession is becoming popular in Flanders. However, successive 
social and political surveys have shown that the territorial question is not that relevant 
to the Flemish electorate (Billiet, Maddens, and Frognier 2006: 917-8; Deschouwer 
and Sinardet 2010: 61-2; Reuchamps 2013: 356). For instance, following the 2007 
election which saw the victory of the CD&V/N-VA cartel –with both parties having 
agreed that they would not enter a government coalition without state reform –survey 
evidence showed that only 13% of the voters declared such a reform to be a top priority 
(Sinardet 2008: 1025).  
Support for further decentralisation, not surprisingly, tends to be higher for nationalist 
parties, with in the Flemish case refers to the N-VA, but also to the CD&V 
(Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010: 74). However, the success of the N-VA is not 
exclusively due to its territorial stance by any means. Although around 80% of the 
party voters said to be in favour of decentralisation, only 4 out of every 10 voters 
declared that Flemish autonomy issues were the main reason to decide to vote for the 
party; with many other voters also valuing the fact that the N-VA is a new party with 
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no links to the establishment parties (Swyngedouw and Abts 2011: 16-8). The tradition 
of consociational governance and party rule or ‘partitocracy’ in Belgium has long had 
a negative impact on the perception of the quality of democracy in the country (De 
Winter, Della Porta, and Deschouwer 1996). Hence, the support for the N-VA as an 
outsider party seems to weight for the voters’ decision alongside their stance for further 
Flemish self-government.  
The Flemish population seems to be rather split in half about further constitutional 
change, with just over half the population supporting more powers for the Flemish 
government and the other half against that prospect, with a quarter declaring 
themselves satisfied with the status quo and another quarter even promoting 
recentralisation, with support for an independent Flanders being negligible 
(Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010: 69-70). The Flemish case is therefore quite 
interesting because of the paradox that independence support is extremely low yet a 
secessionist party is the first party in the country. The party is well aware of the reality 
in Flanders, as Ben Weyts described it in an interview: 
‘We know there isn’t a strong majority in Flanders for the idea of 
independence. We accept that. We are democratic, but we see there is a great, 
[…] great demand for more, less complexity and more autonomy’ (Weyts 
2012). 
The awareness that independence is a chimera in the short-to-medium term thus 
explains the party’s step-by-step strategy and builds on the considerable support for 
further autonomy to put forward its confederal horizon for Belgium. The logic of the 
party is neatly described by Jan Jambon, MP as follows: 
‘what people accept […] is that you talk about reform of the institutions and 
then we use another term: confederalism. Because once we could realise 
confederalism, how we see it is near, very near to independence. So the next 
step to independence would be a tiny step. I think, and, it’s a little bit political 
and electoral opportunism what brings us confederalism as a step in between’ 
(Jambon 2012). 
The aim of the N-VA is therefore to sell independence progressively by showing that 
more self-government means better government. However, the struggle to achieve 
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further institutional reform meanwhile is something the electorate does not seem very 
concerned with and the political tension and ongoing conflict seems to be more a 
product of elite and institutional dynamics rather popular active demands for 
constitutional change (Reuchamps 2013: 366). The Flemish situation heavily contrasts 
with the Catalan case, as the SNRPs’ escalation of demands has been decisively 




National identity is strong in Scotland although it has been so traditionally (Bechhofer 
and McCrone 2009), and even if Scottish identity has been reinforced in the last 30 
years, as in the Belgian case dual identities –i.e. one feeling both Scottish and British– 
prevail (Keating 2009). Such a strong sense of identity has led political parties to 
consistently play the ‘regionalist card’ and present themselves as Scottish, while the 
anti-Tory sentiment often exaggerated by the Conservatives’ rivals has been built on a 
deliberate discourse of the Tories being essentially anti-Scottish because of the 
neoliberal policies carried out in the 1980s and early 1990s (Hassan 2012).  
Table 5. National Identity in Scotland, Percentages, 2012-2014 
 2012 2013 2014 
Scottish not British 23 27 24 
More Scottish than British 28 27 25 
Equally Scottish and British 28 27 30 
More British than Scottish 6 4 5 
British not Scottish 8 10 9 
Other 6 4 5 
Don’t knows 2 2 1 
Source: What Scotland Thinks.91 
                                                 




As Table 5 shows, Scottish national identity is indeed strong with British-leaning 
identities being espoused by a small share of the population while almost a third claims 
to feel both ‘Scottish and British’ when answering the so-called Moreno question. 
In terms of constitutional preferences, unlike in Flanders and Catalonia, independence 
support has been significant in Scotland –consistently between a quarter and a third of 
the population as shown on Figure 5 –since devolution, thus keeping an increasing 
tendency after the Thatcher governments (Keating 2009: 71). However, devolution is 
by far supported by a majority of Scots while recentralisation support leading to the 
Parliament being abolished is supported only by a minority and therefore highly 
unlikely (Jeffery 2009b).  
Figure 5. Constitutional preferences in Scotland, 1999-2014 
Source: What Scotland Thinks.92 
After the back-to-back election victories for the SNP in the 2007 and 2011 elections 
to the Scottish Parliament, the latter leading to the 2014 independence referendum, it 
                                                 
92 For clarification, the category ‘Independence’ includes respondents that preferred an independent 
Scotland either within or outside the EU. The category ‘Devolution’ includes respondents that support 




is interesting the relationship between such victories and the support for independence, 
given the pro-independence stance of the Nationalists. However, since independence 
support seems to have remained rather stable, unlike in Catalonia, is there any hint that 
the SNP election victories reproduced a ‘hidden’ increased support for independence? 
As the case of Flanders shows after the success of the N-VA, and given the rejection 
of independence in the September 2014 referendum, people do not exclusively vote 
based on the territorial question (Johns, Mitchell, and Carman 2013: 162-3). Besides, 
the fact that the SNP strategy to achieve independence included the call for a 
referendum gives certain security to Scottish voters who were unsure about 
independence to vote for the Nationalists on other grounds and then being able to reject 
independence in the referendum if it came to that (Bradbury 2006: 240-1). 
The wide support for devolution indeed suggested that Scots would not vote for 
independence if other options were available (Keating 2009: 179), although the 
increasing support for independence in the run-up to the 18 September 2014 
referendum shown by public opinion surveys, with one survey a few days before the 
vote showing that the ‘Yes’ campaign was ahead (BBC News 2014), probably 
accentuated the unionist parties’ fears that the vote could be lost.  The closeness of the 
vote result did scare the unionist parties enough to offer a substantive improvement of 
the powers of the Scottish Parliament, including several measures of fiscal autonomy. 
The 45% of ‘Yes’ votes suggest that several people who ideally support further 
devolution turned to independence, but still those in favour of a Scottish Parliament 
within the UK prevailed. As pointed out above, in the Scottish case the unionist parties 
have reacted to public hints that further change was needed, first after the election of 
the SNP to office in 2007 by extending the powers of the Scottish Parliament and more 
decisively during the 2014 campaign where more devolution was offered in order to 
defeat independence in the referendum.  
Public opinion therefore modulates political parties’ territorial demands. The 
negligible support for independence in Flanders has not stopped the N-VA from 
proposing independence as their ultimate goal, although the party clinches to the 
significant popular support for further powers to defend a progressive strategy to 
achieve independence by promoting confederalism first, an ambition shared, albeit 
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more reluctantly, by other Flemish parties. The evidence suggests that the effect of the 
voters’ constitutional preferences is greater in the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. In 
Catalonia the burst of support for independence since 2010 has contributed to the 
Catalan SNRPs’ emboldened territorial proposals, including a referendum on 
independence or even a unilateral declaration of independence –defended by ERC. 
Conversely, the SWPs seem rather reluctant to be moved by the change on 
constitutional preferences, although the PSC led to convince the PSOE to put forward 
a constitutional reform to better accommodate Catalan distinctiveness, even if defined 
in a rather ambiguous fashion. In Scotland SWPs, on the other hand, reacted more 
decisively to prevent a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum, while the SNP accepted the defeat 
and was subsequently willing to enter negotiations with the other parties to discuss 
expanded powers for the Scottish Parliament. As a result, public opinion matters to 
political parties, although different effects can be appreciated depending on the varying 
contexts of the three cases analysed. 
 
5. The Dynamics of Territorial Demands in Flanders and 
Scotland 
This comparative chapter has shed some light on the dynamics of territorial demands 
in Flanders and Scotland. The effects of party competition, the role of central 
government’s territorial management strategies, and public opinion on the political 
parties’ positioning on the constitutional question have been scrutinised. Even though 
the analysis of the cases of Flanders and Scotland has been more limited in length and 
depth, some patterns are interesting to note and some valuable comparisons with the 
empirical evidence of Catalonia from the previous chapters can be learned. 
Party competition seems to play a highly relevant role in influencing political parties’ 
proposals and counterproposals on territorial issues both in Flanders and Scotland. The 
presence of strong nationalist secessionist parties –the N-VA and the SNP– combined 
with the government-opposition dynamic has led the traditional parties in Flanders and 
the unionist parties in Scotland to substantially increase their territorial ambitions: the 
Flemish parties, namely the Christian-Democrats and the Liberals, espoused 
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confederalism as their constitutional horizon for Belgium and agreed on a hard-fought 
constitutional reform with the Francophone parties to deliver more autonomous 
powers to the Flemish institutions after the shocking electoral victory of the N-VA in 
2010. Similarly, the unionist parties in Scotland have tried to counter the electoral 
success of the SNP and the heated campaign to win the 2014 independence referendum 
with several proposals for further devolution. These progressive raise in territorial 
demands clearly echo the SNRP-SWP competition seen in Catalonia between the CiU 
and ERC, on the one hand, and the PSC on the other. Yet, it is clear that after the 
definite push of the Catalan SNRPs for independence the PSC has moderated their 
demands and ended up standing for its traditional proposal to reform the Spanish 
constitution in a federalising fashion.  
Further similar patterns include the competition between nationalist parties in Flanders 
and Catalonia, which is non-existent in Scotland due to the hegemonic position of the 
SNP on this camp. However, the particular position of the traditional parties in 
Flanders after the split in the party system between Flemish and Francophone factions 
allows these parties to be treated both as sort of SWPs and SNRPs. Following from 
this assumption, we have seen how the competition between the N-VA and the CD&V 
has triggered more demands in Flanders in a similar fashion to the competition 
between ERC and CiU does in Catalonia. Moreover, this competition can be 
exemplified both through direct electoral competition and government-opposition 
dynamics between both parties or, also interestingly, with the two parties cooperating. 
This has been the case of the ‘Flemish cartel’ between the N-VA and the CD&V and 
the cooperation –and eventual electoral alliance prior to the September 2015 Catalan 
election– between Convergència and Esquerra. Such cooperation implies that parties 
have to compromise on common constitutional positions which resulted in a 
strengthening of their territorial demands. 
Party competition does seem to play an important role in determining political parties’ 
territorial ambitions, whereas the comparative element analysed in this chapter 
suggests that the role of the central government in exacerbating demands may be more 
debatable, possibly far more relevant in the Catalan case than it is in Scotland or 
Flanders. In Scotland the UK government has been traditionally more willing to accept 
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the plurinationality of the state and the home nations of the UK are not questioned, 
whereas this is clearly not the case in Spain. Furthermore, the unwillingness of the 
Spanish central government to renegotiate a new constitutional settlement to 
accommodate the Catalan nationalists’ aspirations is opposite to the attitude of the UK 
government, which (reluctantly) accepted the celebration of the September 2014 
referendum on Scotland’s independence and is willing in principle to devolve more 
powers to the Scottish self-governing institutions following the rejection of 
independence by the Scottish people.  
Similarly, the specificity of Belgium as a bipolar federation seems to suggest that the 
actions of the central government do not necessarily fuel further territorial demands in 
Flanders. Certainly, the government formation deadlocks and the antagonistic 
positions of Flemish and Francophone parties do incite territorial tensions which the 
Flemish parties, and particularly the N-VA, are willing to exploit. However, the 
aforementioned specific bipolar character of the Belgian federation, alongside the fact 
that the Flemish are a majority in the country –unlike the Catalans in Spain– make it 
questionable that this variable has the same effect in the cases of Flanders and Scotland 
than it does in Catalonia. As a result, we may suggest that the effect of party 
competition is reinforced as the main explanatory variable in this research. 
Finally, we have considered the effect that public opinion has on influencing the 
parties’ territorial positions in Flanders and Scotland. We have claimed that political 
parties take into account people’s views, and parties in all three cases seem to be 
responsive to the population’s views on the constitutional question, even when we 
perceive significant variation on the constitutional preferences across cases. A very 
low support for independence in Flanders has led the N-VA to campaign for 
independence in the long term and emphasise more autonomous powers and 
confederalism in the mid-term. Conversely, a consistent support for independence in 
Scotland led the SNP to carry on with its intended plan to hold a referendum on 
independence. Had independence support been as low as in Flanders, it would have 
made sense to ask whether the SNP would have gone through with the 2014 vote. 
Furthermore, a majority support for further devolution shown in the polls correlated to 
the unionist parties’ proposals for further powers to be devolved to Scotland in the run 
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up to the independence referendum. The Catalan evidence has also shown that CiU 
progressively put forward more ambitious demands coinciding with the increasing 
support for Catalan independence amongst the population after 2010. 
Public opinion seems to influence political parties’ positions on the territorial cleavage, 
yet not all parties respond to the same way. While some parties are willing to adapt to 
changes in public opinion or to a certain composition of the constitutional preferences, 
like CiU or the N-VA, others seem rather unmoved and give pre-eminence to their 
ideological stance: this would be the case of the PP in Catalonia or the SNP in Scotland, 
which still supports independence as the party’s main constitutional aim even after the 
defeat suffered in the independence referendum. 
The comparison of Catalonia with Flanders and Scotland has provided for a cross-
testing of our three explanatory variables. The limitations in the scope of the analysis 
and the comparatively little amount of data collected for the Flemish and Scottish cases 
does not allow us to generalise our results to these two cases. However, the role of 
party competition seems evident as an important explanatory variable of the ongoing 
territorial demands posed by political parties in these two contexts enhances the 
validity of our assumption that party competition is also highly relevant to explain the 







Chapter 8. Conclusion: The Dynamics of 




Stateless nationalist mobilisation in Western European multinational countries 
challenged the unitary state structure with demands that ranged from cultural 
recognition and economic concessions to claims for political independence (Coakley 
1992; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Central government responses to such territorial 
demands also ranged accordingly, with states trying to manage peripheral discontent 
without engaging in radical constitutional change, although the persistence and relative 
strength of demands led to the decentralisation of state structures and the adoption of 
sub-state self-governing institutions, which exercised some policy powers transferred 
by the centre so stateless nations could manage (some) of their own affairs 
autonomously from the central government (Rudolph and Thompson 1989). 
The main proponents of such demands for political decentralisation were Stateless 
Nationalist and Regionalist Parties, which campaigned for sub-state self-government 
in order to preserve the distinctiveness of their stateless nations and to better manage 
their own affairs (De Winter 1998a). The success of SNRPs on the decentralisation of 
state structures also offered the opportunity to these parties to be able to achieve office 
at the newly created sub-state level of government, which provided for both policy 
influence and the capacity to voice further territorial concerns to the central 
government with the legitimacy that elected office entails. Hence, the dual nature of 
political decentralisation is that while cutting down the prospect of secession by 
sharing power territorially, central governments also aid stateless nationalists, 
especially SNRPs, with a formidable platform to put forward further territorial claims. 
This ‘paradox’ (Erk and Anderson 2009) is the starting point of this research. 
The analysis of the cases of Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland has clearly emphasised 
that territorial demands have not stopped after these three stateless nations were 
granted sub-state institutions with significant competences on different policy areas. 
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Rather, demands have exacerbated since the turn of the century. The focus of this 
research has been on the ongoing demands put forward by political parties. Such 
demands have different nature and scope, with different parties in different contexts 
putting forward cultural, symbolic, economic, or governmental demands. First, 
cultural demands are still present regarding stateless nations’ languages. The 
Catalanist parties have long demanded cultural autonomy to preserve the Catalan 
language, especially in the matter of education; whereas Flemish nationalists insist on 
the rights of Dutch-speakers in mainly Francophone Brussels and the respect of the 
linguistic border around Belgium’s capital. Symbolic demands are also high on the 
agenda, with Catalan SNRPs demanding constitutional national recognition and the 
Flemish parties campaigning together to split the BHV electoral district. Cultural and 
symbolic demands are less –if at all– relevant in Scotland, since language is not an 
issue and Scotland’s nation-ness is widely accepted by everyone. 
Economic demands are also prominent in all three cases, with the Catalans and Flemish 
parties demanding more fiscal autonomy to collect taxes and to legislate on them. 
Fiscal autonomy is also stressed as a mechanism to modulate the solidarity transfers 
that redistribute wealth across the state. Although the nationalists do not want to stop 
such transfers immediately, they demand more transparency and influence on 
determining how solidarity has to be implemented. Solidarity transfers have not been 
an issue in Scotland, but fiscal autonomy has also played an important role in recent 
constitutional debates with parties aiming at the Scottish Parliament to be more 
responsible for what it expends. Finally, governmental demands have also been raised 
by political parties in all three cases with the aim of expanding the policy scope of sub-
state governments. 
However, political parties have been demanding way more than that. Secession is a 
highly debated topic and as of 2015 the three main parties leading the Catalan, Flemish, 
and Scottish executives openly demand secession for the three stateless nations. In 
Catalonia, CiU has progressively increased their territorial demands. In ten years, the 
nationalists have gone from supporting a reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy 
half-heartedly to campaign for a referendum on independence. The N-VA won the 
2010 Belgian federal election and leads the Flemish executive since 2014, and 
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although the party supports independence in the long term, it is also committed to 
further decentralisation. Finally, the SNP has been in power in Edinburgh since 2007 
and successfully put forward the holding of a referendum on independence on 18 
September 2014. Although independence was rejected at the ballot boxes by the 
Scottish people, the constitutional question is still vivid and further devolution of 
powers to the Scottish Parliament is on its way. 
The observation of this set of ongoing demands in Western European multinational 
states has triggered the question of what explains the political dynamics that drive 
political parties in stateless nations to keep pushing for further territorial 
empowerment. This study aims to provide an answer to this puzzle by suggesting that 
party competition in stateless nations drives political parties’ territorial demands. 
Territory and identity are highly contested issues in these contexts, with strong SNRPs, 
either in power or opposition, putting forward territorial claims that must be met by 
SWPs in order to be electorally competitive in sub-state politics (Detterbeck and 
Hepburn 2010; Swenden and Maddens 2009). Thus, it has been argued that 
competition between SNRPs and between SNRPs and SWPs creates a reinforcing 
dynamic which leads to an escalation of demands on aggregate. 
Territorial demands from political parties in stateless nations are met by central state 
political actors. The responses of central institutions and SWPs in government at the 
centre will accordingly have an impact on the evolution of territorial demands. The 
actions of central state institutions, which have been referred as territorial management 
strategies (Keating 1988), will create a dynamic of demand-response-demand that 
political parties in the stateless nation will be able to incorporate as part of their 
territorial discourse in order to justify further territorial claims. Either a central 
government rejection of previous demands or territorial concessions perceived to be 
insufficient by stateless nationalist may set the grounds for reinvigorated territorial 
demands, which are often accompanied by claims of the central government 
mistreatment of the stateless nation’s identity and ambitions. 
Finally, a third factor that contributes to the explanation of political parties’ ongoing 
territorial demands is public opinion. Parties do care about what the population thinks 
in order to be electorally competitive. Thus, it has been hypothesised that public 
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support for further constitutional change may lead political parties to incorporate such 
demand in the party discourse, whereas public indifference to the territorial question 
or a specific position on the constitution, for instance a reluctant public opinion 
towards the idea of independence, may contain political parties’ territorial ambitions. 
Furthermore, this study also aims at combining two main research areas on territorial 
politics that have not often been put together. On the one hand, the rich literature on 
SNRPs and SWPs operating in multi-level context is often silent on the effects that 
party competition may have on constitutional change. On the other hand, the literature 
on federalism and multinational accommodation of minority nationalism does not pay 
attention to political party competition and heavily relies on the analysis of political 
institutions.  
Therefore, this research intends to shed some light on the relationship between political 
parties and constitutional change by providing an explanation of the dynamics that 
lead political parties to continuously question the territorial status quo. This is a timely 
research given the saliency of this topic not only in the cases concerned, but also as a 
wider European issue, with the highly debated run up to the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum and the uncertainties about the evolution of the Catalan 
situation generating both academic interest and political and social debate across 
Europe. The main focus of the research has been on the dynamics of territorial 
demands since the turn of the century until 2013, when the Catalan Parliament declared 
its intention to hold a referendum on independence. However, given the similarities on 
the escalation of territorial demands in other stateless nations in Western Europe, this 
research has also looked at the cases of Flanders and Scotland to provide a wider 
framework for analysis and case variation. 
This concluding chapter will look in turn at the effects of party competition on the 
dynamics of territorial demands, followed by the effects of territorial management and 
public opinion. The last section wraps up the argument developed in this research, 
critically analyses the shortcomings of this project, and finally points out future lines 
of research and contextualises the most recent events that suggest that territorial 
demands in stateless nations are far from being over. 
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2. Party Competition as the Main Explanatory Factor of 
Territorial Demands 
 
The empirical analysis of Catalonia shows that party competition drove the demand to 
reform the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Party competition is developed in a 
government-opposition dynamic that leads parties in opposition to put pressure on 
governing parties in order to develop constitutional change. SNRPs have been long 
regarded as implementing ‘tribune strategies’ (De Winter 1998b) to force SWPs in 
government to incorporate some elements of constitutional change. In Flanders, the 
case of the VU pressuring for the federalisation of Belgium –and its ultimate success– 
has been discussed in chapter 7. Likewise, the victory of the N-VA in the 2010 Belgian 
election made constitutional change unavoidable after the traditional Flemish parties 
had already incorporated it in their territorial discourses. In Scotland, the breakthrough 
of the SNP led Labour to support devolution.  
However, the analysis of Catalonia shows that SWPs can also play the ‘regionalist 
card,’ as the PSC did when supporting a reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy 
that set CiU on the wrong foot due to its dependency for support in the Catalan 
Parliament on the centralist-minded PP. CiU was nevertheless able to pay the PSC 
back when consistently increased the ambitions of its territorial proposals during the 
drafting of the Statute reform in order to put under stress the Socialists’ coalition with 
the independence-seeking ERC. Thus, CiU not only pressured the PSC but also ERC 
by challenging Esquerra’s secessionist credentials by going hand in hand with the 
federalist-minded PSC. The Catalan Statute reform negotiation clearly shows how 
competition between both SNRPs and SWPs and between SNRPs themselves led to 
an escalation of the scope and ambition of the reform.  
However, competition between parties does not only lead to further territorial demands 
when parties face each other in a government-opposition dynamic. The Flemish cartel 
between the CD&V and the N-VA increased the regionalist profile of the Christian-
Democrats and their commitment to not take part in the federal government if no state 
reform was achieved. The CD&V chose government over the N-VA with the resulting 
breakup of the alliance, but the influence of the nationalists on the Christian-
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Democrats remained. Thus, cooperation between parties can also lead to a 
strengthening of territorial demands. Once parties agree on a common territorial 
objective, it is very difficult to back off. This is also the case in Catalonia between CiU 
and ERC. After the government-opposition dynamics that defined the relationship 
between the two parties during the process of reform of the Statute of Autonomy, the 
two parties decided to cooperate after the 2012 election. The radicalisation of the two 
SNRPs, which demand to hold a referendum on independence, makes it quite difficult 
for CiU especially to desist once they committed to it for fear that the ERC will blame 
them for lowering down their expectations. In Flanders, the N-VA benefited from the 
breakup of the cartel following the 2008 disagreement between the N-VA and the 
CD%V. In Catalonia, the ERC might benefit as well if CiU went to back off, as the 
ERC victory in the 2014 European election suggests. 
SNRPs in power at the sub-state level provide a higher saliency of territorial demands, 
since these are strengthened by the legitimacy given by the electoral support. When 
SNRPs put forward significant demands, SWPs in opposition may also raise some 
territorial demands to counterbalance the appeal of the proposals of the SNRPs in 
power. Nowhere this situation has been more evident than in Scotland after 2007. Once 
the SNP achieved office, the opposition SWPs started discussing an expansion of self-
government powers to challenge the intention of the nationalists to hold a referendum 
on independence. The recommendations of the Calman Commission however did not 
prevent the returning of the SNP to office in 2011, this time with an overall majority 
which made the referendum almost inevitable after the SNP received such a clear 
democratic mandate. Yet again, the opposition SWPs offered further transfers of 
powers in order to cut short the appeal of independence to the Scottish people. 
Following the defeat of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the September 2014 referendum, 
though, further powers for the Scottish Parliament are negotiated and as a result, 
aggregate territorial demands as a product of the government-opposition dynamics of 
the competition between the SNP and the unionist parties have crystallised.  
Although less evident, this pattern of SWPs offering counterproposals is also present 
in Catalonia. While the SNRPs substantially increased their demands after the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute of Autonomy, the PSC also took some  
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–minor– steps. Whereas CiU and ERC demanded full fiscal autonomy first (2010-
2012) and a referendum on independence in the run-up to the 2012 election, the PSC 
also demanded some constitutional change to counterbalance the SNRPs increased 
demands. As we have seen, the party countered CiU’s bid for full fiscal autonomy with 
a –more moderate– reform of fiscal autonomy as long as the perennial demand for 
constitutional change to advance on the federalisation of Spain. Although these 
demands lacked credibility at first due to the Spanish-wide PSOE rejecting them from 
scratch, the radicalisation of the SNRPs’ demands since 2012 have led the PSOE to 
support –in principle– constitutional reform. However, the margin of action of the 
PSOE, in opposition at the central level since 2011, is rather limited. 
To sum up, then, the three cases provide with rich evidence that party competition 
decisively triggers demands for constitutional change. The dynamics of competition 
include on the one hand competition between SWPs and SNRPs, with SNRPs usually 
putting forward more enhanced territorial demands and the SWPs countering them in 
order to cut down the electoral success of the SNRPs, but increasing territorial 
demands on aggregate nevertheless. Yet the exception of the PSC demanding the 
reform of the Statute is worth noticing. Furthermore, the Catalan case shows that 
competition between SNRPs is highly determinant as well, with different SNRPs 
outbidding each other in terms of territorial proposals, especially when one SNRP is 
in government and another is in opposition. Cooperation between SNRPs may also 
lead to enhanced demands, as shown by the Flemish cartel and the agreement between 
CiU and ERC to secure the parliamentary majority in favour of a referendum on 
Catalan independence. On the other hand, the dynamics of government and opposition 
also enhance territorial demands, either because parties in opposition put pressure on 
the governmental parties to demand constitutional change, or because the opposition 
parties offer counterproposals to radical demands put forward by parties in power. 
Hypothesis 1 therefore seems to be mostly validated. The evidence shows that SNRPs 
in government have pushed for territorial reform and that SWPs have reacted to the 
former’s territorial agendas by putting forward proposals of their own as done by the 
PSC in Catalonia, and the traditional parties in Flanders and the unionist parties in 
Scotland. However, it is also worth emphasising the role played by CiU in the 
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opposition between 2003 and 2010. By getting rid of the constraints of being in power 
and the risks for not delivering, CiU was free to put forward a more ambitious 
territorial agenda that put pressure on the PSC and ERC. This shows that strong SNRPs 
in opposition can also be very influential in accelerating aggregated territorial demands 
by the effect that party competition generates on their competitor parties, pressuring 
them to equal the opposition parties’ proposals to remain appealing to the electorate. 
 
3. The Influence of Territorial Management and Public 
Opinion 
 
Territorial management strategies have great influence on the dynamics of territorial 
demands. The Catalan case clearly exemplifies the importance that central government 
actions have in reinforcing or appeasing the centrifugal dynamics of demand-response-
demand. Rejectionist strategies and constant opposition to constitutional change have 
led to a radicalisation of territorial demands in Catalonia. The reform of the Statute of 
Autonomy involved a negotiated process in which the constitutional question seemed 
ready to be settled down for a long while. After the reform was ratified by the Catalans, 
political parties accepted the will of the Catalan voters and even the independence-
minded ERC focused on developing the new self-government law.  
The Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute provided SNRPs with a justification 
to pose as victims of the state. In two years, from 2010 to 2012, demands escalated 
substantially, and as we have seen the continuous rejection to negotiate subsequent 
demands –i.e. more fiscal autonomy– by the Spanish government has led to a 
continuous radicalisation of the demands of CiU and ERC, and territorial tensions have 
been running high since.  
Although set in a rather different context, the bipolar and essentially divisive nature of 
Belgium has produced deadlocks at the federal level between the Flemish and the 
French-speakers and hazardous negotiations on constitutional reform. The successive 
federal governmental crisis of 2007 and 2010-2011 have fuelled the N-VA’s argument 
that further decentralisation would solve the question of federal governmental 
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deadlocking by removing competences subject to be negotiated between the two 
communities. The electoral success of the N-VA in 2010 preceded the sixth 
constitutional reform in Belgium since 1970 although the nationalists rejected it for 
not being ambitious enough. However, they were returned as victors in the 2014 
federal and regional elections.  
The specific nature of territorial management in Belgium is nevertheless different from 
that of Spain, and accordingly the dynamic of demand-response-demand has evolved 
differently. Although secessionist parties are strong in both contexts, the Catalan 
SNRPs are currently pursuing secession after what they perceived to be an 
unwillingness of the Spanish central government to further decentralise the country. 
In Belgium, the secessionist N-VA, is working at the federal level to further 
decentralise Belgium and implement confederalism. The Flemish, however, are a 
majority of the Belgian population and the Flemish parties’ territorial aims are sought 
on a bilateral negotiation with their Francophone counterparts, whereas the Catalans 
are a minority in Spain and perceive they have no such power to determine 
constitutional change.  
The case of Scotland is rather different since the UK has traditionally been willing to 
accommodate Scottish demands for self-government, and the September 2014 
referendum proves that self-determination is a widely acknowledged fact. Once 
independence was rejected by a majority of Scottish voters, the SNP has accepted the 
result and thus has little margin for victimisation against the UK government and have 
since moderated its demands, leaving independence for a later date and focusing on 
negotiating the power transfers promised by the unionist parties during the referendum 
campaign. 
Hypothesis 2 seems to stand clearly for the case of Catalonia, as the continuous 
rejection of Catalan demands by the Spanish government has fuelled Catalan 
nationalist parties’ progressive demands, ranging from the reform of the Statute of 
Autonomy, to a new fiscal agreement to increase the economic and fiscal powers of 
the Catalan government, to a referendum on independence. The impact of central 
government actions is less clear in the case of Scotland and Flanders. In Scotland, the 
UK government has been willing to negotiate the SNP government’s demands, and 
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most notably permitted the September 2014 referendum on independence. In Flanders, 
due to its essentially bipolar nature, it is difficult to identify ‘who’ is the centre. In a 
certain way, the Flemish political parties are part of the ‘centre,’ and even if there is a 
case to affirm that the traditional parties put forward a constitutional reform to counter 
the electoral success of the N-VA after the 2010 Belgian federal election, the party has 
put aside its territorial agenda and has even become a government party at the federal 
level after the 2014 federal election –won again by the N-VA. 
The differences between Catalonia, and Flanders and Scotland are also evident 
regarding the impact of public opinion on territorial demands. Support for 
independence has skyrocketed in Catalonia since 2010, and mass demonstrations for 
self-government and independence have been organised every year since 2012 with no 
symptoms of a substantial decrease in attendance. Conversely, although both Scots 
and Flemish support further decentralisation, support for independence has been rather 
stable in both cases: a consistent tendency of around 30% of Scots while almost 
negligible amongst the Flemish. Constitutional preferences in both cases, albeit 
substantially different in quantitative terms, influence nevertheless political parties’ 
territorial aims. The N-VA in Flanders is perfectly conscious that independence is not 
desired and so the party emphasises its commitment to further decentralisation, which 
has proven to be electorally successful even if the party’s success cannot only be 
explained by its territorial stance. Similarly, the consistent support for independence 
in Scotland certainly was taken into account by the SNP to put forward the demand for 
a referendum. Had independence support been negligible, it is reasonable to think that 
the SNP would not have risked to have independence battered at the polls. Conversely, 
consistent support for independence and the fears late in the referendum campaign that 
independence might have carried the day secured the unionist parties’ pledge to further 
devolution to the Scottish Parliament. 
Hypothesis 3 seems therefore to be validated in the three cases. Parties respond to 
public opinion and CiU has taken into account the increasing support for Catalan 
independence amongst the population when launching its progressive territorial 
agenda including a referendum on the matter. However, establishing causality is 
complicated because, as the former secretary general of CiU claimed, many people 
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started supporting independence because the party had progressively supported 
independence. The comparison with Flanders and Scotland comes very handy here, 
though, since parties in both contexts have reacted to the people’s views on the 
territorial question. In Flanders, with a scarce support for secession, the N-VA has 
accepted that and talk about independence ‘in the long term.’ In Scotland, the 
substantial amount of people that support independence clearly influenced the SNP to 
give it a shot and put forward a referendum on independence that returned 45% of 
voters saying ‘Yes,’ while the consistent support for more powers to be delivered to 
the Scottish parliament was also instrumental in the unionist parties’ decision to offer 
to increase Scottish autonomy in the event of a ‘No’ victory in the September 2014 
independence vote. 
 
4. Explaining Territorial Demands in Western European 
Multinational States 
 
The analysis of party competition seems to confirm our first hypothesis that demands 
posed by the SNRPs while in government lead to counterproposals by SWPs, as the 
Scottish and Catalan cases suggest. However, party competition is also driven by 
government-opposition dynamics as the Catalan case clearly shows between the PSC-
CiU competition and the CiU-ERC competition, while cooperation between parties 
can also impose particular territorial commitments to a common objective which may 
be tricky for a party to abandon as the Flemish and the Catalan cases show for the 
cooperation between the CD&V and N-VA, and CiU and ERC, respectively.  
When negotiations for constitutional change are not successful and the central 
government is blamed by the sub-state political actors, they may generate alternative 
demands being raised and the establishment of a dynamic of demand-response-
demand. If this dynamic evolves into a centrifugal process in which demands are not 
attended by the centre and substantially increased as a result by the stateless nations’ 
political actors, a radicalisation of demands is the most likely outcome. This has been 
the logic in Catalonia since 2010 after the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Statute 
of Autonomy. From 2006 until 2010, the Catalanist parties understood that their 
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demand for a new Statute had been attended, even if partially. The Court’s ruling 
changed that perception entirely and further demands ensued. The successive rejection 
of demands has led a centrifugal dynamic of demand-response-demand to crystallise 
which has eventually led to a radicalisation of the demands of Catalan SNRPs. Thus 
our second hypothesis seems to be confirmed. Furthermore, the continuous willingness 
of the UK SWPs to transfer further powers to the Scottish Parliament, if only to counter 
the SNP decisive commitment for Scotland’s independence, has led to a positive 
response which has halted the appeal for radical demands, as the result of the 
independence referendum suggests.  
Finally, as detailed in the previous section, public opinion does seem to matter to 
political parties, which would also confirm our third hypothesis, especially for the 
Catalan and Scottish cases. The evolution of CiU towards supporting independence 
seems to go in line with the recent backing of independence amongst the Catalan 
electorate, while the unionist parties in Scotland have reacted to the SNP successes by 
offering more devolution, which goes in line with the Scottish population’s top 
constitutional preference. In Flanders, given the meagre support for Flemish 
independence it is debatable whether the hypothesis validates the N-VA continuous 
support for independence, although the party presents independence as a long term aim 
and somehow adapts to the preference of a substantial share of the Flemish public that 
desires more decentralisation. 
Notwithstanding the influence of the state’s territorial management and public opinion, 
it seems that party competition is the factor that carries more weight in driving political 
parties’ territorial demands. Territorial management actions are interpreted by political 
parties and reframed in the parties’ discourse to better suit the parties’ own needs. The 
Catalan case is illustrative in that regard. The Constitutional Court ruling on the Statute 
of Autonomy triggered the outrage of Catalanist political parties, and certainly the 
2010 mass demonstration influenced on building up on such outrage at the perceived 
mistreatment of Catalan self-government by Spain’s central institutions. However, the 
negotiation of the Statute reform in Madrid also involved a watering down of the first 
draft of the reform agreed by the Catalanist political parties. However, that process 
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was accepted by the main actors –CiU and PSC– and the opposition of the ERC was 
rather anecdotic.  
Likewise, public opinion is also influenced by the political parties’ views on 
constitutional change. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the boost on public support 
for independence seen after 2010 in Catalonia is exclusively due to the independent 
effects of the Constitutional Court ruling on the Statute and not affected by the 
vociferous rejection that the Catalanist parties made of that ruling. Party competition, 
the effects of territorial management and the responses to previous territorial demands 
and the mood of public opinion on constitutional issues all have an influence in 
determining political parties’ views on territory and the constitution. The analysis of 
Catalonia has shown though that party politics played a role in determining the origins 
and motivations to reform the Statute of Autonomy. Similarly, the limited analysis 
carried out in Chapter 7 seems to point out that party competition matters in explaining 
demands for constitutional change directed at enhancing the self-government of 
Flanders and Scotland. The results of this modest comparative analysis further 
highlight the importance that party competition has as a crucial explanatory variable 
to explain the ongoing progressive dynamic of territorial demands in Catalonia. 
This research design has focused on party competition, central government strategies, 
and public opinion as the explanatory variables of the dynamics of territorial demands 
in stateless nations. However, the analysis of the three cases, and especially of the 
Catalan case, point out that other factors may as well be important. Within the 
limitations of a Ph.D. Thesis, and aiming at a parsimonious research design, these three 
variables have been considered. Two other factors also come up from the analysis to 
be potentially relevant.  
First is the economy. The recent wave of enhanced territorial demands in the three 
stateless nations under study have occurred coincidently with a severe economic and 
financial crisis. Thus, it could be argued that economic hardship makes resources 
scarcer and accordingly SNRPs and sub-state political actors will demand more 
powers on economic matters –or outright independence– to be better prepared to fight 
economic crises. This has been a part of the analytical discourse regarding Catalan and 
Flemish demands for further fiscal autonomy, accompanied by the assumption that 
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demands for independence would not occur if the economic situation was better. This 
is an interesting hypothesis which has not been directly included in the analysis, though 
political parties’ economic demands have been included as a substantial element of 
party competition. However, a reasonable question to ask would be why such 
processes of increasing territorial demands have not occurred before during other 
economic crises, such as in the 1990s. Economy is, nevertheless, a factor to be taken 
into account in more detailed analysis of the reasons for stateless nationalists’ 
territorial demands. 
A second factor that has caught the author’s attention is the role of internal party 
dynamics in explaining party positioning on the territorial question. When explaining 
party competition this thesis has focused mainly on the competition between political 
parties. There have been some elements coming from the research interviews and also 
from the parties’ responses to the evolution of the political situation that seem to 
suggest that internal party dynamics also play a highly important role in determining 
the party’s positioning on the territorial question. 
The role of intra-party conflict has not been dealt with in this research, in which the 
political parties have been mostly discussed as homogenic and consistent actors. Yet 
the case of ERC and its two splits has been briefly discussed, as well as the internal 
struggles within the PSC and its relationship with the PSOE. The ongoing attempts by 
the Catalan nationalist parties to hold a referendum have produced internal conflict in 
the PSC and the CiU, most remarkably. These internal conflicts have indeed been 
going on for years and perhaps the late splits suffered by both parties –which lie quite 
beyond the timeframe of this analysis– have nevertheless made the author realise that 
internal party dynamics may play an important role. First, the PSC suffered the 
progressive split of the most Catalan nationalist members of their leadership and rank-
and-file. These internal tensions included several conflicting votes within the party’s 
parliamentary groups in Madrid and Barcelona. Eventually, several of those 
Catalanists who abandoned the party ended up creating a loose coalition which 
supports independence, whereas the resulting PSC leadership has now clearly aligned 
with their Spanish counterparts and has brought back some internal coherence to the 
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party in rejecting the referendum on independence and pushing for constitutional 
reform. 
The case of CiU is even more relevant. In this coalition that has ruled Catalonia for 28 
out of the 35 years since the reestablishment of Catalan self-government, the junior 
UDC party was progressively pulled by CDC to support increased territorial 
objectives. The UDC supported a referendum on independence before the 2012 
Catalan election, even when the UDC leader, Duran i Lleida, kept assuring he was not 
in favour of Catalan secession. After the impossibility to hold a legal referendum due 
to the central government’s opposition, Artur Mas and CDC decided to call for another 
snap election on 27 September 2015 to be considered a de facto plebiscite on 
independence, with the parliament set to declare independence unilaterally if the pro-
independence parties achieved a majority. For UDC this was clearly going too far and 
inevitably the decades-old coalition split in June 2015 following disagreements on the 
constitutional future of Catalonia. 
The recent splits and internal tensions occurred in the main Catalan parties suggest that 
this process of ongoing demands has had an effect on the internal balances in political 
parties. Thus, it makes sense to ask whether such influence could work the other way 
round and whether internal party tensions may also explain the parties’ positioning on 
the territorial question. Although this has not been directly considered in the research 
design, it is another factor that could contribute to better explain the dynamics of 
territorial demands in stateless nations. 
Alongside the limitations on explanatory factors, the generalisability of the results is 
also affected by the unbalanced comparison between Catalonia, and Flanders and 
Scotland. The limited analysis on the Scottish and Flemish cases surely helps us to 
better understand the dynamics of territorial demands in Catalonia, yet the results of 
this research cannot be expanded to the two complementary cases, and neither can the 
explanations provided on the role of party competition as a driver of territorial 
demands be applied to other well-known cases of stateless nations, such as Quebec, 
Wales, the Basque Country, or Galicia.  
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However, this study has shed some light on the dynamics of territorial demands in 
Catalonia. Furthermore, the experience of Catalonia in the last decade can teach us 
some lessons about the nature of federalism and decentralisation. Although this 
research does not aim to answer the ‘paradox of federalism’, that is, whether 
federalism exacerbates or constrains secession, we have pointed out that not only 
institutions matter, political actors do as well. The Catalan case shows that federalism 
has provided a very good platform for secessionist parties to seriously threaten the 
territorial integrity of Spain, but, as yet, secession has not occurred. Nor did it happen 
in Scotland following the secessionists’ defeat in the 2014 referendum. It remains to 
be seen if the total opposition to renegotiate a new constitutional settlement by the PP 
central government will push a clear majority of Catalans towards supporting 
independence in the future. The recent 27 September 2015 Catalan election returned a 
majority of pro-independence seats in Parliament, yet an overall pro-independence 
vote short of 50%. New general elections in Spain in December 2015 may deliver a 
government change and perhaps a territorial policy change towards Catalan demands. 
And even if this were not the case, the obstacles and costs to achieve unilateral 
independence may prove too great to seduce a majority of the Catalan population. 
This research has aimed to show the importance of party competition in stateless 
nations’ to explain the dynamics of ongoing territorial demands in multinational states. 
Such demands are far from over. The defeat of independence in the Scottish 
referendum has opened the way to enhanced devolution and the SNP will be vigilant 
that the SWPs’ promises on further self-government are kept. The electoral success of 
the N-VA and its long-term commitment to independence will lead other political 
parties to continue pushing for further decentralisation in Belgium in order to match 
the popular nationalists’ views on the territorial question. Finally, territorial tension 
has been higher than ever in Catalonia with the demand to hold an independence 
referendum akin to the one held in Scotland on 18 September 2014 continuously 
rejected by Spain’s central government of the PP. Facing pressure from ERC and the 
secessionist civil society, Artur Mas called for a non-binding public consultation on 
independence held on 9 November 2014 with 1.8 million Catalans taking part on it 
and around 80% voting for independence. It was a bold move by the Catalan PM which 
has led him to be brought to court for violating an explicit prohibition by the 
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Constitutional Court to hold the consultation. However, the pressure of ERC, which 
would have quickly discredited Mas for cowing out forced him to play on the offense. 
At the time of writing, a pro-independence majority exists in the Catalan Parliament 
following the September 2015 election, which assures that territorial conflict will still 
be highly salient for the time being in Catalonia. 
Competition between CiU and ERC has escalated Catalan demands since the 
negotiation of the reform of the Statute of Autonomy. The competition to decide which 
party will spearhead the next phase of demands will go on. Party competition between 
both parties will surely help to understand the future constitutional path of Catalonia. 
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